When threatened by a fellow inmate in the New Jersey State
Prison, petitioner sent a note reporting the incident to respondent
Assistant Superintendent of the prison, who read the note and sent
it to respondent Corrections Sergeant, who, while informed of its
contents, did not read it or notify other officers of the threat,
and forgot about it by the time he went off duty. Two days later,
the inmate attacked petitioner and inflicted serious injuries.
Petitioner then brought a damages action against respondents in
Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they
had violated his rights under,
inter alia, the Fourteenth
Amendment by negligently failing to protect him from the other
inmate. After a bench trial, the District Court awarded damages,
holding that petitioner was deprived of his liberty interest in
personal security as a result of respondents' negligence and that
such deprivation was without due process because of a New Jersey
statute that protects prison officials from liability for injuries
caused by one prisoner to another. The Court of Appeals
reversed.
Held: The protections of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, whether procedural or substantive, are not
triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.
Daniels v.
Williams, ante p.
474 U. S. 327.
Respondents' lack of due care, while leading to serious injuries,
simply does not approach the sort of abusive government conduct
that the Due Process Clause was designed to prevent. Pp.
474 U. S.
347-348.
752 F.2d 817, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
ante, p.
474 U. S. 336.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
474 U. S. 349.
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J.,
joined,
post, p.
474 U. S.
349.
Page 474 U. S. 345
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner sued prison official, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 or injuries he suffered when they negligently failed to
protect him from another inmate. On December 19, 1980, petitioner
was threatened by one McMillian, a fellow inmate at the New Jersey
State Prison at Leesburg. Petitioner sent a note reporting the
incident that found its way to respondent Cannon, the Assistant
Superintendent of the prison, who read the note and sent it on to
respondent James, a Corrections Sergeant.
* Cannon
subsequently testified that he did not view the situation as urgent
because, on previous occasions when petitioner had a serious
problem, he had contacted Cannon directly.
James received the note at about 2 p.m. on December 19, and was
informed of its contents. James then attended to other matters,
which he described as emergencies, and left the note on his desk
unread. By the time he left the prison that evening, James had
forgotten about the note, and since
Page 474 U. S. 346
neither he nor Cannon worked on December 20 or 21, the officers
on duty at that time had not been informed of the threat.
Petitioner took no steps other than writing the note to alert the
authorities that he feared an attack, nor did he request protective
custody. He testified that he did not foresee an attack, and that
he wrote the note to exonerate himself in the event that McMillian
started another fight. He also testified that he wanted officials
to reprimand McMillian in order to forestall any future incident.
On Sunday, December 21, McMillian attacked petitioner with a fork,
breaking his nose and inflicting other wounds to his face, neck,
head, and body.
Petitioner brought this § 1983 suit in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, claiming that
respondents (and two others) had violated his constitutional rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a bench trial,
the District Court held that petitioner had not established an
Eighth Amendment violation
"because [respondents] did not act with deliberate or callous
indifference to [petitioner's] needs and because the incident
complained of was a single attack."
App. 89. The court also found, however, that respondents
"negligently failed to take reasonable steps to protect
[petitioner], and that he was injured as a result."
Ibid.
Petitioner was thereby deprived,
see Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U. S. 527,
451 U. S.
536-537 (1981), of his liberty interest in personal
security,
see Igraham v. Wright, 430 U.
S. 651,
430 U. S. 673
(1977); and because New Jersey law provides that "[n]either a
public entity nor a public employee is liable for . . . any injury
caused by . . . a prisoner to any other prisoner," N.J.Stat.Ann. §
59:5-2(b)(4) (1982), the court concluded that the deprivation was
without due process. Petitioner was awarded compensatory damages of
$2,000.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, hearing the case en
banc, reversed. 752 F.2d 817 (1984). While accepting the District
Court's conclusion that respondents had been negligent, and
agreeing that the attack on petitioner implicated
Page 474 U. S. 347
a recognized liberty interest, the majority held that
respondents' negligence did not work a "deprivation" of that
interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. The court
conceded that language in
Parratt supported the District
Court's position that merely negligent conduct causing injury could
constitute a Fourteenth Amendment "deprivation," but concluded that
"
Parratt does not so hold." 752 F.2d at 826. Accordingly,
the court ruled that petitioner had failed to make out a violation
of his procedural or substantive due process rights, stating that §
1983 provides no remedy "for the type of negligence found in this
case."
Id. at 829.
Two judges who joined the majority opinion also wrote separately
to suggest that even if respondents' negligence had "deprived"
petitioner of liberty, the State's decision not to provide a
remedy, in view of its strong interest in protecting its prison
officials from liability, did not violate due process. Three judges
dissented, essentially embracing the position of the District
Court.
We granted certiorari, 471 U.S. 1134 (1985), and set this case
for oral argument with
Daniels v. Williams, ante p.
474 U. S. 327.
Finding the principles enunciated in
Daniels controlling
here, we affirm.
In
Daniels, we held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated by the lack of due care of
an official causing unintended injury to life, liberty, or
property. In other words, where a government official is merely
negligent in causing the injury, no procedure for compensation is
constitutionally required. In this case, petitioner does not
challenge the District Court's finding that respondents "
did
not act with deliberate or callous indifference to [petitioner's]
needs,'" 752 F.2d at 820. Instead, he claims only that respondents
"negligently failed to protect him from another inmate." Brief for
Petitioner 2. Daniels therefore controls.
Respondents' lack of due care in this case led to serious
injury, but that lack of care simply does not approach the sort
Page 474 U. S. 348
of abusive government conduct that the Due Process Clause was
designed to prevent.
Daniels, ante at
474 U. S.
331-333. Far from abusing governmental power, or
employing it as an instrument of oppression, respondent Cannon
mistakenly believed that the situation was not particularly
serious, and respondent James simply forgot about the note. The
guarantee of due process has never been understood to mean that the
State must guarantee due care on the part of its officials.
In an effort to limit the potentially broad sweep of his claim,
petitioner emphasizes that he
"does not ask this Court to read the Constitution as an absolute
guarantor of his liberty from assault by a fellow prisoner, even if
that assault is caused by the negligence of his jailers."
Brief for Petitioner 17. Describing his claim as one of
"procedural due process, pure and simple,"
id. at 14, all
he asks is that New Jersey provide him a remedy. But the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require a remedy when there has been no
"deprivation" of a protected interest. Petitioner's claim, based on
respondents' negligence, is quite different from one involving
injuries caused by an unjustified attack by prison guards
themselves,
see Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (CA2),
(Friendly, J.),
cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414
U.S. 1033 (1973), or by another prisoner where officials simply
stood by and permitted the attack to proceed,
see Curtis v.
Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (CA3 1973),
cert. denied sub nom.
Smith v. Curtis, 416 U. S. 995
(1974). As we held in
Daniels, the protections of the Due
Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not
triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Page 474 U. S. 349
[For opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS concurring in the judgment,
see ante p.
474 U. S.
336].
* The note, addressed to a civilian hearing officer, said:
"When I went back to the unit after seeing you McMillian was on
the steps outside the unit. When I was going past him he told
me
I
'll fuck you up you old mother-fucking fag.' Go up to your cell, I
be right there."
"I ignored this and went to another person's cell and thought
about it. Then I figured I should tell you so
if' anything
develops you would be aware."
"I'm quite content to let this matter drop but evidently
McMillian isn't."
"Thank you, R. Davidson."
752 F.2d 817, 819 (CA3 1984).
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I agree with the Court that merely negligent conduct by a state
official, even though causing personal injury, does not constitute
a deprivation of liberty under the Due Process Clause. I do
believe, however, that official conduct which causes personal
injury due to recklessness or deliberate indifference, does deprive
the victim of liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
As JUSTICE BLACKMUN persuasively demonstrates in his dissent,
the record in this case strongly suggests that the prison
officials' failure to protect petitioner from attack was reckless,
and not merely negligent. Accordingly, like JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I
would vacate the judgment and remand this case so that the Court of
Appeals may review the District Court's holding that respondents'
conduct was not reckless.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.
When the State of New Jersey put Robert Davidson in its prison,
it stripped him of all means of self-protection. It forbade his
access to a weapon. N.J. Dept. of Corrections Standards 251.4.a.201
and .202. It forbade his fighting back. Standards 251.4.a.002,
.003, and .004. It blocked all avenues of escape. The State forced
Davidson to rely solely on its own agents for protection. When
threatened with violence by a fellow inmate, Davidson turned to the
prison officials for protection, but they ignored his plea for
help. As a result, Davidson was assaulted by another inmate. He
suffered stab wounds on his face and body as well as a broken nose
that required surgery.
The Court nevertheless excuses the prison officials from
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, holding that, because the
officials were "merely negligent in causing the injury" there was
no "deprivation" of liberty without due process of law.
Page 474 U. S. 350
Ante at
474 U. S. 347.
It relies for this proposition and result on the easier companion
case,
Daniels v. Williams, ante p.
474 U. S. 327,
which overrules in part
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.
S. 527 (1981). In
Daniels, also a § 1983 suit,
the Court holds that a pretrial detainee, allegedly injured when he
slipped on a pillow negligently left on the jail stairs by a
deputy, as a matter of law suffered no deprivation under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
While I concur in the judgment in
Daniels, I do not
join the Court in extending that result to this case. It is one
thing to hold that a commonplace slip and fall, or the loss of a
$23.50 hobby kit,
see Parratt v. Taylor, supra, does not
rise to the dignified level of a constitutional violation. It is a
somewhat different thing to say that negligence that permits
anticipated inmate violence resulting in injury, or perhaps leads
to the execution of the wrong prisoner, does not implicate the
Constitution's guarantee of due process. When the State
incarcerated
Daniels, it left intact his own faculties for
avoiding a slip and a fall. But the State prevented Davidson from
defending himself, and therefore assumed some responsibility to
protect him from the dangers to which he was exposed. In these
circumstances, I feel that Davidson was deprived of liberty by the
negligence of the prison officials. Moreover, the acts of the state
officials in this case may well have risen to the level of
recklessness. I therefore dissent.
I
Davidson broke up a fight between two other inmates. Two days
later, on Friday, December 19, 1980, the three were brought before
a prison disciplinary officer. Only one of the three, Gibbs, was
found guilty of fighting. When Davidson and the other inmate,
McMillian, returned to their unit, McMillian threatened Davidson.
Davidson decided to report the threat, in part to exonerate himself
in advance but primarily to get the prison officials to take
precautions. App. 85 (District Court's findings of fact).
See
also id. at
Page 474 U. S. 351
75. Accordingly, Davidson reported the threat to Officer Garcia.
Because McMillian had a history of prison assaults and fighting,
id. at 33-34, 62, Garcia recognized the seriousness of
McMillian's threats. Garcia had Davidson relate the incident in
writing. He then took Davidson's note and told Davidson to return
to his unit.
Garcia delivered the note to respondent Cannon, Assistant
Superintendent of the prison, and described its contents. Cannon
did not think the threat serious, because Davidson had not
personally come to him to report it and because of the nature of
the earlier fight.
Id. at 44, 46. Cannon nonetheless asked
to speak to Davidson, but changed his mind when he learned that
Davidson had already returned to his unit.
Id. at 42.
Rather than take one of the usual preventive measures, such as
separating the two inmates, placing Davidson in protective custody,
or attempting to ascertain the gravity of the threat by talking to
the two,
id. at 44, Cannon simply told Garcia to pass the
note along to respondent James, a Corrections Sergeant in the
Internal Affairs Unit.
Id. at 43.
Garcia followed Cannon's order, giving the note to James at
approximately 2:15 p.m., and informing James that it concerned a
threat to Davidson by McMillian.
Id. at 38-39. Because
James was not ordered to act immediately, he decided there was no
urgency. James also decided not to follow the normal procedure of
interviewing the complainant.
Id. at 50. James had two
other tasks that he considered to be of higher priority,
id. at 61 -- paperwork and a report of a knife in a cell.
James described the latter as an emergency situation; he conceded,
however, that that cell had been double locked, so that it was
secure.
Id. at 51. James' regular shift ended at 4 p.m.,
but he worked a second shift that night as Assistant Center Keeper
until 10:30 p.m. The Center Keeper ordinarily investigates threats
to inmates, but again James took no action on the threat to
Davidson.
Id. at 54-55. The second shift was "normal and
routine."
Id. at
Page 474 U. S. 352
59. James made at least two conscious decisions not to act on
the note; by the time he left the prison, he had forgotten about
it.
Ibid. Had he remembered, he would have notified the
weekend shift.
Id. at 59-60. A reported threat would not
normally be ignored over the weekend.
Id. at 50.
Meanwhile, the prison authorities had been alerted to the
potential violence through another channel. On Wednesday, December
17, Officer Gibson wrote a "Special Report" stating that an inmate
source had told him the fight involving Davidson and McMillian was
"not over yet." Gibson recommended keeping Davidson and Gibbs in
the detention area for their own protection.
Id. at 80.
This recommendation was apparently ignored, as both Davidson and
McMillian remained in their regular unit.
Neither Cannon nor James worked during the weekend.
Id.
at 48. On Sunday, December 21, McMillian attacked Davidson,
id. at 28, inflicting the injuries that gave rise to this
suit.
II
The Court appears to recognize that the injuries to Davidson (as
well as that to Daniels in the companion case,
ante P.
474 U. S. 327)
implicates the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It
is well established that this liberty includes freedom from
unjustified intrusions on personal security.
Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651,
430 U. S.
673-674 (1977). In particular, it includes a prisoner's
right to safe conditions and to security from attack by other
inmates.
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.
S. 307,
457 U. S.
315-316 (1982). [
Footnote 1] Before a State can
Page 474 U. S. 353
deprive a prisoner of the liberty he retains after imprisonment,
it must afford him constitutionally adequate procedures.
Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480,
445 U. S.
493-494 (1980).
Although Daniels' and Davidson's liberty interests were
infringed, the Court holds that they were not "deprived" of liberty
in the constitutional sense. In the past, we have held that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires a
"familiar
two-stage analysis: we must first ask whether
the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'life, liberty or
property.'"
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at
430 U. S. 672
(emphasis added). If so, "we then must decide what procedures
constitute
due process of law.'" Ibid. But I agree
with the Court that a deprivation of liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment generally requires more than a mere infringement of a
liberty interest. I also agree that the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause should guide our determination of
what actions constitute a deprivation of liberty under the Clause.
A deprivation must contain some element of abuse of governmental
power, for the "touchstone of due process is protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government." Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539,
418 U. S. 558
(1974). Finally, I agree that mere negligent activity ordinarily
will not amount to an abuse of state power. Where the Court today
errs, in my view, is in elevating this sensible rule of thumb to
the status of inflexible constitutional dogma. The Court declares
that negligent activity can never implicate the concerns
of the Due Process Clause. I see no justification for this rigid
view. In some cases, by any reasonable standard, governmental
negligence is an abuse of power. [Footnote 2] This is one of those cases.
Page 474 U. S. 354
It seems to me that, when a State assumes sole responsibility
for one's physical security and then ignores his call for help, the
State cannot claim that it did not know a subsequent injury was
likely to occur. Under such circumstances, the State should not
automatically be excused from responsibility. In the context of
prisons, this means that, once the State has taken away an inmate's
means of protecting himself from attack by other inmates, a prison
official's negligence in providing protection can amount to a
deprivation of the inmate's liberty, at least absent extenuating
circumstances. [
Footnote 3]
Such conduct by state officials seems to me to be the "arbitrary
action" against which the Due Process Clause protects. The
Page 474 U. S. 355
officials' actions in such cases thus are not remote from the
purpose of the Due Process Clause and § 1983. [
Footnote 4]
Moreover, this case does not raise the concern noted in
Daniels, ante at
474 U. S. 332,
that "[t]he only tie between the facts . . . and anything
governmental in nature" is the identity of the parties. In
Daniels, the negligence was only coincidentally connected
to an inmate-guard relationship; the same incident could have
occurred on any staircase. Daniels in jail was as able as he would
have been anywhere else to protect himself against a pillow on the
stairs. The State did not prohibit him from looking where he was
going or from taking care to avoid the pillow. [
Footnote 5]
In contrast, where the State renders a person vulnerable and
strips him of his ability to defend himself, an injury that results
from a state official's negligence in performing his duty is
peculiarly related to the governmental function. Negligence in such
a case implicates the "
[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law.'" Monroe v. Pape,
365 U. S. 167,
365 U. S. 184
(1961), quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.
S. 299, 313 U. S. 326
(1941). The deliberate decision not to protect Davidson from a
known threat
Page 474 U. S. 356
was directly related to the often violent life of prisoners. And
protecting inmates from attack is central to one of the State's
primary missions in running a prison -- the maintenance of internal
security.
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.
S. 517,
468 U. S. 524
(1984).
The Fourteenth Amendment is not "trivialized,"
see Daniels,
ante at
474 U. S. 332,
by recognizing that, in some situations, negligence can lead to a
deprivation of liberty. On the contrary, excusing the State's
failure to provide reasonable protection to inmates against prison
violence demeans both the Fourteenth Amendment and individual
dignity. [
Footnote 6]
III
Even were I to accept the Court's rigid view of what constitutes
a deprivation, I would not vote to affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. Although the District Court ruled that the prison
officials' conduct here was not reckless, there is substantial
reason to doubt that conclusion. Since the Court of Appeals did not
review the recklessness holding, I would remand the case for that
review.
The Court has previously indicated that prison officials act
recklessly when they disregard the potential for violence between a
known violent inmate and a known likely victim. In
Smith v.
Wade, 461 U. S. 30
(1983), the Court recognized that a prison guard had acted
recklessly in placing a known violent inmate in a cell shared by
the previously victimized plaintiff and another inmate, without
attempting to locate an empty cell nearby. The plaintiff, who had
recently been removed from protective custody, was assaulted by his
cellmates. It is far from clear that the officials in the present
case were any less reckless.
Page 474 U. S. 357
Even if respondents' conduct ordinarily would be considered only
negligent, the forewarning here changes the constitutional
complexion of the case. When officials have actual notice of a
prisoner's need for physical protection, "
administrative
negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or
reckless disregard for that prisoner's safety.'" Layne v.
Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 471 (CA1 1981), quoting West v.
Rowe, 448 F. Supp.
58, 60 (ND Ill.1978). See also Matzker v. Herr, 748
F.2d 1142, 1149 (CA7 1984); Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d
1020, 1024-1025 (CA8), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 841 (1984).
Cf. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137,
443 U. S. 148
(1979) (concurring opinion) (sheriff who failed to adopt procedures
for identifying arrestees was negligent, rather than reckless, when
he had not previously been notified of the legitimate need for or
duty to adopt such procedures).
Respondents
"had the responsibility to care for plaintiff's safety, actual
notice of the threat by an inmate with a known history of violence,
and an opportunity to prevent harm to plaintiff."
App. 89 (District Court's conclusions of law). Both respondents
knew that McMillian had threatened Davidson after the fight, and
that Davidson had reported the threat immediately. Although Cannon
knew that McMillian was a troublemaker,
id. at 41, he
nonetheless chose to think that the situation was not serious.
Id. at 42. Likewise, James decided to attend to other
matters during the entire eight hours he worked after receiving the
note.
Id. at 86-87. Cannon and James intentionally delayed
protecting Davidson's personal security in the face of a real and
known possibility of violence.
See Porm v. White, 762 F.2d
635, 636-638 (CA8 1986).
Cf. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U. S. 97,
429 U. S.
104-105 (1976) (intentional delay in providing necessary
medical care to seriously ill inmate can constitute deliberate
indifference, and thus violate the Eighth Amendment). Cannon did
not check on what James had found; James turned his back on the
violence brewing for the weekend. Yet the risk
Page 474 U. S. 358
that harm would occur was substantial and obvious. Respondents'
behavior very well may have been sufficiently irresponsible to
constitute reckless disregard of Davidson's safety.
Even if negligence is deemed categorically insufficient to cause
a deprivation under the Fourteenth Amendment, recklessness must be
sufficient. Recklessness or deliberate indifference is all that a
prisoner need prove to show that denial of essential medical care
violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at
429 U. S. 104.
The Due Process Clause provides broader protection than does the
Eighth Amendment,
see, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.
S. 520 (1979);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.
S. 651 (1977);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at
418 U. S.
557-558;
Revere v. Massachusetts General
Hospital, 463 U. S. 239,
463 U. S. 244
(1983), so a violation of the Due Process Clause certainly should
not require a more culpable mental state.
IV
The deprivation of Davidson's liberty interest violated the
Fourteenth Amendment if it occurred "without due process of law."
That condition is clearly satisfied. In both
Parratt and
Hudson, the Court held that where a deprivation of
property was caused by a random and unauthorized act of a state
official, it was impracticable for the State to provide process in
advance, and the State could satisfy procedural due process by a
meaningful postdeprivation remedy, such as a tort suit.
Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 541;
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. at
468 U. S.
520-521. Even assuming the same is true for deprivations
of liberty, New Jersey has failed to provide a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy. By statute, the State has ruled: "Neither a
public entity nor a public employee is liable for . . . any injury
caused by . . . a prisoner to any other prisoner." N.J.Stat.Ann. §
59:5-2(b)(4) (West 1982). The State acknowledges that it would have
asserted the immunity statute as a defense to a state court action,
and
Page 474 U. S. 359
that Davidson's complaint would have been dismissed before being
heard on the merits. Brief for Respondents 34.
Conduct that is wrongful under § 1983 surely cannot be immunized
by state law. A State can define defenses, including immunities, to
state law causes of action, as long as the state rule does not
conflict with federal law.
Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.
S. 193,
444 U. S. 198
(1979). But permitting a state immunity defense to control in a §
1983 action
"'would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise;
and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the
proper construction may be enforced.'"
Martinez v. California, 444 U.
S. 277,
444 U. S. 284,
n. 8 (1980), quoting
Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607
(CA7 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974). It is
irrelevant that state immunity, as applied to defeat a state law
tort claim, is constitutional, and may be construed as one aspect
of the State's definition of a tort claim.
See 444 U.S. at
444 U. S.
281-282, and n. 5. Since § 1983 was designed to attack
the misuse of state power, "government officials, as a class, could
not be totally exempt, by virtue of some absolute immunity, from
liability under its terms."
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232,
416 U. S. 243
(1974).
Strong federal interests argue for allowing Davidson to bring
his suit in the face of the New Jersey statute.
See Ferri v.
Ackerman, 444 U.S. at
444 U. S. 198, n. 13. First,
"a deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly
different from and more serious than a violation of a state right,
and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the same act
may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a
constitutional right."
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at
365 U. S. 196
(concurring opinion). Second, the legislative history of § 1983's
predecessor makes clear that Congress intended to alter the
federal-state relationship with respect to the protection of
federal rights. "The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the
federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of
the people's federal rights."
Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U. S. 225,
405 U. S. 242
(1972). In particular, Congress intended
Page 474 U. S. 360
"to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy . . . was
not available in practice."
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at
365 U. S.
174.
Davidson has been denied "
an opportunity . . .
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner' . . . `for
[a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'" Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422,
455 U. S. 437
(1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Lacking a
meaningful postdeprivation remedy in state court, Davidson was
deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
I therefore would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and order that the District Court award of $2,000 be reinstated. If
I agreed with the rigid rule announced in
Daniels -- which
I do not -- I would vacate the judgment and remand the case for
review of the District Court's finding that the respondents'
conduct was not reckless.
[
Footnote 1]
The Court in
Youngberg v. Romeo held that an
infringement of an institutionalized mental patient's liberty
interest in safe conditions would not violate due process if it
resulted from a professionally acceptable judgment concerning the
conditions of confinement. The essence of Davidson's complaint, of
course, is that the judgments made by respondents were not
acceptable.
Youngberg, in any event, is factually
inapposite here, because Davidson -- like Daniels -- does not
challenge the general conditions of his confinement.
[
Footnote 2]
It is important not to confuse negligence with the absence of
deliberate action. Negligent acts are often deliberate. W. Prosser,
D. Dobbs, W. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of
Torts § 31, p. 171 (5th. ed.1984) (Prosser);
see, e.g., The
Germanic, 196 U. S. 589
(1905). Respondents Cannon and James did not act inadvertently.
They deliberately decided that the threat to Davidson was not
serious. Whether conduct is denominated negligent or intentional
can be a function of the likelihood that harm will occur. Where
occurrence of the harm is substantially certain, the law imputes to
the actor an intent to cause it. Restatement (Second) of Torts §
8A, Comment b (1965). Where harm is less certain, we may call the
actor negligent. Prosser,
supra, at 170. In some
circumstances, the risk of injury is so high that the government's
failure to make efforts to avoid the injury is unacceptable, even
if its omission still might be categorized as negligence.
[
Footnote 3]
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97,
429 U. S. 106
(1976), is not to the contrary. In
Estelle, the Court held
that a valid Eighth Amendment claim based on a prison physician's
diagnosis or treatment required an allegation of deliberate
indifference, rather than one of mere negligence. The requirement
that deliberate indifference or wantonness be shown flows directly
from the requirement of cruel and unusual conduct. The type of
conduct about which the drafters of the Eighth Amendment were
primarily concerned included "
torture[s]' and other
`barbar[ous]' methods of punishment" (quotations and citation
omitted). Id. at 102. As is shown in the text
infra, the concerns underlying the Due Process Clause are
broader than those underlying the Eighth Amendment.
A prison is not the only setting in which governmental
negligence may amount to an abuse of power. If police officers
arrest a motorist on the freeway and leave his young children alone
in the car by the side of the road on a cold night, any resulting
injury to the children might well constitute a "deprivation" within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cf. White v.
Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (CA7 1979).
[
Footnote 4]
In adopting the predecessor of § 1983, Congress sought a remedy
"against those who representing a State in some capacity were
unable or unwilling to enforce a state law."
Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U. S. 167,
365 U. S. 176
(1961) (emphasis in original).
[
Footnote 5]
While negligence of prison officials can constitute a due
process violation, general conditions of confinement do not
ordinarily give rise to the increased standard of care discussed
above. Prison conditions are typically part of the State's
legitimate restraint of liberty as a function of punishing
convicted persons.
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.
S. 337 (1981).
"Traditionally, this has meant confinement in a facility which,
no matter how modern or how antiquated, results in restricting the
movement of a detainee in a manner in which he would not be
restricted if he simply were free to walk the streets pending
trial."
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520,
441 U. S. 537
(1979).
See also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.
S. 576 (1984).
[
Footnote 6]
The Court's notion of trivialization is especially difficult to
understand given its recognition that negligent behavior may
violate other constitutional provisions.
See United States v.
Leon, 468 U. S. 897,
468 U. S.
919-923, and n. 23 (1984) (Fourth Amendment).