Respondent was indicted by a federal grand jury on February 18,
1983, for felony illegal entry into the United States and reentry
by a deported alien, he having been previously convicted for
illegal entry "on or about December 17, 1981." Appearing through
counsel on February 18, 1983, respondent was arraigned, and the
trial was set for April 19, 1983. When it was noticed that the date
of the previous conviction was actually December 7, 1981, the grand
jury, on April 15, 1983, returned a superseding indictment
identical to the original except that it corrected the date of the
previous conviction. Respondent then moved for a 30-day continuance
of the trial, contending that 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2) -- which
provides that a trial shall not commence less than 30 days "from
the date on which the defendant first appears through counsel" --
required a new 30-day trial preparation period following the return
of the superseding indictment. The District Court denied the
motion, and respondent was convicted. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that respondent was entitled to the new 30-day
trial preparation period.
Held: The Speedy Trial Act, of which § 3161(c)(2) is a
part, does not require that the 30-day preparation period be
restarted upon the filing of a superseding indictment. Pp.
474 U. S.
234-237.
(a) That this was Congress' intention is evident from the
unambiguous language of § 3161(c)(2) that clearly fixes the
beginning point for the trial preparation period as the first
appearance through counsel, and does not refer to the date of the
indictment, much less the date of any superseding indictment. This
conclusion is further supported by the language of § 3161(c)(1),
which establishes the outside time limit within which a trial must
commence and explicitly refers to the date of indictment as one of
the relevant dates for determining that time limit. Pp.
474 U. S.
234-235.
(b) The requirements of § 3161(c)(2) were met here, where the
time between the date of respondent's first appearance through
counsel and the date of the trial afforded a trial preparation
period
twice as long as the minimum required by §
3161(c)(2). P.
474 U. S.
236.
(c) Respondent was clearly not prejudiced by the return of the
superseding indictment, which did nothing except correct the date
of the previous conviction. Pp.
474 U. S.
236-237.
730 F.2d 771, reversed.
Page 474 U. S. 232
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
in which BRENNAN, J., joined,
post, p.
474 U. S.
237.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits
[
Footnote 1] as to whether (a)
the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161
et seq., as
amended, prohibits commencement of a trial less than 30 days after
arraignment on a superseding indictment; and (b) assuming a
violation of the Speedy Trial Act in this case, was that error
harmless?
I
On December 7, 1981, respondent, who is not a citizen of the
United States, was convicted of illegal entry into this country and
was sentenced to one year's imprisonment. After serving his
sentence, respondent returned to Mexico.
Again, on February 13, 1983, he entered the United States
illegally and was apprehended by United States Border
Page 474 U. S. 233
Patrol agents. On February 18, 1983, a federal grand jury
sitting in the Southern District of California returned a two-count
indictment charging respondent with felony illegal entry under 8
U.S.C. § 1325 and with reentry by a deported alien under 8 U.S.C. §
1326. The indictment stated that the judgment of conviction for the
prior illegal entry, which formed the predicate for the enhancement
of the § 1325 offense to a felony, was "rendered on or about
December 17, 1981." The date of the previous conviction was
actually December 7, 1981. On February 18, 1983, respondent,
appearing through counsel, was arraigned on the indictment. Trial
was set for April 19, 1983.
On March 21, 1983, the Government informed respondent of the
correct date of the previous conviction, and on April 15, 1983, the
grand jury returned a superseding indictment which was identical
with the original indictment in all respects except that it stated
that the date of the previous conviction was "on or about December
7, 1981." [
Footnote 2]
Respondent was arraigned on the superseding indictment on April 18,
1983.
Later that day at a pretrial conference, respondent's counsel
moved for a 30-day continuance of the trial scheduled to begin the
next day, contending that the Speedy Trial Act, as construed by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
United States v.
Arkus, 675 F.2d 245 (1982), required that a new 30-day trial
preparation period be granted following the return of a superseding
indictment. [
Footnote 3] The
District Court denied respondent's motion for a 30-day continuance,
citing the Seventh Circuit's decision in
United States v.
Horton, 676
Page 474 U. S. 234
F.2d 1165 (1982), and distinguishing
Arkus. Respondent
was convicted of felony illegal entry into the United States.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under its decision
in
United States v. Harris, 724 F.2d 1452 (CA9 1984),
which in turn relied on its decision in
Arkus, respondent
was entitled to a new 30-day trial preparation period following his
arraignment on the superseding indictment. Citing its decision in
United States v. Daly, 716 F.2d 1499 (CA9 1983), the Court
of Appeals held that reversal of respondent's conviction was
required to remedy the Speedy Trial Act violation because "any
pretrial preparation period shorter than thirty days is inadequate
per se. No showing of prejudice is required."
We granted certiorari, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985). We reverse.
II
Our starting point, of course, is the language of the statute.
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as amended in 1979, 18 U.S.C. § 3161
et seq., establishes inside and outside time limits for
commencing trial in criminal cases. Section 3161(c)(2), the
provision at issue in this case, provides:
"Unless the defendant consents in writing to the contrary, the
trial shall not commence less than thirty days
from the date on
which the defendant first appears through counsel or expressly
waives counsel and elects to proceed pro se."
(Emphasis added.) The statute clearly fixes the beginning point
for the trial preparation period as the first appearance through
counsel. It does not refer to the date of the indictment, much less
to the date of any superseding indictment. Given this unambiguous
language, we have no choice but to conclude that Congress did not
intend that the 30-day trial preparation period begin to run from
the date of filing of a superseding indictment.
Page 474 U. S. 235
That conclusion finds additional support in the language of §
3161(c)(1). That section establishes the outside time limit within
which trial must commence under the Act, and explicitly refers to
the date of the indictment as one of the relevant dates for
determining that time limit:
"[T]he trial of a defendant charged in an information or
indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within
seventy days
from the filing date (and making public) of the
information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has
appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs."
(Emphasis added.) It is clear that Congress knew how to provide
for the computation of time periods under the Act relative to the
date of an indictment. Had Congress intended that the 30-day trial
preparation period of § 3161(c)(2) commence or recommence on such a
date, it would have so provided.
Because the language of § 3161(c)(2) is a clear expression of
congressional intent, we need not resort to the legislative history
of that section. We note, however, that the legislative history is
wholly consistent with our reading of that section. The 30-day
trial preparation period was not included in the original Speedy
Trial Act as it was enacted in 1975, but was incorporated into the
Act with the 1979 amendments to the Act. Speedy Trial Act
Amendments Act of 1979, Pub.L. 96-43, 93 Stat. 327. The legislative
history of the 1979 revisions suggests that the source of the
30-day trial preparation period was a set of Guidelines issued by
the Judicial Council of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
See Hearings on S. 961 and S. 1028 before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 122,
386-436 (1979). The Guidelines were issued to assist the trial
judges sitting in the Second Circuit in interpreting the provisions
of the Act.
Id. at 386. These Guidelines provided
that,
"whenever the time between arraignment and the scheduled trial
date does not exceed thirty (30) days,
Page 474 U. S. 236
the Court shall . . . view a request for an adjournment of trial
to a date beyond thirty (30) days, but within the sixty (60) day
limit, liberally. . . ."
Id. at 392-393. The Guidelines also stated that, in the
situation where a superseding indictment adds new charges, trial of
the original charges must begin "within the time limit for
commencement of trial on the original indictment or information."
Id. at 417. Taking these two statements from the
Guidelines together, it appears that, although the Second Circuit
was clearly concerned that a defendant be given a pretrial
preparation period of at least 30 days, the filing of a superseding
indictment was not enough, by itself, to require the restarting of
that 30-day period.
Applying § 3161(c)(2) to the facts of this case, we conclude
that the requirements of that section were met here. The record
reflects that respondent's first appearance through counsel
occurred on February 18, 1983. Trial was not commenced until April
19, 1983. Respondent was, therefore, afforded a pretrial
preparation period
twice as long as the minimum required
by § 3161(c)(2).
In concluding as we do that the Act does not require that the
30-day trial preparation period be restarted upon the filing of a
superseding indictment, we do not hold that a defendant must always
be compelled to go to trial less than 30 days after the filing of
such an indictment. The Act itself places broad discretion in the
District Court to grant a continuance when necessary to allow
further preparation. Section 3161(h)(8) authorizes the trial judge
to grant a continuance if "the ends of justice served by taking
such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
defendant in a speedy trial." The authority of the District Court
to grant an "ends of justice" continuance should take care of any
case in which the Government seeks a superseding indictment which
operates to prejudice a defendant.
Here, respondent was clearly not prejudiced by the return of the
superseding indictment. The initial indictment recited that the
judgment on the prior illegal entry had been
Page 474 U. S. 237
rendered "on or about December 17, 1981." The superseding
indictment did nothing except to correct that phrase to read "on or
about December 7, 1981." Even if we were prepared to hold that
December 7 is not "on or about" December 17, we would nevertheless
be compelled to conclude that respondent was not prejudiced by the
change.
Since the Act did not prohibit the commencement of the trial
less than 30 days after arraignment on the superseding indictment,
we need not address the question whether the District Court's
refusal to grant the continuance requested by respondent was
harmless error.
The Court of Appeals' construction of the Act ignored its plain
language, and would frustrate its basic purpose, which is manifest
in its very title: The speedy trial of criminal cases. That
construction was error, and we reverse.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Compare United States v. Guzman, 754 F.2d 482 (CA2
1985),
cert. pending, No. 84-1604;
United States v.
Rush, 738 F.2d 497 (CA1 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1004 (1985);
United States v. Williford, No. 831376 (CA5,
Feb. 27, 1984) (unpublished opinion),
cert. denied,
469 U. S. 893
(1984);
United States v. Horton, 676 F.2d 1165 (CA7 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1201 (1983);
and United States
v. Todisco, 667 F.2d 255 (CA2 1981),
cert. denied,
455 U.S. 906 (1982),
with United States v.
Rojas-Contreras, No. 83-5089 (CA9, Mar. 2, 1984) (case below;
unpublished opinion).
See also United States v. Feldman,
761 F.2d 380 (CA7 1985).
[
Footnote 2]
The record does not disclose why the indictment was not
corrected by a motion for amendment in the District Court.
[
Footnote 3]
Respondent's counsel also argued that he needed the additional
time to consult a fingerprint expert and to review respondent's
immigration file. However, the ultimate fact to which such evidence
related,
i.e., that respondent and the person arrested in
1981 were one and the same, was ultimately stipulated to by
respondent,
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring in
the judgment.
I concur in the result the Court reaches, and therefore in its
judgment. The Court today holds that the Speedy Trial Act does not
mandate a new 30-day defense-preparation period following return of
a superseding indictment. I agree with the Court that that holding
is strongly guided by the express purpose of the Speedy Trial Act.
But because I find neither the language of the Act particularly
clear nor its legislative history at all helpful, I refrain from
joining the opinion's statutory analysis.
The term "superseding indictment" refers to a second indictment
issued in the absence of a dismissal of the first. The Act nowhere
refers to a superseding indictment, and seems to assume that
dismissal of the first indictment will precede issuance of the
second.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(d)(1) and 3161(h)(6).
Section 3161(c)(2), which establishes the 30-day
defense-preparation period "from the date on which the defendant
first appears through counsel" therefore can provide only the
starting point of the inquiry. The question
Page 474 U. S. 238
before the Court is whether that language may be interpreted to
refer to the defendant's appearance on the indictment upon which he
ultimately goes to trial, or whether one must read that language to
refer to the defendant's appearance on the first indictment.
Despite the fact that the legislative history of the Act is of no
assistance, [
Footnote 2/1] we are
guided in our task by the purpose and the structure of the Act.
The Speedy Trial Act
"gave effect to a Federal defendant's right to speedy trial
under the Sixth Amendment and acknowledged the danger to society
represented by accused persons on bail for prolonged periods of
time."
H.R.Rep. No. 96-390, p. 3 (1979). To accomplish these goals, the
Act provides strict time limits for each stage of the criminal
trial process. The Act, as amended, requires that a defendant be
brought to trial within 70 days of his first appearance through
Page 474 U. S. 239
counsel.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). For 30 of those
days, the Government cannot proceed to trial, in order that the
defendant may prepare his case.
Because the criminal process does not always proceed in a linear
fashion, the Act addresses second indictments that occur, unlike in
this case, following dismissal of the first indictment. When an
indictment is dismissed on motion of the defendant, and the
defendant is thereafter reindicted, both the 30-day and 70-day
periods run anew.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1). In contrast,
however, when an indictment is dismissed on motion of the
Government, and the defendant is thereafter reindicted, both the
30-day and 70-day periods continue to run from the first
indictment, with the proviso that the period during which no
indictment is outstanding is excluded from the 70-day calculation.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6). The difference in treatment
protects against governmental circumvention of the speedy-trial
guarantee.
Neither of these reindictment provisions applies here, because
the second indictment was issued in the absence of dismissal of the
first. The provisions demonstrate, however, that the 30-day and
70-day periods were intended to operate in tandem; where one runs
anew, so should the other. In this case, therefore, the structure
of the statute suggests that either both periods should continue to
run upon issuance of a superseding indictment, or both should start
anew. To permit a new 30-day period, but not a new 70-day period,
could lead to a result surely not intended by Congress, namely,
that there is no day on which a defendant could be brought to
trial. To avoid that possibility, respondent argues that the second
30-day period could simply be excluded from the continuing 70-day
period in which a defendant must be brought to trial. But the Act's
comprehensive list of express exclusions counsels one to read
Congress' failure to exclude certain periods of time as a
considered judgment that those periods are to be included in the
speedy-trial
Page 474 U. S. 240
calculation, or as a recognition that the need for such an
exclusion will not arise under the statutory scheme.
In light of Congress' intent to bring defendants quickly to
trial, it would make little sense to restart both the 30-day and
70-day periods whenever there is a superseding indictment.
Frequently, a superseding indictment is used to drop charges or
parties or, as here, to make a minor correction, leaving the
charges and the evidence necessary to defend against them
unaffected. These kinds of changes should not create a need for
further preparation time; indeed, in some instances, superseding
indictments may lessen the defense burden. Where a superseding
indictment of this type is issued, the Court's holding today
permits the defendant to be brought to trial without unnecessary
delay.
Like the Court, I fully recognize that a superseding indictment
may add to a defendant's burden in preparing for trial. In the
event of additional charges, or of material changes, a defendant
well may need additional preparation time. Under the Act, a
defendant then may seek an "ends of justice" continuance, to be
granted in the discretion of the trial court. [
Footnote 2/2]
See 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(8)(A). This continuance is available whether the need for
additional time is occasioned by a superseding indictment or
otherwise. Indeed, the 1979 amendments to the Speedy Trial Act not
only mandated the 30-day defense-preparation period, but also
provided that one basis for granting a continuance is if
"the failure to grant such a continuance . . . would deny
counsel for the defendant . . . the reasonable time necessary for
effective preparation."
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv). The constitutional right to
assistance of counsel is rendered meaningless if a defendant is
forced to trial in the absence of adequate time to prepare. To
avoid prejudicing a defendant, a continuance should be
Page 474 U. S. 241
granted where there is a meaningful possibility that a
superseding indictment will require an alteration or adjustment in
the planned defense. Trial courts should bear in mind that counsel
may require time fully to analyze the impact of the superseding
indictment, and to explore any options it presents or precludes.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The Speedy Trial Act assures that defendants will be brought to
trial quickly, but without undermining the Constitution's guarantee
of effective assistance of counsel. Because the Court's holding
today upholds that essential promise of the Act, I concur in the
judgment.
[
Footnote 2/1]
As the Court observes
ante at
474 U. S. 235,
the notion that the Act might operate to deny defendants the
necessary time adequately to prepare for trial had its genesis in
the Guidelines issued by the Judicial Council of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Guidelines).
See
Hearings on S. 961 and S. 1028 before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 122, 386-436 (1979) (Hearings).
However, in enacting the 1979 amendments, Congress did not adopt
the Second Circuit's Guidelines; in fact, Congress rejected the
Guidelines'
discretionary grant of a defense-preparation
period, opting instead for a
mandatory 30-day period. In
light of this fundamental difference between the Act and the
Guidelines, the latter's details can provide little help for
today's decision. In any event, the Guidelines do not answer the
question before us. Under them, where a superseding indictment
contains charges not included in the original indictment, trial of
the original charges must begin "within the time limit for
commencement of trial on the original indictment or information."
Hearings at 417. This language plainly instructs that,
as to
the original charges contained in a superseding indictment, no
new 30-day and 70-day periods begin to run.
As to any new
charges, however, the Guidelines at least suggest that the
clock for the 70-day time to trial must be restarted.
Ibid. It is not obvious under the Guidelines whether a
modified charge of the sort before us today would be treated the
same as the original charge, and the Guidelines are silent on the
question whether to accord the defendant the opportunity to seek an
additional discretionary preparation period where the 70-day period
ran anew.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Because time granted under an "ends of justice" continuance is
expressly excluded from the 70-day period, any preparation time
granted would not jeopardize the Government's ability to bring the
defendant to trial.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A).
[
Footnote 2/3]
Following enactment of the 1979 amendments, the Committee on the
Administration of the Criminal Law recommended precisely this
analysis. The Committee advised district courts that, in the event
of a superseding indictment, the 30-day preparation period should
not run anew, but
"the trial court should use its scheduling discretion to ensure
that the defense has time to prepare in the circumstances of the
particular case."
See Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee
on the Administration of the Criminal Law, Guidelines to the
Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as Amended, p. 14
(1981).