Petitioner was convicted of homicide in an Ohio court, and
ultimately the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the conviction. She sought
habeas corpus relief in the Federal District Court, which referred
the case to a Magistrate, who issued a report recommending denial
of the writ and containing proposed findings and conclusions of law
and a notice that failure to file objections within 10 days waived
the right to appeal the District Court's order. Petitioner failed
to file objections even though she had received an extension of
time to do so, but the District Judge
sua sponte reviewed
the entire record
de novo and dismissed the petition on
the merits. On appeal, petitioner provided no explanation for her
failure to object to the Magistrate's report. Without reaching the
merits, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that petitioner had
waived the right to appeal by failing to file objections to the
Magistrate's report.
Held: A court of appeals may adopt a rule conditioning
appeal, when taken from a district court judgment that adopts a
magistrate's recommendation, upon the filing of objections with the
district court identifying those issues on which further review is
desired. Such a rule, at least when (as here) it incorporates clear
notice to the litigants and an opportunity to seek an extension of
time for filing objections, is a valid exercise of the court's
supervisory power that does not violate either the Federal
Magistrates Act or the Constitution. Pp.
474 U. S.
145-155.
(a) Here, the Court of Appeals intended to adopt a rule of
procedure in the exercise of its supervisory power. Neither the
intent nor the practical effect of the court's waiver rule is to
restrict the court's own jurisdiction. Pp.
474 U. S.
145-146.
(b) The courts of appeals have supervisory powers that permit,
at the least, the promulgation of procedural rules governing the
management of litigation. The fact that the Sixth Circuit has
deemed petitioner to have forfeited her statutory right to an
appeal is not enough, standing alone, to invalidate the court's
exercise of its supervisory power. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit's
decision to require the filing of objections is supported by sound
considerations of judicial economy. Pp.
474 U. S.
146-148.
(c) Neither the language nor the legislative history of the
Federal Magistrates Act -- which provides that a litigant "may"
file objections to
Page 474 U. S. 141
the magistrate's report within 10 days and thus obtain
de
novo review by the district judge, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) --
supports petitioner's argument that the Act precludes the waiver
rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit. The Act does not require that
the district court review the magistrate's report under some lesser
standard than
de novo review when no objection is filed.
Nor does the obligatory filing of objections under the Act extend
only to findings of fact, and not to the magistrate's conclusions
of law. Moreover, the waiver of appellate review is not
inconsistent with the Act's purposes. Pp.
474 U. S.
148-153.
(d) The waiver of appellate review does not violate Article III
of the Constitution. Although a magistrate is not an Article III
judge, a district court may refer dispositive motions to a
magistrate for a recommendation so long as the entire process takes
place under the district court's control and jurisdiction, and the
judge exercises the ultimate authority to issue an appropriate
order. The waiver of appellate review does not implicate Article
III, because it is the district court, not the court of appeals,
that must exercise supervision over the magistrate, and the waiver
rule does not elevate the magistrate from an adjunct to the
functional equivalent of an Article III judge. Nor does the waiver
rule violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioner's statutory right of appeal was not denied; it was
merely conditioned upon the filing of a piece of paper. Pp.
474 U. S.
153-155.
728 F.2d 813, affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN,
J., joined,
post, p.
474 U. S. 156.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
474 U. S.
157.
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1976, Congress amended § 101 of the Federal Magistrates Act,
28 U.S.C. § 636, to provide that a United States district judge may
refer dispositive pretrial motions, and petitions for writ of
habeas corpus, to a magistrate, who shall conduct appropriate
proceedings and recommend dispositions.
Page 474 U. S. 142
Pub.L. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729. [
Footnote 1] The amendments also provide that any party
that disagrees with the magistrate's recommendations "may serve and
file written objections" to the magistrate's report, and thus
obtain
de novo review by the district judge. [
Footnote 2] The question presented is
whether a court of appeals may exercise its supervisory powers to
establish a rule that the failure to file objections to the
magistrate's report waives the right to appeal the district court's
judgment. We hold that it may.
I
Petitioner was convicted by an Ohio court in 1978 of fatally
shooting her common law husband during an argument.
Page 474 U. S. 143
The evidence at trial showed that the victim was a violent man
who had beaten petitioner on a number of occasions during the
previous three years. Petitioner raised the issue of self-defense
at trial, and sought to call two witnesses who would present expert
testimony concerning the Battered Wife Syndrome. After conducting a
voir dire of these witnesses in chambers, the trial court
refused to admit the testimony, on the grounds that the jury did
not need the assistance of expert testimony to understand the case,
and that the witnesses, who had not personally examined petitioner,
could not testify about her state of mind at the time of the
shooting.
The Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County reversed.
State v.
Thomas, 64 Ohio App.2d 141, 411 N.E.2d 845 (1979). The court's
syllabus [
Footnote 3] concluded
that testimony concerning the Battered Wife Syndrome is admissible
"to afford the jury an understanding of the defendant's state of
mind at the time she committed the homicide." App. 9. The Ohio
Supreme Court, on discretionary review, reversed.
State v.
Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981). The court
held that the testimony was irrelevant to the issue of
self-defense, and that its prejudicial effect would outweigh its
probative value. Having exhausted state remedies, petitioner sought
habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio. The petition raised,
inter
alia, the question whether petitioner was denied a fair trial
by the trial court's refusal to admit testimony concerning the
Battered Wife Syndrome. Petitioner filed a memorandum of law in
support of the petition. The District Judge, acting pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), referred the case, including petitioner's
memorandum of law, to a Magistrate. The Magistrate did not hold a
hearing. On May 11, 1982, the Magistrate issued his report,
containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and
recommending
Page 474 U. S. 144
that the writ be denied. On the issue of the Battered Wife
Syndrome testimony, the Magistrate concluded that the trial court's
failure to admit the proffered testimony had not impaired the
fundamental fairness of the trial, and therefore was not an
adequate ground for habeas corpus relief. The last page of the
Magistrate's report contained the prominent legend:
"ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed
with the Clerk of Courts within ten (10) days of receipt of this
notice. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives
the right to appeal the District Court's order.
See United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981)."
Despite this clear notice, petitioner failed to file objections
at any time. She sought and received an extension of time to file
objections through June 15, 1982, on the grounds that "this case
entails many substantive issues and counsel needs more time to
write his brief." However, petitioner made no further submissions
on the merits to the District Court. Notwithstanding petitioner's
failure to file objections, the District Judge
sua sponte
"review[ed] . . . the entire record
de novo," App. 59, and
dismissed the petition on the merits. Petitioner sought and was
granted leave to appeal.
Petitioner's brief on appeal raised only the issue of the
Battered Wife Syndrome testimony. The brief provided no explanation
for petitioner's failure to object to the Magistrate's report.
Counsel for petitioner waived oral argument, and the case was
decided on the briefs. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. 728 F.2d 813 (1984). Without reaching the merits, it held
that petitioner had waived the right to appeal by failing to file
objections to the Magistrate's report.
Id. at 815. The
court relied upon its prior decision in
United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (1981), which established the
prospective rule that failure to file timely objections with the
district court waives subsequent review in the
Page 474 U. S. 145
court of appeals. We granted the petition for a writ of
certiorari, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985), and we now affirm.
II
In United
States v. Walters, supra, the appellant
failed to object to the Magistrate's report, and the District Court
adopted that report as its disposition of the case. The appellant
then brought an appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
considered the threshold question whether the appellant's failure
to apprise the District Court of its disagreement with the
Magistrate's recommendation waived the right to appeal. The court
held:
"The permissive language of 28 U.S.C. § 636 suggests that a
party's failure to file objections is not a waiver of appellate
review. However, the fundamental congressional policy underlying
the Magistrate's Act -- to improve access to the federal courts and
aid the efficient administration of justice -- is best served by
our holding that a party shall file objections with the district
court or else waive right to appeal. Additionally, through the
exercise of our supervisory power, we hold that a party shall be
informed by the magistrate that objections must be filed within ten
days or further appeal is waived."
"
* * * *"
"However, we give our ruling only prospective effect because
rules of procedure should promote, not defeat the ends of justice .
. . ."
Id. at 949-950 (footnote and citations omitted).
The nature of the rule and its prospective application
demonstrate that the court intended to adopt a "rul[e] of
procedure,"
id. at 950, in the exercise of its supervisory
powers. Later opinions of the Sixth Circuit make it clear that the
court views
Walters in this way.
See Patterson v.
Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 286 (1983) ("In Walters . . . , this
Court promulgated [a] rule of waiver");
United States v.
Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 275 (1983) (Jones, J., concurring)
(characterizing
Walters
Page 474 U. S. 146
as "[r]ulemaking through the exercise of supervisory powers").
Thus, petitioner's first contention -- that the Court of Appeals
has refused to exercise the jurisdiction that Congress granted it
-- is simply inaccurate. The Court of Appeals expressly
acknowledged that it had subject matter jurisdiction over
petitioner's appeal. 728 F.2d at 814. The Sixth Circuit has also
shown that its rule is not jurisdictional by excusing the
procedural default in a recent case.
See Patterson v. Mintzes,
supra, (considering appeal on merits despite
pro se
litigant's late filing of objections). We therefore conclude that
neither the intent nor the practical effect of the Sixth Circuit's
waiver rule is to restrict the court's own jurisdiction. [
Footnote 4]
III
It cannot be doubted that the courts of appeals have supervisory
powers that permit, at the least, the promulgation of procedural
rules governing the management of litigation.
Cf. Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335,
446 U. S. 346,
n. 10 (1980) (approving exercise of supervisory powers to require
district court inquiry concerning joint representation of criminal
defendants). Indeed, this Court has acknowledged the power of the
courts of appeals to mandate
"procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound
judicial practice although
Page 474 U. S. 147
in nowise commanded by statute or by the Constitution."
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141,
414 U. S. 146
(1973);
see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.
S. 514,
407 U. S. 530,
n. 29 (1972). [
Footnote 5] Had
petitioner failed to comply with a scheduling order or pay a filing
fee established by a court of appeals, that court could certainly
dismiss the appeal.
Cf. Link v. Wabash R. Co.,
370 U. S. 626
(1962) (recognizing "inherent power" of court to dismiss case for
want of prosecution). The fact that the Sixth Circuit has deemed
petitioner to have forfeited her statutory right to an appeal is
not enough, standing alone, to invalidate the court's exercise of
its supervisory power. The Sixth Circuit's decision to require the
filing of objections is supported by sound considerations of
judicial economy. The filing of objections to a magistrate's report
enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues --
factual and legal -- that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.
[
Footnote 6] The Sixth
Circuit's rule, by precluding appellate
Page 474 U. S. 148
review of any issue not contained in objections, prevents a
litigant from "sandbagging" the district judge by failing to object
and then appealing. Absent such a rule, any issue before the
magistrate would be a proper subject for appellate review. This
would either force the court of appeals to consider claims that
were never reviewed by the district court, or force the district
court to review every issue in every case, no matter how thorough
the magistrate's analysis and even if both parties were satisfied
with the magistrate's report. Either result would be an inefficient
use of judicial resources. In short,
"[t]he same rationale that prevents a party from raising an
issue before a circuit court of appeals that was not raised before
the district court applies here."
United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (CA4)
(footnote omitted),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208
(1984).
IV
Even a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power,
however, is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or
statutory provisions. A contrary result "would confer on the
judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered
limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing."
United
States v. Payner, 447 U. S. 727,
447 U. S. 737
(1980). Thus we now consider whether the Sixth Circuit's waiver
rule conflicts with statutory law or with the Constitution.
A
Petitioner argues that the Federal Magistrates Act precludes the
waiver rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit. Her argument focuses on
the permissive nature of the statutory language. The statute
provides that a litigant "may" file objections, and nowhere states
that the failure to do so will waive an appeal. Petitioner cites
the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that
"[o]ne would think that, if Congress had wished such a drastic
consequence to follow from the missing of the ten-day time limit,
it would have said so explicitly."
Lorin Corp. v. Goto & Co., 700 F.2d 1202, 1206
(1983). However,
Page 474 U. S. 149
we need not decide whether the Act mandates a waiver of
appellate review absent objections. We hold only that it does not
forbid such a rule.
Section 636(b)(1)(C) provides that
"[a] judge of the [district] court shall make a
de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made."
The statute does not, on its face, require any review at all, by
either the district court or the court of appeals, of any issue
that is not the subject of an objection. Petitioner argues,
however, that the statutory language and purpose implicitly require
the district court to review a magistrate's report even if no party
objects. If petitioner's interpretation of the statute is correct,
then the waiver of appellate review, as formulated by the Sixth and
other Circuits, proceeds from an erroneous assumption -- that the
failure to object may constitute a procedural default waiving
review even at the district court level. [
Footnote 7] Moreover, were the district judge required
to review the magistrate's report in every case, the waiver of
appellate review would not promote judicial economy as discussed in
473 U. S.
supra.
Petitioner first argues that a failure to object waives only
de novo review, and that the district judge must still
review the magistrate's report under some lesser standard. However,
§ 636(b)(1)(C) simply does not provide for such review. This
omission does not seem to be inadvertent, because Congress provided
for a "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard of review of
a magistrate's disposition of certain pretrial matters in §
636(b)(1)(A).
See Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
616 F.2d 603, 605 (CA1 1980). Nor
Page 474 U. S. 150
does petitioner point to anything in the legislative history of
the 1976 amendments mandating review under some lesser standard. We
are therefore not persuaded that the statute positively requires
some lesser review by the district court when no objections are
filed.
Petitioner also argues that, under the Act, the obligatory
filing of objections extends only to findings of fact. She urges
that Congress, in order to vest final authority over questions of
law in an Article III judge, intended that the district judge would
automatically review the magistrate's conclusions of law. We
reject, however, petitioner's distinction between factual and legal
issues. Once again, the plain language of the statute recognizes no
such distinction. [
Footnote 8]
We also fail to find such a requirement in the legislative
history.
It does not appear that Congress intended to require district
court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under
a
de novo or any other standard, when neither party
objects to those findings. The House and Senate Reports
accompanying the 1976 amendments do not expressly consider what
sort of review the district court should perform when no party
objects to the magistrate's report.
See S.Rep. No. 94-625,
pp. 9-10 (1976) (hereafter Senate Report); H.R.Rep. No. 94-1609, p.
11 (1976) (hereafter House Report). There is nothing in those
Reports, however, that demonstrates an intent to require the
district court to give any more consideration to the magistrate's
report than the court considers appropriate. [
Footnote 9] Moreover, the Subcommittee
Page 474 U. S. 151
that drafted and held hearings on the 1976 amendments had before
it the guidelines of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts concerning the efficient use of magistrates. Those
guidelines recommended to the district courts that
"[w]here a magistrate makes a finding
or ruling on
motion or an issue, his determination should become that of the
district court, unless specific objection is filed within a
reasonable time."
See Jurisdiction of United States Magistrates, Hearings
on S. 1283 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 24 (1975) (emphasis added) (hereafter Senate Hearings). The
Committee also heard Judge Metzner of the Southern District of New
York, the chairman of a Judicial Conference Committee on the
administration of the magistrate system, testify that he personally
followed that practice.
See id. at 11 ("If any objections
come in, . . . I review [the record] and decide it. If no
objections come in, I merely sign the magistrate's order").
[
Footnote 10] The
Page 474 U. S. 152
Judicial Conference of the United States, which supported the
de novo standard of review eventually incorporated in §
636(b)(1)(C), opined that in most instances no party would object
to the magistrate's recommendation, and the litigation would
terminate with the judge's adoption of the magistrate's report.
See Senate Hearings, at 35, 37. Congress apparently
assumed, therefore, that any party who was dissatisfied for any
reason with the magistrate's report would file objections, and
those objections would trigger district court review. [
Footnote 11] There is no indication
that Congress, in enacting § 636(b)(1)(C), intended to require a
district judge to review a magistrate's report to which no
objections are filed. It did not preclude treating the failure to
object as a procedural default, waiving the right to further
consideration of any sort. We thus find nothing in the statute or
the legislative history that convinces us that Congress intended to
forbid a rule such as the one adopted by the Sixth Circuit. Nor is
the waiver of appellate review inconsistent with the purposes of
the Act. The Act grew out of Congress' desire to give district
judges "additional assistance" in dealing with a caseload that was
increasing far more rapidly than the number of judgeships.
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U. S. 261,
423 U. S. 268
(1976). [
Footnote 12]
Congress did not intend district judges "to devote a
Page 474 U. S. 153
substantial portion of their available time to various
procedural steps, rather than to the trial itself." House Report at
7. Nor does the legislative history indicate that Congress intended
this task merely to be transferred to the court of appeals. It
seems clear that Congress would not have wanted district judges to
devote time to reviewing magistrate's reports except to the extent
that such review is requested by the parties or otherwise
necessitated by Article III of the Constitution. We now turn to the
latter question.
B
Petitioner contends that the waiver of appellate review violates
Article III and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Article III vests the judicial power of the United States in judges
who have life tenure and protection from decreases in salary.
[
Footnote 13] Although a
magistrate is not an Article III judge, this Court has held that a
district court may refer dispositive motions to a magistrate for a
recommendation so long as "the entire process takes place under the
district court's total control and jurisdiction,"
United States
v. Raddatz, 447 U. S. 667,
447 U. S. 681
(1980), and the judge "
exercise[s] the ultimate authority to
issue an appropriate order,'" id. at 447 U. S. 682,
quoting Senate Report at 3. The Sixth Circuit's rule, as petitioner
sees it, permits a magistrate to exercise the Article III judicial
power, because the rule forecloses meaningful review of a
magistrate's report at both the district and appellate levels if no
objections are filed.
We find that argument untenable. The waiver of appellate review
does not implicate Article III, because it is the
Page 474 U. S. 154
district court, not the court of appeals, that must exercise
supervision over the magistrate. Even assuming, however, that the
effect of the Sixth Circuit's rule is to permit both the district
judge and the court of appeals to refuse to review a magistrate's
report absent timely objection, we do not believe that the rule
elevates the magistrate from an adjunct to the functional
equivalent of an Article III judge. The rule merely establishes a
procedural default that has no effect on the magistrate's or the
court's jurisdiction. The district judge has jurisdiction over the
case at all times. He retains full authority to decide whether to
refer a case to the magistrate, to review the magistrate's report,
and to enter judgment. Any party that desires plenary consideration
by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover,
while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue
de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude
further review by the district judge,
sua sponte or at the
request of a party, under a
de novo or any other standard.
Indeed, in the present case, the District Judge made a
de
novo determination of the petition despite petitioner's
failure even to suggest that the Magistrate erred. The Sixth
Circuit's rule, therefore, has not removed "
the essential
attributes of the judicial power,'" Northern Pipeline Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50,
458 U. S. 77
(1982) (plurality opinion), quoting Crowell v. Benson,
285 U. S. 22,
285 U. S. 51
(1932), from the Article III tribunal. [Footnote 14]
Page 474 U. S. 155
Petitioner claims also that she was denied her statutory right
of appeal, in violation of the Due Process Clause. That right was
not denied, however; it was merely conditioned upon the filing of a
piece of paper. Petitioner was notified in unambiguous terms of the
consequences of a failure to file, and deliberately failed to file
nevertheless. We recently reiterated our longstanding maxim that
"the State certainly accords due process when it terminates a claim
for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural or evidentiary
rule."
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.
S. 422,
455 U. S. 437
(1982). The same rationale applies to the forfeiture of an appeal,
and we believe that the Sixth Circuit's rule is reasonable.
Litigants subject to the Sixth Circuit's rule are afforded "
an
opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner,'" ibid., quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U. S. 545,
380 U. S. 552
(1965), to obtain a hearing by the Court of Appeals. We also
emphasize that, because the rule is a nonjurisdictional waiver
provision, the Court of Appeals may excuse the default in the
interests of justice. [Footnote
15]
V
We hold that a court of appeals may adopt a rule conditioning
appeal, when taken from a district court judgment that adopts a
magistrate's recommendation, upon the filing of objections with the
district court identifying those issues on which further review is
desired. Such a rule, at least when it incorporates clear notice to
the litigants and an opportunity to seek an extension of time for
filing objections, is a valid exercise of the supervisory power
that does not violate either the Federal Magistrates Act or the
Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Page 474 U. S. 156
[
Footnote 1]
Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) provides:
"[A] judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings,
including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the
court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the
disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in
subparagraph (A), of applications for posttrial relief made by
individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner
petitions challenging conditions of confinement."
The motions excepted in § 636(b)(1)(A), and included by
reference in subparagraph (B), are motions
"for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for
summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information
made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to
dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to
involuntarily dismiss an action."
[
Footnote 2]
Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) provides:
"[T]he magistrate shall file his proposed findings and
recommendations under subparagraph (B) with the court and a copy
shall forthwith be mailed to all parties."
"Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may
serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and
recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court
shall make a
de novo determination of those portions of
the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence
or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions."
[
Footnote 3]
In Ohio, the court's syllabus contains the controlling law.
See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
456 U. S. 111,
n. 3 (1982), citing
Haas v. State, 103 Ohio St. 1, 7-8,
132 N.E. 158, 159-160 (1921).
[
Footnote 4]
The First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have adopted
waiver rules similar to the Sixth Circuit rule at issue in the
present case.
See Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
616 F.2d 603 (CA1 1980);
McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234,
237 (CA2 1983);
United State v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91
(CA4),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984);
United
States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1386 (CA5 1980),
cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981). The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
have concluded that the failure to file objections waives only
factual issues on the appeal.
See Britt v. Simi Valley Unified
School District, 708 F.2d 452, 454 (CA9 1983) (order denying
petition for rehearing);
Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d
404 (CA5 1982) (en banc);
but see Lorin Corp. v. Goto &
Co., 700 F.2d 1202, 1205-1207 (CA8 1983) (rejecting waiver
rule, at least where parties had not been notified that failure to
object would waive appeal). In none of these cases have the courts
spoken in jurisdictional terms.
[
Footnote 5]
This power rests on the firmest ground when used to establish
rules of judicial procedure.
See Beale, Reconsidering
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory
Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum.L.Rev.
1433, 1465 (1984) (federal courts have inherent authority to
regulate "technical details and policies intrinsic to the
litigation process"). The Courts of Appeals have often exercised
that authority.
See, e.g., Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d
1109, 1112 (CA6 1983) (establishing procedure for
sua
sponte dismissal of complaints);
United States v.
Florea, 541 F.2d 568, 572 (CA6 1976) (prospective rule holding
that contact between party's agent and juror is
per se
prejudicial),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977);
United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 7-8 (CA3) (en banc)
(establishing procedures for enjoining publication of in formation
concerning criminal trial),
cert. denied sub nom. Ditter v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
[
Footnote 6]
In the present case, the filing of objections could have
resulted in a considerable saving of judicial time. The original
petition contained several grounds for relief, but on appeal,
petitioner raised only the issue of the admissibility of expert
testimony on the Battered Wife Syndrome. Had petitioner objected
only to that aspect of the Magistrate's report, the Magistrate's
review would have served to narrow the dispute for the District
Judge, and petitioner would have preserved her right to appeal the
exclusion of her expert testimony.
[
Footnote 7]
The Sixth Circuit, in
Walters, cited with approval the
First Circuit's decision in
Park Motor Mart, which held
that "a party
may' file objections within ten days or he may
not, as he chooses, but he `shall' do so if he wishes further
consideration." 616 F.2d at 605; see Walters, 638 F.2d at
950. See also McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d at 237 ("When a
party fails to object timely to a magistrate's recommended
decision, it waives any right to further judicial review of that
decision") (footnote and citation omitted).
[
Footnote 8]
This is so even though the category of dispositive matters
subject to
de novo review by the district judge as of
right only upon filing of objections includes motions for judgment
on the pleadings and dismissal for failure to state a claim on
which relief can be granted, which consist exclusively of issues of
law.
See n 1,
supra.
[
Footnote 9]
Petitioner points to a passage in the House Report that quotes
from
Campbell v. United States District Court, 501 F.2d
196, 206 (CA9),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974). The
Ninth Circuit concluded:
"If neither party contests the magistrate's proposed findings of
fact, the court may assume their correctness and decide the motion
on the applicable law."
See House Report at 3. However, that statement was part
of a longer quotation setting a
de novo review standard
when objections are filed. The House Report stated that a House
amendment, which called for
de novo review in the same
circumstances, was "adopted" from the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Campbell. House Report at 3. We believe, therefore, that
the House Report used the language from
Campbell only to
support a
de novo standard upon the filing of objections,
and not for any other proposition.
[
Footnote 10]
Indeed, Judge Metzner specifically addressed the difference
between a magistrate's ruling on a nondispositive motion, which
Congress clearly "intended to be
final' unless a judge of the
court exercises his ultimate authority to reconsider the
magistrate's determination," Senate Report at 8, and a ruling on a
dispositive motion. Judge Metzner concluded: "I think we are
talking more about form than we are of substance." Senate Hearings,
at 12.
Moreover, both Judge Metzner and the Judicial Conference were of
the opinion that Congress could probably vest magistrates with the
authority to make a final decision on dispositive motions without
violating Article III, and that the language of 636(b)(1)(B),
calling for the magistrate to make only recommendations on
dispositive motions, was adopted out of an abundance of caution.
See Senate Hearings, at 6 (statement of Judge Metzner);
id. at 35 (report of Judicial Conference of the United
States). While we express no view on the accuracy of those
opinions, we think they are relevant to Congress' intent.
See
also House Report at 8 ("it is not feasible for every judicial
act, at every stage of the proceeding, to be performed by
a
judge of the court'").
[
Footnote 11]
See Senate Hearings, at 32 (statement of William P.
Westphal, Chief Counsel) (filing objections as provided in the
statute "is the procedure for them to follow, if they feel
aggrieved by any of these motions").
[
Footnote 12]
The 1976 amendments were prompted by this Court's decision in
Wingo v. Weddin, 418 U. S. 461
(1974). That case held that Congress had not intended, in enacting
the Federal Magistrates Act in 1968, to permit a magistrate to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on a habeas corpus petition.
Congress enacted the 1976 amendments to "restat[e] and clarif[y]"
Congress' intent to permit magistrates to hold evidentiary hearings
and perform other judicial functions.
See Senate Report at
3.
[
Footnote 13]
Article III, § 1, of the Constitution provides:
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office."
[
Footnote 14]
The plurality in
Northern Pipeline, and the concurrence
in
Raddatz, noted that the magistrate himself remains
under the district court's authority. The magistrate is appointed,
and subject to removal, by the district court.
See Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 79, and n. 30;
Raddatz, 447 U.S. at
447 U. S. 685
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring) ("[T]he only conceivable danger of a
threat' to the `independence' of the magistrate comes from
within, rather than without, the judicial department"). Those
observations, of course, are also relevant here, and again weigh on
the side of concluding that a magistrate remains an adjunct even
though the district court and the court of appeals may refuse to
entertain issues that are not raised in properly filed
objections.
[
Footnote 15]
Cf. Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 52(b) (court may correct plain
error despite failure of party to object). We need not decide at
this time what standards the courts of appeals must apply in
considering exceptions to their waiver rules.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins,
dissenting.
Under the rule adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit and sanctioned by this Court, a party waives his
right to appeal the judgment of the district court by failing to
file timely objections to a magistrate's report. Because this rule
conflicts with the plain language of the Federal Magistrate's Act,
I dissent.
The Magistrate's Act states that
"any party may serve and file written objections to [the
magistrate's] proposed findings and recommendations. . . . A judge
of the court shall make a
de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made."
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Act clearly specifies the penalty
for a party's failure to file objections to the magistrate's report
-- the party loses his right to
de novo review by the
district court. The Act does not
require a party to file
objections. And it does not, contrary to the Sixth Circuit's rule,
provide that a party's failure to file objections deprives him of
the right to
any review by the district court,
* or by the court
of appeals. Rather, the district court judge retains the power, and
indeed the obligation, to "accept, reject, or modify" the
magistrate's findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C). The Act leaves unaffected a party's right to appeal
the judgment of the district court to the court of appeals.
A habeas applicant is entitled to appeal only the final order of
the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. I fail to understand how
petitioner could have waived her right to appeal a final order
before that order was rendered. The majority attempts to
justify this result by characterizing the Sixth Circuit's rule as a
simple exercise of its supervisory powers.
Page 474 U. S. 157
While I do not question the Court of Appeals' authority to
promulgate reasonable procedural rules, I would not sanction a rule
that imposes a penalty for failure to file objections beyond that
contemplated by Congress. Because the Sixth Circuit's "supervisory
rule" unlawfully deprives petitioner of her statutory right to
appeal the District Court's judgment, I respectfully dissent.
* The absence of an objection cannot "reliev[e] the district
court of its obligation to act judicially, to decide for itself
whether the Magistrate's report is correct."
Lorin Corp. v.
Goto & Co., 700 F.2d 1202, 1206 (CA8 1983)
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The waiver rule adopted by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit is neither required nor prohibited by the
Federal Magistrates Act. As a product of that court's supervisory
power, it need not conform to the practice followed in other
circuits. Hence, despite the appearance of a conflict among the
circuits, the interest in uniform interpretation of federal law is
not implicated, and this Court might have been well advised simply
to deny the petition for certiorari. Since the Court has elected to
review the application of the Sixth Circuit's rule, however, I
believe it should modify it in one respect. As the Court
demonstrates, in most cases, it is surely permissible to treat the
failure to file timely objections to a magistrate's report as a
waiver of the right to review, not only in the district court, but
in the court of appeals as well. But our precedents often recognize
an exception to waiver rules -- namely, when a reviewing court
decides the merits of an issue even though a procedural default
relieved it of the duty to do so.
See, e.g., Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808,
471 U. S.
815-816 (1985) (reaching merits despite failure to
object to jury instruction because Court of Appeals over looked
default);
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.
S. 747,
343 U. S. 750,
n. 3 (1952) ("Though we think the Court of Appeals would have been
within its discretion in refusing to consider the point, their
having passed on it leads us to treat the merits also"). It is for
this reason that we may disregard a procedural default in a state
trial court if a state appellate court addresses the federal issue.
E.g., 442 U. S.
Page 474 U. S.
158
Allen, 442 U. S. 140,
442 U. S. 149
(1979);
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423,
360 U. S.
436-437 (1959). In such cases, the reasons for relying
on the procedural default as a bar to further review are generally,
if not always, outweighed by the interest in having the merits of
the issue correctly resolved. A similar exception should be
recognized in this case. When the district court elects to exercise
its power to review a magistrate's report
de novo and
renders an opinion resolving an issue on the merits, there is no
danger of "sandbagging" the district judge.
See ante at
474 U. S. 148.
Moreover, if the district judge has concluded that there is enough
merit in a claim to warrant careful consideration and explanation
despite the litigant's failure to object before the magistrate, the
interest in minimizing the risk of error should prevail over the
interest in requiring strict compliance with procedural rules.
Because the District Court decided the merits of petitioner's claim
in this case, I would hold that she has a right to review in the
Court of Appeals. To that admittedly limited extent, I respectfully
dissent.