Petitioner, after a 58-minute interrogation at the New Jersey
State Police Barracks, confessed to a murder. The New Jersey trial
court rejected his motion to suppress the confession, and the jury
found him guilty of first-degree murder. The New Jersey Superior
Court Appellate Division reversed, finding as a matter of law that
the confession was the result of compulsion, and thus was
impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
guarantee. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding, after
examining the "totality of all the surrounding circumstances," that
the interrogation was proper and that the resulting confession,
being voluntary, had been properly admitted into evidence.
Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District
Court, which dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the voluntariness of a
confession is a "factual issue" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d), which provides that state court findings of fact, with
certain exceptions, "shall be presumed to be correct" in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding, and that accordingly federal review of
the New Jersey Supreme Court's determination that petitioner's
confession was voluntary was limited to whether that court applied
the proper legal test and whether its factual conclusions were
supported by the record. Under this standard, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the District Court's denial of the habeas corpus
petition was proper.
Held: The voluntariness of a confession is not an issue
of fact entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption, but is a legal
question meriting independent consideration in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding. Pp.
474 U. S.
109-118.
(a) There is no support in this Court's decisions for the
suggestion that the enactment of § 2254(d) in 1966 altered this
Court's prior confession cases holding that the ultimate issue of
"voluntariness" is a legal question requiring independent federal
determination. More importantly, § 2254(d)'s history undermines any
argument that Congress intended that the ultimate question of the
admissibility of a confession be treated as a "factual issue"
within the meaning of that provision. Pp.
474 U. S.
109-112.
(b) In addition to considerations of
stare decisis and
congressional intent, the nature of the "voluntariness" inquiry
itself lends support to the
Page 474 U. S. 105
holding in this case. Moreover, the practical considerations
that have led this Court to find other issues within the scope of
the § 2254(d) presumption are absent in the confession context.
Unlike such issues as the impartiality of a juror or competency to
stand trial, assessments of credibility and demeanor are not
crucial to the proper resolution of the ultimate issue of
voluntariness. And the critical events surrounding the taking of a
confession almost invariably occur, not in open court, but in a
secret and more coercive environment. Pp.
474 U. S.
112-118.
741 F.2d 1466, reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and
STEVENS, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
474 U. S.
118.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), state court findings of fact "shall
be presumed to be correct" in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
unless one of eight enumerated exceptions applies. [
Footnote 1] The question presented is whether
the voluntariness
Page 474 U. S. 106
of a confession is an issue of fact entitled to the § 2254(d)
presumption.
I
On the morning of August 13, 1973, a stranger approached the
rural New Jersey home of 17-year-old Deborah Margolin and told her
that a heifer was lose at the foot of her driveway. She set out
alone to investigate and never returned. Later that day, her
mutilated body was found in a nearby stream.
The victim's brothers were able to provide a description of the
stranger's car and clothing. Based on this information, officers of
the New Jersey State Police tentatively identified petitioner and,
later that evening, found him at his place of employment.
Petitioner responded to the officers' preliminary inquiries and
agreed to return to the police barracks for further questioning.
Approximately two hours later, Detective Charles Boyce led
petitioner to an interrogation room and informed him of his
Miranda rights. Petitioner inquired about the scope of his
privilege to remain silent, and then executed a written waiver, the
validity of which is not at issue.
A 58-minute-long interrogation session ensued. During the course
of the interview, Detective Boyce told petitioner that Ms. Margolin
had just died. That statement, which Boyce knew to be untrue,
supported another officer's earlier, and equally false, suggestion
that the victim was still alive and could identify her attacker.
App. 16-17; Record 109 and 305. Detective Boyce also told
petitioner that he had been identified at the Margolin home earlier
in the day. In fact, Ms. Margolin's brothers had only provided a
general description of the stranger's car and clothing. Finally,
Detective Boyce indicated that blood stains had been found on
petitioner's front stoop. No such evidence was introduced at trial,
and respondents do not now contend that it ever in fact
existed.
Throughout the interview, Detective Boyce presented himself as
sympathetic to petitioner's plight. On several
Page 474 U. S. 107
occasions, he stated that he did not consider petitioner to be a
criminal, because the perpetrator of the deed had a "mental
problem" and needed medical help, rather than punishment. App.19.
[
Footnote 2] Eventually,
petitioner fully confessed to the crime. After doing so, he lapsed
into what Detective Boyce described as a "state of shock." Record
84-85. Repeated
Page 474 U. S. 108
efforts to rouse him from his stupor failed, and the police
summoned an ambulance to transport him to the hospital.
The trial court rejected petitioner's motion to suppress the
confession, and the jury found petitioner guilty of murder in the
first degree. The Superior Court Appellate Division reversed,
finding as a matter of law that the confession was the result of
"intense and mind-bending psychological compulsion," and therefore
was impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due
process. App. 53. Over three dissents, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey reversed again.
State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392,
388 A.2d
218 (1978). After examining the "totality of all the
surrounding circumstances," including petitioner's educational
level, age, and awareness of his
Miranda rights, the court
found that the interrogation "did not exceed proper bounds," and
that the resulting confession, being voluntary, had been properly
admitted into evidence.
Id. at 402-405, 388 A.2d at
223-224.
Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey. That court
dismissed the application without an evidentiary hearing. A divided
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 741
F.2d 1456 (1984). Relying on Circuit precedent, [
Footnote 3] the court held that the
voluntariness of a confession is a "factual issue" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, federal review of the
New Jersey Supreme Court's determination that petitioner's
confession was voluntary was
"limited to whether the state court applied the proper legal
test, and whether [its] factual conclusions . . . [were] supported
on the record as a whole."
741 F.2d at 1462. Under this standard, the court concluded,
Page 474 U. S. 109
the District Court's denial of the petition for habeas relief
was proper.
Because the Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions
on whether state court voluntariness determinations are entitled to
the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness, and because of the
issue's importance to the administration of criminal justice, we
granted certiorari. 471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
Compare Brantley v.
McKaskle, 722 F.2d 187, 188 (CA5 1984) "([V]oluntariness of a
confession is a mixed question of law and fact"),
with
Alexander v. Smith, 582 F.2d 212, 217 (CA2) (state court
voluntariness determination entitled to § 2254(d) presumption),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 990 (1978). We now reverse and
remand.
II
This Court has long held that certain interrogation techniques,
either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of
a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of
justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U. S. 278
(1936), was the wellspring of this notion, now deeply embedded in
our criminal law. Faced with statements extracted by beatings and
other forms of physical and psychological torture, the Court held
that confessions procured by means "revolting to the sense of
justice" could not be used to secure a conviction.
Id. at
297 U. S. 286.
On numerous subsequent occasions, the Court has set aside
convictions secured through the admission of an improperly obtained
confession.
See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.
S. 385 (1978);
Haynes v. Washington,
373 U. S. 503
(1963);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.
S. 143 (1944);
Chambers v. Florida,
309 U. S. 227,
309 U. S.
235-238 (1940). Although these decisions framed the
legal inquiry in a variety of different ways, usually through the
"convenient shorthand" of asking whether the confession was
"involuntary,"
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.
S. 199,
361 U. S. 207
(1960), the Court's analysis has
Page 474 U. S. 110
consistently been animated by the view that "ours is an
accusatorial, and not an inquisitorial, system,"
Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U. S. 534,
365 U. S. 541
(1961), and that, accordingly, tactics for eliciting inculpatory
statements must fall within the broad constitutional boundaries
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of fundamental
fairness. Indeed, even after holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies in the
context of custodial interrogations,
Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U. S. 436,
384 U. S. 478
(1966), and is binding on the States,
Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U. S. 1,
378 U. S. 6
(1964), the Court has continued to measure confessions against the
requirements of due process.
See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona,
supra, at
437 U. S. 402;
Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35,
389 U. S. 38
(1967) (per curiam).
Without exception, the Court's confession cases hold that the
ultimate issue of "voluntariness" is a legal question requiring
independent federal determination.
See, e.g., Haynes v.
Washington, supra, at
373 U. S. 515-516;
Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
supra, at
322 U. S.
147-148. As recently as 1978, the Court reaffirmed that
it was "not bound by" a state court voluntariness finding and
reiterated its historic "duty to make an independent evaluation of
the record."
Mincey v. Arizona, supra, at
437 U. S. 398.
That duty, as
Mincey makes explicit, is not limited to
instances in which the claim is that the police conduct was
"inherently coercive."
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra, at
322 U. S. 154.
It applies equally when the interrogation techniques were improper
only because, in the particular circumstances of the case, the
confession is unlikely to have been the product of a free and
rational will.
See Mincey v. Arizona, supra, at
437 U. S. 401.
Because the ultimate issue in both categories of cases is the same
-- whether the State has obtained the confession in a manner that
comports with due process -- the decisions leave no doubt that our
independent obligation to decide the constitutional question is
identical.
Mincey, Ashcraft, and many of the early decisions
applying the independent determination rule in confession cases
came
Page 474 U. S. 111
to the Court on direct appeal from state court judgments. The
rule, however, is no less firmly established in cases coming to the
federal system on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737
(1966), resolved the issue with unmistakable clarity. There, the
State had admitted into evidence a confession elicited from an
impoverished, mentally deficient suspect who had been held
incommunicado for 16 days with barely adequate nourishment.
Expressly relying on the direct-appeal cases, the Court stated
unequivocally that state court determinations concerning the
ultimate question of the voluntariness of a confession are not
binding in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
Id. at
384 U. S.
741-742.
Davis was decided four months before 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d) was signed into law. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub.L. 89-711, 80
Stat. 1105. Respondent contends that, whatever may have been the
case prior to 1966, the enactment of § 2254(d) in that year
fundamentally altered the nature of federal habeas review of state
voluntariness findings. That suggestion finds no support in this
Court's decisions.
See, e.g., Boulden v. Holman,
394 U. S. 478,
394 U. S. 480
(1969) (finding confession voluntary after making "an independent
study of the entire record");
Frazier v. Cupp,
394 U. S. 731,
394 U. S. 739
(1969) (examining "totality of the circumstances" to assess
admissibility of confession). More importantly, the history of §
2254(d) undermines any argument that Congress intended that the
ultimate question of the admissibility of a confession be treated a
"factual issue" within the meaning of that provision. The 1966
amendment was an almost verbatim codification of the standards
delineated in
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.
S. 293 (1963), for determining when a district court
must hold an evidentiary hearing before acting on a habeas
petition. When a hearing is not obligatory,
Townsend held,
the federal court "ordinarily should . . . accept the facts as
found" in the state proceeding.
Id. at
372 U. S. 318.
Congress elevated that exhortation into a mandatory presumption
of
Page 474 U. S. 112
correctness. But there is absolutely no indication that it
intended to alter
Townsend's understanding that the
"ultimate constitutional question" of the admissibility of a
confession was a "mixed questio[n] of fact and law" subject to
plenary federal review.
Id. at
372 U. S. 309,
and n. 6.
In short, an unbroken line of cases, coming to this Court both
on direct appeal and on review of applications to lower federal
courts for a writ of habeas corpus, forecloses the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the "voluntariness" of a confession merits
something less than independent federal consideration. To be sure,
subsidiary factual questions, such as whether a drug has the
properties of a truth serum,
id. at
372 U. S. 306,
or whether in fact the police engaged in the intimidation tactics
alleged by the defendant,
LaVallee v. Delle Rose,
410 U. S. 690,
410 U. S.
693-695 (1973) (per curiam), are entitled to the §
2254(d) presumption. And the federal habeas court, should, of
course, give great weight to the considered conclusions of a
coequal state judiciary.
Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U. S. 568,
367 U. S. 605
(1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). But, as we now reaffirm, the
ultimate question whether, under the totality of the circumstances,
the challenged confession was obtained in a manner compatible with
the requirements of the Constitution is a matter for independent
federal determination.
III
The Court of Appeals recognized that treating the voluntariness
of a confession as an issue of fact was difficult to square with
"fifty years of caselaw" in this Court. 741 F.2d at 1462. It
believed, however, that this substantial body of contrary precedent
was not controlling in light of our more recent decisions
addressing the scope of the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness.
See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412,
469 U. S. 429
(1985) (trial court's determination that a prospective juror in a
capital case was properly excluded for cause entitled to
presumption);
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.
S. 1025 (1984)
Page 474 U. S. 113
(impartiality of an individual juror);
Rushen v. Spain,
464 U. S. 114
(1983) (per curiam) (effect of
ex parte communication on
impartiality of individual juror);
Maggio v. Fulford,
462 U. S. 111
(1983) (per curiam) (competency to stand trial);
Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422,
459 U. S.
431-437 (1983) (determination that defendant received
and understood sufficient notice of charges against him to render
guilty plea voluntary). We acknowledge that the Court has not
charted an entirely clear course in this area. We reject, however,
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that these case-specific holdings
tacitly overturned the longstanding rule that the voluntariness of
a confession is a matter for independent federal determination.
In the § 2254(d) context, as elsewhere, the appropriate
methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of
law has been, to say the least, elusive.
See Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.
S. 485 (1984);
Baumgartner v. United States,
322 U. S. 665,
322 U. S. 671
(1944). A few principles, however, are by now well established. For
example, that an issue involves an inquiry into state of mind is
not at all inconsistent with treating it as a question of fact.
See, e.g., Maggio v. Fulford, supra. Equally clearly, an
issue does not lose its factual character merely because its
resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional question.
See Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.
S. 526,
443 U. S. 534
(1979) (finding of intent to discriminate subject to "clearly
erroneous" standard of review). But beyond these elemental
propositions, negative in form, the Court has yet to arrive at "a
rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual
finding from a legal conclusion."
Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U. S. 273,
456 U. S. 288
(1982).
Perhaps much of the difficulty in this area stems from the
practical truth that the decision to label an issue a "question of
law," a "question of fact," or a "mixed question of law and fact"
is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of
Page 474 U. S. 114
analysis.
See Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85
Colum.L.Rev. 229, 237 (1985). At least in those instances in which
Congress has not spoken and in which the issue falls somewhere
between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the
fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that,
as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial
actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question. Where, for example, as with proof of actual malice in
First Amendment libel cases, the relevant legal principle can be
given meaning only through its application to the particular
circumstances of a case, the Court has been reluctant to give the
trier of fact's conclusions presumptive force and, in so doing,
strip a federal appellate court of its primary function as an
expositor of law.
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. at
466 U. S. 503.
Similarly, on rare occasions in years past, the Court has justified
independent federal or appellate review as a means of compensating
for "perceived shortcomings of the trier of fact by way of bias or
some other factor. . . ."
Id. at
466 U. S. 518
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. at
373 U. S. 516;
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49,
338 U. S. 52
(1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Cf. Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 587
(1935).
In contrast, other considerations often suggest the
appropriateness of resolving close questions concerning the status
of an issue as one of "law" or "fact" in favor of extending
deference to the trial court. When, for example, the issue involves
the credibility of witnesses, and therefore turns largely on an
evaluation of demeanor, there are compelling and familiar
justifications for leaving the process of applying law to fact to
the trial court and according its determinations presumptive
weight.
Patton v. Yount, supra, and
Wainwright v.
Witt, supra, are illustrative. There, the Court stressed that
the state trial judge is in a position to assess juror bias that is
far superior to that of federal judges reviewing an application for
a writ of habeas corpus. Principally
Page 474 U. S. 115
for that reason, the decisions held, juror bias merits treatment
as a "factual issue" within the meaning of § 2254(d)
notwithstanding the intimate connection between such determinations
and the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury.
For several reasons, we think that it would be inappropriate to
abandon the Court's longstanding position that the ultimate
question of the admissibility of a confession merits treatment as a
legal inquiry requiring plenary federal review. We note at the
outset that we do not write on a clean slate. "Very weighty
considerations underlie the principle that courts should not
lightly overrule past decisions."
Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375,
398 U. S. 403
(1970). Thus, even assuming that contemporary considerations
supported respondent's construction of the statute, nearly a half
century of unwavering precedent weighs heavily against any
suggestion that we now discard the settled rule in this area.
Moreover, as previously noted, Congress patterned § 2254(d) after
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293
(1963), a case that clearly assumed that the voluntariness of a
confession was an issue for independent federal determination.
Thus, not only are
stare decisis concerns compelling, but,
unlike in
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.
S. 422 (1983),
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.
S. 114 (1983), or any of our other recent § 2254(d)
cases, in the confession context, we have the benefit of some
congressional guidance in resolving whether the disputed issue
falls outside of the scope of the § 2254(d) presumption. Although
the history of that provision is not without its ambiguities, it is
certainly clear enough to tip the scales in favor of treating the
voluntariness of a confession as beyond the reach of § 2254(d).
In addition to considerations of
stare decisis and
congressional intent, the nature of the inquiry itself lends
support to the conclusion that "voluntariness" is a legal question
meriting independent consideration in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding. Although sometimes framed as an issue of
Page 474 U. S. 116
"psychological fact,"
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
at
367 U. S. 603,
the dispositive question of the voluntariness of a confession has
always had a uniquely legal dimension. It is telling that, in
confession cases coming from the States, this Court has
consistently looked to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to test admissibility.
See, e.g., Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. at
437 U. S. 402.
The locus of the right is significant, because it reflects the
Court's consistently held view that the admissibility of a
confession turns as much on whether the techniques for extracting
the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a
system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will
not be secured by inquisitorial means as on whether the defendant's
will was, in fact, overborne.
See, e.g., Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U. S. 49,
370 U. S. 51
(1962) (suggesting that "a compound of two influences" requires
that some confessions be condemned);
Culombe v. Connecticut,
supra, at
367 U. S. 605
(describing voluntariness as an "amphibian"). This hybrid quality
of the voluntariness inquiry, [
Footnote 4] subsuming, as it does, a "complex of values,"
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. at
361 U. S. 207,
itself militates against treating the question as one of simple
historical fact.
Putting to one side whether "voluntariness" is analytically more
akin to a fact or a legal conclusion, the practical considerations
that have led us to find other issues within the scope of the §
2254(d) presumption are absent in the confession context. First,
unlike the impartiality of a given juror,
Patton v. Yount,
467 U.S. at
467 U. S.
1036, or competency to stand trial,
Maggio v.
Fulford, 462 U.S. at
462 U. S. 117,
assessments of credibility
Page 474 U. S. 117
and demeanor are not crucial to the proper resolution of the
ultimate issue of "voluntariness." Of course, subsidiary questions,
such as the length and circumstances of the interrogation, the
defendant's prior experience with the legal process, and
familiarity with the
Miranda warnings, often require the
resolution of conflicting testimony of police and defendant. The
law is therefore clear that state court findings on such matters
are conclusive on the habeas court if fairly supported in the
record and if the other circumstances enumerated in § 2254(d) are
inapplicable. But once such underlying factual issues have been
resolved, and the moment comes for determining whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, the confession was obtained in a
manner consistent with the Constitution, the state court judge is
not in an appreciably better position than the federal habeas court
to make that determination.
Second, the allocution of a guilty plea,
Marshall v.
Lonberger, supra, the adjudication of competency to stand
trial,
Maggio v. Fulford, supra, and the determination of
juror bias,
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.
S. 412 (1985), take place in open court on a full
record. In marked contrast, the critical events surrounding the
taking of a confession almost invariably occur in a secret and
inherently more coercive environment.
Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. at
384 U. S. 458.
These circumstances, standing alone, cannot be dispositive of the
question whether a particular issue falls within the reach of §
2254(d). However, together with the inevitable and understandable
reluctance to exclude an otherwise reliable admission of guilt,
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
378 U. S. 381
(1964), they elevate the risk that erroneous resolution of the
voluntariness question might inadvertently frustrate the protection
of the federal right.
See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
at
373 U. S. 516;
Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547
(1942). We reiterate our confidence that state judges, no less than
their federal counterparts, will properly discharge their duty to
protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. We
Page 474 U. S. 118
note only that in the confession context, independent federal
review has traditionally played an important parallel role in
protecting the rights at stake when the prosecution secures a
conviction through the defendant's own admissions.
IV
After defending at length its conclusion that the voluntariness
of a confession was entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption, and
after carefully analyzing the petitioner's confession under that
standard, the Court of Appeals suggested in a brief footnote that
it "would reach the same result" even were it to give the issue
plenary consideration. 741 F.2d at 1467, n. 21. Inasmuch as it is
not clear from this language that the court did, in fact,
independently evaluate the admissibility of the confession, and
because, in any event, we think that the case warrants fuller
analysis under the appropriate standard, we reverse the decision
below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
"In any proceeding instituted in a Federal Court by an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a
hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of
competent jurisdiction . . . shall be presumed to be correct,
unless . . ."
"
* * * *"
"(8) . . . the Federal court . . . concludes that such factual
determination is not supported by the record as a whole."
[
Footnote 2]
The following exchange is representative of the tone of the
interrogation.
"Boyce: 'Frank, look, you want help, don't you, Frank?'"
"Miller: 'Yes, uh huh, yes, but yet I'm, I'm not going to admit
to something that, that I wasn't involved in.'"
"Boyce: 'We don't want you to, an I want you to do is talk to
me, that's all. I'm not talking about admitting to anything Frank.
I want you to talk to me. I want you to tell me what you think. I
want you to tell me how you think about this, what you think about
this?'"
"Miller: 'What I think about it?'"
"Boyce: 'Yeah.'"
"Miller: 'I think whoever did it really needs help.'"
"Boyce: 'And that's what I think, and that's what I know. They
don't, they don't need punishment, right? Like you said, they need
help.'"
"Miller: 'Right.'"
"Boyce: 'Now, don't you think it's better if someone knows that
he or she has a mental problem to come forward with it and say,
look, I've, I've, I've done these acts, I'm responsible for this,
but I want to be helped, I couldn't help myself, I had no control
of myself, and if I'm examined properly you'll find out that's the
case.'"
"
* * * *"
"'Okay. [L]isten Frank, [i]f I promise to, you know, do all I
can with the psychiatrist and everything, and we get the proper
help for you . . . will you talk to me about it.?'"
"Miller: 'I can't talk to you about something I'm not . .
.'"
"Boyce: 'Alright, listen Frank, alright, honest. I know, I know
what's going on inside you, Frank. I want to help you, you know,
between us right now. . . . You've got to talk to me about it. This
is the only way we'll be able to work it out. I mean, you know,
listen, I want to help you, because you are in my mind, you are not
responsible. You are not responsible, Frank. Frank, what's the
matter?'"
"Miller: 'I feel bad.'"
App. 17-22.
[
Footnote 3]
The Court of Appeals relied on an earlier decision of that court
holding that the "voluntariness" of a waiver of
Miranda
rights was entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption.
Patterson v.
Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925, 930 (1984). The present case presents no
occasion for us to address the question whether federal habeas
courts must accord the statutory presumption of correctness to
state court findings concerning the validity of a waiver.
[
Footnote 4]
The voluntariness rubric has been variously condemned as
"useless," Paulson, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree,
6 Stan.L.Rev. 411, 430 (1954); "perplexing," Grano, Voluntariness,
Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 Va.L.Rev. 859, 863
(1979); and "legal
doubletalk,'" A. Beisel, Control Over
Illegal Enforcement of the Criminal Law: Role of the Supreme Court
48 (1955). See generally Y. Kamisar, Police Interrogation
and Confessions 1-25 (1980).
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
The Court decides that the voluntariness of a confession is not
an issue of fact presumed to be correct under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
I think it is difficult to sensibly distinguish the determination
that a particular confession was voluntary from the determinations
which we have held to be entitled to a presumption of correctness
under § 2254(d).
See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.
S. 539 (1981);
Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.
S. 591 (1982) (per curiam);
Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422,
459 U. S.
431-437 (1983);
Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.
S. 111 (1983) (per curiam);
Rushen v. Spain,
464 U. S. 114
(1983) (per curiam);
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.
S. 1025,
467 U. S.
1036-1038 (1984); and
Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U. S. 412,
469 U. S.
426-430 (1985). While the Court relies principally on
stare decisis for the result it reaches today, almost all
the cases upon which it relies entailed direct review by this Court
of state court decisions,
Page 474 U. S. 119
rather than federal habeas review. But even if that difference
were deemed immaterial, it seems to me that
stare decisis
is not a sufficient reason for excluding a finding as to the
voluntariness of a confession from the presumption embodied in §
2254(d). All of the recent cases cited evince a more reasoned
approach to this issue than the interesting but somewhat mystical
exegesis in cases such as
Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U. S. 568,
367 U. S.
603-605 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
I also disagree with the Court's decision to remand this case to
the Court of Appeals for a second run at the voluntariness issue. I
think the majority of that court made it clear that it had
evaluated the admissibility of the confession under the correct
standard as defined by this Court today. It is unfortunate that
petitioner's challenge to his conviction for a murder which
occurred 12 years ago should be the subject of additional and
unnecessary litigation and delay.
I respectfully dissent.