Where the bill of exceptions appears upon its face to have been
regularly taken, the court cannot presume against the record.
Where a mortgage was given by a postmaster to secure the Post
Office Department, and the circuit court was asked to instruct the
jury that, according to the true interpretation of the mortgage,
there was contained therein no stipulation or agreement to extend
the time, or preclude the government from suing the principal and
sureties upon the postmaster's bond, and the court refused, upon
the ground that the jury were the proper judges of the fact whether
time was given, on a perusal of the mortgage, this was error in the
court. It is the duty of the court to construe all written
instruments given in evidence as a question of law.
Payment under this mortgage could not be enforced until after
the lapse of six months from its date. But its acceptance by the
government did not release the sureties upon the bond, because, in
order to discharge the surety by giving time, the time which is
given must operate upon the instrument which the surety has signed.
The mortgage here was only a collateral security, which was
beneficial to the surety.
A motion for a new trial waives the right to a writ of error in
those circuits only where the courts have adopted a rule to this
effect, and in those circuits the right should be waived upon the
record before the motion for a new trial is heard.
The practice in Louisiana allows the sureties to be sued without
joining the principal.
This was an action brought against the defendants in error
as the securities upon the bond of the Postmaster of the City of
New Orleans. The facts of the case are sufficiently set forth in
the opinion of the Court.
Page 47 U. S.
281
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
William H. Ker, being appointed Postmaster of the City of New
Orleans, in 1836 gave a bond, with the defendants as his security,
in the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars for the faithful
discharge of his duties as postmaster. Having failed to perform
those duties, an action was commenced on the bond against his
securities alleging a large defalcation by Ker and claiming the
penalty of the bond.
In their defense the defendants set up a mortgage which was
executed by Ker 15 August, 1839, on property real and personal, to
secure the payment to the Post Office Department of a sum not
exceeding sixty-five thousand dollars or such sum as might be found
due on a settlement from and after six months from the date of the
mortgage. This instrument, which gives time for the payment of the
indebtment by Ker, it is pleaded, releases the defendants as the
sureties of Ker.
A jury, being empanelled, found a verdict for the defendants. A
motion for a new trial was made and overruled. No exception lies to
this decision. The motion is made to the sound discretion of the
court.
The questions arise on certain instructions to the jury prayed
for by the district attorney; none was asked by the defendants.
It is objected that it does not appear that the exceptions were
taken on the trial and signed by the judge during the term. The
bill of exceptions states that "on the trial of the
Page 47 U. S. 282
cause, the district attorney requested the court to charge the
jury," &c., and at the close,
"to which opinions of the court refusing to charge as requested
the district attorney excepts, and prays that the bill of
exceptions, with the documents referred to therein, be signed,
sealed, and made a part of the record, which is accordingly
done,"
and which is signed by the judge. Upon its face, this bill of
exceptions appears to have been regularly signed, and the Court
cannot presume against the record.
The first, fifth, seventh, ninth, and tenth instructions,
refused by the court, are not so connected with the case as to
require a consideration. Nor is it deemed necessary to consider the
instructions given as asked or as modified by the court until we
come to the eleventh and last prayer. In this, the district
attorney requested the court to instruct the jury
"That according to the true interpretation of said mortgage,
there was and is contained therein no stipulation or agreement to
extend the time or preclude the government from suing the principal
and sureties on said bond."
This the court refused to give, on the ground that the jury was
the proper judge of the fact whether time was given, on a perusal
of the mortgage. In this the court erred. It is its duty to
construe all written instruments given in evidence, as a question
of law.
Payment under the mortgage could not be enforced until after the
lapse of six months from its date. And it appears that the mortgage
was designed to cover the whole amount of Ker's defalcation. But
the important question is whether this mortgage suspended the legal
remedy of the department on the official bond of the postmaster.
There is no provision in the mortgage to this effect. And it cannot
be successfully contended that taking collateral security merely
can suspend the remedy on the bond. The holder of a bill of
exchange, by taking collateral security of the drawer, not giving
time, does not release the endorser.
James v. Badger, 1
Johns.Cas. 131;
Kennedy v. Motte, 3 McCord 13;
Hurd v.
Little, 12 Mass. 502;
Ruggles v. Patten, 8 Mass.
480.
Giving time for payment, to discharge the endorser, must operate
upon the instrument endorsed by him. Now if the Post Office
Department had, by the mortgage, suspended the right of action on
the bond for the time limited in the mortgage, it might have
released the sureties. But no such condition is expressed, and none
such can be implied. The mortgage does not purport to be given in
lieu of or in discharge of the bond. It is merely a collateral
security, which operates beneficially to the defendants. For if
they shall pay the defalcation of Ker or so much of it as shall
amount to the penalty of the
Page 47 U. S. 283
bond and the mortgaged property shall be sufficient to cover the
whole indebtment, there can be no question that the sureties would
be subrogated to a due proportion of the rights of the department
in the mortgage.
The principle is in no respect different from that which arises
on a promissory note or bill where collateral security is taken. In
the authorities above cited, it was considered that where an
endorser takes an indemnity for endorsing a note, he waives a
notice of demand. But if the holder of the note take additional
security from the drawer, the endorser is not released. And it
cannot be material of what character the collateral security may
be. It may consist of promissory notes not due, a mortgage payable
on time, or anything else, it does not affect the remedy on the
original instrument. This can only be done by an express agreement,
for a valuable consideration. The remedy on the collateral
instrument is wholly immaterial unless it discharges or postpones
that on the original obligation. There is no such condition in the
mortgage under consideration, and consequently it can in no respect
affect or suspend the remedy of the Post Office Department on the
bond.
If the remedy on an instrument is suspended for a valuable
consideration, the endorser or security is released, because his
right to discharge the obligation and be subrogated to the rights
of the holder of the paper is also suspended. But a contract to
give time is void and does not release the security unless it be
founded upon a valuable consideration. It must be a contract which
a court of law or equity can enforce. Now there is no contract in
the mortgage which suspends the right of action on the official
bond. Consequently no injury is done to the sureties on that bond.
They are left free to act for their own interests, as they could
have acted before the mortgage. The principle on which sureties are
released is not a mere shadow without substance. It is founded upon
a restriction of the rights of the sureties, by which they are
supposed to be injured. But by no possibility can they be injured
in the case under consideration. On the contrary, it is clear that
the mortgage may operate beneficially to them if they shall pay the
amount of their bond. And the circuit court should have instructed
the jury to this effect.
The motion for a new trial was not a waiver of a writ of error.
In some of the circuits there is a rule of court to this effect.
But effect could be given to that rule only by requiring a party to
waive on the record a writ of error before his motion for a new
trial is heard. In the greater part of the circuits no such rule
exists. It does not appear to have been adopted in Louisiana.
Page 47 U. S. 284
It is insisted that "the action is brought wrong, and that if
the judgment be reversed, the plaintiffs cannot recover because of
the nonjoinder of Ker as a defendant."
The action against the sureties, omitting the principal, is
sustained by the Louisiana practice. In
Maria Griffing v.
Caldwell, 1 Robinson 15, it was held that a creditor has the
right, but he is under no obligation, to include the principal and
surety in the same suit. And in
Smith v. Scott, 3 Robinson
258, it is said a surety, who binds himself with his principal
in solido, is not entitled to the benefit of discussion,
and may be sued alone for the whole debt. So in
Curtis v.
Martin, 5 Martin 674, it is laid down that the surety may be
sued without the principal.
In
Barrow v. Norwood, 3 La. 437, the court held, where
the obligation is joint, all the obligors must be made parties to
the suit. But that was not a case of suretyship. The action was
brought against one of three endorsers.
On the grounds above stated, the judgment of the circuit court
is
Reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings
conformably to this opinion.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Louisiana and was argued by counsel. On consideration
whereof it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the
judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is
hereby reversed and that this cause be and the same is hereby
remanded to the said circuit court with directions to award a
venire facias de novo.