For assaulting an undercover Secret Service agent with a loaded
pistol, in an attempt to rob him of $1,800 of Government "flash
money" that the agent was using to buy counterfeit currency from
them, petitioners were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2114,
which proscribes the assault and robbery of any custodian of "mail
matter or of any money or other property of the United States." The
Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions over petitioners'
contention that § 2114 is limited to crimes involving the Postal
Service.
Held: The language "any money or other property of the
United States" in § 2114 includes the $1,800 belonging to the
United States and entrusted to the Secret Service agent as "flash
money," and thus by using a pistol in an effort to rob the agent
petitioners fell squarely within the prohibitions of the statute.
Pp.
469 U. S.
73-80.
(a) "Mail matter," "money," and "other property" are separated
from one another in § 2114 by use of the disjunctive "or." This
means that the word "money" must be given its ordinary, separate
meaning and does not mean "postal money" or "money in the custody
of postal employees." P.
469 U. S.
73.
(b) There is no ambiguity in the language of the statute. But
even if there were, the particular language here does not lend
itself to application of the
ejusdem generis rule so as to
require reading the general terms "money" and "other property"
following "mail matter" in a specific, restricted postal context.
The term "mail matter" is no more a specific term -- and is
probably less specific -- than "money." Pp.
469 U. S.
73-75.
(c) The legislative history shows no intent by Congress to limit
the statute to postal crimes. Pp.
469 U.S. 75-78.
(d) The fact that the Solicitor General in a prior case
presenting the identical issue conceded that § 2114 only applied to
postal crimes, a concession he now states was unwarranted, does not
relieve this Court of its responsibility to interpret Congress'
intent in enacting § 2114. Pp.
469 U. S.
78-79.
718 F.2d 1528, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined.
Page 469 U. S. 71
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
469 U. S.
80.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners assaulted an undercover United States Secret Service
agent with a loaded pistol, in an attempt to rob him of $1,800 of
Government "flash money" that the agent was using to buy
counterfeit currency from them. They were convicted of violating 18
U.S.C. § 2114, which proscribes the assault and robbery of any
custodian of "mail matter or of any money or other property of the
United States." The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed petitioners' convictions, over their contention
that § 2114 is limited to crimes involving the Postal Service. 718
F.2d 1528 (1983). We granted certiorari, 466 U.S. 926 (1984), to
resolve a split in the Circuits concerning the reach of § 2114,
[
Footnote 1] and we affirm.
Agent K. David Holmes of the United States Secret Service posed
as someone interested in purchasing counterfeit currency. He met
petitioners Jose and Francisco Garcia in a park in Miami, Fla.
Petitioners agreed to sell Holmes a large quantity of counterfeit
currency, and asked that he show them the genuine currency he
intended to give in exchange. He "flashed" the $1,800 of money to
which he had been entrusted by the United States, and they showed
him a sample of their wares -- a counterfeit $50 bill.
Page 469 U. S. 72
Wrangling over the terms of the agreement began, and Jose Garcia
leapt in front of Holmes brandishing a semiautomatic pistol. He
pointed the pistol at Holmes, assumed a combat stance, chambered a
round into the pistol, and demanded the money. While Holmes slowly
raised his hands over his head, three Secret Service agents who had
been watching from afar raced to the scene on foot. Jose Garcia
dropped the pistol and surrendered, but Francisco Garcia seized the
money belonging to the United States and fled. The agents arrested
Jose Garcia on the spot, and pursued and later arrested Francisco
Garcia as well.
Petitioners were convicted in a jury trial of violating 18
U.S.C. § 2114 by assaulting a lawful custodian of Government money,
Agent Holmes, with intent to "rob, steal, or purloin" the money.
That section states in full:
"Whoever assaults any person having lawful charge, control, or
custody of any mail matter or of any money or other property of the
United States, with intent to rob, steal, or purloin such mail
matter, money, or other property of the United States, or robs any
such person of mail matter, or of any money, or other property of
the United States, shall for the first offense, be imprisoned not
more than ten years; and if in effecting or attempting to effect
such robbery he wounds the person having custody of such mail,
money, or other property of the United States, or puts his life in
jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, or for a subsequent
offense, shall be imprisoned twenty-five years."
Both petitioners were sentenced to the 25-year prison term
mandated by § 2114 when the assault puts the custodian's life in
jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon. [
Footnote 2] On appeal the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgments of conviction. The only
issue before us on certiorari is whether the language "any money,
or other property of the
Page 469 U. S. 73
United States" in § 2114 includes the $1,800 belonging to the
United States and entrusted to Agent Holmes as "flash money" in
this case.
Section 2114 prohibits the assault with intent to rob of "any
person having lawful charge, control or custody of any mail matter
or of any money or other property of the United States. . .
." (emphasis supplied). Petitioners contend that
notwithstanding the reach of this language, Congress intended that
only the robbery of "postal" money or property was to be covered by
the statute.
The enacted language of the statute is contrary to petitioners'
argument. The language protects custodians of any mail matter,
custodians of any United States money, and, in a catchall phrase,
custodians of any other United States property. As in our recent
case of
Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S.
55 (1980),
"[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests a congressional
intent to limit its coverage to persons [employed by the Postal
Service]."
Id. at
445 U. S.
60.
The three classes of property protected by § 2114 are each
separated by the conjunction "or." Canons of construction indicate
that terms connected in the disjunctive in this manner be given
separate meanings.
See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U. S. 726,
438 U. S.
739-740 (1978). In
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U. S. 330
(1979), we refused to ignore the statutory meaning which would be
presumed from similar disjunctive language, stating that the use of
the term "or" indicates an intent to give the nouns their separate,
normal meanings.
Id. at
442 U. S. 339.
In our case, Congress separated "mail matter," "money," and "other
property" from one another by use of a disjunctive, and we think
this means that the word "money" must be given its ordinary,
separate meaning; it does not mean "postal money" or "money in the
custody of postal employees."
Petitioners contend that the language of the statute is
ambiguous, and in support of this contention offer what seems to us
a rather labyrinthine explanation of the statutory language.
Petitioners first claim that the conjunction "or"
Page 469 U. S. 74
cannot properly be read to totally separate the three types of
property listed in the prohibition; for if the word "or" indeed
strictly separates the three types of property, the statute would
proscribe assaults on custodians of any "money," whether or not it
was money belonging to the United States, because the term "money"
would not be modified or restricted by the term "of the United
States" which follows the word "property." Thus Congress would have
enacted a law, say petitioners, proscribing assaults on custodians
of money by whomever owned, and "Congress would then have enacted a
Federal robbery statute without any jurisdictional basis." Reply
Brief for Petitioners 3. Because Congress could not have intended
this absurd result, petitioners contend, there is an ambiguity in
the statutory language. This contention, however, totally ignores
the word "other" which follows "money" and shows that the money
referred to, like the property referred to, is money belonging to
the United States.
Petitioners then develop their argument by invoking the
principle of
ejusdem generis to resolve the ambiguity
which their analysis creates. Under that principle, of course,
where general words follow an enumeration of specific terms, the
general words are read to apply only to other items like those
specifically enumerated.
See Harrison v. PPG Industries,
Inc., 446 U. S. 578,
446 U. S. 588
(1980). Petitioners thus urge that "mail matter" is a specific
term, and therefore the general terms "money" and "other property"
which follow it must be read in the specific, restricted postal
context. They conclude that "money" was intended to mean "postal
money" and "other property of the United States" was intended to
mean "other postal property."
We said in
Harrison that
""
the rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly
established, is only an instrumentality for ascertaining the
correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty.'""
Ibid., quoting United States v. Powell, 423 U. S.
87,
423 U. S. 91
(1975), in turn
quoting 297 U. S. United
States,
Page 469 U. S. 75
297 U. S. 124,
297 U. S. 128
(1936). We are not persuaded that petitioners' analysis of the
statutory language creates any ambiguity in the plain meaning of
the words, and even if it did we do not think that the particular
language here lends itself to the application of the
ejusdem
generis rule. We have previously noted that the terms in
question are made separate and distinct from one another by
Congress' use of the disjunctive; in addition, the term "mail
matter" is no more specific a term -- and is probably less specific
-- than "money."
Notwithstanding petitioners' argument to the contrary, we are
satisfied that the statutory language with which we deal has a
plain and unambiguous meaning. While we now turn to the legislative
history as an additional tool of analysis, we do so with the
recognition that only the most extraordinary showing of contrary
intentions from those data would justify a limitation on the "plain
meaning" of the statutory language. When we find the terms of a
statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in
"
rare and exceptional circumstances,'" TVA v. Hill,
437 U. S. 153,
437 U. S. 187,
n. 33 (1978), quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S.
55, 282 U. S. 60
(1930).
Section 2114 had its genesis as a law to protect mail carriers
from assault and robbery of mail matter. The forerunner to § 2114
was 18 U.S.C. § 320 (1934 ed., Supp. V). It proscribed assault and
robbery of "any person having lawful charge, control, or custody of
any mail matter." Section 320 had been placed in Chapter 8 of Title
18 of the United States Code. Chapter 8 was entitled "Offenses
Against Postal Service." In 1935, however, the 74th Congress
amended § 320 by appending after the term "mail matter" the clause
"or of any money or other property of the United States." Section
320 as amended retained its place in Chapter 8 of Title 18 until
1948, when it was transferred to Chapter 103, which is entitled
"Robbery and Burglary" and contains all of the federal statutes
covering those crimes. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 797.
Section 320 was then renumbered as § 2114; with the exception of
minor particulars
Page 469 U. S. 76
the text of the statute has remained unchanged since the 1935
amendment.
Petitioners contend that the 1935 amendment to § 320 was not
intended to expand the reach of that statute beyond postal crimes.
In support of this they rely on some short colloquies from the
House floor which they describe as "snippets."
In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that
the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies
in the Committee Reports on the bill, which
"represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of
those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed
legislation."
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168,
396 U. S. 186
(1969). We have eschewed reliance on the passing comments of one
Member,
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U. S.
25,
456 U. S. 35
(1982), and casual statements from the floor debates.
United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367,
391 U. S. 385
(1968);
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U. S. 102,
447 U. S. 108
(1980). In
O'Brien, supra, at
391 U. S. 385,
we stated that Committee Reports are "more authoritative" than
comments from the floor, and we expressed a similar preference in
Zuber, supra, at
396 U. S. 187.
[
Footnote 3]
The Committee Reports on this bill show no intent on the part of
the 74th Congress to limit the amended § 320 to less than the
normal reach of its words. The House Report on the bill to amend §
320 is entitled "SAFEGUARDING CUSTODIANS OF GOVERNMENT MONEYS AND
PROPERTY" and states that
"[t]he purpose of the pending
Page 469 U. S. 77
bill is to bring within the provisions of the Penal Code the
crime of robbing or attempting to rob custodians of Government
moneys."
H.R.Rep. No. 582, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1935). The Senate
Report on the 1935 amendment is entitled
"PROVIDING FOR PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBING OR ATTEMPTING
TO ROB CUSTODIANS OF GOVERNMENT MONEYS OR PROPERTY"
and the Senate Report states the purpose of the bill exactly
like the House Report. S.Rep. No. 1440, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1
(1935). Nowhere do the Committee Reports state that the amended
statute required a "postal nexus" or was limited to postal
crimes.
Petitioners make a good deal of the fact that both Reports
contain the letter from the Postmaster General, requesting
enactment of the bill. That official's letter, however, says
nothing about limiting the broad language of the bill to postal
crimes, but instead speaks simply of "custodian[s] of Government
funds," not of Government "mail." H.R.Rep. No. 582,
supra,
at 1; S.Rep. No. 1440,
supra, at 1. In two places the
Postmaster General's letter states that the bill was designed to
punish the crime of "robbing or attempting to rob custodians of
Government moneys."
Ibid. Thus the Committee Reports show
that the Postmaster, and the two Committees responsible for the
legislation, gave no evidence of their belief that the statute was
limited to postal crimes.
Petitioners rely heavily on the statement of Representative
Dobbins, whom the dissent identifies as the floor manager, made on
the floor of the House of Representatives on May 24, 1935.
Representative Dobbins stated:
"The only purpose of the pending bill is to extend the
protection of the present law to property of the United States in
the custody of its postal officials. . . . [L]et me say there are
many custodians of postal stations who have a great amount of money
in their custody but little mail. . . ."
79 Cong.Rec. 8205 (1935).
Page 469 U. S. 78
We find a number of flaws in petitioners' argument that
Representative Dobbins' statement is clear proof of Congress'
intent. First, this snippet quotes Representative Dobbins out of
context. The above-quoted statement was made in response to an
objection from another Member concerning the mandatory 25-year
penalty in the proposed statute. As one in favor of the bill,
Representative Dobbins' attempt to limit the scope of the statute
is best read in light of this objection.
See ibid. To
permit such colloquies to alter the clear language of the statute
undermines the intent of Congress.
Regan v. Wald,
468 U. S. 222,
468 U. S. 237
(1984).
See Russello v. United States, 464 U. S.
16 (1983). Isolated statements such as Representative
Dobbins' are "not impressive legislative history."
Zuber,
supra, at
396 U. S. 187.
If they were, a statement of Representative Wolcott earlier in the
same colloquy to the effect that "[t]his bill is confined to
assaults on Federal law enforcement officers," 79 Cong.Rec. at
8205, would seem to counterbalance the import of Representative
Dobbins' statement. Thus petitioners would lose even if we were to
adopt some type of reverse parol evidence rule, where oral
statements were elevated above enacted language in determining the
meaning of the statute.
We think probably the strongest argument that may be made for
limitation on the coverage of § 2114, although petitioners do not
themselves make it as such, is that set forth in the opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v.
Reid, 517 F.2d 953 (1975), and amplified by our dissenting
colleagues today. This argument is certainly not without persuasive
power, and it would perhaps be controlling if there were
substantial ambiguity in the language Congress had enacted. But
there is no such ambiguity. We are not willing to narrow the plain
meaning of even a criminal statute on the basis of a gestalt
judgment as to what Congress probably intended.
As a final argument petitioners assert that they are vindicated
by the Solicitor General's earlier stipulation in
United
Page 469 U. S. 79
States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (CA7 1971),
vacated
and remanded, 414 U.S. 807 (1973). In that case we were faced
with the identical issue presented here, but we vacated and
remanded in light of the Solicitor General's concession that § 2114
only applied to postal crimes. [
Footnote 4] The Solicitor General now states that his
concession in
Hanahan was unwarranted. As we noted in
NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335,
434 U. S. 351
(1978), a governmental agency "is not disqualified from changing
its mind" concerning the construction of a statute.
See also
Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S. 212,
423 U. S. 222
(1976). Moreover, private agreements between litigants, especially
those disowned, cannot relieve this Court of performance of its
judicial function. It is our responsibility to interpret the intent
of Congress in enacting § 2114, irrespective of petitioners' or
respondent's prior or present views. "[T]he proper administration
of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of
[the] parties."
Young v. United States, 315 U.
S. 257,
315 U. S. 259
(1942). We agree that the Solicitor General's prior concession was
ill-advised, but it does not control this case.
Petitioners seek to clip § 2114 despite its plain terms, but
"[t]he short answer is that Congress did not write the statute that
way."
Russello, 464 U.S. at
464 U. S. 23.
[
Footnote 5] Instead,
Congress
Page 469 U. S. 80
selected language that penalized assaults or robberies of anyone
who is a custodian of "any money or other property of the United
States." It is beyond question that by using a pistol in an effort
to rob Agent Holmes, petitioners fell squarely within the
prohibitions of the statute.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
See United States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953 (CA2 1975);
United States v. Rivera, 513 F.2d 519 (CA2),
cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 948 (1975);
United States v.
Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730 (CA9 1974),
cert. denied, 420
U.S. 990 (1975)
[
Footnote 2]
Petitioners were also convicted of other crimes.
See
718 F.2d 1528 (1983).
[
Footnote 3]
As Justice Jackson stated:
"Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face
of the Act is inescapably ambiguous, and then I think we should not
go beyond Committee reports, which presumably are well considered
and carefully prepared. . . . [T]o select casual statements from
floor debates, not always distinguished for candor or accuracy, as
a basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended to enact
is to substitute ourselves for the Congress in one of its important
functions."
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U. S. 384,
341 U. S.
395-396 (1951) (concurring).
[
Footnote 4]
Despite the Solicitor General's view, Government prosecutors had
relied on § 2114 outside of the postal context.
See, e.g.,
United States v. O'Neil, 436 F.2d 571 (CA9 1970) (Customs
Service employee);
United States v. Sherman, 421 F.2d 198
(CA4) (military money custodian),
cert. denied, 398 U.S.
914 (1970);
Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (CA9 1963)
(same).
[
Footnote 5]
We disagree with petitioners' assertion that § 2114 as we have
read it does not fit well with other federal statutes, especially §
2112. The statutes are related but not duplicitous. Section 2112
prohibits only consummated robberies of any person -- whether
lawful custodian or not -- possessing any type of personal property
of the United States. The difference between § 2112 and § 2114 is
that the latter is specifically directed to authorized custodians,
and protects them against assaults accompanying both attempted and
completed robberies. Thus the statutes complement each other.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, dissenting.
When the literal application of a statute would produce a result
"demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters," the
actual legislative intent must control our disposition.
See
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.
S. 564,
458 U. S. 571
(1982). I believe a similar rule should apply to the literal
application of a federal criminal statute that is dramatically
broader than the coverage that its draftsmen intended.
I
A fair reading of the entire history of 18 U.S.C. § 2114
convinces me that Congress never intended it to apply outside of
the postal context. As the Court correctly notes,
ante at
469 U.S. 75, § 2114 "had
its genesis as a law to protect mail carriers from assault and
robbery of mail matter." The deterrent purpose of such a law
justifies the imposition of especially severe sanctions. For that
reason, heavy penalties have always been authorized, and sometimes
mandated, for assaults upon mail carriers.
The Second Congress, recognizing the importance of the delivery
of the mails, enacted the earliest predecessor to § 2114 in 1792.
That enactment, entitled "An Act to establish the Post-Office and
Post Roads within the United States," [
Footnote 2/1] stated in part that death was the penalty
for any
Page 469 U. S. 81
person who robbed "any carrier of the mail of the United
States." [
Footnote 2/2] The penalty
for robbery of a carrier of the mail remained the same when the
Third Congress passed the Act of May 8, 1794. [
Footnote 2/3] Almost three years later, Congress
made aiding and abetting the robbery of a mail carrier an offense
also subject to a penalty of death. [
Footnote 2/4]
Repeatedly in subsequent years Congress enacted special
legislation dealing with mail-robbery offenses. Such statutes were
enacted in 1799, [
Footnote 2/5]
1810, [
Footnote 2/6] 1825,
[
Footnote 2/7] 1872, [
Footnote 2/8] and
Page 469 U. S. 82
1909. [
Footnote 2/9] In the 1909
statute, Congress established a mandatory minimum sentence of
incarceration of 25 years for attempted robbery if the mail carrier
was wounded or had his life put in danger. As it had done
consistently for over a century, Congress thus ensured that the law
would provide special protection for a person within the postal
setting by making it clear that a crime upon such a person was an
unusually serious matter, not only because it was a federal
offense, but also because of the severity of the mandated penalty.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Page 469 U. S. 83
The history through the 1909 codification and in the immediate
years thereafter unequivocally demonstrates that § 2114's
predecessors were always intended for postal offenses. This case,
of course, involves an interpretation of the amendment of § 320 of
Title 18 that Congress adopted in 1935. The question is whether
Congress intended to abandon the postal nexus that had
characterized this legislation throughout its long history.
II
A review of the circumstances leading to the 1935 amendment
persuades me that Congress merely intended to broaden the
protection of postal workers. In 1934 two bills containing the
amendatory language that was enacted in the following year were
introduced in the House of Representatives and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary. [
Footnote
2/11] Neither of those bills was reported out of that Committee
which, of course, is the Committee that would normally process a
significant change in the general coverage of the Criminal Code. In
1935, the highest postal official, the Postmaster General, wrote a
letter to Representative James M. Mead, Chairman of the House
Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads, requesting an
amendment to cover assaults
Page 469 U. S. 84
on custodians of Government funds. [
Footnote 2/12] In both the House and the Senate it was
the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads that processed the
requested legislation.
See H.R.Rep. No. 582, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935); S.Rep. No. 1440, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935).
The 1935 amendment that was referred to the House Committee on
the Post Office and Post Roads was a noncontroversial measure that
Congressman Dobbins, a Member of that Committee, managed on the
floor of the House. In response to a query, he stated that
"[t]he only purpose of
Page 469 U. S. 85
the pending bill is to extend the protection of the present law
to property of the United States
in the custody of its postal
officials, the same as it now extends that protection to mail
matter in the custody of its postal officials. [
Footnote 2/13]"
When a
Page 469 U. S. 86
relatively minor piece of legislation of this sort is processed
with almost no debate on the floor of either House, the unambiguous
comment of a spokesman for the Committee that reported the bill is
particularly illuminating. In my opinion it is entitled to greater
weight than a general statement in the Committee Reports that is
little more than a paraphrase of the statutory language itself.
As Judge Friendly succinctly wrote in
United States v.
Reid, 517 F.2d 953 (CA2 1975):
"[T]he 1935 amendment was to a statute which stood in the
chapter of the Criminal Code dealing with offenses against the
postal service. No Congressman could have supposed that, in passing
an amendment to that section proposed by the Postmaster General and
recommended by the committees dealing with the postal service, he
was creating a new crime with respect to government property
generally."
Id. at 957, n. 3a.
III
Even after Congress enacted the 1935 amendment, thus structuring
the statute to read [
Footnote
2/14] in much the same form as it
Page 469 U. S. 87
exists today, the statute remained in the chapter dealing with
crimes against the Postal Service until the general revision of the
Judicial Code in 1948. No one contends that the 1948 revision
changed the meaning of the statute. [
Footnote 2/15]
Apparently it never occurred to any federal prosecutor that this
statute had any application outside the postal context until
several decades after it was amended. [
Footnote 2/16] Indeed, in 1973, when the question was
first considered at the top executive level of the Department of
Justice in
United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (CA7
1971),
vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 807 (1973),
Solicitor General Bork carefully examined the question, concluding
that it covered only postal crimes. The Solicitor General's
explanation of that conclusion merits quotation:
"In 1935 Congress added the more encompassing phrase 'money or
other property of the United States.' On its face the statute
covers the crime for which petitioner was convicted, as one
involving a 'person having lawful charge, control, or custody of
any . . . money or other property of the United States. . . .' We
agree with petitioner, however, that the legislative history
plainly shows that the statute was intended to apply only to postal
crimes."
"The bill amending the statute was designed to remedy the
anomalous situation which existed under the old statute. Before the
amendments the statute imposed a severe penalty on one who robbed
mail matter from the Postal Office but imposed no penalty on one
who
Page 469 U. S. 88
robbed money or other valuable property from the Post Office. .
. ."
"The change in the law had been advocated by the Post Office
Department and only that Department submitted a report on the bill
to the House and Senate Committees on Post Office and Post Roads. .
. . We therefore concede that Section 2114, as amended, was
designed only to cover robberies of post offices or postal
employees. [
Footnote 2/17]"
IV
Even if I am correct in my appraisal of the actual intent of
Congress, it is arguable that the statutory language is
sufficiently plain that it should nevertheless be given effect.
There are, however, three special concerns that lead me to the
contrary conclusion.
First is the relationship between this statute and other parts
of the Criminal Code. The general statute proscribing thefts of
Government property, 18 U.S.C. § 2112, carries a lesser penalty
even if violence accompanies the theft. [
Footnote 2/18] The more severe penalty in § 2114 is
only explicable if we assume that Congress wanted to provide a
special deterrent to crimes against an identifiable class of
federal employees. Moreover, that special deterrent is consistent
with the congressional decision in 1868 that mail carriers should
wear special uniforms that the Postmaster General prescribed.
See Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 20, 15 Stat.197.
Robbery of a uniformed postal worker fits squarely into the
rationale for § 2114. The assault in this case, however, was upon
an undercover agent not known to have any connection with
Page 469 U. S. 89
the Federal Government. This type of robbery is not
appropriately prosecuted under § 2114. [
Footnote 2/19]
Second, the severity of the mandatory minimum sentences -- 10
years if no actual or threatened violence is involved and 25 years
in a case of this kind -- is rather plainly disproportionate to the
offense if it covers every conceivable theft of Government property
-- even the attempted robbery of a Government-owned hammer.
[
Footnote 2/20] The Government
responds by noting that it is for Congress to decide if a penalty
is too harsh. [
Footnote 2/21]
This is quite true. But this response identifies my final -- and
most important -- concern.
It is Congress, rather than the Executive, that must define the
dimensions of the federal law enforcement program. Law enforcement
remains, and should remain, the primary responsibility of the
several States. Every increase in the power of the federal
prosecutor moves us a step closer to a national police force with
its attendant threats to individual liberty. For that reason, I
believe we have a special obligation to make sure that Congress
intended to authorize a novel assertion of federal criminal
jurisdiction.
Cf. Bell v. United States, 462 U.
S. 356,
462 U. S. 363
(1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting);
McElroy v. United
States, 455 U. S. 642,
455 U. S. 675
(1982) (STEVENS, J., dissenting);
United States v.
Altobella, 442
Page 469 U. S. 90
F.2d 310, 316 (CA7 1971). There is, of course, no doubt that
Congress has the authority to enact a law with the meaning the
Court finds in § 2114 today. I am not, however, convinced that
Congress actually intended to do so. I therefore respectfully
dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 232.
[
Footnote 2/2]
That section provided in pertinent part:
"That if any person or persons shall rob any carrier of the mail
of the United States, of such mail, or if any person shall rob the
mail, in which letters are sent to be conveyed by
post of
any letter or packet, or shall steal such mail, or shall steal and
take from or out of the same, or from or out of any post-office,
any letter or packet, such offender or offenders shall, on
conviction thereof, suffer death."
§ 17, 1 Stat. 237.
[
Footnote 2/3]
See ch. 23, § 17, 1 Stat. 361.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch.19, § 4, 1 Stat. 511.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 43, § 15, 1 Stat. 736-737 (up to 40
lashes and imprisonment not exceeding 10 years for first
mail-robbery conviction; death for first mail-robbery conviction,
if wounding the carrier or placing his life in danger by the use of
a dangerous weapon; death for second mailrobbery conviction; up to
30 lashes or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, for
attempted robbery of the mails).
[
Footnote 2/6]
Act of Apr. 30, 1810, ch. 37, § 19, 2 Stat. 598 (up to three
years' imprisonment for attempted robbery of the mails by
assaulting, shooting, or threatening the custodian with a dangerous
weapon).
[
Footnote 2/7]
Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 64, § 22, 4 Stat. 108-109 (5 to 10
years' imprisonment for first mail-robbery conviction; death for
first mail-robbery conviction if the carrier of the mails was
wounded or had his life put in danger by a dangerous weapon; death
for second mail-robbery conviction).
[
Footnote 2/8]
In 1872, Congress passed
"An Act to revise, consolidate, and
amend the Statutes relating to the Post-office Department."
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, §§ 1-327, 17 Stat. 283-330. Section
285 of the revision stated:
"That any person who shall rob any carrier, agent, or other
person intrusted with the mail, of such mail, or any part thereof,
shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned at hard labor not less
than five nor more than ten years; and if convicted a second time
of a like offence, or if, in effecting such robbery the first time,
the robber shall wound the person having custody of the mail, or
put his life in jeopardy by the use of dangerous weapons, such
offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor for the term of his
natural life."
17 Stat. 320. In contrast to the single grouping of offenses
related to mail robbery in previous statutes, the revision also
contained a separate section for attempting to rob a mail
carrier:
"That any person who shall attempt to rob the mail by assaulting
the person having custody thereof, shooting at him or his horse, or
threatening him with dangerous weapons, and shall not effect such
robbery, shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned at hard labor
not less than two nor more than ten years."
§ 287, 17 Stat. 320. The Revised Statutes of 1878 contained the
separate mail-robbery-related provisions, as renumbered. Rev.Stat.
§§ 5472, 5473.
[
Footnote 2/9]
In 1909 Congress codified the United States Penal Code, combined
the two sections that related to robbery of the mails, and placed
the single statute on mail robbery in the section entitled
"Offenses Against Postal Service." Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §
197, 35 Stat. 1126. The section provided:
"Whoever shall assault any person having lawful charge, control,
or custody of any mail matter, with intent to rob, steal, or
purloin such mail matter or any part thereof, or shall rob any such
person of such mail or any part thereof, shall, for a first
offense, be imprisoned not more than ten years; and if in effecting
or attempting to effect such robbery, he shall wound the person
having custody of the mail, or put his life in jeopardy by the use
of a dangerous weapon, or for a subsequent offense, shall be
imprisoned for twenty-five years."
Ibid. See 18 U.S.C. § 320 (1934 ed., Supp.
V).
[
Footnote 2/10]
Congress' attention was particularly called to the consolidation
of the previous two sections and the establishment of a single
25-year penalty. The Report on S. 2982, 60th Cong., 1st Sess.,
stated:
"This section is made up of two sections of the Revised
Statutes. Under those sections, one committing robbery of the
mails, or attempting to do so, and in doing or attempting to do
which makes use of a dangerous weapon, is subject to imprisonment
for life. This language has been omitted and the maximum
imprisonment which may be imposed has been reduced to twenty-five
years."
S.Rep. No. 10, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1908) (Report of the
Special Joint Committee on the Revision of the Laws). Throughout
the discussion on the provision, Congress had no doubt that it was
concerned with the mails.
Id. at 1906 ("The offense
intended to be reached by this provision is interfering with a
person having custody of the mail") (statement of Mr. Heyburn).
[
Footnote 2/11]
See H.R.Rep. No. 582, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2
(1935).
[
Footnote 2/12]
The text of the letter stated:
"The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of the 16th instant,
requesting a report on H.R. 5360, a bill providing for punishment
for the crime of robbing or attempting to rob custodians of
Government moneys or property."
"Assaults upon custodians of mail matter are punishable under
section 197 of the Federal Penal Code (18 U.S.C. 320), which
provides a penalty of 25 years' imprisonment if the custodian is
wounded or his life is put in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous
weapon. If the person assaulted is a custodian of Government funds
(not mail) the maximum punishment that can be imposed is
imprisonment for not more than 10 years and a fine of not more than
$5,000; and no penalty is provided for attempts to commit such
crimes. Recent years have witnessed a substantial increase in
crimes of the latter type and it is believed that section 197 of
the Penal Code should be amended so as to bring within its
provisions the crime of robbing or attempting to rob custodians of
Government moneys. Legislation to this effect was recommended in
the Postmaster General's annual report for 1933 and two bills, H.R.
6546 and H.R. 7214, were introduced and referred to the House
Judiciary Committee but neither bill was reported out by the
committee. The recommendation for the passage of this legislation
is renewed."
H.R.Rep. No. 582, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1935).
See
also Hearings before Subcommittee No. 8 of the House Committee
on the Post Office and Post Roads on H.R. 154, 3252, 5049, 5162,
5360, 5370, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1935) ("What we want to say
about this bill is the fact that, when a bandit, at the point of a
gun, holds up our postal employees and takes mail, we have a
25-year penalty for it, but if he comes into the post office and
does the same thing and takes away only cash, we are unable to give
him such a sentence") (statement of K. P. Aldrich, Chief Post
Office Inspector).
[
Footnote 2/13]
79 Cong.Rec. 8205 (1935) (emphasis added). The discussion that
led to the comment proceeded, in part, as follows:
"Mr. DOBBINS. I do not believe that the recommittal of this bill
would accomplish anything. It was rather thoroughly considered. It
did not merely receive perfunctory consideration. I think the
language to which objection was made the previous day when this
bill was considered, while it may be unusual language, it has been
in the statute a great many years. Since the objection was made the
other day I have taken up the matter with the legal advisor and
with the inspection force of the Post Office Department. They feel
it would be extremely dangerous to change the language of the
statute as it is now. As to new language being incorporated in the
act, I see no objection to changing it in the manner suggested by
the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Wolcott] at the last hearing of
the Consent Calendar."
"Mr. WOLCOTT. I stated at that time that I thought it was a very
poorly drafted bill, and I had hoped the committee would redraft it
and report it out. I do not insist upon my amendment so far as the
penalty is concerned. I think it is a very bad way to leave
legislation, making it mandatory upon a judge to give a particular
sentence, and no more or no less. If the committee want it that
way, however, I have no objection. I think, however, for the
purpose of safeguarding the integrity of our work here the language
on page 1 should be amended."
"
* * * *"
"Mr. DOBBINS. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Ohio objects to
the 25-year penalty provision provided in this bill. The penalty
clause is not new legislation. If this bill is not passed, the
statute will still contain the mandatory 25-year penalty."
"The only purpose of the pending bill is to extend the
protection of the present law to property of the United States in
the custody of its postal officials, the same as it now extends
that protection to mail matter in the custody of postal officials.
Aside from that it makes no change in the law. It just includes
property of the United States in addition to mail matter which is
protected; and let me say there are many custodians of postal
stations who have a great amount of money in their custody but
little mail; for instance in those substations where money orders
are sold. If a bandit attacks those employees seeking that money,
there is no way to prosecute the bandit under the present law, but
if he is merely after a postal card or a letter he can be
prosecuted."
"I think this makes a salutory change in the law. It is
advocated by the Post Office Department and it seems to me there
ought to be no objection to it. "
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/14]
The text of the statute read:
"Whoever shall assault any person having lawful charge, control,
or custody of any mail matter or of any money or other property of
the United States, with intent to rob, steal, or purloin such mail
matter, money, or other property of the United States, or any part
thereof, or shall rob any such person of such mail matter, or of
any money, or other property of the United States, or any part
thereof, shall, for the first offense, be imprisoned not more than
ten years; and if in effecting or attempting to effect such robbery
he shall wound the person having custody of such mail, money, or
other property of the United States, or put his life in jeopardy by
the use of a dangerous weapon, or for a subsequent offense, shall
be imprisoned twenty-five years."
Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 694, 49 Stat. 867.
[
Footnote 2/15]
The Court,
ante at
469
U.S. 75-76, correctly states that § 320 was renumbered §
2114 and transferred to the section of Title 18 entitled "Robbery
and Burglary" in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
797.
[
Footnote 2/16]
The earliest appeal using § 2114 outside of a postal setting
appears to be
Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (CA9
1963); it arose almost three decades after the 1935 amendment.
[
Footnote 2/17]
Memorandum for United States in
Hanahan v. United
States, O.T. 1972, No. 72-6454, pp. 2-3 (footnotes
omitted).
[
Footnote 2/18]
That section provides:
"Whoever robs another of any kind or description of personal
property belonging to the United States, shall be imprisoned not
more than fifteen years."
[
Footnote 2/19]
The Government stated at oral argument that § 2114 was activated
in this case instead of § 2112 because the former section covers
attempted robbery. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. However, in its brief the
Government concedes that it was not without statutory relief
because 18 U.S.C. § 111 prohibits assaults on Government employees
or officials listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1114, which includes "any
officer or employee of the Secret Service." A conviction under §
111, if involving a deadly or dangerous weapon, carries a fine of
not more than $10,000, or imprisonment of 10 years, or both. Jose
Garcia was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 111, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction. 718 F.2d 1528, 1530 (1983).
[
Footnote 2/20]
At oral argument, the Government stated that § 2114 covers the
robbery of a hammer that is Government property.
See Tr.
of Oral Arg. 25.
[
Footnote 2/21]
Id. at 26