In petitioners' action in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, they alleged and proved that they had been assaulted by an
officer of the Memphis Police Department who had a history of
violent behavior that was well known within the Department. The
court's judgment for petitioners, in addition to awarding
compensatory and punitive damages against the officer, also awarded
compensatory damages against the then Director of the Police
Department "in his official capacity," the court having found that,
although the Director had no actual knowledge of the officer's
disciplinary record because of the Department's administrative
policies, he should have known of the officer's dangerous
propensities. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment against
the Director, holding that he had acted in good faith and was
accordingly entitled to immunity. The court rejected petitioners'
contention that the action against the Director was tantamount to
an action against the city of Memphis, which could not claim the
qualified immunity that its agents could assert, and thus was
liable for the damages awarded against the Director. The court
concluded that the suit was against an individual, not the
city.
Held:
1. The city was not named as a defendant in this case because
the complaint was filed before
Monroe v. Pape,
365 U. S. 167 --
which held that municipalities could not be held liable under §
1983 -- was overruled by
Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Social Services, 436 U. S. 658. The
course of these proceedings after
Monell was decided,
however, made it abundantly clear that the action against the
Director was in his official capacity and only in that capacity,
and that petitioners claimed a right to recover damages from the
city. Thus, petitioners would be entitled to amend their pleadings
to conform to the proof and to the District Court's findings of
fact, and it is appropriate for this Court to decide the legal
issues without first insisting that such a formal amendment be
filed. Pp.
469 U. S.
469-471.
2. In cases under § 1983, a judgment against a public servant
"in his official capacity" imposes liability on the entity that he
represents. This rule was plainly implied in
Monell,
supra; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.
S. 678; and
Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U. S. 622. The
Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the distinction between
suits against
Page 469 U. S. 465
government officials "in their individual capacities" entitled
to qualified immunity, and suits in which only the liability of the
municipality itself was at issue. Pp.
469 U. S.
471-473.
719 F.2d 151, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. BURGER, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p.
469 U. S. 473.
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
469 U. S.
474.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The District Court entered a damages judgment against the
Director of the Memphis (Tenn.) Police Department in his official
capacity.
Brandon v. Allen, 516
F. Supp. 1355, 1361 (WD Tenn.1981). The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that he was protected by
qualified immunity.
Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151, 153
(1983). The question presented is whether the damages judgment is
payable by the city of Memphis because the Director was sued in his
official capacity or whether the Director is individually liable,
but shielded by qualified immunity.
Petitioners brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
[
Footnote 1] They alleged and
proved that Robert J. Allen, who was then
Page 469 U. S. 466
a Memphis police officer, viciously assaulted them on March 5,
1977. [
Footnote 2] They also
proved that Allen had a history of violent and irregular behavior
[
Footnote 3] that was well
known within the Police Department. [
Footnote 4]
Page 469 U. S. 467
E. Winslow Chapman had been the Director of the Memphis Police
Department for approximately six months when Officer Allen attacked
the petitioners. It is undisputed that Chapman had no actual
knowledge of Allen's disciplinary record. The District Court found,
however, that "Director Chapman
should have known that
Officer Allen's dangerous propensities created a threat to the
rights and safety of citizens." [
Footnote 5] The Director's lack of actual knowledge of
Allen's propensities was found to have been caused by the "policies
in effect during that period of Mr. Chapman's relatively new
administration," which policies included "the inherently deficient
nature of police administrative procedures involving the discovery
of officer misconduct." [
Footnote
6]
Petitioners sought damages from Officer Allen and from Director
Chapman. Allen did not defend the action and a default judgment was
entered against him for both compensatory
Page 469 U. S. 468
and punitive damages. The award against Director Chapman was,
however, limited to compensatory damages. [
Footnote 7] In its findings and conclusions, the
District Court repeatedly and unambiguously stated that the
liability of Director Chapman was "in his official capacity."
[
Footnote 8]
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment against Director
Chapman on the ground that he had "acted in good faith and is
accordingly entitled to immunity." [
Footnote 9] In explaining its holding, the Court of
Appeals rejected the petitioners' contention that the action
against Chapman was tantamount to an action against the city of
Memphis. The court wrote:
"The plaintiffs' argument that the qualified immunity is
inapplicable simply because they sued Chapman in his official
capacity is unavailing. Under
Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U. S. 622 . . . (1980), a
municipality is not entitled to claim the qualified immunity that
the city's agents can assert. But this is a suit against an
individual, not the city. In reality, plaintiffs are attempting to
amend their complaint so as to treat the Police Director as though
he were the City in order to avoid the qualified
Page 469 U. S. 469
immunity which shields Director Chapman. Such an argument is
without support in precedent or reason. [
Footnote 10]"
We granted certiorari to consider the validity of that argument.
467 U.S. 1204 (1984). We now reverse.
I
In
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167,
365 U. S.
187-192 (1961), the Court held that a city was not "a
person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That construction
of § 1983 protected municipalities from liability in cases of this
kind until June 6, 1978, when we decided
Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.
S. 658. The complaint in this case was filed on February
22, 1978, before
Monroe v. Pape was overruled; this
explains why the city of Memphis was not named as a defendant in
this case. The timing of the complaint may also explain why
petitioners did not expressly allege at the outset of the
litigation that they were suing Chapman in his official capacity as
Director of Police of the Memphis Police Department. [
Footnote 11]
The course of proceedings after
Monell was decided did,
however, make it abundantly clear that the action against Chapman
was in his official capacity and only in that capacity. Thus, in
petitioners' response to a defense motion for summary judgment,
petitioners' counsel stated:
"Defendant Chapman is sued in his official capacity as Director
of Police Services, City of Memphis, Tennessee. '[O]fficial
capacity suits generally represent an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent. . . .
Page 469 U. S. 470
Monell v. New York Department of Social Services,
436 U. S.
658,
436 U. S. 690 n. 55 (1978).'
[
Footnote 12]"
The point was reiterated in counsel's opening statement,
[
Footnote 13] in the trial
court's evidentiary rulings, [
Footnote 14] in the findings on liability, [
Footnote 15] and in the proceedings
relating to damages in which it was recognized that our decision in
Newport v. Facts Concert, Inc., 453 U.
S. 247 (1981), precluded an award of punitive damages
against Director Chapman. [
Footnote 16]
The Court of Appeals also repeatedly noted that the suit against
Chapman was "in his official capacity." [
Footnote 17] Moreover, while the appeal was pending
Director Chapman left office and was replaced by John D. Holt.
Pursuant to Rule 43(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Holt was automatically substituted as a party. [
Footnote 18] It is Director Holt
Page 469 U. S. 471
who appears as a respondent in this Court, and there is not even
an arguable basis for claiming that the record would support an
award of damages against him individually.
Given this state of the record, even at this late stage of the
proceedings, petitioners are entitled to amend their pleadings to
conform to the proof and to the District Court's findings of fact.
[
Footnote 19] Moreover, it
is appropriate for us to proceed to decide the legal issues without
first insisting that such a formal amendment be filed; this is
because we regard the record as plainly identifying petitioners'
claim for damages as one that is asserted against the office of
"Director of Police, City of Memphis," rather than against the
particular individual who occupied that office when the claim
arose. Petitioners are claiming a right to recover damages from the
city of Memphis.
II
In at least three recent cases arising under § 1983, we have
plainly implied that a judgment against a public servant "in his
official capacity" imposes liability on the entity that he
represents, provided, of course, the public entity received
Page 469 U. S. 472
notice and an opportunity to respond. [
Footnote 20] We now make that point explicit.
In
Monell, the City of New York was not itself
expressly named as a defendant. The suit was nominally against the
city's Department of Social Services, but that Department had no
greater separate identity from the city than did the Director of
the Department when he was acting in his official capacity. For the
purpose of evaluating the city's potential liability under § 1983,
our opinion clearly equated the actions of the Director of the
Department in his official capacity with the actions of the city
itself. [
Footnote 21]
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678
(1978), was an action against state officials rather than municipal
officers. Notwithstanding our express recognition that an order
requiring the Arkansas Commissioner of Corrections to pay the
plaintiff's counsel fees would be satisfied with state funds, we
sustained the order against an Eleventh Amendment challenge. We
considered it obvious that the State would pay the award because
the defendants had been sued in their "official capacities."
[
Footnote 22]
Less than two years later, we decided
Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U. S. 622
(1980), a § 1983 action in which the complaint named as defendants
"the city of Independence, City Manager Alberg, and the present
members of the City Council in their official capacities."
[
Footnote 23] We held that
the qualified immunity that protects public servants acting in good
faith was not available to those defendants. In so holding, we
expressly distinguished between suits against government officials
"in their individual capacities" on the
Page 469 U. S. 473
one hand, and those in which "only the liability of the
municipality itself was at issue," on the other. [
Footnote 24]
Because the Court of Appeals failed to apply that distinction in
this case, it erred. Our holding in
Owen, that a
municipality is not entitled to the shield of qualified immunity
from liability under § 1983, requires a reversal of the Court of
Appeals' judgment. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the
case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. [
Footnote
25]
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
That section provides, in pertinent part:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
[
Footnote 2]
The following excerpt from the District Court's findings of fact
adequately reflects the character of the incident:
"[Petitioners], who were seventeen years of age, drove to the
Memphis Hunt and Polo Club while on a date and parked in a dark and
secluded driveway area. . . . After approximately thirty minutes
had elapsed, a Chevrolet pickup truck entered the driveway where
[petitioners] were parked. . . . The driver of the truck identified
himself to [petitioners] as a police officer and showed them an
official police identification card bearing the name and photograph
of Robert J. Allen. . . . Mr. Allen ordered Mr. Muse to step out of
the car. After briefly questioning him, Officer Allen maliciously,
and without provocation, struck Mr. Muse in the neck and head with
his fist and then stabbed and cut Muse on the neck and ear with a
knife. As Officer Allen tried to break into the car where
[petitioner] Elizabeth A. Brandon was seated, Mr. Muse jumped into
the driver's side of the car and quickly drove away. Officer Allen
fired one shot at the escaping vehicle from his police revolver.
The bullet shattered the front window on the driver's side of the
car. Officer Allen followed plaintiffs in a high speed chase which
ended at St. Joseph's Hospital East, where plaintiffs sought
medical care and assistance and reported the unprovoked attack upon
them by Officer Allen."
Brandon v. Allen, 516 F.
Supp. 1355, 1357 (WD Tenn.1981).
[
Footnote 3]
Officer Allen's police file records contained 20 complaints
against him when he left the Memphis Police Department. They
included complaints for "serious abuse of police authority and use
of unnecessary force."
Id. at 1358.
[
Footnote 4]
The District Court found that Officer Allen's "reputation for
displaying maladaptive behavior was well known among Police
officers in his precinct."
Ibid. The court also found that
Allen's colleagues commented thusly when the March 5 incident was
reported to them: "They finally caught up with him; he's a quack;
Allen has done something this time that he can't get out of."
Ibid. Moreover, the court found that Allen's fellow
officers regarded him as a "mental case"; that Allen rode in his
squad car alone because of the reluctance of other officers to ride
with him; and that Allen boasted of killing a man in the course of
duty.
Ibid. Additionally, the District Court wrote:
"Officer Allen has often stated to other officers that he wished
he knew the exact bullet spread in the chest of the man he killed.
Officer Allen referred to a pair of gloves in his possession as his
'killing gloves,' and he would ceremoniously put those gloves on
his hands when he was called to the scene of a crime."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 5]
Id. at 1360.
[
Footnote 6]
Regarding these policies and procedures, the District Court
wrote:
"Due to a code of silence induced by peer pressure among the
rank-and-file officers and among some police supervisors, few -- if
any -- formal complaints were ever filed by police personnel.
Furthermore, when complaints were filed by citizens, little
disciplinary action was apparently taken against the offending
officer. Instead, a standard form letter, bearing Mr. Chapman's
signature, was mailed to each complainant, assuring the person that
appropriate action had been taken by the Police Department, even if
such action had not in fact been taken. This tended to discourage
follow-up measures by the complaining citizen. Perhaps, Mr.
Chapman's belief that it was better to take no disciplinary action
than to act and later be reversed by a review board was responsible
for this obviously inadequate solution. The end result was twofold:
1) Mr. Chapman's procedures were highly conducive to 'covering up'
officer misconduct; 2) the Police Director and many of his
supervisors were totally insulated from knowledge of wrongdoing by
officers as a result of policies in effect during that period of
Mr. Chapman's relatively new administration."
Id. at 1361.
[
Footnote 7]
Petitioner Muse recovered $21,310.75 in compensatory damages and
out-of-pocket expenses; petitioner Brandon recovered $5,000. App.
36a.
[
Footnote 8]
The District Court initially summarized: "This is a civil action
against the Honorable E. Winslow Chapman,
in his official
capacity as director of the Memphis Police Department and
former Memphis Police Officer Robert J. Allen." 516 F. Supp. at
1356 (emphasis added). It also later stated that "Mr. Chapman was
sued
in his official capacity as an agent of the Memphis Police
Department,"
id. at 1359 (emphasis added), and that
"[b]ecause Mr. Chapman,
as Police Director, should have
known of Officer Allen's dangerous propensities the Court finds
that he must be held liable
in his official capacity, to
the plaintiffs."
Id. at 1360 (emphasis added). Finally,
the court concluded: "Accordingly, Mr. Chapman
in his capacity
as Director of the Memphis Police Department must be held
liable to plaintiffs in this case."
Id. at 1361 (emphasis
added).
[
Footnote 9]
Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151, 154 (1983). The Court
of Appeals also held that the award of compensatory damages against
Allen was inadequate.
Id. at 153.
[
Footnote 10]
Id. at 154.
[
Footnote 11]
The caption and the body of the complaint named as a defendant,
"E. Winslow Chapman, Director of Police." Complaint,
Brandon v.
Allen, Civil Action No. 78-2076 (WD Tenn.). The Mayor of
Memphis was also named; the District Court granted summary judgment
in his favor. App. 13a-18a.
[
Footnote 12]
Brief for Petitioners 19.
[
Footnote 13]
Counsel stated:
"Mr. Chapman is sued in this lawsuit in his official capacity,
and as was stated in Monell versus New York City Department of
Social Services, a 1978 Supreme Court case, official capacity suits
generally represent only another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent."
Id. at 20-21. See also Tr. 202 ("Mr. Chapman is not
sued individually, but in his official capacity") (statement of
petitioners' counsel during trial).
[
Footnote 14]
The trial court held that certain out-of-court statements by
police officers were admissible because the officers were employed
by a party to the case, namely the city of Memphis.
See
id. at 17-21, 45-47.
[
Footnote 15]
See n 8,
supra.
[
Footnote 16]
Chapman's attorney argued that
Newport made it clear
that no award of punitive damages could be made against Chapman
"since he was found liable in his official capacity." See Brief for
Defendant E. Winslow Chapman on Issue of Damages in No. C-78-2076
(WD Tenn.), p. 1.
[
Footnote 17]
719 F.2d at 152, 153, 154;
see also Order Denying
Petition for Rehearing En Banc,
Brandon v. Allen, Nos.
82-5321, 83-5346 (CA6) ("We do not believe that a judgment for
damages against a police official in his official capacity is the
same as a judgment against the city itself").
[
Footnote 18]
Rule 43(c)(1), entitled "
Public officers; death or
separation from office," provides:
"When a public officer is a party to an appeal or other
proceeding in the court of appeals in his official capacity and
during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold
office, the action does not abate and his successor is
automatically substituted as a party. Proceedings following the
substitution shall be in the name of the substituted party, but any
misnomer not affecting the substantial rights of the parties shall
be disregarded. An order of substitution may be entered at any
time, but the omission to enter such an order shall not affect the
substitution."
See also this Court's Rule 40.3; Fed.Rule Civ.Proc.
25(d)(1).
[
Footnote 19]
See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 15(b); 3 J. Moore, Federal
Practice �15.13[2], p. 15-157 (2d ed.1984) (amendment to conform to
evidence may be made at any time);
id. at 15-168 (Rule
15(b) amendment allowed "so long as the opposing party has not been
prejudiced in presenting his case"); 6 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1491, pp. 453, 454 (1971 ed. and
Supp.1983) (Rule 15(b) is "intended to promote the objective of
deciding cases on their merits rather than in terms of the relative
pleading skills of counsel");
ibid. ("[C]ourts should
interpret [Rule 15(b)] liberally and permit an amendment whenever
doing so will effectuate the underlying purpose of the rule").
[
Footnote 20]
Here, the Police Department and the city received notice; no
claim is made that the Director of Police and the city were without
due notice of the proceedings.
[
Footnote 21]
We stated that
"official capacity suits generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent."
436 U.S. at
436 U. S. 658,
690, n. 55.
[
Footnote 22]
See 437 U.S. at
437 U. S.
693.
[
Footnote 23]
445 U.S. at
445 U. S.
630.
[
Footnote 24]
We wrote:
"The governmental immunity at issue in the present case differs
significantly from the official immunities involved in our previous
decisions. In those cases, various government officers had been
sued in their individual capacities. . . . Here, in contrast,
only the liability of the municipality itself is at issue, not
that of its officers. . . ."
Id. at
445 U. S. 638,
n. 18 (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 25]
As an alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, respondents argue that the record does not establish
that petitioners' injury was caused by the kind of "policy or
custom" that "may fairly be said to represent official policy" of
the city of Memphis.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at
436 U. S. 694.
Because the Court of Appeals did not address this argument, we do
not consider it.
Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,
465 U. S. 752,
465 U. S.
759-761, n. 6 (1984);
Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U. S. 144,
398 U. S. 147,
n. 2 (1970);
Duignan v. United States, 274 U.
S. 195,
274 U. S. 200
(1927).
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment.
This case presents two issues: (1) was the Director of Police,
as a matter of law, sued in his official capacity? (2) does a
judgment against the Director of Police in his official capacity
impose liability against the city?
It does not make a fetish out of orderly procedure to say that,
if a claimant seeks damages from a municipality, this should be
done by making it a named party defendant; that will assure the
municipality has notice and an opportunity to respond. At the
latest, a claimant should move at the close of the case to amend
the pleadings to conform with the proof.
Page 469 U. S. 474
It is an odd business for this Court, the third and final
tribunal, to treat the issue in a casual, offhand way; modern
pleading is less rigid than in an earlier day, but it is not too
much to ask that, if a person or entity is to be subject to suit,
the person or the entity should be named. I agree with JUSTICE
REHNQUIST that it is a dubious business to encourage such shoddy
pleading practices, but the courts have crossed that bridge. I join
only the judgment.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
The Court's decision in this case announces two propositions,
both of which seem wrong to me, but which in any event are mutually
inconsistent.
Part I holds that petitioners are entitled to amend their
pleadings in this Court to add the city of Memphis as a party
defendant. The Court relies for this holding on Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(b), and on citations to texts discussing that
Rule. The entire presentation of this issue in this Court consisted
of one sentence in petitioners' reply brief, and therefore the
Court is seriously handicapped in deciding the question --
particularly since it is the sort of issue with which this Court
almost never deals, but which is dealt with regularly by the
district courts. I think the Court is wrong in deciding this issue
as it does.
Rule 15(b) by its terms deals with "amendments to conform to the
evidence." It states in part:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure
so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues.
Page 469 U. S. 475
To come within the purview of the Rule, an issue must have been
tried 'by express or implied consent
of the parties,' and
it seems to me that Rule 15(b) must deal with the sort of
amendments to the pleadings that have in fact been impliedly
consented to by
parties already in the case, who raised no
objection when the factual matters that would support findings on
such an issue were offered in evidence. It cannot, by definition,
deal with a motion to
add a party defendant, since that
sort of an amendment could never have been 'tried by express or
implied consent
of the parties.'"
Even if the Rule could be construed to allow the addition of a
party defendant, however, the Rule still requires a finding that
the added party somehow consented to its addition through the
conduct of the trial. The Court glosses over this problem by citing
statements of
petitioners' counsel at trial, and some
other actions that occurred after trial,
ante at
469 U. S.
469-471, but it is hard to see how these references bear
on the
city's consent. Given the differences in proof that
might be involved in a suit against a city as opposed to a suit
against an individual, the opportunity for prejudice is obvious,
and I note that the Court reaches its conclusion based upon a trial
record that is not nearly as clear as the Court would have one
believe.
The Court's halfhearted and thoroughly unenlightening effort to
bring this case within the ambit of Federal Rules would be
unfortunate if confined only to the facts of this case, but I fear
that it bids fair to spawn uncertainty and upset settled authority
in an area with which we as a Court have virtually no experience,
and on a point that for all intents and purposes was not even
briefed.
Part II of the Court's opinion announces the novel proposition
that in suing a public official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a money
judgment against a public official "in his official capacity" is
collectible against the public entity that employs the official.
This startling doctrine -- that a plaintiff may name as defendant
only an agent, but nonetheless succeed in imposing
Page 469 U. S. 476
damages on the principal who was not named -- would seem to be
at odds with the most rudimentary notions of pleading, parties, and
of due process. It has long been the practice, of course, to sue a
government official in his "official capacity" when seeking
injunctive relief against a government entity. But I
suspect that process arose in no small part from the fact that
equity courts traditionally acted
in personam, enforcing
their decrees through the contempt power over the individual
defendant. See H. McClintock, Equity § 34 (2d ed.1948); W.
Stafford, Handbook of Equity, ch. 6 (1934). Money damages suits are
different; since the entity can be named as a defendant and its
property proceeded against
in rem, there is absolutely no
need for the rule adopted by the Court today, and indeed, no cases
of this Court can be cited in which money damages were awarded from
a government treasury when the only defendant named was an
individual sued "in his official capacity."
To support its result the Court relies upon its characterization
of three of our recent opinions. Quoting footnote 55 from the
opinion in
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Services, 436 U. S. 658,
436 U. S. 690
(1978), it concludes that "our opinion clearly equated the actions
of the Director of the Department in his official capacity with the
actions of the city itself."
Ante at
469 U. S. 472.
But to say that the "actions of the Director" are equated with the
actions of the city itself falls far short of saying that an action
naming only the Director as defendant can result in the judgment
against the city itself.
The Court also relies on the opinion in
Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U. S. 678
(1978), because, we are told, "we considered it obvious that the
State would pay the award because the defendants had been sued in
their
official capacities.'" Ante at 469 U. S. 472.
The Court in Hutto said, at the page cited in the present
opinion:
"The order does not expressly direct the Department of
Correction to pay the award, but since petitioners are sued in
their official capacities, and since they are represented
Page 469 U. S. 477
by the Attorney General, it is obvious that the award will be
paid with state funds."
437 U.S. at
437 U. S. 693.
Again, this observation is more readily interpreted as an estimate
of what would probably happen in the particular case, than as a
cryptic announcement of the novel doctrine for which the Court now
says that it stands.
The third case upon which the Court relies is
Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U. S. 622
(1980), which, as the Court points out, was a suit that named the
municipal corporation as a defendant as well as the public
officials. The statement of the Court in that case in footnote 18
that "[h]ere, in contrast, only the liability of the municipality
itself is at issue" would seem a straightforward recognition of the
fact that the city had been named as a defendant, not an
announcement of the new rule of pleading for which the Court takes
it today.
I think, therefore, that both "prongs" of the Court's decision
are wrong. But right or wrong, they cannot both be applied to the
same case. If in fact naming an official as a defendant "in his
official capacity" is sufficient to impose liability upon a
municipal corporation that was not named as a defendant, there is
absolutely no need to amend the pleadings at this late date to add
the city as a defendant. And if, at this late date, it is proper on
the basis of this record to add the city as a defendant,
petitioners have no need of the strained rule deduced from
Monell, Hutto, and
Owen that one need not name a
defendant in a lawsuit in order to take judgment against that
defendant.