Petitioner Board revoked the license of respondent Attic Lounge
after considering evidence that a Rhode Island judge, in related
criminal proceedings, ruled was obtained in a search of the Lounge
that violated the Fourth Amendment. This Court granted certiorari
to consider whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies
in civil liquor license revocation proceedings.
Held: Because the Lounge has since gone out of
business, the case is rendered moot.
Certiorari dismissed. Reported below:
463
A.2d 161.
PER CURIAM.
We granted certiorari in this case,
468 U.
S. 1216 (1984), to decide whether the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule applies in civil liquor license revocation
hearings. Some state courts have held that the exclusionary rule
applies.
See New York State Liquor Authority v. Finn's Liquor
Shop Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 647, 249 N.E.2d 440,
cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969);
Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board v. Leonardziak, 210 Pa.Super. 511, 233 A.2d 606 (1967)
(exclusionary rule applies in Liquor Control Board proceeding in
which Board imposed fine, but could also have revoked license).
Illinois, on the other hand, admits evidence obtained during a
search pursuant to an invalid warrant on
Page 469 U. S. 238
the reasoning that the State can and does require consent to a
warrantless search as a prerequisite to the issuance of a liquor
license.
Daley v. Berzanskis, 47 Ill. 2d
395,
269 N.E.2d
716 (1971).
In proceedings below, the Tiverton Board of License
Commissioners had considered evidence obtained during a search of
the Attic Lounge, a local liquor-serving establishment, in deciding
to revoke its license. A Rhode Island judge in related criminal
proceedings subsequently ruled that the evidence had been obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Rhode Island v.
Benoit, No. N2/77-51 (Super.Ct. Newport Cty., R.I., Jan. 16,
1978). The Attic Lounge then argued that evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment could not be admitted in a civil
hearing to revoke its liquor license. The Rhode Island Liquor
Control Administrator reversed the decision of the Tiverton
Commissioners on unrelated grounds, and directed that the license
be reinstated. After losing an appeal to the State Superior Court,
Civ. Action No. 78-2659 (Super.Ct., Providence Cty., R.I., Aug. 6,
1980), the Tiverton Commissioners obtained review in the Rhode
Island Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari naming both
the Attic Lounge and the Liquor Control Administrator as
respondents. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
exclusionary rule applies to liquor license revocation hearings.
463
A.2d 161 (1983).
After this Court issued a writ of certiorari to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, considered briefs on the merits, and commenced oral
argument, we learned that the Attic Lounge has gone out of
business. Counsel for both the Tiverton Board of License
Commissioners and the respondent Liquor Control Administrator
stated at oral argument that no decision on the merits by this
Court can now have an effect on the Attic Lounge's liquor license.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 28, 31. The case is therefore moot. At oral
argument counsel discussed some circumstances under which a
decision on the merits
Page 469 U. S. 240
by this Court might conceivably affect substantive rights of
interested parties. But as the Court noted in
DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312,
416 U. S. 320,
n. 5 (1974):
"'[S]uch speculative contingencies afford no basis for our
passing on the substantive issues [the petitioner] would have us
decide,'
Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45,
396 U. S.
49 (1969), in the absence of 'evidence that this is a
prospect of immediacy and reality.'
Golden v. Zwickler,
394 U. S.
103,
394 U. S. 109 (1969);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co.,
312 U. S.
270,
312 U. S. 273 (1941)."
It is appropriate to remind counsel that they have a "continuing
duty to inform the Court of any development which may conceivably
affect the outcome" of the litigation.
Fusari v.
Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379,
419 U. S. 391
(1975) (BURGER, C.J., concurring). When a development after this
Court grants certiorari or notes probable jurisdiction could have
the effect of depriving the Court of jurisdiction due to the
absence of a continuing case or controversy, that development
should be called to the attention of the Court
without
delay. See this Court's Rules 34.1(g) (petitioner's
statement of the case shall contain all that is material to the
issues); 34.2 (respondent's brief may correct any omission from
petitioner's statement); and 35.5 (parties may file supplemental
briefs after briefs on the merits to point out intervening matters
not contained in the merits briefs).
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as moot.
It is so ordered.