An application to stay the Federal District Court's order
granting a preliminary injunction against applicant's commencing
state court eminent domain proceedings under California law to
condemn certain geothermal leases obtained by respondent from the
Federal Government, is denied. Although the District Court has not,
as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), provided any
reviewing court with the benefit of its views as to the nature of
the irreparable injury that respondent might suffer or the
inadequacy of the remedy at law, or any other requirement for an
injunction, appeal as of right lies from the District Court to the
Court of Appeals. Moreover, it cannot be said with any certainty
that this Court would grant certiorari to review a Court of Appeals
judgment approving the District Court's action, or that the
District Court may not enter appropriate findings in support of an
injunction before the case is heard in the Court of Appeals.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, Circuit Justice.
Applicant asks that I stay an order of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California granting a
preliminary injunction against its commencing eminent domain
proceedings in state court against certain leasehold interests held
by respondent. On the basis of the papers submitted to me by both
parties, it seems to me that the applicant has made out a strong
case for the proposition that respondent had a plain and adequate
remedy at law through the process afforded under California's
eminent domain laws. A party seeking an injunction from a federal
court must invariably show that it does not have an adequate remedy
at law.
See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.
S. 620,
326 U. S. 622
(1946). Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, I have decided
not to grant the application for stay.
Respondent contends that it will suffer irreparable harm
Page 469 U. S. 1307
by applicant, an order would issue for immediate possession of
the property in question. It claims that loss of possession would
mean loss of its only source of revenue, and would lead to
immediate financial complications. On the merits, respondent's
contention is that applicant's exercise of eminent domain to
condemn its geothermal leases, which leases were obtained from the
Federal Government under the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, 84 Stat.
1566, 30 U.S.C. § 1001
et seq., would be preempted by the
provisions of that statute. Applicant in turn contends that
respondent would have had an adequate opportunity to raise this
federal claim in the state condemnation proceedings prior to being
deprived of possession.
See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Ann. §§
1255.420, 1255.430, 1250.360(h) (West 1982).
So far as the papers before me indicate, the only written
document issued by the District Court in connection with its
granting of an injunction contains only the following operative
language:
"The court finds that the plaintiffs have satisfied the
requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction and,
accordingly, a preliminary injunction will issue."
"The defendants, and each of them, are enjoined, pending further
order of this court, from filing in any way, instituting or
commencing any eminent domain or condemnation proceedings or any
litigation affecting plaintiff's interest of whatsoever kind or
character in the property, real or personal, which is the subject
of this litigation. "
Thus, the District Court has not provided any reviewing court
with the benefit of its views as to the nature of the irreparable
injury that respondent might suffer or the inadequacy of the remedy
at law, or any other requirement for an injunction. If this were
the only order or finding issued by the District Court, it seems to
me to wholly fail to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d),
which provides that
Page 469 U. S. 1308
"[e]very order granting an injunction and every restraining
order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance. . . ."
While this Court has, on another occasion, summarily reversed
the judgment of a District Court which failed to comply with Rule
65(d),
see Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.
S. 473 (1974), in that case, an appeal lay directly from
the District Court to this Court. Here, appeal as of right lies
from the District Court to the Court of Appeals. I have previously
expressed my view that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a),
grants the authority to issue stays of district court orders
pending appeal to the court of appeals,
see Atiyeh v.
Capps, 449 U. S. 1312,
449 U. S.
1313 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers), but I have
also noted my belief that such an exercise should be reserved for
the unusual case.
Ibid. Here the absence of appropriate
findings by the District Court makes it impossible for me to
determine whether the District Court properly required the
respondent to show that it had no adequate remedy at law in the
state proceedings. The very absence of these findings, if the
District Court entered no further order than the one that I have
quoted, would seem to be a significant departure from the
requirements of Rule 65(d); but I cannot say with any certainty
that this Court would grant certiorari to review a judgment of the
Court of Appeals which approved the action of the District Court
here, nor can I say that the District Court may not enter
appropriate findings in support of an injunction before the case is
heard in the Court of Appeals.
The application for a stay is accordingly denied.