Respondents filed an action in a Maryland state court against
petitioner officers of the state college where respondents were
employed, claiming employment discrimination in violation of,
inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 (Civil
Rights Acts). Petitioners removed the action to Federal District
Court. Because the Civil Rights Acts contain no statute of
limitations, the District Court borrowed a 6-month limitations
period from a Maryland statute that establishes a procedure for
administrative resolution of employment discrimination complaints,
and granted petitioners' motion to dismiss the action because the
complaint had been filed more than six months after respondents'
causes of action had accrued. The Court of Appeals found the
6-month period inappropriate, and, applying Maryland's 3-year
statute of limitations for all civil actions for which a statutory
limitation period is not otherwise provided, held that the action
was not time-barred.
Held: While federal courts properly turn to state law
for statutes of limitations in actions under the Civil Rights Acts,
borrowing the limitations period from an administrative employment
discrimination statute was inappropriate. Both the practical
differences between litigation and an administrative proceeding and
the divergence in the objectives of the federal causes of action
and the state administrative procedure lead to this conclusion. On
the one hand, the practical difficulties facing an aggrieved person
in an action under the Civil Rights Acts involve such matters as
recognizing the constitutional dimensions of the claimed injury,
obtaining counsel or preparing to proceed
pro se,
establishing the amount of damages, and preparing legal documents.
On the other hand, the sole responsibility of an aggrieved person
who invokes the state administrative remedies is to make, sign, and
file a complaint with the Human Relations Commission, which then
has the burden of investigating and developing the case. And the
goals of the Civil Rights Acts to compensate persons whose civil
rights have been violated and to prevent the abuse of state power
are far different from the goals of the state administrative
employment procedure. The administrative scheme, including the
short statute of limitations, encourages prompt identification,
conciliation, and private settlement of employment disputes through
the State Commission's intervention. Pp. 47-55.
710 F.2d 160, affirmed.
Page 468 U. S. 43
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p.
468 U. S. 56.
REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which BURGER, C.J., and O'CONNOR, J., joined,
post, p.
468 U. S.
56.
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a state law, establishing a
procedure for administrative resolution of employment
discrimination complaints, provides an appropriate statute of
limitations for actions brought under the Reconstruction Era Civil
Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
et seq. We hold that it does
not.
I
Respondents James Grattan and Adrienne Hedman were employees of
Coppin State College, a predominantly Negro college in Maryland.
Their primary responsibility was to recruit students of diverse
ethnic backgrounds to attend the school. App. 34-39. Respondents
received notice in June, 1976, that their contracts would not be
renewed because the college "was not satisfied with the recruitment
efforts of the Minority Affairs office."
Id. at 34, 38. In
response, respondents, who are white, filed complaints of racial
discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Page 468 U. S. 44
Commission. While those claims were pending, they filed suit in
state court in February, 1977, naming as defendants the petitioners
in the present action -- the president of the College, the
vice-president of student affairs, and the chairman and executive
director of the board of trustees. In October, 1981, on leave of
the court, [
Footnote 1]
respondents filed an amended complaint, specifically alleging that
they were victims of racial discrimination, and, in Hedman's case,
gender discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, [
Footnote 2] 1983, [
Footnote 3] 1985, [
Footnote 4] 1986, [
Footnote 5] and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that their discharge also violated the
First Amendment and various provisions of the Maryland
Constitution. App. 11-33. Petitioners removed the action from state
to federal court. Thereafter, they filed a motion
Page 468 U. S. 45
to dismiss on the ground that respondents' claims were barred by
the applicable statute of limitations.
Id. at 39-40.
Because the federal statutes under which respondents sued do not
themselves contain a statute of limitations, the District Court
borrowed a limitations period from a state statute prohibiting
discriminatory practices in employment. Md.Ann.Code, Art. 49B, §
9(a) (1979); [
Footnote 6]
see App. to Pet. for Cert. 23, 34. The District Court
identified a "commonality of purpose" between the federal rights
asserted and the rights defined in the state statute, and concluded
that it was reasonable to subject the federal claims to the 6-month
statute of limitations on filing employment discrimination
complaints with an administrative body, the Maryland Human Affairs
Commission.
Id. at 34-36. Because respondents' complaint
had been filed more than six months after their cause of action
accrued, the District Court dismissed the suit as time-barred.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, relying on its
previous decision in
McNutt v. Duke Precision Dental and
Orthodontic Laboratories, Inc., 698 F.2d 676 (1983), found the
6-month period selected by the District Court inappropriate for
suits brought under the Civil Rights Acts because the state law
"governed the limitation of administrative proceedings which were
informal, investigatory and conciliatory in nature." 710 F.2d 160,
162 (1983). The Court of Appeals applied Maryland's 3-year statute
of limitations for all civil
Page 468 U. S. 46
actions for which the Code does not otherwise provide a
limitations period. Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 5-101
(1984). [
Footnote 7] Finding
that Grattan's and Hedman's amended complaint stated claims that
related back to the action originally filed in the Maryland court
some eight months after their cause of action arose, [
Footnote 8] the Court of Appeals held that
the action was not time-barred, and remanded to the District
Court.
We granted certiorari to resolve confusion in the Circuits
regarding reliance upon a state administrative statute of
limitations in a federal civil rights suit. [
Footnote 9] 464 U.S. 981 (1983). We now
affirm.
Page 468 U. S. 47
II
The century-old Civil Rights Acts do not contain every rule of
decision required to adjudicate claims asserted under them. In the
absence of specific guidance, Congress has directed federal courts
to follow a three-step process to borrow an appropriate rule. 42
U.S.C. § 1988. [
Footnote 10]
First, courts are
Page 468 U. S. 48
to look to the laws of the United States "so far as such laws
are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights
statutes] into effect."
Ibid. If no suitable federal rule
exists, courts undertake the second step by considering application
of state "common law, as modified and changed by the constitution
and statutes" of the forum State.
Ibid. A third step
asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to
apply state law only if it is not "inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States."
Ibid.
A
The task before the courts in the present case was to identify a
limitations period governing respondents' claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. [
Footnote 11] The Civil Rights Acts do not provide the
rule. Only 42 U.S.C. § 1986 contains a statute of limitations.
[
Footnote 12] Other sources
of federal law
Page 468 U. S. 49
are no more helpful. On several occasions, this Court has
rejected arguments that a particular federal statute of limitations
applied,
O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.
S. 318,
233 U. S.
324-325 (1914) (rejecting federal statute of limitations
for suits for a penalty, because civil actions under Civil Rights
Act are remedial), or has implicitly rejected linkage with other
federal statutes, emphasizing the independence of the remedial
scheme established by the Reconstruction Era Acts.
See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.
S. 454,
421 U. S.
459-461 (1975) (§ 1981 and Title VII (Equal Employment
Opportunity) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide independent
rights and remedies);
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U. S. 409,
392 U. S.
416-417, and n. 20 (1968) (enactment of Title VIII (Fair
Housing) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 "had no effect upon §
1982"). It is now settled that federal courts will turn to state
law for statutes of limitations in actions brought under these
civil rights statutes.
See, e.g., Chardon v. Fumero Soto,
462 U. S. 650,
462 U. S.
655-656 (1983).
B
We have described in a variety of ways the task of a court when
determining which of a set of arguably relevant state statutes of
limitations should govern a suit brought under the Civil Rights
Acts. For example, in
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
supra, at
421 U. S. 462,
an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, we described the goal as
that of identifying the "most appropriate" state statute of
limitations. In
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.
S. 478,
446 U. S.
483-484 (1980), an action under § 1983, we suggested
that the court should select "the state law of limitations
governing an analogous cause of action."
See also Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, supra, at
421 U. S. 469
("that [period of limitations] which the State would apply if the
action had been brought in a state court") (MARSHALL, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). We agree with the Court
of Appeals that the District Court's selection of Art. 49B of the
Maryland Code was
Page 468 U. S. 50
erroneous under this approach. The functional differences
between the federal causes of action and the state administrative
law make Art. 49B an inappropriate analog from which to borrow to
effectuate Congress' purpose in enacting the Civil Rights Acts.
In the Civil Rights Acts, Congress established causes of action
arising out of rights and duties under the Constitution and federal
statutes. These causes of action exist independent of any other
legal or administrative relief that may be available as a matter of
federal or state law. They are judicially enforceable in the first
instance. The statutes are characterized by broadly inclusive
language. They do not limit who may bring suit, do not limit the
cause of action to a circumscribed set of facts, nor do they
preclude money damages or injunctive relief. An appropriate
limitations period must be responsive to these characteristics of
litigation under the federal statutes. A state law is not
"appropriate" if it fails to take into account practicalities that
are involved in litigating federal civil rights claims and policies
that are analogous to the goals of the Civil Rights Acts.
Applying these criteria for disqualifying a particular state
law, we begin with the observation that borrowing an administrative
statute of limitations ignores the dominant characteristic of civil
rights actions: they belong in court.
McDonald v. West
Branch, 466 U. S. 284,
466 U. S. 290
(1984). Assuring the full availability of a judicial forum
necessitates attention to the practicalities of litigation.
Litigating a civil rights claim requires considerable preparation.
An injured person must recognize the constitutional dimensions of
his injury. He must obtain counsel, or prepare to proceed
pro
se. He must conduct enough investigation to draft pleadings
that meet the requirements of federal rules; [
Footnote 13] he must also establish
Page 468 U. S. 51
the amount of his damages, prepare legal documents, pay a
substantial filing fee or prepare additional papers to support a
request to proceed
in forma pauperis, and file and serve
his complaint. At the same time, the litigant must look ahead to
the responsibilities that immediately follow filing of a complaint.
He must be prepared to withstand various responses, such as a
motion to dismiss, as well as to undertake additional
discovery.
The practical difficulties facing an aggrieved person who
invokes administrative remedies are strikingly different.
Maryland's scheme is modeled on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., and is typical of
statutes in some 30 States.
See Pet. for Cert. 10, and n.
7. A person's sole responsibility under this scheme is to "make,
sign and file with the Human Relations Commission . . . a complaint
in writing under oath." Md.Ann.Code, Art. 49B, § 9(a) (1979). The
complaint need contain no more than the name and address of the
person or entity alleged to have committed the discriminatory act,
"the particulars thereof," and "other information as may be
required from time to time by the Commission."
Ibid.
Although the complainant is potentially liable for a malicious
filing, § 12(b), he has no obligation to investigate his
allegations more fully. The entire burden of investigating and
developing the case rests on the Human Rights Commission, which is
empowered to issue subpoenas, conduct hearings, and seek judicial
enforcement of its orders. §§ 11-12.
When a legislature selects a statute of limitations to govern a
particular cause of action, it takes into account the burdens borne
by the parties to a suit of that sort. Article 49B,
Page 468 U. S. 52
§ 9(a), tells a person when he must act if he wishes to request
the aid of the Human Rights Commission in resolving an employment
discrimination dispute. The time limit established by the Maryland
Legislature reflects in part the minimal burden state law places on
the administrative complainant, which does not correspond in any
significant way to the substantial burden federal law places on a
civil rights litigant. [
Footnote
14] Indeed, Maryland's administrative procedure acknowledges
these different burdens. Where a complainant has only six months to
initiate a grievance, the Human Affairs Commission -- which, after
receiving notice of the complaint, essentially assumes the role of
"litigant" -- may engage in investigation and negotiations toward
settlement for at least two years before bringing formal charges
against an employer. Code of Maryland Regulations
14.03.01.01-14.03.01.03.A (1983).
A legislative definition of a statute of limitations also
reflects a policy assessment of the state causes of action to which
it applies.
Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC,
432 U. S. 355,
432 U. S. 367
(1977) ("State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods
with national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal
courts to assure that the importation
Page 468 U. S. 53
of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the
implementation of national policies"). For instance, the length of
a limitations period will be influenced by the legislature's
determination of the importance of the underlying state claims, the
need for repose for potential defendants, considerations of
judicial or administrative economy, and the relationship to other
state policy goals. To the extent that particular state concerns
are inconsistent with, or of marginal relevance to, the policies
informing the Civil Rights Acts, the resulting state statute of
limitations may be inappropriate for civil rights claims. [
Footnote 15]
The divergence between the goals of the federal civil rights
statutes and of the state employment discrimination administrative
statute is clear in the present case. The goals of the federal
statutes are compensation of persons whose civil rights have been
violated, and prevention of the abuse of state power.
Board of
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at
446 U. S. 488;
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584,
436 U. S.
590-591 (1978). That these are not the goals of the
statute empowering Maryland's administrative agency to resolve
employment discrimination complaints is apparent both because the
remedial authority of the agency is limited, [
Footnote 16] and because the state
Page 468 U. S. 54
scheme does not create a private right of action. [
Footnote 17] The stated goal of the
state administrative procedure is the prompt identification and
resolution of employment disputes. The administrative scheme,
including a short statute of limitations, encourages conciliation
and private settlement through the agency's intervention in live
disputes.
Petitioners urge the prompt assertion and resolution of public
employee disputes in particular, noting that this important
policy
"is clearly mirrored in . . . an abbreviated period for the
filing of claims of employment discrimination with the state fair
employment practices agency,"
enacted in Maryland and most other States. Brief for Petitioners
30, and n.19. That policy, keyed to a classification of plaintiffs,
cannot preempt the broadly remedial purposes of the Civil Rights
Acts, which make no distinction among persons who may look to the
court to vindicate their federal constitutional rights. If the
statute of limitations in Art. 49B is "abbreviated" precisely
because it effectuates the narrower state goal, a federal court
should look elsewhere in state law for an appropriate limitations
period.
Similarly, the state petitioners argue that the short
limitations period in Art. 49B should be applied here, because it
affords public officers "some reasonable protection from the
seemingly endless stream of unfounded, and often stale, lawsuits
brought against them." Brief for Petitioners 30. This contention
undercuts, rather than buttresses, the case for applying the
limitations period embodied in Art. 49B to federal civil rights
actions. The statement suggests that the legislative
Page 468 U. S. 55
choice of a restrictive 6-month limitations period reflects in
part a judgment that factors such as minimizing the diversion of
state officials' attention from their duties outweigh the interest
in providing employees ready access to a forum to resolve valid
claims. That policy is manifestly inconsistent with the central
objective of the Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes, which is
to ensure that individuals whose federal constitutional or
statutory rights are abridged may recover damages or secure
injunctive relief.
See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.
S. 225,
407 U. S. 239
(1972);
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S.
88,
403 U. S. 97
(1971);
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.
S. 668,
373 U. S.
671-672 (1963);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.
S. 167,
365 U. S. 173
(1961). [
Footnote 18]
III
In sum, the Court of Appeals properly applied the tests
established by our prior cases for determining whether a particular
state statute of limitations should control a suit brought under
the Civil Rights Acts. Both the practical differences between the
administrative proceeding contemplated by the Maryland statute and
a civil action in a federal court, and the divergence in the
objectives of the state administrative procedure to resolve
employment discrimination suits and a federal cause of action to
vindicate constitutional rights, lead us to conclude that borrowing
the limitations period from Maryland's Art. 49B was inappropriate.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
Page 468 U. S. 56
[
Footnote 1]
Respondents' original state court action sought a declaratory
judgment that their dismissals were arbitrary and without basis in
law or fact, and constituted a deprivation of property without due
process and a denial of equal protection. App. 6-7. The state court
sustained petitioners' supplemental demurrer on the ground that the
facts set forth in the complaint did not state a case appropriate
for declaratory relief, but granted leave to amend.
Id. at
11.
[
Footnote 2]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 guarantees the right to be free from
racial discrimination in specific activities, such as making
contracts and bringing suit.
[
Footnote 3]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 confers a private federal right of action
for damages and injunctive relief against state actors who deprive
any citizen or person within the jurisdiction of the United States
of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws."
See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.
S. 167 (1961) (constitutional deprivations);
Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980)
(statutory violations).
[
Footnote 4]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) creates a private right of action for
damages for injury or deprivation caused by a conspirator to
deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws."
[
Footnote 5]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1986 creates a right to recover damages "in an
action on the case" brought within one year after the cause of
action has accrued against every person who has knowledge of, and
power to prevent, a § 1985 conspiracy, but neglects or refuses to
act.
[
Footnote 6]
Maryland assures
"all persons equal opportunity in receiving employment and in
all labor management-union relations regardless of race, color,
religion, ancestry or national origin, sex, age, marital status, or
physical or mental handicap unrelated in nature and extent so as to
reasonably preclude the performance of the employment."
Md.Ann.Code, Art. 49B, § 14 (1979). Article 49B prohibits
discrimination in public accommodations and in housing, as well as
in employment. §§ 5, 8, 16, 20-22 (1979 and Supp.1983).
[
Footnote 7]
"A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from
the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a
different period of time within which an action shall be
commenced."
Petitioners do not contest here that this is the appropriate
state law statute of limitations for federal civil rights actions
if Art. 49B, § 9(a), does not apply.
[
Footnote 8]
The District Court held that the First Amendment claim was
governed by Maryland's 3-year statute of limitations, but that it,
too, was time-barred, because it did not relate back, under the
analysis required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, to the
action filed in state court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37-38. That
ruling was not appealed. 710 F.2d at 162. The Court of Appeals'
holding that respondents' other claims relate back to the action
filed in state court is not at issue in the present case.
[
Footnote 9]
Several Circuits have adopted positions similar to that taken by
the Court of Appeals in this case.
See, e.g., Childers v.
Independent School Dist. No. 1 of Bryan County, 676 F.2d 1338,
1342-1343 (CA10 1982) (rejecting applicability of Oklahoma's
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act 120-day limitation on filing
administrative claims to public employee's claim of discrimination
infringing First Amendment rights, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380, 384, n. 5 (CA10
1978) (rejecting Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act 6-month period
in § 1981 action because "limitations periods for state statutory
nonjudicial proceedings are inapplicable to civil rights actions in
courts of law"),
overruled on other grounds, Garcia v.
Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (CA10 1984) (en banc) (holding that all §
1983 claims in the Circuit will be characterized uniformly as
actions for injuries to personal rights for statute of limitations
purposes, rather than in terms of the specific facts generating a
particular suit);
Chambers v. Omaha Public School Dist.,
536 F.2d 222, 225-228 (CA8 1976) (rejecting applicability of
Nebraska's Fair Employment Practices Act 180-day administrative
statute of limitations to public employee's action under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983, alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations
in nonrenewal of contract);
Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
517 F.2d 520, 521-522 (CA6 1975) (rejecting applicability of Ohio's
1-year Civil Rights Act administrative statute of limitations to
private employee's claim of racial discrimination in promotion and
discharge, brought under 42 U.S.C.1981);
Garner v.
Stephens, 460 F.2d 1144, 1147-1148, and n. 1 (CA6 1972)
(Kentucky Civil Rights Commission's 90-day statute of limitations);
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co.,
427 F.2d 476, 488-489 (CA7) (rejecting applicability of Illinois'
120-day Fair Employment Practices Act administrative claim statute
of limitations to private employee's § 1981 action),
cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
But see Warner v.
Perrino, 585 F.2d 171, 173-175 (CA6 1978) (applying Ohio's
180-day fair housing law limitations period to § 1982 action);
Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233, 1237-1238 (CA8 1978)
(Missouri's 180-day fair housing law barred §§ 1981, 1982 claims,
but not § 1983 claim against state officials);
Warren v. Norman
Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730, 733-735 (CA8) (applying Nebraska's
Civil Rights Act 180-day limitation to housing discrimination claim
filed under §§ 1981, 1982, where state law specifically creates a
civil action for private litigants as alternative to administrative
relief),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975).
The First Circuit has upheld reliance upon administrative
statutes of limitations.
See, e.g., Burns v. Sullivan, 619
F.2d 99 (applying Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
6-month limitation on filing administrative complaints in public
employee's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983),
cert. denied,
449 U.S. 893 (1980). The First Circuit has followed
Burns
in
Carter v. Supermarkets General Corp., 684 F.2d 187, 189
(1982) (private employee, § 1981 action);
Holden v. Commission
Against Discrimination of Massachusetts, 671 F.2d 30 (claim of
racially motivated discharge brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 843 (1982);
Hussey v.
Sullivan, 651 F.2d 74 (1981) (per curiam) (claim of political
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3)).
[
Footnote 10]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in pertinent part:
"The jurisdiction . . . conferred on the district courts by the
[civil and criminal Civil Rights Titles] for the protection of all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their
vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the
laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to
carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not
adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary
to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such
civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and
disposition of the cause. . . ."
For discussion of the history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and its
complementary role in the scheme of federal civil rights
legislation,
see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.
S. 693,
411 U. S. 702,
and n. 13,
411 U. S.
703-706, and nn. 18-19 (1973).
[
Footnote 11]
Neither the District Court, the Court of Appeals, nor the
parties have suggested that the statute of limitations inquiry
would vary depending on the particular federal civil rights statute
under which a person claimed relief. That issue is not presented to
us.
[
Footnote 12]
Because our affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judgment
reinstates respondents' claims (with the exception of the First
Amendment claim,
n 8,
supra), we have no occasion to discuss the District
Court's conclusion that the explicit 1-year statute of limitations
in § 1986 did not control that claim because the related § 1985
claim was time-barred by the state law 6-month limitations
period.
[
Footnote 13]
Although the pleading and amendment of pleadings rules in
federal court are to be liberally construed, the administration of
justice is not well served by the filing of premature, hastily
drawn complaints. The recent revision of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 emphasizes that an attorney or
pro se
litigant certifies that,
"to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry, [a complaint] is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it
is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation."
[
Footnote 14]
It is true that we have "borrowed" a 6-month administrative
statute of limitations in the labor context,
DelCostello v.
Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151
(1983), but we do not find that decision relevant to the civil
rights issue before us. In
DelCostello, we held that the
limitations period fixed by § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act for filing unfair labor practice claims with the National Labor
Relations Board offered the most analogous limitations period for
suits alleging breaches of the collective bargaining agreement. The
importance of uniformity in the labor law field, and "the realities
of labor relations and litigation,"
id. at
462 U. S. 167,
informed our decision not to adopt a state statute of limitations
that would be at odds with the purpose of the substantive federal
law. Congress, for whatever reason, sees no need for national
uniformity in all aspects of civil rights cases.
See Robertson
v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584,
436 U. S. 594,
n. 11 (1978). Moreover, the state administrative statute here,
unlike the federal statute we relied on in
DelCostello, is
not functionally related to Congress' policy enacted in the
relevant substantive law.
[
Footnote 15]
To this degree, the second and third steps of the § 1988 inquiry
shade into each other. The step three inquiry -- whether a state
rule of decision is inconsistent with the Constitution or federal
law -- is not necessary to resolve this case, but must be made, for
example, when a state legislature has enacted a statute of
limitations specifically applicable to actions brought under one or
all of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts.
See, e.g., Johnson
v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (CA4 1978) (rejecting Virginia's
express 1-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions as
discriminating against federal cause of action).
See also
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610,
155 U. S. 615
(1895) (patent action) (state statute of limitations must operate
uniformly on state and federal rights, and "must give a party a
reasonable time to sue").
[
Footnote 16]
If the Human Affairs Commission concludes that an employer has
violated the statute, it has authority to issue a cease-and-desist
order, which may include reinstatement or hiring, with or without
backpay limited to a 2-year period, and other equitable relief.
Md.Ann.Code, Art. 49B, § 11(e) (1979). At the time of the District
Court's decision, monetary damages were not available to public
employees. § 7(b) (1979). Maryland has since amended the law. 1980
Md.Laws, ch. 568.
[
Footnote 17]
Maryland's administrative procedure provides for judicial review
on the record of a final administrative decision. Md.Ann.Code, Art.
49B § 12 (Supp.1983). The statute does not create a private right
of action, nor provide for
de novo judicial consideration
of an employment discrimination complaint. § 12(a). These
restrictions limit the state procedure in deterring employment
discrimination.
[
Footnote 18]
As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted,
"[i]t would be anomalous for a federal court to apply a state
policy restricting remedies against public officials to a federal
statute that is designed to augment remedies against those
officials, especially a federal statute that affords remedies for
the protection of constitutional rights."
Pauk v. Board of Trustees of City University of New
York, 654 F.2d 856, 862 (1981) (rejecting applicability of
l-year and 90-day limitation period in N.Y.Gen.Mun.Law § 50-i
(McKinney Supp.1983-1984) for actions against city or its employees
to action brought under § 1983),
cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1000 (1982).
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
The question is what is the appropriate statute of limitations
applicable to this Maryland employment discrimination case under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3). The Court of Appeals in
McNutt v. Duke Precision Dental Orthodontic Laboratories,
Inc., 698 F.2d 676 (CA4 1983), and again in this case, held
that in all claims for which no other limitations period is
specifically provided, Maryland's general 3-year period of
limitations is the most appropriate for federal courts to apply in
actions under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. The Court of
Appeals rejected petitioners' reliance on Maryland's 6-month period
of limitations applicable to state administrative complaints of
employment discrimination. As petitioners have adduced no
persuasive reason to doubt that the Court of Appeals correctly
decided this question, I agree with the judgment of the Court.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
O'CONNOR join, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment of the Court, agreeing with the Court
of Appeals that, in these circumstances, the statute of limitations
imposed on administrative complaints filed under Md.Ann.Code, Art.
49B, § 9(a) (1979), is not the most appropriate statute of
limitations to be applied in this case. I write separately because
I cannot agree with the standard by which the Court purports to
reach this result. In my view, the search for the most appropriate
statute of limitations should begin with determining the intent of
the state legislature in enacting a particular statute of
limitations.
The task before us is straightforward: we are to examine
Maryland law to determine what is the most appropriate statute of
limitations to apply to respondents' lawsuit. The Court is
presented with this task because Congress has seen fit not to
prescribe a specific statute of limitations to govern actions under
most of the federal civil rights statutes, instead directing courts
to apply state law if "not inconsistent" with
Page 468 U. S. 57
federal law.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
cf. § 1986
(setting a 1-year statute of limitations). The Court addresses the
question before us by assuming that certain functional differences
may exist between claims asserted under the federal civil rights
laws and claims asserted under state law. Under this approach, the
appropriateness of a particular state statute of limitations for
purposes of borrowing in a federal civil rights action depends on
whether the state law reflects the "practicalities" that attend
litigation under the federal civil rights statutes and embodies
policies "analogous" to those of the federal civil rights statutes.
But the test prescribed by the Court is consistent neither in
principle nor in practice with our prior decisions.
I part ways with the majority, first of all, with its view of
the "practicalities" of litigation that so trouble the Court. These
seeming difficulties are hardly unique to respondents' claims or
any other garden-variety federal civil rights claim. The Court
apparently believes that a person asserting a federal civil rights
claim must undertake an involved investigation preparatory to
filing suit.
See ante at
468 U. S. 50-51.
The basis for this assumption is not clear. The Federal Rules
require nothing more than a plain statement of the grounds for
relief, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 8(a), while the Rules of discovery that
enable a party to develop his case fully prior to trial come into
play after suit has been filed. To be sure, at least a modicum of
investigation should be necessary before initiating suit: the
amount will depend not on the fact that a federal civil rights
claim is being asserted, but on the particular facts that give rise
to a claim. But there is nothing inherent in a claim asserted under
§ 1981, § 1983, or § 1985, in light of modern pleading rules, that
makes such a claim invariably more difficult to investigate than a
claim asserted under state law.
Cf. Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency Inc., 421 U. S. 454,
421 U. S. 464
(1975).
It is true that a longer statute of limitations will give a
person more time to reflect and to recognize that he may have some
means of relief. But that common-sense truism hardly
Page 468 U. S. 58
qualifies as a "practicality" that should ordinarily affect a
court's analysis whether to borrow a particular state statute of
limitations. Were it otherwise, a federal court should always
prefer a longer statute of limitations over an alternative, but
shorter, period, a type of approach we have rejected before.
Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.
S. 584 (1978). While the "practicalities" of preparing a
case may have some relevance to the question whether a state
statute of limitations should be applied,
see ante at
468 U. S. 53,
the Court's focus on the "practicalities" of filing a lawsuit
alleging a federal civil rights claim do not illuminate any
convincing reason why the limitations period contained in
Md.Ann.Code, Art. 49B, § 9(a) (1979), is inconsistent with federal
law.
The second part of the Court's proposed test for determining
whether to apply a particular state statute of limitations is
whether the state policies underlying the statute of limitations
reflect policies "analogous" -- whatever that may mean -- to
federal civil rights claims. From the application of that principle
to this case, the Court seems to believe that the basic purpose
underlying the federal civil rights statutes, vindication of a
violation of a federal right, necessitates a statute of limitations
that is both general in the remedies it encompasses and
nondiscriminatory between the federal plaintiffs bringing suit. The
logical result of this approach is that a federal court should
always prefer a general statute of limitations to any specific
state statute of limitations directed at a particular type of claim
or involving a particular party as plaintiff or defendant. Thus, a
general catch-all statute of limitations, or one covering all forms
of invasions of personal rights, would be the appropriate statute
of limitations to govern nearly all federal civil rights
actions.
This approach, of course, means that any federal civil rights
action grounded on a contract claim could avoid the statute of
limitations applying to contract claims, or that a claim against a
state-employed doctor, though alleging only
Page 468 U. S. 59
malpractice, might benefit from a longer statute of limitations
than ordinarily applying to medical malpractice actions. This
desire for uniform treatment of federal civil rights claims is at
odds with the fact that Congress has seen no need to establish a
uniform approach in federal civil rights actions.
Board of
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478,
446 U. S. 489
(1980);
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. at
436 U. S. 593,
n. 11. More significantly, it fails to recognize that a state
statute of limitations can still be consistent with federal law
notwithstanding the fact that the particular statute of limitations
applies only to a particular class of claims cognizable under a
federal civil rights statute, or involves a particular class of
parties.
On several occasions the Court has addressed the issue of
whether a limitations period is inconsistent with the federal
policy embodied in the civil rights statutes. In
Robertson, for example, we indicated that the dual
policies of preventing the abuse of state power and compensating
victims for violations of federal rights were the yardsticks by
which any state limitations period must be measured.
Id.
at
436 U. S. 591.
We developed the concept of inconsistency further in
Tomanio,
supra, where we observed that, to gauge consistency, "the
state and federal policies which the respective legislatures sought
to foster must be identified and compared."
Id. at
446 U. S. 487.
We went on to affirm in that case that statutes of limitations have
"long been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial
system,"
ibid., and to state that, "in general, state
policies of repose cannot be said to be disfavored in federal law,"
id. at
446 U. S. 488.
Finally, in
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, the
Court addressed the question of inconsistency to determine whether
an otherwise applicable state 1-year statute of limitations should
be tolled pending federal administrative proceedings. We rejected
the petitioner's contention in
Johnson that state rules
for tolling were inconsistent with federal law, since they forced
him to bring a § 1981 claim during the pendency of federal
agency
Page 468 U. S. 60
proceedings. We noted that there was not "anything peculiar to a
federal civil rights action that would justify special reluctance
in applying state law."
Id. at
421 U. S.
464.
The Court, of course, purports to measure the statute of
limitations in this case against the relevant federal policies
forming the basis of respondents' cause of action.
See
ante at
468 U. S. 53-55.
Under the Court's reasoning, however, the policies of repose and
prevention of stale claims that generally underlie limitations
statutes will always be of marginal relevance to compensating
victims of violations of federal rights. Thus, the approach adopted
by the Court utterly disregards our earlier observation, also in
Robertson, that "[a] state statute cannot be considered
inconsistent' with federal law merely because the statute
causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation." 436 U.S. at
436 U. S. 593.
Congress, moreover, has instructed federal courts to refer to state
statutes when federal law does not provide a rule of decision for
actions brought under one of the civil rights statutes.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This admonition is more than a mere
"technical obstacle to be circumvented if possible." Tomanio,
supra, at 446 U. S. 484.
Only if state law is "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States," 42 U.S.C. § 1988, are federal courts free to
disregard otherwise applicable state statutes of limitations. As
our decision in Tomanio made clear, the intent of the
state legislature in enacting a particular limitations statute is
extremely relevant to determining whether the applicable state law
is inconsistent with federal law. The conclusion that I reach is
that, if the legislature has indicated that a particular statute of
limitations should apply to a claim, that statute is prima
facie the most appropriate statute of limitations to apply to
a federal civil rights action.
Congress, however, has prescribed limits to this reliance on
legislative intent in 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plainly, if the state
statute of limitations discriminates against federal claims, such
that a federal claim would be time-barred, while
Page 468 U. S. 61
an equivalent state claim would not, then the state law is
inconsistent with federal law. Alternatively, if the state statute
of limitations fails to afford a reasonable time to the federal
claimant, then state legislative intent can also be disregarded.
Exactly what constitutes a reasonable time, however, is not to be
determined a prior. The willingness of Congress to impose a 1-year
limitations period in 42 U.S.C. § 1986 demonstrates that at least a
1-year period is reasonable. In another context, we have been
willing to impose a 6-month limitations period on a federal
claimant, in circumstances where the "practicalities" of litigation
seem materially the same as in this case.
DelCostello v.
Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151
(1983). Even shorter periods of limitation might be permissible, if
the state interest in repose is strong and the nature of the claim
is such that the magnitude of the harm is readily ascertainable in
a short period.
I agree with the court below that it is unlikely that the
Maryland Legislature intended for the 6-month statute of
limitations embodied in Md.Ann.Code, Art. 49B, § 9(a) (1979), to
apply to the federal civil rights claims asserted in this case.
Unlike the Court, however, I do not believe that the
"practicalities" of litigation necessarily mean that a 6-month
limitations period is an unreasonable time in which to bring a
federal cause of action. Perhaps if the legislative intent had been
clear, borrowing the administrative statute of limitations would
have been consistent with the underlying federal policies embodied
in these civil rights statutes. On the other hand, the differences
between the two types of claims, one judicial, the other
administrative, reinforce the conclusion that the Maryland
Legislature did not intend that Art. 49B, § 9(a), apply to federal
civil rights claims. Thus, to this limited extent, the
"practicalities" of litigation bear on the question whether the
state legislature intended for the statute to apply to this federal
claim.
In sum, I believe that the correct inquiry is to examine the
intent of the state legislature in enacting a statute of
limitations.
Page 468 U. S. 62
If that inquiry indicates that the legislature would have
intended that statute to apply to the particular claim before the
court, then the court must apply that limitations period, unless
the statute discriminates against the federal claim or does not
afford a reasonable amount of time in which to bring the claim.
Since it appears that the legislature did not intend that
Md.Ann.Code, Art. 49B, apply to respondents' claims, I would affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals.