Following an accident in which he lost control of his car and
collided with a pickup truck, killing a passenger in the truck,
respondent was charged with four misdemeanors -- reckless driving,
driving while his license was revoked, driving on the wrong side of
the road, and driving while intoxicated. Upon being convicted of
these charges in a Mississippi Justice of the Peace Court, he
appealed, and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for a
trial
de novo. While the appeal was pending, he was
indicted for manslaughter based on the same accident, and was
convicted. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, refusing
respondent leave to pursue state postconviction remedies.
Respondent then brought a habeas corpus action in Federal District
Court, which adopted a Magistrate's report holding that the
manslaughter prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, and
that substitution of a felony charge covering the conduct for which
respondent had been convicted of the misdemeanors violated the Due
Process Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying solely on
the double jeopardy ground.
Held:
1. The prosecution of respondent for manslaughter, following his
invocation of his statutory right to appeal his misdemeanor
convictions, was unconstitutional as a violation of due process.
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21. The
fact that the proceedings before the Justice of the Peace were the
county prosecutor's responsibility, whereas the felony indictment
was obtained by the District Attorney, who was then involved in the
manslaughter trial, may not make inappropriate the presumption of
unconstitutional vindictiveness arising from obtaining that
indictment. That presumption does not hinge on the continued
involvement of a particular individual. In any event, here the
county prosecutor was the State's sole representative at the
arraignment on the felony indictment and, as required by statute,
assisted at the manslaughter trial. Pp. 30-32.
2. Although the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari
addressed only the double jeopardy issue, this Court, without
deciding that issue, will decide the due process issue and not
remand it to the Court of Appeals, where it was argued in both
courts below, the State's opposition
Page 468 U. S. 28
to the Magistrate's report and its brief to the Court of Appeals
are before this Court, and the factual record is adequate. Pp.
32-33.
693 F.2d 132, affirmed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
468 U. S. 33.
O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which POWELL, J.,
joined,
post, p.
468 U. S.
40.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
On August 6, 1977, respondent Barry Joe Roberts lost control of
his car and collided with a pickup truck, killing a passenger in
the truck. Shortly after the accident, Roberts received citations
for reckless driving, driving while his license was revoked,
driving on the wrong side of the road, and driving while
intoxicated. He was convicted of these four misdemeanors in a
Justice of the Peace Court in Tallahatchie County, Miss. [
Footnote 1] Roberts gave notice of
appeal and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for trial
de novo. [
Footnote
2]
Page 468 U. S. 29
While the appeal was pending, in December, 1977, a grand jury
indicted Roberts for manslaughter based on the August 6 accident.
App. 90-91. Roberts was arraigned on the appeal and the felony
indictment simultaneously, and the five charges were set for trial
together.
Id. at 92-93. During the trial, the State
elected not to press the misdemeanor charges, and remanded them to
the file. [
Footnote 3] The jury
convicted Roberts of manslaughter, and the judge sentenced him to
20 years in prison. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Roberts
v. State,
379 So. 2d
514 (1979). It also refused Roberts leave to pursue state
postconviction remedies.
Roberts then brought the present habeas corpus action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi. The petition was referred to a Magistrate, who
recommended that the writ issue for two reasons. First, the
manslaughter prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause
because proof of manslaughter required proof of all the elements of
reckless driving, of which Roberts had already been convicted.
See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U. S. 410
(1980). Second, substitution of a felony charge covering the
conduct for which Roberts had already been convicted of four
misdemeanors violated the Due Process Clause.
See Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U. S. 21
(1974). The District Court adopted the Magistrate's report. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying solely on
the double jeopardy argument, judgment order reported at 693 F.2d
132 (1982).
We granted certiorari, 461 U.S. 956 (1983), and we now affirm.
Although the court below and the petition for certiorari
Page 468 U. S. 30
addressed only the double jeopardy issue, we may affirm on any
ground that the law and the record permit and that will not expand
the relief granted below.
United States v. New York Telephone
Co., 434 U. S. 159,
434 U. S. 166,
n. 8 (1977). Because this case is plainly controlled by
Blackledge v. Perry, supra, we affirm on the basis of that
decision without reaching the double jeopardy issue.
Perry was convicted of assault in a court of limited
jurisdiction under a scheme essentially identical to Mississippi's.
He exercised his statutory right to a trial
de novo, and
the prosecutor then obtained a felony indictment charging him with
assault with a deadly weapon. We concluded that this sequence of
events suggested "a realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness.'"
417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 27.
Fearing that the prosecutor, who "has a considerable stake in
discouraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing, and thus
obtaining a trial de novo," would make retaliatory use of
his power to "up the ante," we considered the situation
analogous to the imposition of a stiffer sentence after reversal
and reconviction. See North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U. S. 711
(1969). We therefore established a presumption of unconstitutional
vindictiveness in these circumstances. Blackledge, supra,
at 417 U. S.
27-28.
Blackledge clearly controls this case. [
Footnote 4] The relevant facts are identical.
Like Perry, Roberts was convicted of a misdemeanor and exercised
his right to a trial
de novo, only to be confronted with a
felony charge. That charge covered
Page 468 U. S. 31
the same conduct as the misdemeanors he sought to appeal. As the
Magistrate concluded, "[t]he facts of this case fall squarely
within
Blackledge." App. to Pet. for Cert. A4.
The only possible distinction between the two cases is that, in
Blackledge, the same attorney was apparently responsible
for the entire prosecution. Here the proceedings before the Justice
of the Peace were the responsibility of the county prosecutor,
whereas the felony indictment was obtained by the District
Attorney, who was then involved in the manslaughter trial. It might
be argued that, if two different prosecutors are involved, a
presumption of vindictiveness, which arises in part from
assumptions about the individual's personal stake in the
proceedings, is inappropriate.
Cf. Colten v. Kentucky,
407 U. S. 104
(1972) (refusing to apply prophylactic rule of
Pearce
where enhanced sentence is imposed by a different court after trial
de novo). On the other hand, to the extent the presumption
reflects
"institutional pressure that . . . might . . . subconsciously
motivate a vindictive prosecutorial . . . response to a defendant's
exercise of his right to obtain a retrial of a decided
question,"
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.
S. 368,
457 U. S. 377
(1982), it does not hinge on the continued involvement of a
particular individual. A district attorney burdened with the
retrial of an already-convicted defendant might be no less
vindictive because he did not bring the initial prosecution.
Indeed,
Blackledge referred frequently to actions by "the
State," rather than "the prosecutor."
E.g., 417 U.S. at
417 U. S.
28-29.
We need not determine the correct rule when two independent
prosecutors are involved, however. Here the county prosecutor
participated fully after the conclusion of proceedings in the
Justice of the Peace Court. He was the State's sole representative
at the arraignment in Circuit Court, App. 92, assisted at the
trial,
id. at 94; Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, and presented the
initial closing argument to the jury, App. 96. In fact, such
participation was a statutory duty. Under the state law then in
effect, the county prosecutor
Page 468 U. S. 32
was to "assist the district attorney in all criminal cases in
the circuit court" in which his county had an interest and "to
represent the state in all matters coming before the grand jury of
his county." Miss.Code Ann. § 19-23-11 (1972). In these
circumstances, the addition of the District Attorney to the
prosecutorial team changes little. [
Footnote 5]
Petitioners suggest that we should remand the
Blackledge issue to the Court of Appeals, rather than
reach it ourselves. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. It is true that
"[w]hen attention has been focused on other issues, or when the
court from which a case comes has expressed no views on a
controlling question, it may be appropriate to remand the case
rather than deal with the merits of that question in this
Court."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471,
397 U. S. 476,
n. 6 (1970). Nonetheless, we have little hesitation in deciding the
case in its current posture. The due process issue was argued
before both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. The
State's opposition to the Magistrate's report and its brief to the
Court of Appeals are before us. The factual record is adequate, and
would not be improved by a remand to the Court of Appeals.
[
Footnote 6]
Page 468 U. S. 33
And the case is decided by a straightforward application of
controlling precedent.
The prosecution of Roberts for manslaughter, following his
invocation of his statutory right to appeal his misdemeanor
convictions, was unconstitutional. The resulting conviction cannot
stand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Roberts was fined $100 for reckless driving, fined $100 and
sentenced to 6 months in jail for driving while his license was
revoked, fined $100 and sentenced to 10 days in jail for driving on
the wrong side of the road, and fined $1,000 and sentenced to 11
months in jail for driving under the influence.
[
Footnote 2]
Under the Mississippi scheme then in effect, Justice of the
Peace Courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the County Courts
over misdemeanors. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 9-9-21, 99-33-1 (1972). In
practice, misdemeanors were always brought in one or the other of
these courts by county prosecutors. Brief for Petitioners 5, n. 1;
Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-10. Such proceedings were initiated by
affidavit, the traffic citations serving that function in the
present case. If convicted in the Justice of the Peace Court, the
defendant had an absolute right to appeal to the Circuit Court for
a trial
de novo. § 99-35-1.
[
Footnote 3]
Under Mississippi practice, a remand to the file "is the
functional equivalent of a
nolle pros." Tr. of Oral Arg.
15.
[
Footnote 4]
At oral argument, the State suggested that
Blackledge
had been overruled, or at least modified, by
United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U. S. 368
(1982). Tr. of Oral Arg. 24.
Goodwin held that the
Blackledge presumption does not apply when charges are
enhanced following a pretrial demand for a jury trial. We
distinguished
Blackledge on the basis of the critical
differences in the timing of the heightened charge and in the
amount of extra effort to which the defendant has put the State.
There is no hint in
Goodwin that
Blackledge does
not apply with full force in the circumstances of that case,
circumstances that are repeated here.
[
Footnote 5]
In both courts below, the State attempted to distinguish
Blackledge on the ground that the misdemeanor and felony
at issue in that case shared specific elements in a way that
traffic violations and manslaughter do not. This argument closely
resembled their double jeopardy argument, both focusing on the rule
set out in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.
S. 299 (1932). Even if the State is correct that the
offenses charged in
Blackledge had more in common than
those charged here, this parsing of the statutes misses the point.
Blackledge engaged in no such analysis. It noted merely
that the "indictment covered the same conduct for which Perry had
been tried and convicted." 417 U.S. at
417 U. S. 23.
That is equally true here. Whatever the congruence, or lack
thereof, of the offenses charged, the postappeal felony indictment
poses "the danger that the State might be retaliating against the
accused for lawfully attacking his conviction."
Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357,
434 U. S. 363
(1978).
[
Footnote 6]
In this regard, we note that the
Blackledge presumption
is rebuttable.
See United States v. Goodwin, supra, at
457 U. S. 376,
n. 8;
Blackledge, 417 U.S. at
417 U. S. 29, n.
7. The State had ample opportunity below to attempt to rebut it,
but did not do so. Its only argument has been that
Blackledge should not apply.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
The Court granted certiorari in this case to review a single
question presented by the petition for certiorari: whether the
Court of Appeals properly applied our decision in
Illinois v.
Vitale, 447 U. S. 410
(1980), in sustaining respondent's claim of double jeopardy under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the Clause was a bar
to further prosecution on a charge of manslaughter stemming from
the death of a 10-year-old child who had been a passenger in the
truck involved in a collision with respondent's car. This Court,
however, in an unexampled bit of procedural footwork which surely
has adverse implications for the "rule of four" principle governing
our grants of certiorari, simply refuses to even consider the
double jeopardy issue raised by the State in its petition for
certiorari. Without any explanation whatever, the Court affirms the
judgment of the Court of Appeals on an alternative ground.
The only precedent cited for this unexplained -- and I dare say
unexplainable -- decision is
United States v. New York
Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159
(1977). But that case stands only for the unexceptionable
proposition that a respondent may argue to this Court any basis
supported by the record for affirming the judgment of the lower
court, even though respondent did not cross-petition for
certiorari. Nevertheless, in
New York Telephone Co., the
Court decided the issue presented in the petition for certiorari in
addition to ruling on the alternative basis for affirmance urged by
the respondent.
Page 468 U. S. 34
See id. at
434 U. S.
174-178.
See also Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U. S. 471
(1970). [
Footnote 2/1] I believe
that the Court is obligated to confront the State's contention that
the Court of Appeals misapplied the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment in this case. The Court being unwilling to
undertake that obligation, I turn to it in dissent.
Respondent was tried and convicted of the misdemeanor offense of
reckless driving in a Justice Court in Tallahatchie County, Miss.,
a county in northwestern Mississippi with a population of
approximately 17,000 people. He was sentenced to pay a fine of $100
for this offense. As permitted by the Mississippi "two-tier"
system, he appealed his conviction to the State Circuit Court,
where he was entitled to a trial
de novo. But before he
was retried on the misdemeanor charge in the Circuit Court, he was
indicted for the felony offense of manslaughter for causing the
death of the 10-year-old child who was riding in the truck that
respondent struck with his car. The misdemeanor offense was
"
nolle prossed" before trial, but respondent was convicted
by a jury of manslaughter and sentenced to 20 years in the custody
of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
Respondent's conviction was affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme
Court.
Roberts v. State, 379 So.
2d 514 (1979). After exhausting his state postconviction
remedies, respondent filed a petition for federal habeas corpus
relief. This
Page 468 U. S. 35
writ was granted by the District Court, and the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that determination. The Court of
Appeals held that,
"because Roberts has a substantial double jeopardy claim under
the Supreme Court's holding in
Illinois v. Vitale, the
district court's granting of habeas corpus relief must be
affirmed."
App. to Pet. for Cert. A13.
In reaching this conclusion, I believe that the Court of Appeals
mistakenly relied upon a mere form of expression in the Court's
opinion in
Illinois v. Vitale to depart from all of our
previous double jeopardy holdings in this area. The Court of
Appeals apparently felt that the
Vitale opinion changed
governing double jeopardy law to permit a defendant to establish a
substantial, and apparently dispositive, claim of double jeopardy
merely by showing that the State actually relied upon the same
evidence to prove both crimes. While there is one sentence in the
Court's opinion in
Vitale that supports this construction,
I do not believe that construction is consistent with the opinion
as a whole. Until the present case, the relevant question to be
answered by any court is whether the evidence required to prove the
statutory elements of crime is the same, not whether the evidence
actually used at trial is the same.
In
Vitale, the Supreme Court of Illinois had held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred the
prosecution of a defendant for manslaughter because the defendant
had previously pleaded guilty to a charge of failing to reduce
speed arising out of the same incident. This Court vacated the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, saying:
"The point is that, if manslaughter by automobile does not
always entail proof of a failure to slow, then the two offenses are
not the 'same' under the
Blockburger test. The mere
possibility that the State will seek to rely on all of the
ingredients necessarily included in the traffic
Page 468 U. S. 36
offense to establish an element of its manslaughter case would
not be sufficient to bar the latter prosecution."
447 U.S. at
447 U. S. 419.
It seems to me that this is about as clear a statement as there can
be of the principle that the double jeopardy inquiry turns on the
statutory elements of the two offenses in question, and not on the
actual evidence that may be used by the State to convict in a
particular case. Nonetheless, the Court went on in
Vitale
to distinguish
Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.
S. 682 (1977), and in so doing stated:
"By analogy, if in the pending manslaughter prosecution Illinois
relies on and proves a failure to slow to avoid an accident as the
reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter, Vitale would have a
substantial claim of double jeopardy under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution."
447 U.S. at
447 U. S. 421.
I cannot say that this last expression did not afford the Court of
Appeals some ground for the views which it expressed, nor can I say
that I think it is entirely consistent with the first quotation
from the
Vitale opinion. But I am reasonably sure that the
Court did not intend to transmute the traditional double jeopardy
analysis from an either "up or down" inquiry based on the evidence
required to prove the statutory elements of a crime into a
"substantial claim" inquiry based on the evidence the State
introduced at trial. I think that there are ambiguities in
Illinois v. Vitale which urgently need resolution by this
Court, that the present case affords an ample opportunity to do
this, and that the Court's failure to do it is an unexampled
abdication of its responsibility.
I would unambiguously reaffirm the statement in
Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U. S. 161
(1977), relied upon in
Illinois v. Vitale, supra, that
Page 468 U. S. 37
"'[t]he applicable rule is that where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof
of a fact which the other does not.'"
432 U.S. at
432 U. S. 166,
quoting
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.
S. 299,
284 U. S. 304
(1932).
Applying that principle to this case, it seems to me that the
Court of Appeals was demonstrably wrong in its treatment of the
double jeopardy issue. Comparing the elements of the Mississippi
reckless driving statute with the Mississippi manslaughter statute,
that court said:
"A narrow focus on the two statutes provides one answer. Proof
of manslaughter does not necessarily entail proof of reckless
driving, for manslaughter could be proved in a situation completely
foreign to a vehicular collision."
App. to Pet. for Cert. A10-A11
But the court went on to say that, taking into account a
"judicial veneer" which had been placed on the statute by the
Supreme Court of Mississippi,
"it is apparent that manslaughter by automobile cannot be proven
without at the same time proving reckless driving. Because the
specific felony offense, manslaughter by automobile, is not
statutorily defined, this Court is confronted with a novel
situation. Depending on whether the focus is on the manslaughter
statute alone or on its case law veneer as well, application of the
first prong of the
Vitale analysis gives different
results."
Id. at A11.
But the Court of Appeals declined to resolve the inquiry based
on the elements of the two statutes, as mandated by
Brown,
supra, and went on to say that there was a "second prong" of
the inquiry based upon the evidence actually presented at trial.
Because the same evidence that led to respondent's conviction on
the misdemeanor charge was also
Page 468 U. S. 38
introduced in the manslaughter trial, respondent was said to
have a "substantial claim" of double jeopardy, whatever that phrase
may mean. Because respondent had such a "substantial claim," the
Court of Appeals set aside a state court conviction.
I believe that a straightforward analysis of the holding in
Brown v. Ohio requires the conclusion that there was a
different element in each of the offenses involved which need not
be proved with respect to the other offense. The offense of
reckless driving is based on the manner of operation of a motor
vehicle upon the public roads, and in no wise requires any result
in injury to persons or property. The crime of manslaughter by
culpable negligence simply requires the causing of a death with a
particular state of mind, and need not in any way involve an
automobile. [
Footnote 2/2]
Page 468 U. S. 39
The fact that, in this particular case, the "same evidence"
might be used to prove the "reckless" element in the automotive
offense and the "culpable negligence" in the manslaughter offense
is also not dispositive. For reckless driving a defendant must have
driven an automobile, which he need not do to be found guilty of
manslaughter; for manslaughter a defendant's act must have caused a
death, which is not required for the offense of reckless driving.
Applying the "
Blockburger" test to a question of statutory
construction, the Court in
Iannelli v. United States,
420 U. S. 770,
420 U. S. 785,
n. 17 (1975), said:
"[T]he Court's application of the test focuses on the statutory
elements of the offense. If each requires proof of a fact that the
other does not, the
Blockburger test is satisfied,
notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to
establish the crimes."
Since
Vitale, we have reaffirmed the
Blockburger test that the evidence required to prove the
statutory elements of a crime determines whether particular crimes
are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.
See Missouri
v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359,
459 U. S.
367-368 (1983). The actual evidence test which the Court
of Appeals inferred from the single sentence in
Vitale has
never been applied to bar a second trial on grounds of double
jeopardy.
I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it upheld respondent's double jeopardy claim. Because
the Court of Appeals did not pass upon respondent's due process
claim based upon our decision in
Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U. S. 21
(1974), I would remand the case to that court so it may consider
the question in the first instance.
Page 468 U. S. 40
[
Footnote 2/1]
Our decision in
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.
S. 531 (1931), is not to the contrary. While, in
Langnes, the Court never addressed the errors specified by
the petitioner in that case, the Court decided in
Langnes
that the District Court should never have addressed the
petitioner's claims in the first instance.
See id. at
282 U. S.
540-542;
cf. Schlesinger v. Councilman,
420 U. S. 738,
420 U. S.
743-744 (1975). When a petitioner's claims should never
have been presented to or decided by a federal court in the first
instance, a ruling by this Court on those claims would be wholly
inappropriate. There being no similar grounds upon which to abstain
from deciding any issue raised by this case, the Court should
address the question raised by the petitioner.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The case which the Court of Appeals suggested created a
separate, nonstatutory crime of manslaughter by automobile,
Smith v. State, 197 Miss. 802, 20 So. 2d 701 (1945),
involved a charge of manslaughter under Miss.Code Ann. § 2232
(1942), which read:
"Every other killing of a human being, by the act, procurement,
or culpable negligence of another, and without any authority of
law, not provided for in this chapter, shall be manslaughter."
This provision has remained unchanged since the
Smith
decision.
See Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-47 (1972).
That the
Smith decision did not result in a new crime
of manslaughter by automobile should be clear from the following
analysis of
Smith in Dickerson v. State, 441 So. 2d
536 (Miss.1983):
"This statute [§ 97-3-47] has been authoritatively construed in
Smith v. State, 197 Miss. 802, 20 So. 2d 701 (1945), a
case involving alleged manslaughter with an automobile, to require
that, before the defendant may be convicted, the state must prove
that he"
"was guilty of such gross negligence on the occasion complained
of as evince [
sic] on his part a wanton and reckless
disregard for the safety of human life, or such an indifference to
the consequences of his act under the surrounding circumstances as
to render his conduct tantamount to willfulness."
Id. at 538 (citing to
Smith v. State, supra,
at 812, 20 So.2d at 703).
At no point in
Dickerson does the Mississippi Supreme
Court suggest that the crime of manslaughter involving use of an
automobile is a different crime than any other manslaughter charged
under § 97-3-47. In other instances involving prosecutions under
the manslaughter statute, the State Supreme Court has employed
similar language, indicating the juxtaposition of the words
"manslaughter" and "motor vehicle" found in
Smith was
nothing more than an effort to illuminate what the court meant by
culpable negligence in those circumstances.
Cf. Latiker v.
State, 278 So. 2d
398, 399 (1973);
Gregory v. State, 152 Miss. 133,
141-142, 118 So. 906, 909 (1928).
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins,
dissenting.
For the reasons stated in JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent, I believe
the Court should address the double jeopardy question decided by
the Court of Appeals. I also agree with JUSTICE REHNQUIST that the
Court of Appeals' ruling should be vacated and the case remanded
for further consideration in light of
Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U. S. 21
(1974). In my view, however, the Court of Appeals' double jeopardy
holding should be vacated simply on the ground that jeopardy does
not attach in the first tier of a "two-tier" criminal trial.
Two-tier systems for adjudicating less serious criminal cases
such as traffic offenses are extremely common.
Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104,
407 U. S. 112,
n. 4 (1972). Indeed, this is our second occasion this Term to
review double jeopardy problems arising out of a two-tier trial.
See Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon,
466 U. S. 294
(1984). Mississippi's two-tier system is fairly typical. A
defendant convicted in a Mississippi justice of the peace court has
an absolute right to a trial
de novo if he chooses to
appeal his conviction.
See Calhoun v. City of Meridian,
355 F.2d 209, 211 (CA5 1966); Miss.Code Ann. § 99-35-1
et
seq. (1972). In Mississippi, as in Kentucky,
"a defendant can bypass the inferior court simply by pleading
guilty and erasing immediately thereafter any consequence that
would otherwise follow from tendering the plea."
Colten v. Kentucky, supra, at
407 U. S.
119-120.
In these circumstances, a defendant is not in "jeopardy" of
anything when he undergoes a first-tier trial. The first-tier
proceedings
"offer a defendant the opportunity to learn about the
prosecution's case and, if he chooses, he need not reveal his own.
. . . In reality, his choices are to accept the decision of the
judge and the sentence imposed in the inferior court or to reject
what in effect is no more than an offer in settlement of his case
and seek the judgment of judge or jury in the [second-tier trial,]
with sentence to be
Page 468 U. S. 41
determined by the full record made in that court."
407 U.S. at
407 U. S.
118-119.
Respondent Roberts chose not to accept the "offer in settlement"
made at his first-tier trial. On August 13, 1977, he was convicted
in the first-tier trial and sentenced to pay a fine of $100 on the
charge of reckless driving. He filed notice of and perfected an
appeal on the same day. The reckless driving misdemeanor charge was
eventually consolidated for trial with the manslaughter charge, but
was not prosecuted further. There is no indication that Roberts
ever paid the $100 fine. At oral argument, counsel conceded that he
probably did not.
This is surely dispositive evidence that Roberts was never in
"jeopardy" at his first-tier trial. Though he was tried, convicted,
and sentenced at that trial, he effortlessly erased his conviction
and suffered no punishment whatsoever for the offense of reckless
driving. If Roberts was never in jeopardy at his first-tier trial,
the second trial could in no circumstance violate Roberts'
constitutional right to avoid being placed twice in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment below and remand for
further consideration in light of
Blackledge v. Perry,
supra.