Respondent Ronwin (hereafter respondent) was an unsuccessful
candidate for admission to the Arizona Bar in 1974. Pursuant to the
Arizona Constitution, the Arizona Supreme Court has plenary
authority to determine admissions to the bar. Under the Arizona
Supreme Court Rules in effect in 1974, a Committee on Examinations
and Admissions (Committee), appointed by the court, was authorized
to examine applicants on specified subjects. The Rules required the
Committee to submit its grading formula to the court prior to
giving the examination. After grading the examination, the
Committee was directed to submit its recommendations for the
admission of applicants to the court, which then made the final
decision to grant or deny admission to practice. Under the Rules, a
rejected applicant was entitled to seek individualized review of
the Committee's adverse recommendation by filing a petition with
the court. After the Arizona Supreme Court denied respondent's
petition for review, he ultimately filed this action in Federal
District Court against the Arizona State Bar, members of the
Committee (including petitioners), and others. Respondent alleged
that petitioners had conspired to restrain trade in violation of §
1 of the Sherman Act by "artificially reducing the numbers of
competing attorneys in the State." He argued that the Committee had
set the grading scale on the examination with reference to the
number of new attorneys it thought desirable, rather than with
reference to some "suitable" level of competence. Petitioners
contended that they were immune from antitrust liability under the
state action doctrine of
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.
S. 341. The District Court dismissed the complaint on
the ground,
inter alia, of failure to state a justiciable
claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, although
petitioners ultimately might be able to show that they were
entitled to state action immunity, the District Court should not
have decided the issue on a motion to dismiss.
Held: The District Court properly dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be
granted. Pp.
466 U. S.
567-582.
(a) Under
Parker, when a state legislature adopts
legislation, its actions constitute those of the State and
ipso
facto are exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws. A
state supreme court, when acting in a legislative capacity,
occupies the same position as that of a state legislature
Page 466 U. S. 559
for purposes of the state action doctrine.
Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350.
When the activity at issue is not directly that of the legislature
or supreme court, but is carried out by others pursuant to state
authorization, there must be a showing that the challenged conduct
is pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace
competition with regulation, and the degree to which the state
legislature or supreme court supervises its representative may be
relevant to the inquiry. However, where the challenged conduct is
in fact that of the state legislature or supreme court, the issues
of "clear articulation" and "active supervision" need not be
addressed. Pp.
466 U. S.
567-569.
(b) In this case, the actions of the Committee with regard to
the bar examination grading formula cannot be divorced from the
Arizona Supreme Court's exercise of its sovereign powers. Although
the Arizona Supreme Court necessarily delegated the administration
of the admissions process to the Committee, under the court's
Rules, the court itself retained the sole authority to determine
who should be admitted to the practice of law in Arizona. Thus, the
challenged conduct was in reality that of the Arizona Supreme
Court, and is therefore exempt from Sherman Act liability under the
state action doctrine.
Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
supra. Pp.
466 U. S.
569-574.
(c)
Bates cannot be distinguished on the ground that
the Arizona Supreme Court is not a petitioner in this case, and was
not named as a defendant in the complaint, or on the ground that
Parker is inapplicable because respondent is not
challenging the Arizona Supreme Court's conduct. The same situation
existed in
Bates. As in
Bates, the real party in
interest is the Arizona Supreme Court. The case law, as well as the
State Supreme Court's Rules, makes clear that the court made the
final decision on each applicant. To allow Sherman Act plaintiffs
to look behind the actions of state sovereigns and base their
claims on perceived illegal conspiracies among the committees,
commissions, or others who necessarily must advise the sovereign
would emasculate the
Parker v. Brown doctrine. Pp.
466 U. S.
574-582.
686 F.2d 692, reversed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined,
post, p.
466 U. S. 582.
REHNQUIST, J., took no part in the decision of the case.
O'CONNOR, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case.
Page 466 U. S. 560
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the state action
doctrine of immunity from actions under the Sherman Act applies to
the grading of bar examinations by the Committee appointed by, and
according to the Rules of, the Arizona Supreme Court.
I
Respondent Ronwin was an unsuccessful candidate for admission to
the Bar of Arizona in 1974. Petitioners were four members of the
Arizona Supreme Court's Committee on Examinations and Admissions
(Committee). [
Footnote 1] The
Arizona
Page 466 U. S. 561
Constitution vests authority in the court to determine who
should be admitted to practice law in the State.
Hunt v.
Maricopa County Employees Merit System Comm'n, 127 Ariz. 259,
261-262,
619 P.2d 1036,
1038-1039 (1980);
see also Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 32-275
(1976). Pursuant to that authority, the Arizona Supreme Court
established the Committee to examine and recommend applicants for
admission to the Arizona Bar. [
Footnote 2] The Arizona Supreme Court Rules, adopted by
the court and in effect in 1974, [
Footnote 3] delegated certain responsibilities to the
Committee while reserving to the court the ultimate authority to
grant or deny admission. The
Page 466 U. S. 562
Rules provided that the Committee "shall examine applicants" on
subjects enumerated in the Rules and "recommend to th[e] court for
admission to practice" applicants found to have the requisite
qualifications.Rule 28(a) (1973). [
Footnote 4] They also authorized the Committee to "utilize
such grading or scoring system as the Committee deems appropriate
in its discretion," [
Footnote
5] and to use the Multi-State Bar Examination.Rule 28(c) VII A
(1973), as amended, 110 Ariz. xxvii, xxxii (1974). Even with
respect to "grading or scoring," the court did not delegate final
authority to the Committee. The Rules directed the Committee to
file the formula it intended to use in grading the examination with
the court 30 days prior to giving the examination. [
Footnote 6] Also, after grading the
examination and compiling the list of those applicants whom it
considered
Page 466 U. S. 563
qualified to practice law in the State, the Committee was
directed to submit its recommendations to the court for final
action. Rule 28(a). Under the Rules and Arizona case law, only the
court had authority to admit or deny admission. [
Footnote 7] Finally, a rejected applicant was
entitled to seek individualized review of an adverse recommendation
of the Committee by filing a petition directly with the court.
[
Footnote 8] The
Page 466 U. S. 564
Rules required the Committee to file a response to such a
petition and called for a prompt and fair decision on the
applicant's claims by the Arizona Supreme Court.
Ronwin took the Arizona bar examination in February 1974.
[
Footnote 9] He failed to pass,
the Committee recommended to the Arizona Supreme Court that it deny
him admission to the Bar, and the court accepted the
recommendation. Ronwin petitioned the court to review the manner in
which the Committee conducted and graded the examination. In
particular, he alleged that the Committee had failed to provide him
with model answers to the examination, had failed to file its
grading formula with the court within the time period specified in
the Rules, had applied a "draconian" pass-fail process, had used a
grading formula that measured group, rather than individual,
performance, had failed to test applicants on an area of the law on
which the Rules required testing, and had conducted the examination
in a "pressure-cooker atmosphere." He further alleged that the
Committee's conduct constituted an abuse of discretion, deprived
him of due process and equal protection, and violated the Sherman
Act. [
Footnote 10] The court
denied his petition and two subsequent petitions for rehearing.
[
Footnote 11] Ronwin then
sought review of the Arizona
Page 466 U. S. 565
Supreme Court's action in this Court. We denied his petition for
certiorari. 419 U.S. 967 (1974).
Some four years later, in March, 1978, Ronwin filed this action
in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Petitioners were named as defendants in the suit in their capacity
as individual members of the Committee. [
Footnote 12] Ronwin renewed his complaint that
petitioners had conspired to restrain trade in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1, by "artificially
reducing the numbers of competing attorneys in the State of
Arizona." [
Footnote 13] The
gist of Ronwin's argument is that the Committee of which
petitioners constituted a majority had set the grading scale on the
February examination with reference to the number of new attorneys
they thought desirable, rather than with reference to some
"suitable" level of competence. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which
Page 466 U. S. 566
relief could be granted, and under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In
particular, petitioners alleged that, acting as a Committee, they
were immune from antitrust liability under
Parker v.
Brown, 317 U. S. 341
(1943). Petitioners also argued that Ronwin suffered no damage from
the conduct of which he complained, and that the Committee's
conduct had not affected interstate commerce. The District Court
granted petitioners' motion after finding that the complaint failed
to state a justiciable claim, that the court had no jurisdiction,
and that Ronwin lacked standing. [
Footnote 14]
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
dismissal of the complaint.
Ronwin v. State Bar of
Arizona, 686 F.2d 692 (1982). The Court of Appeals read the
District Court's ruling that Ronwin had failed to state a claim as
a holding that bar examination grading procedures are immune from
federal antitrust laws under
Parker v. Brown. It reasoned
that, although petitioners ultimately might be able to show that
they are entitled to state action immunity, the District Court
should not have decided this issue on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
See 686 F.2d at 698. The court stated that, under Parker
and its progeny, the mere fact that petitioners were state
officials appointed by the Arizona Supreme Court was insufficient
to confer state action immunity on them. 686 F.2d at 697. Relying
on its reading of several recent opinions of this Court, [
Footnote 15] the Court of Appeals
noted that the petitioners might be able to invoke the state
Page 466 U. S. 567
action doctrine, but reasoned that they first must show that
they were acting pursuant to a "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed . . . state policy."
Id. at 696.
Therefore, dismissal for failure to state a claim was improper. The
court also held that Ronwin had standing to bring this action. The
case was remanded to the District Court for further action.
[
Footnote 16]
We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals'
application of the state action doctrine. 461 U.S. 926 (1983). We
now reverse.
II
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine is the reasoning of
Parker v. Brown. In
Parker, the Court considered the antitrust implications of
the California Agriculture Prorate Act -- a state statute that
restricted competition among food producers in California. Relying
on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the Court
declined to construe the Sherman Act as prohibiting the
anticompetitive actions of a State acting through its
legislature:
"We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or
its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution,
the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents
is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."
317 U.S. at
317 U. S.
350-351. Thus, under the Court's rationale in
Parker, when a state legislature adopts legislation, its
actions constitute those of
Page 466 U. S. 568
the State,
see id. at
317 U. S. 351,
and
ipso facto are exempt from the operation of the
antitrust laws.
In the years since the decision in
Parker, the Court
has had occasion in several cases to determine the scope of the
state action doctrine. It has never departed, however, from
Parker's basic reasoning. Applying the
Parker
doctrine in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.
S. 350,
433 U. S. 360
(1977), the Court held that a state supreme court, when acting in a
legislative capacity, occupies the same position as that of a state
legislature. Therefore, a decision of a state supreme court, acting
legislatively rather than judicially, is exempt from Sherman Act
liability as state action.
See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U. S. 773,
421 U. S. 790
(1975). Closer analysis is required when the activity at issue is
not directly that of the legislature or supreme court, [
Footnote 17] but is carried out by
others pursuant to state authorization.
See, e.g., Community
Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S.
40 (1982) (municipal regulation of cable television
industry);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980)
(private price-fixing arrangement authorized by State);
New
Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
439 U. S. 96 (1978)
(new franchises controlled by state administrative board). In such
cases, it becomes important to ensure that the anticompetitive
conduct of the State's representative was contemplated by the
State.
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U. S. 389,
435 U. S.
413-415 (1978) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.);
see New
Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363, 369-370 (CA9
1974). If the replacing of entirely free competition with some form
of regulation or restraint was not authorized or approved by the
State, then the rationale of
Parker is inapposite. As a
result, in cases
Page 466 U. S. 569
involving the anticompetitive conduct of a nonsovereign state
representative the Court has required a showing that the conduct is
pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy" to replace competition with regulation. Boulder,
supra, at
455 U. S. 54.
The Court also has found the degree to which the state legislature
or supreme court supervises its representative to be relevant to
the inquiry.
See Midcal Aluminum, supra, at
445 U. S. 105;
Goldfarb, supra, at
421 U. S. 791.
When the conduct is that of the sovereign itself, on the other
hand, the danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise.
Where the conduct at issue is in fact that of the state legislature
or supreme court, we need not address the issues of "clear
articulation" and "active supervision."
Pursuant to the State Constitution, the Arizona Supreme Court
has plenary authority to determine admissions to the Bar. [
Footnote 18] Therefore, the first
critical step in our analysis must be to determine whether the
conduct challenged here is that of the court. If so, the
Parker doctrine applies, and Ronwin has no cause of action
under the Sherman Act.
III
At issue here is the Arizona plan of determining admissions to
the bar, and petitioners' use thereunder of a grading formula.
Ronwin has alleged that petitioners conspired to use
Page 466 U. S. 570
that formula to restrain competition among lawyers. [
Footnote 19] His argument is that,
although petitioners qualified as state officials in their capacity
as members of the Committee, they acted independently of the
Arizona Supreme Court. As a result, the argument continues, the
Committee's actions are those of a Supreme Court representative,
rather than those of the court itself, and therefore are not
entitled to immunity. We cannot agree that the actions of the
Committee can be divorced from the Supreme Court's exercise of its
sovereign powers. The Court's opinion in
Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. at
433 U. S. 360,
is directly pertinent. [
Footnote
20] In
Bates, two
Page 466 U. S. 571
attorneys were suspended temporarily from the practice of law in
Arizona for violating a disciplinary rule of the American Bar
Association (ABA) that prohibited most lawyer advertising. The
Arizona Supreme Court had incorporated the ABA's advertising
prohibition into the local Supreme Court Rules. [
Footnote 21] Those Rules also provided that
the Board of Governors of the Arizona State Bar Association, acting
on the recommendation of a local Bar disciplinary committee, could
recommend the censure or suspension of a member of the Bar for
violating the advertising ban. Under the Rules, the Board of
Governor's recommendation automatically would become effective if
the aggrieved party did not object to the recommendation within 10
days. If the party objected, he was entitled to have the Arizona
Supreme Court review the findings and recommendations of the Board
of Governors and the local committee. The plaintiffs challenged the
Rule on Sherman Act and First Amendment grounds. This Court
ultimately concluded that the ABA Rule violated the First
Amendment, but it first held that the State Bar Association was
immune from Sherman Act liability because its enforcement of the
disciplinary Rules was state action. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court noted that, although only the State Bar was named as a
defendant in the suit, the suspended attorneys' complaint was with
the State. The Court stated:
"[T]he appellants' claims are against the State. The Arizona
Supreme Court is the real party in interest; it adopted the rules,
and it is the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement
process.
In re Wilson, 106
Page 466 U. S. 572
Ariz. 34,
470 P.2d 441
(1970). Although the State Bar plays a part in the enforcement of
the rules, its role is completely defined by the court; the [State
Bar] acts as the agent of the court under its continuous
supervision."
Id. at
433 U. S. 361.
The opinion and holding in
Bates with respect to the state
action doctrine were unanimous.
The logic of the Court's holding in
Bates applies with
greater force to the Committee and its actions. The petitioners
here were each members of an official body selected and appointed
by the Arizona Supreme Court. Indeed, it is conceded that they were
state officers. The court gave the members of the Committee
discretion in compiling and grading the bar examination, but
retained strict supervisory powers and ultimate full authority over
its actions. The Supreme Court Rules specified the subjects to be
tested, and the general qualifications required of applicants for
the Bar. With respect to the specific conduct of which Ronwin
complained -- establishment of an examination grading formula --
the Rules were explicit. Rule 28(c) VII A authorized the Committee
to determine an appropriate "grading or scoring system," and Rule
28(c) VII B required the Committee to submit its grading formula to
the Supreme Court at least 30 days prior to the examination.
[
Footnote 22] After giving
and grading the examination, the Committee's authority was limited
to
Page 466 U. S. 573
making recommendations to the Supreme Court. The court itself
made the final decision to grant or deny admission to practice.
Finally, Rule 28(c) XII F provided for a detailed mandatory review
procedure by which an aggrieved candidate could challenge the
Committee's grading formula. [
Footnote 23] In light of these provisions and the Court's
holding and reasoning in
Bates, we conclude that, although
the Arizona Supreme Court necessarily delegated the administration
of the admissions process to the Committee, the court itself
approved the particular grading formula and retained the sole
authority to determine who should be admitted to the practice of
law in Arizona. Thus, the conduct that Ronwin challenges was, in
reality, that of the Arizona Supreme Court.
See Bates, 433
U.S. at
433 U. S. 361.
It therefore is exempt from Sherman Act liability under the state
action doctrine of
Parker v. Brown. [
Footnote 24]
Page 466 U. S. 574
At oral argument, Ronwin suggested that we should not attribute
to the Arizona Supreme Court an intent to approve the
anticompetitive activity of petitioners in the absence of proof
that the court was aware that petitioners had devised a grading
formula the purpose of which was to limit the number of lawyers in
the State. This argument misconceives the basis of the state action
doctrine. The reason that state action is immune from Sherman Act
liability is not that the State has chosen to act in an
anticompetitive fashion, but that the State itself has chosen to
act. "There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action
in the [Sherman] Act's legislative history."
Parker, 317
U.S. at
317 U. S. 351.
The Court did not suggest in
Parker, nor has it suggested
since, that a state action is exempt from antitrust liability only
if the sovereign acted wisely after full disclosure from its
subordinate officers. The only requirement is that the action be
that of "the State acting as a sovereign."
Bates, supra,
at
433 U. S. 360.
The action at issue here, whether anticompetitive or not, clearly
was that of the Arizona Supreme Court. [
Footnote 25]
IV
The dissenting opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS would, if it were
adopted, alter dramatically the doctrine of state action immunity.
We therefore reply directly. The dissent concedes, as it must, that
"the Arizona Supreme Court exercises sovereign power with respect
to admission to the Arizona Bar," and "if the challenged conduct
were that of the court, it would be immune under
Parker. "
Post at
466 U. S. 588.
It also is conceded
Page 466 U. S. 575
that the members of the court's Committee on Examinations and
Admissions -- petitioners here -- are state officers. These
concessions are compelled by the Court's decision in
Bates, and we think they dispose of Ronwin's
contentions.
In its effort to distinguish
Bates, the dissent notes
that the Arizona Supreme Court "is not a petitioner [in this case],
nor was it named as a defendant in respondent's complaint," and
"because respondent is not challenging the conduct of the
Arizona Supreme Court,
Parker [v. Brown] is simply
inapplicable."
Post at
466 U. S. 588,
466 U. S. 589.
The dissent fails to recognize that this is precisely the situation
that existed in
Bates. In that case, the Supreme Court of
Arizona was not a party in this Court, nor was it named as a
defendant by the complaining lawyers. Yet, in our unanimous
opinion, we concluded that the claims by appellants in
Bates were "against the State," and that the
"Arizona Supreme Court [was] the real party in interest; it
adopted the rules, and it [was] the ultimate trier of fact and law
in the enforcement process."
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at
433 U. S. 361;
see supra at
466 U. S. 571.
[
Footnote 26]
The core argument of the dissent is that Ronwin has challenged
only the action of the Committee, and not that of the Arizona
Supreme Court. It states that "there is no claim that the
court directed [the Committee] to artificially reduce the
number of lawyers in Arizona," and therefore the Committee cannot
assert the sovereign's antitrust immunity.
Post at
466 U. S. 592
(emphasis in original). The dissent does not acknowledge that,
conspire as they might, the Committee could not reduce the number
of lawyers in Arizona. [
Footnote
27] Only
Page 466 U. S. 576
the Arizona Supreme Court had the authority to grant or deny
admission to practice in the State. [
Footnote 28] As in
Bates, "[t]he Arizona Supreme
Court is the real party in interest." 433 U.S. at
433 U. S.
361.
The dissent largely ignores the Rules of the Arizona Supreme
Court. [
Footnote 29] A
summary of the court's commands suggests why the dissent apparently
prefers not to address them. The Arizona Supreme Court established
the Committee for the sole purpose of examining and recommending
applicants for admission to the Bar.Rule 28(a). Its Rules
provided:
"The examination and admission of applicants . . . shall conform
to this Rule. . . . The committee
shall examine applicants
and recommend [qualified applicants] to this court. . . . Two
examinations
will be held each year. . . ."
Ibid.; Rule 28(c) VI (1973), as amended, 110 Ariz.
xxxii (1974) (emphasis added). The Rules also specified the
subjects to be tested and required the Committee to submit its
grading formula to the court in advance of each examination. Rule
28(c) VII (1973), as amended, 110 Ariz. xxxii (1974).
As a further safeguard, a disappointed applicant was accorded
the right to seek individualized review by filing a petition
directly with the court -- as Ronwin did unsuccessfully. Pursuant
to Rule 28(c) XII F, Ronwin filed a complaint with the court that
contained a plethora of charges,
Page 466 U. S. 577
including the substance of the complaint in this case. The court
denied his petition as well as two petitions for rehearing.
See
supra at
466 U. S. 564.
Thus, again there was
state action by the court itself
explicitly rejecting Ronwin's claim. [
Footnote 30] Finally, the
Page 466 U. S. 578
case law, as well as the Rules, makes clear that the Arizona
Supreme Court made the final decision on each applicant. [
Footnote 31]
See n 6,
supra. Unlike the actions
of the Virginia State Bar in
Goldfarb, the actions of the
Committee are governed by the court's Rules. Those Rules carefully
reserve to the court the authority to make the decision to admit or
deny, and that decision is the critical state action here.
[
Footnote 32]
See
Bates, 433
Page 466 U. S. 579
U.S. at
433 U. S.
359-361. Our opinion, therefore, also is wholly
consistent with the Court's reasoning in
Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389
(1978), and
Community Communications Co. v. Boulder,
455 U. S. 40
(1982). [
Footnote 33]
Our holding is derived directly from the reasoning of
Parker and
Bates. Those cases unmistakably hold
that, where the action complained of -- here the failure to
admit
Page 466 U. S. 580
Ronwin to the Bar -- was that of the State itself, the action is
exempt from antitrust liability regardless of the State's motives
in taking the action. Application of that standard to the facts of
this case requires that we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
The reasoning adopted by the dissent would allow Sherman Act
plaintiffs to look behind the actions of state sovereigns and base
their claims on perceived conspiracies to restrain trade among the
committees, commissions, or others who necessarily must advise the
sovereign. Such a holding would emasculate the
Parker v.
Brown doctrine. For example, if a state legislature enacted a
law based on studies performed, or advice given, by an advisory
committee, the dissent would find the State exempt from Sherman Act
liability, but not the committee. A party dissatisfied with the new
law could circumvent the state action doctrine by alleging that the
committee's advice reflected an undisclosed collective desire to
restrain trade without the knowledge of the legislature. The
plaintiff certainly would survive a motion to dismiss -- or even
summary judgment -- despite the fact that the suit falls squarely
within the class of cases found exempt from Sherman Act liability
in
Parker. [
Footnote
34]
Page 466 U. S. 581
In summary, this case turns on a narrow and specific issue: who
denied Ronwin admission to the Arizona Bar? The dissent argues, in
effect, that, since there is no court order in the record, the
denial must have been the action of the Committee. This argument
ignores the incontrovertible fact that, under the law of Arizona,
only the State Supreme Court had authority to admit or deny
admission to practice law:
"[It] is not the function of the committee to grant or deny
admission to the bar. That power rests solely in the Supreme Court.
. . ."
Application of Burke, 87 Ariz. 336, 338,
351 P.2d 169,
171 (1960) (
see n
30,
supra).
Thus, if the dissent's argument were accepted all decisions made
with respect to admissions and denials of those who took the
examination in February, 1974, are void. Ronwin did not allege that
he alone was a victim: his complaint avers
Page 466 U. S. 582
that he "was among those artificially prevented from entering
into competition as an attorney in the state of Arizona" by the
Committee's action with respect to the February, 1974, examination.
We are unwilling to assume that the Arizona Supreme Court failed to
comply with state law, and allowed the Committee alone to make the
decisions with respect to the February, 1974, examination. In any
event, the record is explicit that Ronwin's post-examination
petition complaining about his denial was rejected by an order of
the Arizona Supreme Court. That there was state action at least as
to Ronwin could not be clearer.
V
We conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Ronwin's
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the decision of this case.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Although petitioners represent only four of the seven members of
the Committee at the time of the February, 1974, bar examination,
Ronwin named all seven members in his original complaint.
Apparently, three of the original defendants to this action did not
join, for reasons not apparent, the petition for certiorari in this
Court. There is no claim that these members of the Committee failed
to participate in or dissented from the actions of the
Committee.
[
Footnote 2]
The procedure in Arizona is not unique to that State. In recent
years, the burgeoning number of candidates for admission to
practice law and the increased complexity of the subjects that must
be tested have combined to make grading and administration of bar
examinations a burdensome task. As a result, although the highest
court in each State retains ultimate authority for granting or
denying admission to the bar, each of those courts has delegated to
a subordinate committee responsibility for preparing, grading, and
administering the examination.
See F. Klein, S. Leleiko,
& J. Mavity, Bar Admission Rules and Student Practice Rules
30-33 (1978).
[
Footnote 3]
The parties disagree on the wording of the Rules at the time
Ronwin took the bar examination. The disagreement centers around
the effective date of some amendments promulgated in 1974.
Petitioners contend that the amendments took effect before Ronwin
took the February, 1974, bar examination; Ronwin submits that they
became effective in March, 1974. Ronwin concedes that the Supreme
Court order amending the Rules provided that the amendments would
become effective in January, 1974. Notwithstanding this directive,
he argues that Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 12-109 (1982) provided that
amendments to the Supreme Court's Rules may not become effective
until 60 days after publication and distribution. Since the Supreme
Court released the amendments on January 11, Ronwin submits that
the earliest possible effective date was March 12.
Ronwin has misread 12-109. That section only applied to Rules
that regulated pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial
proceedings in state courts. By its terms, the statute did not
limit the jurisdiction of the Arizona Supreme Court to establish
the terms of admission to practice law in the State.
See
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 32-275 (1976).
[
Footnote 4]
Rule 28(a) provided:
"Examination and Admission. . . . The examination and admission
of applicants for membership in the State Bar of Arizona shall
conform to this Rule. For such purpose, a committee on examinations
and admissions consisting of seven active members of the state bar
shall be appointed by this court. . . . The committee shall examine
applicants and recommend to this court for admission to practice
applicants who are found by the committee to have the necessary
qualifications and to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the
rules of the board of governors as approved by this court
respecting examinations and admissions. . . . The court will then
consider the recommendations and either grant or deny
admission."
[
Footnote 5]
According to Ronwin's complaint, the Committee announced before
the February examination that the passing grade on the test would
be 70, but it assigned grades using a scaled scoring system. Under
this system, the examinations were graded first without reference
to any grading scale. Thus, each examination was assigned a "raw
score" based on the number of correct answers. The Committee then
converted the raw score into a score on a scale of zero to 100 by
establishing the raw score that would be deemed the equivalent of
"seventy."
See n19,
infra.
[
Footnote 6]
Rule 28(c) VII B provided:
"The Committee on Examinations and Admissions will file with the
Supreme Court thirty (30) days before each examination the formula
upon which the Multi-State Bar Examination results will be applied
with the other portions of the total examination results. In
addition the Committee will file with the Court thirty (30) days
before each examination the proposed formula for grading the entire
examination."
110 Ariz. at xxxii.
[
Footnote 7]
See n 4,
supra;
Application of Courtney, 83 Ariz. 231, 233,
319 P.2d 991,
993 (1957) ("[T]his court may in the exercise of its inherent
powers, admit to the practice of law with or without favorable
action by the Committee");
Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d
499, 501 (CA9) ("[W]e find the power to grant or deny admission is
vested solely in the Arizona Supreme Court"),
cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966).
See also Application of
Burke, 87 Ariz. 336,
351 P.2d 169
(1960).
[
Footnote 8]
Rule 28(c) XII F provided:
"1. An applicant aggrieved by any decision of the Committee"
"(A) Refusing permission to take an examination upon the
record;"
"(B) Refusing permission to take an examination after
hearing;"
"(C) For any substantial cause other than with respect to a
claimed failure to award a satisfactory grade upon an
examination;"
"may within 20 days after such occurrence file a verified
petition with this Court for a review. . . ."
"2. A copy of said petition shall be promptly served upon the
chairman or some member of the Committee and the Committee shall
within 15 days of such service transmit said applicant's file and a
response to the petition fully advising this Court as to the
Committee's reasons for its decision and admitting or contesting
any assertions made by applicant in said petition. Thereupon this
Court shall consider the papers so filed together with the petition
and response and make such order, hold such hearings and give such
directions as it may in its discretion deem best adapted to a
prompt and fair decision as to the rights and obligations of
applicant judged in the light of the Committee's and this Court's
obligation to the public to see that only qualified applicants are
admitted to practice as attorneys at law."
110 Ariz. at xxxv-xxxvi.
Under Rule 28(c) XII G, an applicant who wished to challenge the
grading of an answer to a particular question first had to submit
his claim to the Committee for review. The applicant was entitled
to request Arizona Supreme Court review only if three members of
the Committee agreed with the applicant that his answer had not
received the grade it deserved. The Rule also provided that the
court could grant or deny such a request in its discretion.
Id. at xxxvi-xxxvii.
[
Footnote 9]
The Arizona Supreme Court Rules instructed the Committee to give
two examinations each year -- one in July and one in February.
Id. at xxxii.
[
Footnote 10]
He also alleged that the Committee had violated his
constitutional rights by refusing, after the grades had been
released, to provide him with the questions and answers to the
Multi-State portion of the examination.
[
Footnote 11]
Rule 28(c) XII F 2 provides, with respect to the petition of an
aggrieved applicant, that the Arizona Supreme Court "shall
consider" the petition and response, and "hold such hearings and
give such directions as it may in its discretion deem best adapted
to a prompt and fair decision." 110 Ariz. at xxxvi. Ronwin makes no
claim that the court failed to comply with its Rules, although --
of course -- he disagrees with the court's judgment denying his
petition. Thus, the court's denial of his petition must be
construed as a consideration and rejection of the arguments made in
the petition -- including Ronwin's claim that the Sherman Act was
violated.
[
Footnote 12]
Also named as defendants were petitioners' spouses and the
Arizona State Bar. The District Court dismissed the suit as to
these defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.
Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 694, n. 1
(CA9 1981). Ronwin challenged this aspect of the Court of Appeals'
opinion in a conditional cross-petition for certiorari. We denied
the cross-petition.
Ronwin v. Hoover, 461 U.S. 938
(1983).
[
Footnote 13]
The averment of a Sherman Act violation in Ronwin's complaint is
as follows:
"The aforesaid conduct [the 'scoring system or formula,'
see n 4,
supra], which the Defendants entered into as a conspiracy
or combination, was intended to and did result in a restraint of
trade and commerce among the Several States by artificially
reducing the numbers of competing attorneys in the State of
Arizona; and, in further consequence of said conduct, Plaintiff was
among those artificially prevented from entering into competition
as an attorney in the State of Arizona and thereby further deprived
of the right to compete as an attorney for the legal business
deriving from or involving the Several States of the United States,
including Arizona."
App. 10-11. The adequacy of these conclusory averments of intent
is far from certain. The Court of Appeals, however, found the
complaint sufficient. Accordingly, we address the "state action"
issue.
[
Footnote 14]
The District Court also denied Ronwin's motion requesting the
trial judge to recuse himself. The Court of Appeals held that the
District Court had not abused its discretion in denying the motion.
6 86 F.2d at 701. We declined to review that finding.
Ronwin v.
Hoover, supra.
[
Footnote 15]
Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S.
40 (1982);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97
(1980);
New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox
Co., 439 U. S. 96
(1978);
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U. S. 389
(1978).
[
Footnote 16]
The Court of Appeals also held that the District Court should
give Ronwin the opportunity to show that petitioners' actions
sufficiently affected interstate commerce to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. Petitioners did not seek review of
this holding.
[
Footnote 17]
This case does not present the issue whether the Governor of a
State stands in the same position as the state legislature and
supreme court for purposes of the state action doctrine.
[
Footnote 18]
Ronwin does not dispute that regulation of the bar is a
sovereign function of the Arizona Supreme Court. In
Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350,
433 U. S. 361
(1977), the Court noted that "the regulation of the activities of
the bar is at the core of the State's power to protect the public."
Likewise, in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.
S. 773,
421 U. S. 792
(1975), the Court stated:
"The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially
great, since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental
function of administering justice, and have historically been
'officers of the courts.'"
See also In re Griffiths, 413 U.
S. 717,
413 U. S.
722-723 (1973). Few other professions are as close to
"the core of the State's power to protect the public." Nor is any
trade or other profession as "essential to the primary governmental
function of administering justice."
[
Footnote 19]
Ronwin's complaint,
see supra at
466 U. S. 565,
focuses on the grading formula as the means used to "restrain
competition." He describes it as follows:
"The Defendants did not grade on a Zero to One Hundred (0 to
100) scale; rather they used a 'raw score' system. After the raw
scores were known, the Defendants picked a particular raw score
value as equal to the passing grade of Seventy (70). Thereby the
number of Bar applicants who would receive a passing grade depended
upon the exact raw score value chosen as equal to Seventy (70),
rather than achievement by each Bar applicant of a pre-set
standard."
App. 10.
Apparently Ronwin was trying to describe a "procedure commonly
known as test standardization" or "scaled scoring."
See
Brief for State Bar of California as
Amicus Curiae 7. This
method of scoring, viewed a the fairest by the Educational Testing
Service (ETS) for the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE),
see S. Duhl, The Bar Examiners' Handbook 61-62 (2d
ed.1980), published by The National Conference of Bar Examiners, is
described as follows:
"In addition to the 'raw' scores (number of correct answers),
ETS reports a 'scaled' score for each applicant. In a series of
tests, such as the MBE, which are intended to measure levels of
competence, it is important to have a standardized score which
represents the same level of competence from test to test. The raw
score is not dependable for this purpose, since the level of
difficulty varies from test to test. It is not possible to draft
two tests of exactly the same level of difficulty. Scaled scores
are obtained by reusing some questions from earlier tests which
have been standardized. A statistical analysis of the scores on the
reused questions determines how many points are to be added to or
subtracted from the raw score to provide an applicant's scaled
score. Thus, a particular scaled score represents the same level of
competence from examination to examination."
[
Footnote 20]
Although the Court of Appeals recognized the similarity between
this case and
Bates, it found the facts in
Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, supra, to be more analogous. The court's
reliance on
Goldfarb was misplaced. As the dissent of
Judge Ferguson noted,
Goldfarb involved procedures that
were not approved by the State Supreme Court or the state
legislature. In contrast, petitioners here performed functions
required by the Supreme Court Rules, and that are not effective
unless approved by the court itself.
[
Footnote 21]
Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona provided:
"The duties and obligations of members [of the Bar] shall be as
prescribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association. . . ."
[
Footnote 22]
Following petitioners' request for a rehearing in the Court of
Appeals, the parties debated whether and to what extent the
Committee complied with this Rule. For purposes of determining the
application of the state action doctrine, it is sufficient that the
Rules contained an enforceable provision calling for submission of
the grading formula. Moreover, the Rules contained a review
procedure that allowed an aggrieved applicant to bring to the
Supreme Court's attention any failure of the Committee to comply
with the filing requirements in Rule 28(c) VII B. The record
reveals that Ronwin, in fact, alleged in his petition for review in
the Arizona Supreme Court that the Committee had not filed its
grading formula within the time provided in the Rule. The court
rejected the petition.
See supra at
466 U. S.
564.
[
Footnote 23]
This procedure allowed a disappointed applicant to challenge
"[f]or any substantial cause" a Committee decision other than "a
claimed failure to award a satisfactory grade." Rule 28(c) XII F
1(C). As we have noted, Ronwin took full advantage of Rule 28(c)
XII F 1(C) in his challenge to the action of the Committee and the
court.
See supra at
466 U. S. 564.
He did not, however, challenge the particular grade assigned to any
of his answers.
[
Footnote 24]
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States as
amicus, contends that our recent opinion in
Community
Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S.
40 (1982), precludes a finding that the Committee's
action was attributable to the Arizona Supreme Court. Contrary to
the Solicitor General's suggestion, our reasoning in
Boulder supports the conclusion we reach today. In
Boulder, we reiterated the analysis of JUSTICE BRENNAN's
opinion in
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U. S. 389
(1978). We noted that the state action doctrine is grounded in
concepts of federalism and state sovereignty. 455 U.S. at
455 U. S. 54. We
stated that
Parker did not confer state action immunity
automatically on municipalities, because the actions of a
municipality are not those of the State itself. 455 U.S. at
455 U. S. 53.
Under our holding in
Boulder, municipalities may be
eligible for state action immunity, but only "to the extent that
they ac[t] pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy."
Id. at
455 U. S. 54;
see also Lafayette, supra, at
435 U. S.
411-412 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Consistent with our
reasoning in
Boulder, our decision today rests on our
conclusion that the conduct Ronwin complains of clearly is the
action of the State.
Bates is explicit authority for this
conclusion.
[
Footnote 25]
Our holding that petitioners' conduct is exempt from liability
under the Sherman Act precludes the need to address petitioners'
contention that they are immune from liability under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U. S. 657
(1965);
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127
(1961).
We also do not address Ronwin's contention that the Arizona
method of limiting bar admissions violates the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. As Ronwin concedes, he made this argument for the first
time in his response to petitioners' motion for rehearing in the
Court of Appeals. His failure to raise this issue in a timely
manner precludes our consideration.
[
Footnote 26]
The authority of the Arizona Supreme Court to determine who
shall be admitted to the Bar, and by what procedure, is even more
clearly defined than the role of that court in
Bates. In
that case, State Bar Committee members were not appointed by the
court, and the court did not expressly accept or reject each of the
Committee's actions.
[
Footnote 27]
Under Arizona law, the responsibility is on the court -- and
only on it -- to admit or deny admission to the practice of law.
This Court certainly cannot assume that the Arizona court, in the
exercise of its specifically reserved power under its Rules,
invariably agrees with its Committee. Even if it did, however, it
would be action of the sovereign.
[
Footnote 28]
Even if Committee members had decided to grade more strictly,
under the grading formula approved by the court, for the purpose of
reducing the total number of lawyers admitted to practice, the
court knew and approved the number of applicants. This was the
definitive action. There is nothing in the state action doctrine,
or in antitrust law, that permits us to question the motives for
the sovereign action of the court.
[
Footnote 29]
The dissent recites the provisions of the Rules regulating the
composition and origin of the Committee, and notes that the Rules
require the Committee to recommend qualified applicants to the
Supreme Court.
Post at
466 U. S. 586.
The dissent does not mention, however, several critical provisions,
summarized in the text
infra, that articulate the Arizona
Supreme Court's intent to retain full authority over, and
responsibility for, the bar admissions process.
[
Footnote 30]
The dissent states,
post at
466 U. S.
591-592, n. 15, that we "advanced the theory that
the relevant
state action'" was the State Supreme
Court's denial of Ronwin's post-examination petitions filed with
the court. (Emphasis supplied.) The dissent is inaccurate. Our
holding is based on the court's direct participation in every stage
of the admissions process, including retention of the sole
authority to admit or deny. The critical action in this case was
the court's decision to deny Ronwin admission to the Bar. The
dissent's suggestion that the Arizona Supreme Court never made this
decision simply ignores Arizona law. The Arizona Supreme Court has
stated on several occasions that it, and not the Committee, makes
the decision to admit or deny admission to applicants. In
Application of Burke, 87 Ariz. at 338, 351 P.2d at
171-172, the court stated:
"[I]t is not the function of the committee to grant or deny
admission to the bar. That power rests
solely in the
Supreme Court. . . . The committee's bounden duty is to 'put up the
red flag' as to those applicants about whom it has some substantial
doubt. If such doubt exists, then its recommendation should be
withheld. The applicant may feel that any questions raised as to
his character or qualifications are without substance. In such
case, he may apply directly to this court for admission. In the
final analysis -- it
being a judicial function -- we have
the
duty of resolving those questions, one way or the
other. . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.) In a similar vein, the court stated in
Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 92,
397 P.2d 205,
207 (1964):
"If the committee fails to recommend the admission of an
applicant, he may challenge the committee's conclusions by an
original application to this Court. . . . This Court will direct
the committee to show cause why the applicant has been refused a
favorable recommendation and, on the applicant's petition and the
committee's response, using our independent judgment,
de
novo determine whether the necessary qualifications have been
shown."
See also Application of Kiser, 107 Ariz. 326, 327,
487 P.2d 393,
394 (1971).
Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed its
responsibility as the final decisionmaker on admissions to the Bar.
The dissent, relying on the absence in the record before us of a
specific order of the court at the time Ronwin was not admitted,
nevertheless would have us hold that the Committee, rather than the
court, made the final decisions as to admissions and denials of the
applicants who took the examination in February, 1974. If the
dissent were correct, there would have been
no valid
action with respect to those who took that examination, since,
under Arizona law, the Committee had no independent power to act.
Ronwin's complaint makes no such extreme averment, and certainly
this Court will not assume that the Supreme Court of Arizona failed
to discharge its responsibility. Moreover, as we have noted,
supra at
466 U. S.
576-577, Ronwin's claims were specifically rejected by
the court.
[
Footnote 31]
It is true, of course, that framing examination questions and
particularly the grading of the examinations involved the exercise
of judgment and discretion by the examiners. This discretion
necessarily was delegated to the Arizona Committee, just as it must
be unless state supreme courts themselves undertake the grading. By
its Rules, the Arizona Supreme Court gave affirmative directions to
the Committee with respect to every nondiscretionary function,
reserving the ultimate authority to control the number of lawyers
admitted to the Arizona Bar. Ronwin avers a "conspiracy to limit
the number" of applicants admitted. He makes no claim of animus or
discriminatory intent with respect to himself.
Ronwin apparently would have us believe that grading
examinations is an exact science that separates the qualified from
the unqualified applicants. Ideally, perhaps, this should be true.
But law schools and bar examining committees must identify a grade
below which students and applicants fail to pass. No setting of a
passing grade or adoption of a grading formula can eliminate --
except on multiple choice exams -- the discretion exercised by the
grader. By its very nature, therefore, grading examinations does
not necessarily separate the competent from the incompetent or --
except very roughly -- identify those qualified to practice law and
those not qualified. At best, a bar examination can identify those
applicants who are
more qualified to practice law than
those less qualified.
[
Footnote 32]
JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent states that
"[a]ny possible claim that the challenged conduct is that of the
State Supreme Court is squarely foreclosed by
Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975)."
Post at
466 U. S. 589.
At issue in
Goldfarb was a Sherman Act challenge to
minimum fee schedules maintained by the Fairfax County Bar
Association and enforced by the Virginia State Bar. In
Goldfarb, state law did not refer to lawyers' fees, the
Virginia Supreme Court Rules did not direct the State Bar to supply
fee schedules, and the Supreme Court did not approve the fee
schedules established by the State Bar. To the contrary, the court
"directed lawyers not
to be controlled' by fee schedules." 421
U.S. at 421 U. S. 789.
Thus, even though the State Bar was a state agency, the Court
concluded that
"it cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia, through
its Supreme Court Rules, required the anticompetitive activities of
either respondent."
Id. at
421 U. S. 790.
As is evident from the provisions in the Arizona Supreme Court
Rules, this case arises under totally different circumstances,
although the relevant legal principles are the same. The dissent's
reliance on
Goldfarb simply misreads the decision in that
case.
[
Footnote 33]
The dissent relies on
Boulder, arguing that the
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" does
not exist in this case.
Post at
466 U. S.
594-596. What the dissent overlooks is that the Court in
Boulder was careful to say that action is not
"exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless it constitutes the action
of the State of Colorado itself in its sovereign capacity,
see
Parker, or unless it constitutes municipal action in
furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy,
see City of
Lafayette. . . ."
455 U.S. at
455 U. S. 52.
Thus, unlike the dissent here, JUSTICE BRENNAN in
Boulder
was careful to distinguish between action by the sovereign itself
and action taken by a subordinate body.
The dissent also cites
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U. S. 579
(1976), and
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97
(1980), as presenting situations analogous to the action of the
Arizona Supreme Court. This argument overlooks the fundamental
difference between this case and the several cases cited by
respondent. In each of those cases, it was necessary for the Court
to determine whether there had been a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy because the challenged conduct
was not that of the State "acting as sovereign." Here, as we have
noted above, the Arizona Supreme Court, acting in its sovereign
capacity, made the final decision to deny admission to Ronwin.
See n 30,
supra.
[
Footnote 34]
The
amicus curiae brief of the National Conference of
Bar Examiners points out that many States have bar admission
processes like those at issue in this case.
See Brief for
National Conference of Bar Examiners as
Amicus Curiae 1,
2, 8. Typically, the state supreme court is the ultimate
decisionmaker, and a committee or board conducts the examinations
pursuant to court rules. It is customary for lawyers of recognized
standing and integrity to serve on these bodies, usually as a
public duty and with little or no compensation.
See S.
Duhl, The Bar Examiner's Handbook 95, 99 (2d ed.1980). In virtually
all States, a significant percentage of those who take the bar
examination fail to pass.
See 1982 Bar Examination
Statistics, 52 Bar Examiner 24-26 (1983). Thus, every year, there
are thousands of aspirants who, like Ronwin, are disappointed. For
example, in 1974 (the year Ronwin first took the Arizona bar
examination), of the 43,798 applicants who took bar examinations
nationwide, 10,440 failed to pass. 44 Bar Examiner 115 (1975). The
National Conference of Bar Examiners, in its
amicus brief,
cautions that affirmance of the Court of Appeals in this case could
well invite numerous suits. It is no answer to say that, of course,
such suits are likely to be frivolous. Ronwin, who failed the bar
in 1974, has been litigating his claim for a decade on the basis of
a complaint that basically challenges the motive of the Arizona
Committee. His claim is that the grading formula was devised for
the purpose of limiting competition. If such an allegation is
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, examining boards and
committees would have to bear the substantial "discovery and
litigation burdens" attendant particularly upon refuting a charge
of improper motive.
See Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for
"State Action" after
Lafayette, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 435, 451
(1981). Moreover, Ronwin has brought a suit for damages under the
Sherman Act, with the threat of treble damages. There can be no
question that the threat of being sued for damages -- particularly
where the issue turns on subjective intent or motive -- will deter
"able citizens" from performing this essential public service.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.
S. 800,
457 U. S. 814
(1982). In our view, as the action challenged by Ronwin was that of
the State, the motive of the Committee in its recommendations to
the court was immaterial. We nevertheless think, particularly in
view of the decision below, that the consequences of an affirmance
should be understood. The consequences of reversal by the Court
today will have only a limited effect. Our attention has not been
drawn to any trade or other profession in which the licensing of
its members is determined directly by the sovereign itself -- here
the State Supreme Court.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN
join, dissenting.
In 14th-century London, the bakers' guild regulated the
economics of the craft and the quality of its product. In the year
1316, it was adjudged that one Richard de Lughteburghe "should have
the punishment of the hurdle" because he sold certain loaves of
bread in London; the bread had been baked in Suthwerke, rather than
London, and the loaves were not of "the proper weight." [
Footnote 2/1] Thus Richard had violated
Page 466 U. S. 583
a guild restriction designed to protect the economic interests
of the local bakers [
Footnote 2/2]
as well as a restriction designed to protect the public from the
purchase of inferior products.
For centuries, the common law of restraint of trade has been
concerned with restrictions on entry into particular professions
and occupations. As the case of the Suthwerke baker illustrates,
the restrictions imposed by medieval English guilds served two
important but quite different purposes. The guilds limited the
number of persons who might engage in a particular craft in order
to be sure that there was enough work available to enable guild
members to earn an adequate livelihood. [
Footnote 2/3] They also protected the public by ensuring
that apprentices, journeymen, and master craftsmen would have the
skills that were required for their work. In numerous occupations
today, licensing requirements [
Footnote
2/4] may serve
Page 466 U. S. 584
either or both of the broad purposes of the medieval guild
restrictions.
The risk that private regulation of market entry, prices, or
output may be designed to confer monopoly profits on members of an
industry at the expense of the consuming public has been the
central concern of both the development of the common law of
restraint of trade and our antitrust jurisprudence. At the same
time, the risk that the free market may not adequately protect the
public from purveyors of inferior goods and services has provided a
legitimate justification for the public regulation of entry into a
wide variety of occupations. Private regulation is generally
proscribed by the antitrust laws; public regulation is generally
consistent with antitrust policy. A potential conflict arises,
however, whenever government delegates licensing power to private
parties whose economic interests may be served by limiting the
number of competitors who may engage in a particular trade. In
fact, private parties have used licensing to advance their own
interests in restraining competition at the expense of the public
interest.
See generally Gellhorn, The Abuse of
Occupational Licensing, 44 U.Chi.L.Rev. 6 (1976).
The potential conflict with the antitrust laws may be avoided in
either of two ways. The State may itself formulate the governing
standards and administer the procedures
Page 466 U. S. 585
that determine whether or not particular applicants are
qualified. When the State itself governs entry into a profession,
the evils associated with giving power over a market to those who
stand to benefit from inhibiting entry into that market are absent.
For that reason, state action of that kind, even if it is
specifically designed to control output and to regulate prices,
does not violate the antitrust laws.
Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341
(1943). Alternatively, the State may delegate to private parties
the authority to formulate the standards and to determine the
qualifications of particular applicants. When that authority is
delegated to those with a stake in the competitive conditions
within the market, there is a risk that public power will be
exercised for private benefit. To minimize that risk, state
policies displacing competition must be "clearly and affirmatively
expressed," and must be appropriately supervised.
See Community
Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S.
40 (1982);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97,
445 U. S.
103-106 (1980).
In this case, respondent has been unable to obtain a license to
practice law in Arizona. He alleges that this is not because of any
doubts about his competence as a lawyer, but because petitioners
have engaged in an anticompetitive conspiracy in which they have
used the Arizona bar examination to artificially limit the number
of persons permitted to practice law in that State. Petitioners
claim that the alleged conspiracy is not actionable under § 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, because it represents the decision
of the State. But petitioners do not identify any state body that
has decided that it is in the public interest to limit entry of
even fully qualified persons into the Arizona Bar. Indeed, the
conspiracy that is alleged is not the product of any regulatory
scheme at all; there is no evidence that any criterion except
competence has been adopted by Arizona as the basis for granting
licenses to practice law. The conspiracy respondent has alleged is
private; market participants are allegedly
Page 466 U. S. 586
attempting to protect their competitive position through a
misuse of their powers. Yet the Court holds that this conspiracy is
cloaked in the State's immunity from the antitrust laws. In my
judgment, the competitive ideal of the Sherman Act may not be so
easily escaped.
I
Petitioners are members of the Arizona Supreme Court's Committee
on Examinations and Admissions. The Arizona Supreme Court
established the Committee to recommend applicants for admission to
the Arizona Bar; it consists of seven members of the State Bar
selected from a list of nominees supplied by the Arizona State Bar
Association's Board of Governors. [
Footnote 2/5] Petitioners administered the 1974 bar
examination which respondent took and failed. In his complaint,
respondent alleged that, after the scores of each candidate were
known, petitioners selected a particular score which would equal
the passing grade. The complaint alleges that the petitioners would
adjust the grading formula in order to limit the number of persons
who could enter the market and compete with members of the Arizona
Bar. In this manner, respondent was "artificially prevented from
entering into competition as an attorney in the State of Arizona."
[
Footnote 2/6]
The Arizona Supreme Court has instructed petitioners to
recommend for admission to the Bar "[a]ll applicants who receive a
passing grade in the general examination and who are found to be
otherwise qualified. . . ." [
Footnote
2/7] There is no indication that any criterion other than
competence is appropriate under the Supreme Court's Rules for
regulating admission to the Bar. [
Footnote 2/8] Indeed with respect to respondent's
application
Page 466 U. S. 587
for admission, the Arizona Supreme Court wrote:
"The practice of law is not a privilege, but a right,
conditioned solely upon the requirement that a person have the
necessary mental, physical and moral qualifications."
Application of Ronwin, 113 Ariz. 357, 358,
555 P.2d
315, 316 (1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977). In
short, one looks in vain in Arizona law, petitioners' briefs, or
the pronouncements of the Arizona Supreme Court for an articulation
of any policy beside that of admitting only competent attorneys to
practice in Arizona.
Thus, respondent does not challenge any state policy. He
contests neither the decision to license those who wish to practice
law nor the decision to require a certain level of competence, as
measured in a bar examination, as a precondition to licensing.
Instead, he challenges an alleged decision to exclude even
competent attorneys from practice in Arizona in order to protect
the interests of the Arizona Bar.
As we have often reiterated in cases that involve the
sufficiency of a pleading, a federal court may not dismiss a
complaint for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt, even when the complaint is liberally construed, that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to
relief. [
Footnote 2/9] The
allegations of the complaint must be taken as true for purposes of
a decision on the pleadings. [
Footnote 2/10]
A judge reading a complaint of this kind is understandably
somewhat skeptical. It seems highly improbable that members of the
profession entrusted by the State Supreme Court
Page 466 U. S. 588
with a public obligation to administer an examination system
that will measure applicants' competence would betray that trust,
and secretly subvert that system to serve their private ends.
Nevertheless, the probability that respondent will not prevail at
trial is no justification for dismissing the complaint. "Indeed, it
may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very
remote and unlikely, but that is not the test."
Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232,
416 U. S. 236
(1974). The Court does not purport to justify dismissal of this
complaint by reference to the low probability that respondent will
prevail at trial. Instead, it substantially broadens the doctrine
of antitrust immunity, using an elephant gun to kill a flea.
II
If respondent were challenging a restraint of trade imposed by
the sovereign itself, this case would be governed by
Parker v.
Brown, 317 U. S. 341
(1943), which held that the Sherman Act does not apply to the
sovereign acts of States.
See id. at
317 U. S.
350-352. As the Court points out, the Arizona Supreme
Court exercises sovereign power with respect to admission to the
Arizona Bar; hence, if the challenged conduct were that of the
court, it would be immune under
Parker. Ante at
466 U. S.
567-569. [
Footnote
2/11] The majority's conclusion that the challenged action was
that of the Arizona Supreme Court is, however, plainly wrong.
Respondent alleged that the decision to place an artificial limit
on the number of lawyers was made by petitioners -- not by the
State Supreme Court. There is no contention that petitioners made
that decision at the direction or behest of the Supreme Court. That
court is not a petitioner, nor was it named as a defendant in
respondent's complaint. Nor, unlike the Court, have petitioners
suggested that the Arizona Supreme Court played any part in
establishing the grading standards for the bar examination
Page 466 U. S. 589
or made any independent decision to admit or reject any
individual applicant for admission to the Bar. [
Footnote 2/12] Because respondent is not
challenging the conduct of the Arizona Supreme Court,
Parker is simply inapplicable.
Any possible claim that the challenged conduct is that of the
State Supreme Court is squarely foreclosed by
Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773
(1975). There an antitrust action was brought challenging minimum
fee schedules published by a county bar association and enforced by
the State Bar pursuant to its mandate from the Virginia Supreme
Court to regulate the practice of law in that State. After
acknowledging that the State Bar was a state agency which had
enforced the schedules pursuant to the authority granted it by the
State Supreme Court, we stated a simple test for antitrust
immunity:
"The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive
activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant
to proscribe is whether the activity is
required by the
State acting as sovereign. Here we need not inquire further into
the state action question, because it cannot fairly be said that
the State of Virginia, through its Supreme Court Rules,
required the anticompetitive activities of either
respondent. Respondents have pointed to no Virginia statute
requiring their activities; state law simply does not refer to
fees, leaving regulation of the profession to the Virginia Supreme
Court; although the Supreme Court's ethical codes mention advisory
fee schedules, they do not direct either respondent
Page 466 U. S. 590
to supply them, or require the type of price floor which arose
from respondents' activities."
Id. at
421 U. S. 790
(emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
In
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.
S. 350 (1977), the Court applied the
Goldfarb
test to a disciplinary rule restricting advertising by Arizona
attorneys that the Supreme Court itself "has imposed and enforces,"
433 U.S. at
433 U. S.
363:
"In the instant case, . . . the challenged restraint is the
affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court under its Rules
27(a) and 29(a) and its Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B). That court is
the ultimate body wielding the State's power over the practice of
law,
see Ariz. Const., Art. 3;
In re Bailey, 30
Ariz. 407, 248 P. 29 (1926), and, thus, the restraint is 'compelled
by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.' 421 U.S. at
421 U. S. 791 (footnote
omitted)."
Id. at
433 U. S.
359-360.
The test stated in
Goldfarb and
Bates is that
the sovereign must
require the restraint. Indeed, that
test is derived from
Parker itself:
"We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or
its officers or agents from activities
directed by its
legislature [or supreme court]."
317 U.S. at
317 U. S.
350-351 (emphasis supplied). Here, the sovereign is the
State Supreme Court, not petitioners, and the court did not require
petitioners to grade the bar examination as they did. [
Footnote 2/13] The fact that petitioners
are part of a state agency under the direction of the sovereign is
insufficient to cloak them in the sovereign's immunity; that much
was also decided in
Goldfarb:
Page 466 U. S. 591
"The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited
purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to
foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.
The State Bar, by providing that deviation from County Bar minimum
fees may lead to disciplinary action, has voluntarily joined in
what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity, and in that
posture cannot claim it is beyond the reach of the Sherman
Act."
421 U.S. at
421 U. S.
791-792 (footnotes and citation omitted).
"
Goldfarb therefore made it clear that, for purposes of
the
Parker doctrine, not every act of a state agency is
that of the State as sovereign."
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U. S. 389,
435 U. S. 410
(1978) (plurality opinion). Rather,
"anticompetitive actions of a state instrumentality not
compelled by the State acting as sovereign are not immune from the
antitrust laws."
Id. at
435 U. S. 411,
n. 41.
See also id. at
435 U. S. 425
(opinion of BURGER, C.J.);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U. S. 579,
428 U. S. 604
(1976) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.). An antitrust attack falls under
Parker only when it challenges a decision of the
sovereign, and not the decision of the state bar, which
indisputably is not the sovereign.
See California Retail Liquor
Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S.
97,
445 U. S.
104-105 (1980). [
Footnote
2/14] Here no decision of the sovereign, the Arizona Supreme
Court, is attacked; [
Footnote
2/15] only a
Page 466 U. S. 592
conspiracy of petitioners which was neither compelled nor
directed by the sovereign is at stake. Since there is no claim that
the court directed petitioners to artificially reduce the number of
lawyers in Arizona, petitioners cannot utilize the sovereign's
antitrust immunity. [
Footnote
2/16]
The majority's confused analysis is illustrated by its
difficulty in identifying the sovereign conduct which it thinks is
at issue here. To support its conclusion that the challenged action
is that of the Arizona Supreme Court, the majority suggests that
what respondent challenges is the court's decision to deny
respondent's application for admission to the Bar.
Ante at
466 U. S.
577-578, n. 30. I find nothing in the record to indicate
that the court ever made such a decision. Respondent's complaint
alleges only that petitioners "announced the results" of the bar
examination. App. 9. In their answer, petitioners admitted this,
and added nothing else of significance.
Id. at 17. The
Rules of the Supreme Court do not call for the court to deny the
application of a person who has failed the bar examination; rather,
they state only that any
"applicant aggrieved by any decision of the Committee . . . may
within 20 days after such occurrence file a verified petition
Page 466 U. S. 593
with this Court for a review."
Ariz.Sup.Ct.Rule 28(c) XII. Yet the Court disavows reliance on
the Supreme Court's denial of Ronwin's petition,
ante at
466 U. S.
577-578, n. 30, [
Footnote
2/17] and with good reason,
see n 15,
supra. [
Footnote 2/18] Thus, if the Supreme Court did not
itself deny Ronwin's application, if its denial of Ronwin's
petition for review is irrelevant, and if the only criterion it
ever required petitioners to employ was competence, it is difficult
to see why petitioners should have immunity from the requirements
of federal law if, as alleged, they took the initiative in
employing a criterion other than competence.
"It is not enough that . . . anticompetitive conduct is
'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must
be compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign."
Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at
421 U. S.
791.
III
It is, of course, true that the Arizona Supreme Court delegated
to petitioners the task of administering the bar exam, and retained
the authority to review or revise any action taken by petitioners.
However, neither of these factors
Page 466 U. S. 594
is sufficient to accord petitioners immunity under the Sherman
Act.
In
Bates, the Court held that the State Bar's
restrictions on attorney advertising qualified for antitrust
immunity, 433 U.S. at
433 U. S.
359-362, because
"the state policy requiring the anticompetitive restraint as
part of a comprehensive regulatory system was one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, and that
the State's policy was actively supervised by the State Supreme
Court as the policymaker."
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at
435 U. S. 410
(plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). This Court has since
"adopted the principle, expressed in the plurality opinion in
Lafayette, that anticompetitive restraints engaged in by
state municipalities or subdivisions must be 'clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy' in order to gain an
antitrust exemption."
Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. at
455 U. S. 51, n.
14 (quoting
Midcal, 445 U.S. at
445 U. S. 105).
[
Footnote 2/19]
Here there is nothing approaching a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy favoring an artificial limit
on the number of lawyers licensed to practice in Arizona. Indeed,
the majority does not attempt to argue that petitioners satisfy
this test. The only articulated policy to be found in Arizona law
is that competent lawyers should be admitted to practice; indeed
this is the only policy petitioners articulate in this Court. An
agreement of the type alleged in respondent's complaint is entirely
unrelated to any "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed"
policy of Arizona. While the Arizona Supreme Court may have
permitted petitioners to grade and score respondent's bar
examination as they did,
Parker itself indicates that
"a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their
action is lawful. . . ."
"317 U.S. at
317 U. S. 351. The Arizona
Supreme Court
Page 466 U. S. 595
may permit the challenged restraint, but it has hardly required
it as a consequence of some affirmatively expressed and clearly
articulated policy. What we said of a state home-rule provision
that permitted, but did not require, municipalities to adopt a
challenged restraint on competition applies fully here:"
"[P]lainly the requirement of 'clear articulation and
affirmative expression' is not satisfied when the State's position
is one of mere
neutrality respecting the municipal actions
challenged as anticompetitive. A State that allows its
municipalities to do as they please can hardly be said to have
'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive actions for which
municipal liability is sought. . . . Acceptance of such a
proposition -- that the general grant of power to enact ordinances
necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific
anticompetitive ordinances -- would wholly eviscerate the concepts
of 'clear articulation and affirmative expression' that our
precedents require."
Boulder, 455 U.S. at
455 U. S. 55-56
(emphasis in original).
Unless the Arizona Supreme Court affirmatively directed
petitioners to restrain competition by limiting the number of
otherwise qualified lawyers admitted to practice in Arizona, it
simply cannot be said that its position is anything more than one
of neutrality; mere authorization for anticompetitive conduct is
wholly insufficient to satisfy the test for antitrust immunity.
See Midcal, 445 U.S. at
445 U. S.
105-106;
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at
435 U. S.
414-415 (plurality opinion). [
Footnote 2/20] No
Page 466 U. S. 596
affirmative decision of the Arizona Supreme Court to restrain
competition by limiting the number of qualified persons admitted to
the Bar is disclosed on the present record. The alleged conspiracy
to introduce a factor other than competence into the bar
examination process is not the product of a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy, and hence does not qualify
for antitrust immunity. [
Footnote
2/21]
IV
The conclusion that enough has been alleged in the complaint to
survive a motion to dismiss does not warrant the further conclusion
that the respondent is likely to prevail at
Page 466 U. S. 597
trial, or even that his case is likely to survive a motion for
summary judgment. For it is perfectly clear that the admissions
policy that is described in the Arizona Supreme Court's Rules does
not offend the Sherman Act. Any examination procedure will place a
significant barrier to entry into the profession; moreover, a
significant measure of discretion must be employed in the
administration of testing procedures. Yet ensuring that only the
competent are licensed to serve the public is entirely consistent
with the Sherman Act.
See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at
421 U. S.
792-793. [
Footnote
2/22]
The Court is concerned about the danger that, because thousands
of aspirants fail to pass bar examinations every year, "affirmance
of the Court of Appeals in this case could well invite numerous
suits" questioning bar examiners' motives; the Court fears that the
burdens of discovery and trial and "the threat of treble damages"
will deter "
able citizens' from performing this essential
public service." Ante at 466 U. S.
580-581, n. 34. The Court is, I submit, unduly alarmed.
[Footnote 2/23] A
Page 466 U. S. 598
denial of antitrust immunity in this case would not necessarily
pose any realistic threat of liability, or even of prolonged
litigation. Respondent must first produce sufficient evidence that
petitioners have indeed abused their public trust to survive
summary judgment, a task that no doubt will prove formidable.
[
Footnote 2/24] Moreover,
petitioners' motives will not necessarily be relevant to
respondent's case. If the proof demonstrates that petitioners have
adopted a reasonable means for regulating admission to the Arizona
Bar on the basis of competence, respondent will be unable to show
the requisite adverse effect on competition even if the subjective
motivation of one or more bar examiners was tainted by sinister
self-interest. Indeed, even if respondent can show that he was
"arbitrarily" denied admission to the Bar for reasons unrelated to
his qualifications, unless he can also show that this occurred as
part of an anticompetitive scheme, his antitrust claim will
fail.
In any event, there is true irony in the Court's reliance on
these concerns. In essence, the Court is suggesting that a special
protective shield should be provided to lawyers because they --
unlike bakers, engineers, or the members of any other craft -- may
not have sufficient confidence in the ability of our legal system
to identify and reject unmeritorious claims to be willing to assume
the ordinary risks of litigation associated with the performance of
civic responsibilities. I do not share the Court's fear that the
administration of bar
Page 466 U. S. 599
examinations by court-appointed lawyers cannot survive the
scrutiny associated with rather ordinary litigation that persons in
most other walks of life are expected to endure.
The Court also no doubt believes that lawyers -- or at least
those leaders of the bar who are asked to serve as bar examiners --
will always be faithful to their fiduciary responsibilities. Though
I would agree that the presumption is indeed a strong one, nothing
in the sweeping language of the Sherman Act justifies carving out
rules for lawyers inapplicable to any other profession. In
Goldfarb, we specifically rejected such parochialism.
Indeed, the argument that it is unwise or unnecessary to require
the petitioners to comply with the Sherman Act
"is simply an attack upon the wisdom of the longstanding
congressional commitment to the policy of free markets and open
competition embodied in the antitrust laws."
Boulder, 455 U.S. at
455 U. S. 56. We
should not ignore that commitment today.
Denial of antitrust immunity in this case would hardly leave the
State helpless to cope with felt exigencies; should it wish to do
so, the Arizona Supreme Court remains free to give petitioners an
affirmative direction to engage in the precise conduct that
respondent has alleged. The antitrust laws hardly create any
inescapable burdens for the State; they simply require that
decisions to displace the free market be made overtly by public
officials subject to public accountability, rather than secretly in
the course of a conspiracy involving representatives of a private
guild accountable to the public indirectly if at all.
See
id. at
455 U. S. 56-57;
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at
435 U. S.
416-417 (plurality opinion).
"The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted
by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement."
Midcal, 445 U.S. at
445 U. S.
106.
The practical concerns identified by the Court pale when
compared with the principle that should govern the decision
Page 466 U. S. 600
of this case. The rule of law that applies to this case is
applicable to countless areas of the economy in which arbitrary
restraints on entry may impose the very costs on the consuming
public which the antitrust laws were designed to avoid. [
Footnote 2/25] Experience in the
administration of the Sherman Act has demonstrated that there is a
real risk that private associations that purport merely to regulate
professional standards may, in fact, use their powers to restrain
competition which threatens their members. [
Footnote 2/26] It is little short of irresponsible to
tear a gaping hole in the fabric of antitrust law simply because we
may be confident that respondent will be unable to prove what he
alleges.
Page 466 U. S. 601
Frivolous cases should be treated as exactly that, and not as
occasions for fundamental shifts in legal doctrine. [
Footnote 2/27] Our legal system has
developed procedures for speedily disposing of unfounded claims; if
they are inadequate to protect petitioners from vexatious
litigation, then there is something wrong with those procedures,
not with the law of antitrust immunity. That body of law simply
does not permit the Sherman Act to be displaced when neither the
state legislature nor the state supreme court has expressed any
desire to preclude application of the antitrust laws to the conduct
of those who stand to benefit from restraints of trade. A healthy
respect for state regulatory policy does not require immunizing
those who abuse their public trust; such a thin veneer of state
involvement is insufficient justification for casting aside the
competitive ideal of the Sherman Act. The commitment to free
markets and open competition that has evolved over the centuries
and is embodied in the Sherman Act should be sturdy enough to
withstand petitioners' flimsy claim. That claim might have merited
the support of the 14th-century guilds; today it should be accorded
the "punishment of the hurdle."
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
H. Riley, Memorials of London and London Life in the XIIIth,
XIVth, and XVth Centuries 119-120 (1868). The punishment is
described in a footnote as "[b]eing drawn on a hurdle through the
principal streets of the City."
Id. at 119, n. 5.
[
Footnote 2/2]
"The principal reason for the existence of the gild was to
preserve to its own members the monopoly of trade. No one not in
the gild merchant of the town could buy or sell there except under
conditions imposed by the gild. Foreigners coming from other
countries or traders from other English towns were prohibited from
buying or selling in any way that might interfere with the interest
of the gildsmen. They must buy and sell at such times and in such
places and only such articles as were provided by the gild
regulations."
E. Cheyney, An Introduction to the Industrial and Social History
of England 52-53 (1920).
[
Footnote 2/3]
"The craft gilds existed usually under the authority of the town
government, though frequently they obtained authorization or even a
charter from the crown. They were formed primarily to regulate and
preserve the monopoly of their own occupations in their own town,
just as the gild merchant existed to regulate the trade of the town
in general. No one could carry on any trade without being subject
to the organization which controlled that trade."
Id. at 55.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Professor Handler has pointed out:
"Entry into various fields of endeavor is guarded by numerous
licensing restrictions. Licenses are demanded of physicians and
surgeons, dentists, optometrists, pharmacists and druggists,
nurses, midwives, chiropodists, veterinarians, certified public
accountants, lawyers, architects, engineers and surveyors,
shorthand reporters, master plumbers, undertakers and embalmers,
real estate brokers, junk dealers, pawnbrokers, ticket agents,
liquor dealers, private detectives, auctioneers, milk dealers,
peddlers, master pilots and steamship engineers, weighmasters,
forest guides, motion picture operators, itinerant retailers on
boats, employment agencies, commission merchants of farm produce,
and manufacturers of frozen desserts, concentrated feeds, and
commercial fertilizers. No factory, cannery, place of public
assembly, laundry, cold storage warehouse, shooting gallery,
bowling alley and billiard parlor, or place of storage of
explosives can be operated, nor can industrial house work be
carried on without registration or license. Licenses are also
required for the sale of minnows, use of fishing nets, and the
operation of educational institutions, correspondence schools,
filling stations and motor vehicles. Motion pictures cannot be
exhibited unless licensed, and canal boats must be registered."
M. Handler, Cases and Other Materials on Trade Regulation 3-4
(1937) (footnotes omitted).
[
Footnote 2/5]
Ariz.Sup.Ct.Rule 28(a).
[
Footnote 2/6]
See App. 10-11.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Ariz.Sup.Ct.Rule 28(c) VIII.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Petitioners certainly do not suggest the existence of any other
criterion under Arizona law. To the contrary, at oral argument,
they expressly acknowledged that there is no state policy adopting
any criterion but competence for admission to the Bar. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 22-24.
[
Footnote 2/9]
See McClain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans,
444 U. S. 232,
444 U. S.
246-247 (1980);
Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391,
440 U. S. 397,
n. 11 (1979);
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex
Hospital, 425 U. S. 738,
425 U. S. 746
(1976);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.
S. 232,
416 U. S. 236
(1974);
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S.
41,
355 U. S. 46-46
(1957).
[
Footnote 2/10]
See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U. S. 5,
449 U. S. 10
(1980) (per curiam);
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.
S. 319,
405 U. S. 322
(1972) (per curiam);
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508,
404 U. S.
515-516 (1972);
Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U. S. 411,
395 U. S. 421
(1969) (plurality opinion);
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v.
Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.
S. 172,
382 U. S.
174-175 (1965).
[
Footnote 2/11]
See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.
S. 350,
433 U. S.
359-360 (1977).
[
Footnote 2/12]
It should be noted that petitioners do not advance the
imaginative argument on which this Court's decision rests -- that
the examination procedure is merely advisory, and that the Arizona
Supreme Court itself "made the final decision on each applicant."
Ante at
466 U. S. 578
(footnote omitted). Presumably petitioners are more familiar with
how their own procedures work than is this Court. The Court shows
precious little deference to "administrative expertise" in its
analysis of the facts.
[
Footnote 2/13]
It is not surprising that petitioners (who must practice before
the Arizona Supreme Court) did not advance the theory on which this
Court relies -- that their challenged conduct is actually conduct
of the Arizona Supreme Court. They surely understand that they are
not the court, but rather its subordinate.
[
Footnote 2/14]
See also New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W.
Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96,
439 U. S. 109
(1978);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. at
428 U. S.
593-595.
[
Footnote 2/15]
In response to this dissent, the Court has advanced the theory
that the relevant "state action" was the State Supreme Court's
rejection of an original complaint filed in that court containing a
"plethora of charges, including the substance of the complaint in
this case."
Ante at
466 U. S.
576-577.
See also ante at
466 U. S. 582.
Presumably, that complaint was simply deficient as a matter of
state law; if the allegations of respondent's current complaint are
taken as true, then the fact that respondent failed the bar
examination would have provided an adequate ground for the
dismissal of respondent's complaint without any review of
respondent's allegations. Even if it were the case that the Arizona
Supreme Court reviewed petitioner's complaint on its merits, all
that would indicate is that the court has declined to exercise its
power of revision with respect to petitioners' alleged
anticompetitive policies. That is far different from having
required petitioners to adopt those policies in the first place,
which is what
Goldfarb requires.
[
Footnote 2/16]
The Court argues that "[o]nly the Arizona Supreme Court had the
authority to grant or deny admission to practice in the State,"
ante at
466 U. S.
575-576 (footnote omitted), and therefore concludes that
the challenged conduct is that of the court. But there is no
allegation that the challenged policy was adopted by the court; at
most, the court has permitted it by accepting the recommendations
of petitioners. Yet, as
Bates and Goldfarb make clear, the
challenged policy must be required by the sovereign. The fact that
the court retained the power to disapprove of the examination
procedure adopted by petitioners is no different from the fact that
the Virginia Supreme Court retained the power to disapprove of the
fee schedules set by the bar association in
Goldfarb.
Similar powers of revision were held insufficient to justify
immunity in
Lafayette, Cantor, and
Midcal.
[
Footnote 2/17]
While the majority's disavowal in its
note 30 is quite unequivocal at other points in its
opinion,
see ante at
466 U. S.
576-577, and in its ultimate statement of its holding,
see ante at
466 U. S. 582,
it does seem to rely on the denial of respondent's petition for
review. If that truly is critical for the majority, then it would
follow that an individual in respondent's position who did not file
a petition for review would be able to mount an antitrust challenge
free from the immunity barrier the majority erects. If it indeed is
that easy to escape the majority's holding, then that holding will
not protect bar examiners against the parade of horribles discussed
by the majority
ante at
466 U. S. 580,
and n. 34.
[
Footnote 2/18]
The cases the Court cites
ante at
466 U. S. 577,
n. 30,
466 U. S. 581,
ail involve instances in which an applicant who had passed the bar
examination was nevertheless not recommended for admission. If the
applicant seeks judicial review, those cases indicate that the
court will decide for itself whether to admit the applicant.
However, none of those cases indicates that the court makes an
independent decision, or indeed any decision at all, to deny the
application of a person who has failed the bar examination.
[
Footnote 2/19]
See also 455 U.S. at
455 U. S. 51-52,
455 U. S. 54;
Midcal, 445 U.S. at
445 U. S.
104-105;
New Motor Vehicle Board of California v.
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. at
439 U. S.
109.
[
Footnote 2/20]
See also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. at
428 U. S.
604-605 (opinion of BURGER, C.J.). In
Cantor,
the Court wrote:
"Respondent could not maintain the lamp-exchange program without
the approval of the Commission, and now may not abandon it without
such approval. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the option
to have, or not to have, such a program is primarily respondent's,
not the Commission's. Indeed, respondent initiated the program
years before the regulatory agency was even created. There is
nothing unjust in a conclusion that respondent's participation in
the decision is sufficiently significant to require that its
conduct implementing the decision, like comparable conduct by
unregulated businesses, conform to applicable federal law.
Accordingly, even though there may be cases in which the State's
participation in a decision is so dominant that it would be unfair
to hold a private party responsible for his conduct in implementing
it, this record discloses no such unfairness."
Id. at
428 U. S.
594-595 (footnotes omitted).
[
Footnote 2/21]
In this Court, petitioners appear to have abandoned the
argument, advanced for the first time in a petition for rehearing
in the Court of Appeals, that the examination grading formula was
actually approved by the State Supreme Court. Because the majority
appears to revive this abandoned contention,
ante at
466 U. S.
572-573, and n. 22,
see also ante at
466 U. S. 576,
it is necessary to address it, though that requires no more than
brief reference to the Court of Appeals' opinion:
"Defendants contend for the first time on rehearing that the
Committee's grading formula 'was submitted to the Court, reviewed
by the Court, and accepted by the Court.' In response, Ronwin has
tendered to this court what purports to be the letter the Committee
filed with the Supreme Court on February 8, 1974, pursuant to Rule
28(c) (VII)(B). If, as Ronwin alleges, the Committee scored the
examination to admit a predetermined number of applicants, the
letter does not so advise the court. Accordingly, if the letter
presented to us constitutes the submission to the Supreme Court, it
cannot be the basis for a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy. Although dismissal might have been proper
if the facts were as defendants now argue for the first time on
rehearing, those facts were never brought to the district court's
attention. Dismissal was therefore improper on the basis of the
information before the district court."
Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 697 (CA9
1981). It is, of course, equally improper for this Court to rely on
evidence not presented to the District Court as a basis for holding
that the complaint was not sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss.
See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,
398 U. S. 144,
398 U. S.
157-158, n. 16 (1970).
[
Footnote 2/22]
See generally Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society, 457 U. S. 332,
457 U. S.
348-349 (1982);
National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679,
435 U. S. 696
(1978).
[
Footnote 2/23]
The majority makes the rather surprising suggestion that, under
the well-settled principles I have discussed, those who advise
state legislatures on legislation which restrains competition could
be sued under the Sherman Act.
Ante at
466 U. S. 580.
Such persons, of course, would have a complete defense, since, in
such a case, they would have been delegated no power which could be
used to restrain competition, and hence cannot be liable for a
restraint they did not impose. Moreover, the Sherman Act protects
the right to seek favorable legislation, even if the reason for
doing so is to injure competitors.
See California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.
S. 508 (1972);
Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.
S. 127 (1961). The majority's focus on cases not before
the Court surely reflects the weakness of its position with respect
to the case that is here.
[
Footnote 2/24]
In order to preserve the secrecy of bar examination questions,
the test must vary from year to year; after a test has been given,
it may become apparent that the anticipated passing grade should be
adjusted in order to provide roughly the same measure of competence
as was used in prior years. Thus respondent's burden of proving the
conspiracy he has alleged requires far more than evidence that
petitioners exercised discretion in setting the passing grade after
the results were known.
[
Footnote 2/25]
The conspiracy respondent has alleged, if proved, would have no
procompetitive justification at all; it would be plainly
inconsistent with the goals of the Sherman Act. Thus, petitioners'
claim of antitrust immunity arises in the least defensible
context:
"[A]s a general proposition, . . . state-sanctioned
anticompetitive activity must fall like any other if its potential
harms outweigh its benefits. This does not mean that
state-sanctioned and private activity are to be treated alike. The
former is different because the fact of state sanction figures
powerfully in the calculus of harm and benefit. If, for example,
the justification for the scheme lies in the protection of health
or safety, the strength of that justification is forcefully
attested to by the existence of a state enactment. . . . A
particularly strong justification exists for a state-sanctioned
scheme if the State, in effect, has substituted itself for the
forces of competition, and regulates private activity to the same
ends sought to be achieved by the Sherman Act. Thus, an
anticompetitive scheme which the State institutes on the plausible
ground that it will improve the performance of the market in
fostering efficient resource allocation and low prices can scarcely
be assailed."
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. at
428 U. S.
610-611 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment).
[
Footnote 2/26]
See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,
457 U. S. 332
(1982);
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U. S. 556
(1982);
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U. S. 679
(1978);
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.
S. 341 (1963);
American Medical Assn. v. United
States, 317 U. S. 519
(1943);
Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U. S. 457,
312 U. S.
465-466 (1941).
[
Footnote 2/27]
If, as seems likely, respondent's claim proves insubstantial, it
should be dealt with in the same manner as other such claims -- by
means of summary judgment, perhaps coupled with an award of
attorneys' fees should it also develop that this case was
"unreasonably and vexatiously" brought.
See 28 U.S.C. §
1927.