From 1957 to 1968, respondent, a wholesale distributor of
agricultural chemicals that engaged in a discount operation, sold
agricultural herbicides manufactured by petitioner. In 1968,
petitioner refused to renew respondent's 1-year distributorship
term, and thereafter respondent was unable to purchase from other
distributors as much of petitioner's products as it desired or as
early in the season as it needed them. Respondent ultimately
brought suit in Federal District Court under § 1 of the Sherman
Act, alleging that petitioner and some of its distributors
conspired to fix the resale prices of petitioner's products and
that petitioner had terminated respondent's distributorship in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Petitioner denied the allegations of
conspiracy, and asserted that respondent's distributorship had been
terminated because of its failure to hire trained salesmen and
promote sales to dealers adequately. The District Court instructed
the jury that petitioner's conduct was
per se unlawful if
it was in furtherance of a price-fixing conspiracy. In answers to
special interrogatories, the jury found,
inter alia, that
the termination of respondent's distributorship was pursuant to a
price-fixing conspiracy between petitioner and one or more of its
distributors. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was
sufficient evidence to satisfy respondent's burden of proving a
conspiracy to set resale prices. It noted evidence of numerous
complaints to petitioner from competing distributors about
respondent's price-cutting practices. In substance, the court held
that an antitrust plaintiff can survive a motion for a directed
verdict if it shows that a manufacturer terminated a price-cutting
distributor in response to or following complaints by other
distributors.
Held:
1. The Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard of proof
to the evidence in this case. A basic distinction in any
distributor termination case is that between concerted action of
the manufacturer and other distributors, which is proscribed by the
Sherman Act, and independent action of the manufacturer, which is
not proscribed.
United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U. S. 300. A
second important distinction in such cases is that between
concerted action to set prices, which is
per se illegal,
and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, which is judged
under
Page 465 U. S. 753
the rule of reason.
See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36.
Permitting a price-fixing agreement to be inferred from the
existence of complaints from other distributors, or even from the
fact that termination came about "in response to" complaints, could
deter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct. Thus, something
more than evidence of complaints is needed. The correct standard is
that there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility
that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting
independently. That is, there must be direct or circumstantial
evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and
others had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to
achieve an unlawful objective. Pp.
465 U. S.
760-764.
2. Under the proper standard of proof, the evidence in this case
created a jury issue as to whether respondent was terminated
pursuant to a price-fixing conspiracy between petitioner and its
distributors. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' judgment is
affirmed. Pp.
465 U. S.
765-768.
(a) There was sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to
have concluded that petitioner and some of its distributors were
parties to an "agreement" or "conspiracy" to maintain resale prices
and terminate price-cutters. Pp.
465 U. S.
765-766.
(b) It also would be reasonable to find that respondent's
termination was part of or pursuant to that agreement, since it is
necessary for competing distributors contemplating compliance with
suggested prices to know that those who do not comply will be
terminated. Moreover, there is some circumstantial evidence of such
a link. Pp.
465 U. S.
767-768.
684 F.2d 1226, affirmed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except WHITE, J., who took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case. BRENNAN, J., filed a
concurring opinion,
post, p.
465 U. S.
769.
Page 465 U. S. 755
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a question as to the standard of proof
required to find a vertical price-fixing conspiracy in violation of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act.
I
Petitioner Monsanto Co. manufactures chemical products,
including agricultural herbicides. By the late 1960's, the
Page 465 U. S. 756
time at issue in this case, its sales accounted for
approximately 15% of the corn herbicide market and 3% of the
soybean herbicide market. In the corn herbicide market, the market
leader commanded a 70% share. In the soybean herbicide market, two
other competitors each had between 30% and 40% of the market.
Respondent Spray-Rite Service Corp. was engaged in the wholesale
distribution of agricultural chemicals from 1955 to 1972.
Spray-Rite was essentially a family business, whose owner and
president, Donald Yapp, was also its sole salaried salesman.
Spray-Rite was a discount operation, buying in large quantities and
selling at a low margin.
Spray-Rite was an authorized distributor of Monsanto herbicides
from 1957 to 1968. In October, 1967, Monsanto announced that it
would appoint distributors for 1-year terms, and that it would
renew distributorships according to several new criteria. Among the
criteria were: (i) whether the distributor's primary activity was
soliciting sales to retail dealers; (ii) whether the distributor
employed trained salesmen capable of educating its customers on the
technical aspects of Monsanto's herbicides; and (iii) whether the
distributor could be expected "to exploit fully" the market in its
geographical area of primary responsibility. Shortly thereafter,
Monsanto also introduced a number of incentive programs,
Page 465 U. S. 757
such as making cash payments to distributors that sent salesmen
to training classes, and providing free deliveries of products to
customers within a distributor's area of primary responsibility.
[
Footnote 1]
In October, 1968, Monsanto declined to renew Spray-Rite's
distributorship. At that time, Spray-Rite was the 10th largest out
of approximately 100 distributors of Monsanto's primary corn
herbicide. Ninety percent of Spray-Rite's sales volume was devoted
to herbicide sales, and 16% of its sales were of Monsanto products.
After Monsanto's termination, Spray-Rite continued as a herbicide
dealer until 1972. It was able to purchase some of Monsanto's
products from other distributors, but not as much as it desired or
as early in the season as it needed. Monsanto introduced a new corn
herbicide in 1969. By 1972, its share of the corn herbicide market
had increased to approximately 28%. Its share of the soybean
herbicide market had grown to approximately 19%.
Spray-Rite brought this action under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26
Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1. It alleged that Monsanto and
some of its distributors conspired to fix the resale prices of
Monsanto herbicides. Its complaint further alleged that Monsanto
terminated Spray-Rite's distributorship, adopted compensation
programs and shipping policies, and encouraged distributors to
boycott Spray-Rite in furtherance of this conspiracy. Monsanto
denied the allegations of conspiracy, and asserted that
Spray-Rite's distributorship had been terminated because of its
failure to hire trained salesmen and promote sales to dealers
adequately.
The case was tried to a jury. The District Court instructed the
jury that Monsanto's conduct was
per se unlawful if it was
in furtherance of a conspiracy to fix prices. In answers to special
interrogatories, the jury found that (i) the termination of
Spray-Rite was pursuant to a conspiracy between
Page 465 U. S. 758
Monsanto and one or more of its distributors to set resale
prices, (ii) the compensation programs, areas of primary
responsibility, and/or shipping policies were created by Monsanto
pursuant to such a conspiracy, and (iii) Monsanto conspired with
one or more distributors to limit Spray-Rite's access to Monsanto
herbicides after 1968. [
Footnote
2] The jury awarded $3.5 million in damages, which was trebled
to $10.5 million. Only the first of the jury's findings is before
us today. [
Footnote 3]
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 684 F.2d
1226 (1982). It held that there was sufficient evidence to satisfy
Spray-Rite's burden of proving a conspiracy to set resale prices.
The court stated that "proof of termination following competitor
complaints is sufficient to support an inference of concerted
action."
Id. at 1238. [
Footnote 4] Canvassing the testimony and exhibits that
were before the jury, the
Page 465 U. S. 759
court found evidence of numerous complaints from competing
Monsanto distributors about Spray-Rite's price-cutting practices.
It also noted that there was testimony that a Monsanto official had
said that Spray-Rite was terminated because of the price
complaints.
In substance, the Court of Appeals held that an antitrust
plaintiff can survive a motion for a directed verdict if it shows
that a manufacturer terminated a price-cutting distributor in
response to or following complaints by other distributors. This
view brought the Seventh Circuit into direct conflict with a number
of other Courts of Appeals. [
Footnote 5] We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
460 U.S. 1010 (1983). We reject the statement by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit of the standard of proof required
to submit a case to the jury in distributor-termination litigation,
but affirm the judgment under the standard we announce today.
[
Footnote 6]
Page 465 U. S. 760
II
This Court has drawn two important distinctions that are at the
center of this and any other distributor-termination
Page 465 U. S. 761
case. First, there is the basic distinction between concerted
and independent action -- a distinction not always clearly drawn by
parties and courts. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires that
there be a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" between the
manufacturer and other distributors in order to establish a
violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Independent action is not proscribed. A
manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to
deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently.
United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.
S. 300,
250 U. S. 307
(1919);
cf. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U. S. 29
(1960). Under
Colgate, the manufacturer can announce its
resale prices in advance and refuse to deal with those who fail to
comply. And a distributor is free to acquiesce in the
manufacturer's demand in order to avoid termination.
The second important distinction in distributor-termination
cases is that between concerted action to set prices and concerted
action on nonprice restrictions. The former have been
per
se illegal since the early years of national antitrust
enforcement.
See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373,
220 U. S.
404-409 (1911). The latter are judged under the rule of
reason, which requires a weighing of the relevant circumstances of
a case to decide whether a restrictive practice constitutes an
unreasonable restraint on competition.
See Continental T. V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36
(1977). [
Footnote 7]
Page 465 U. S. 762
While these distinctions in theory are reasonably clear, often
they are difficult to apply in practice. In
Sylvania, we
emphasized that the legality of arguably anticompetitive conduct
should be judged primarily by its "market impact."
See, e.g.,
id. at
433 U. S. 51.
But the economic effect of all of the conduct described above --
unilateral and concerted vertical price setting, agreements on
price and nonprice restrictions -- is in many, but not all, cases
similar or identical.
See, e.g., Parke, Davis, supra, at
362 U. S. 44; n.
7,
supra. And judged from a distance, the conduct of the
parties in the various situations can be indistinguishable. For
example, the fact that a manufacturer and its distributors are in
constant communication about prices and marketing strategy does
not, alone, show that the distributors are not making independent
pricing decisions. A manufacturer and its distributors have
legitimate reasons to exchange information about the prices and the
reception of their products in the market. Moreover, it is
precisely in cases in which the manufacturer attempts to further a
particular marketing strategy by means of agreements on often
costly nonprice restrictions that it will have the most interest in
the distributors' resale prices. The manufacturer often will want
to ensure that its distributors earn sufficient profit to pay for
programs such as hiring and
Page 465 U. S. 763
training additional salesmen or demonstrating the technical
features of the product, and will want to see that "free riders" do
not interfere.
See Sylvania, supra, at
433 U. S. 55.
Thus, the manufacturer's strongly felt concern about resale prices
does not necessarily mean that it has done more than the
Colgate doctrine allows.
Nevertheless, it is of considerable importance that independent
action by the manufacturer, and concerted action on nonprice
restrictions, be distinguished from price-fixing agreements, since,
under present law, the latter are subject to
per se
treatment and treble damages. On a claim of concerted price fixing,
the antitrust plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to carry
its burden of proving that there was such an agreement. If an
inference of such an agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous
evidence, there is a considerable danger that the doctrines
enunciated in
Sylvania and
Colgate will be
seriously eroded.
The flaw in the evidentiary standard adopted by the Court of
Appeals in this case is that it disregards this danger. Permitting
an agreement to be inferred merely from the existence of
complaints, or even from the fact that termination came about "in
response to" complaints, could deter or penalize perfectly
legitimate conduct. As Monsanto points out, complaints about
price-cutters
"are natural -- and from the manufacturer's perspective,
unavoidable -- reactions by distributors to the activities of their
rivals."
Such complaints, particularly where the manufacturer has imposed
a costly set of nonprice restrictions, "arise in the normal course
of business, and do not indicate illegal concerted action."
Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F.2d 1168, 1172
(CA8 1982),
on rehearing en banc, 712 F.2d 1235 (CA8 1983)
(affirming District Court judgment by an equally divided court).
Moreover, distributors are an important source of information for
manufacturers. In order to assure an efficient distribution system,
manufacturers and distributors constantly must coordinate their
activities to assure that their product will
Page 465 U. S. 764
reach the consumer persuasively and efficiently. To bar a
manufacturer from acting solely because the information upon which
it acts originated as a price complaint would create an irrational
dislocation in the market.
See F. Warren-Boulton, Vertical
Control of Markets 13, 164 (1978). In sum,
"[t]o permit the inference of concerted action on the basis of
receiving complaints alone, and thus to expose the defendant to
treble damage liability, would both inhibit management's exercise
of its independent business judgment and emasculate the terms of
the statute."
Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637
F.2d 105, 111, n. 2 (CA3 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911
(1981). [
Footnote 8]
Thus, something more than evidence of complaints is needed.
There must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that
the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting
independently. As Judge Aldisert has written, the antitrust
plaintiff should present direct or circumstantial evidence that
reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others "had a
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an
unlawful objective."
Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, supra,
at 111;
accord, H. L. Moore Drug Exchange v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 662 F.2d 935, 941 (CA2 1981),
cert. denied, 459
U.S. 880 (1982);
cf. American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U. S. 781,
328 U. S. 810
(1946) (Circumstances must reveal "a unity of purpose or a common
design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful
arrangement"). [
Footnote 9]
Page 465 U. S. 765
III
A
Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we believe
there was sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to have
concluded that Monsanto and some of its distributors were parties
to an "agreement" or "conspiracy" to maintain resale prices and
terminate price-cutters. In fact, there was substantial direct
evidence of agreements to maintain prices. There was testimony from
a Monsanto district manager, for example, that Monsanto, on at
least two occasions in early 1969, about five months after
Spray-Rite was terminated, approached price-cutting distributors
and advised that, if they did not maintain the suggested resale
price, they would not receive adequate supplies of Monsanto's new
corn herbicide. Tr.1929-1934. When one of the distributors did not
assent, this information was referred to the Monsanto regional
office, and it complained to the distributor's parent company.
There was evidence that the parent instructed its subsidiary to
comply, and the distributor informed Monsanto that it would charge
the suggested price.
Id. at 1933-1934. Evidence of this
kind plainly is relevant and persuasive as to a meeting of minds.
[
Footnote 10]
An arguably more ambiguous example is a newsletter from one of
the distributors to his dealer-customers. The newsletter is dated
October 1, 1968, just four weeks before Spray-Rite was terminated.
It was written after a meeting between the author and several
Monsanto officials,
id. at 2564, 2571-2573, and discusses
Monsanto's efforts to "ge[t] the
market place in order.'" App.
A-65. The newsletter reviews
Page 465 U. S.
766
some of Monsanto's incentive and shipping policies, and then
states that, in addition, "every effort will be made to maintain a
minimum market price level." Id. at A-66. The newsletter
relates these efforts as follows:
"In other words, we are assured that Monsanto's company-owned
outlets will not retail at less than their suggested retail price
to the trade as a whole. Furthermore, those of us on the
distributor level are not likely to deviate downward on price to
anyone, as the idea is implied that doing this possibly could
discolor the outlook for continuity as one of the approved
distributors during the future upcoming seasons. So, none
interested in the retention of this arrangement is likely to risk
being deleted from this customer service opportunity. Also, as far
as the national accounts are concerned, they are sure to recognize
the desirability of retaining Monsanto's favor on a continuing
basis by respecting the wisdom of participating in the suggested
program in a manner assuring order on the retail level 'playground'
throughout the entire country. It is elementary that harmony can
only come from following the rules of the game, and that, in case
of dispute, the decision of the umpire is final."
Id. at A-66 - A-67. It is reasonable to interpret this
newsletter as referring to an agreement or understanding that
distributors and retailers would maintain prices, and Monsanto
would not undercut those prices on the retail level and would
terminate competitors who sold at prices below those of complying
distributors; these were "the rules of the game." [
Footnote 11]
Page 465 U. S. 767
B
If, as the courts below reasonably could have found, there was
evidence of an agreement with one or more distributors to maintain
prices, the remaining question is whether the termination of
Spray-Rite was part of or pursuant to that agreement. It would be
reasonable to find that it was, since it is necessary for competing
distributors contemplating compliance with suggested prices to know
that those who do not comply will be terminated. Moreover, there is
some circumstantial evidence of such a link. Following the
termination, there was a meeting between Spray-Rite's president and
a Monsanto official. There was testimony that the first thing the
official mentioned was the many complaints Monsanto had received
about Spray-Rite's prices. Tr. 774, 1295. [
Footnote 12] In addition, there was reliable
testimony that Monsanto never discussed with Spray-Rite prior to
the termination the distributorship criteria that were the alleged
basis for the action.
See 684 F.2d at 1239. By contrast, a
former Monsanto salesman for Spray-Rite's area testified that
Monsanto representatives on several occasions in 1965-1966
approached Spray-Rite, informed the distributor of complaints from
other distributors -- including one major and influential one,
see Tr. 126, 135 -- and requested that prices be
maintained.
Id. at 109-110, 114. Later that same year,
Spray-Rite's president testified, Monsanto officials
Page 465 U. S. 768
made explicit threats to terminate Spray-Rite unless it raised
its prices.
Id. at 619, 711. [
Footnote 13]
IV
We conclude that the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect
standard to the evidence in this case. The correct standard is that
there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of
independent action by the manufacturer and distributor. That is,
there must be direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably
tends to prove that the manufacturer and others had a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful
objective. Under this standard, the evidence in this case created a
jury issue as to whether Spray-Rite was terminated pursuant to a
price-fixing conspiracy between Monsanto and its distributors.
[
Footnote 14] The judgment
of the court below is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Page 465 U. S. 769
JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
[
Footnote 1]
These areas of primary responsibility were not exclusive
territorial restrictions. Approximately 10 to 20 distributors were
assigned to each area, and distributors were permitted to sell
outside their assigned area.
[
Footnote 2]
The three special interrogatories were as follows:
"1. Was the decision by Monsanto not to offer a new contract to
plaintiff for 1969 made by Monsanto pursuant to a conspiracy or
combination with one or more of its distributors to fix, maintain
or stabilize resale prices of Monsanto herbicides?"
"2. Were the compensation programs and/or areas of primary
responsibility, and/or shipping policy created by Monsanto pursuant
to a conspiracy to fix, maintain or stabilize resale prices on
Monsanto herbicides?"
"3. Did Monsanto conspire or combine with one or more of its
distributors so that one or more of those distributors would limit
plaintiff's access to Monsanto herbicides after 1968?"
684 F.2d 1226, 1233 (CA7 1982).
The jury answered "Yes" to each of the interrogatories.
[
Footnote 3]
See n 6,
infra.
[
Footnote 4]
The court later in the same paragraph restated the standard of
sufficiency as follows:
"Proof of distributorship termination
in response to
competing distributors' complaints about the terminated
distributor's pricing policies is sufficient to raise an inference
of concerted action."
684 F.2d at 1239 (emphasis added). It may be argued that this
standard is different from the one quoted in text, in that this one
requires a showing of a minimal causal connection between the
complaints and the termination of the plaintiff, while the textual
standard requires only that the one "follow" the other. As we
explain
infra at
465 U. S.
763-764, the difference is not ultimately significant in
our analysis.
[
Footnote 5]
The court below recognized that its standard was in conflict
with that articulated in
Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v.
Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 110-111 (CA3 1980),
cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). Other Courts of Appeals also have
rejected the standard adopted by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
See Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America,
677 F.2d 946, 952-953 (CA2),
cert. denied, 459 U.
S. 1007 (1982);
Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service
Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1199 (CA6 1982),
cert.
pending, No. 82-848;
Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister,
Inc., 688 F.2d 853, 856-857 (CA1 1982);
see also
Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840, 845 (CA10 1981). The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has adopted the Seventh
Circuit's standard.
See Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire
Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1213-1215 (1983). One panel of the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also has adopted that standard,
see Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 990-992
(1982), while another appears to have rejected it in an opinion
issued the same day,
see Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler
Corp., 671 F.2d 1168, 1172 (1982). On rehearing en banc, the
Court of Appeals was equally divided between the two positions.
Compare Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 712 F.2d 1235
(1983) (en banc),
with Battle v. Watson, 712 F.2d 1238,
1240 (1983) (en banc) (McMillian, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 6]
Monsanto also challenges another part of the Court of Appeals'
opinion. It argues that the court held that the nonprice
restrictions in this case -- the compensation and shipping policies
-- would be judged under a rule of reason, rather than a
per
se, rule "
only if there is no allegation that the
[nonprice] restrictions are part of a conspiracy to fix prices.'"
Brief for Petitioner 15 (emphasis deleted) (quoting 684 F.2d at
1237). Monsanto asserts that, under this holding, a mere allegation
that nonprice restrictions were part of a price conspiracy would
subject them to per se treatment. Monsanto contends this
view undermines our decision in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36
(1977), that such restrictions are subject to the rule of
reason.
If this were what the Court of Appeals held, it would present an
arguable conflict. We think, however, that Monsanto misreads the
court's opinion. Read in context, the court's somewhat broad
language fairly may be read to say that a plaintiff must prove, as
well as allege, that the nonprice restrictions were in fact a part
of a price conspiracy. Thus, later in its opinion, the court notes
that the District Court properly instructed the jury that
"Monsanto's otherwise lawful compensation programs and shipping
policies were
per se unlawful
if undertaken as part of
an illegal scheme to fix prices."
684 F.2d at 1237 (emphasis added). The court cited
White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253,
372 U. S. 260
(1963), in which this Court wrote that restrictive practices
ancillary to a price-fixing agreement would be restrained only if
there was a.finding that the two were sufficiently linked. And the
Court of Appeals elsewhere noted the jury's finding that the
nonprice practices here were "created by Monsanto pursuant to a
conspiracy to fix . . . resale prices." 684 F.2d at 1233.
Monsanto does not dispute Spray-Rite's view that, if the
nonprice practices were proved to have been instituted as part of a
price-fixing conspiracy, they would be subject to
per se
treatment.
See Brief for Petitioner 23-27. Instead,
Monsanto argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding that the nonprice practices were "created by
Monsanto pursuant to" a price-fixing conspiracy. Monsanto failed to
make its sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument in the Court of
Appeals with respect to this finding,
see Brief for
Defendant-Appellant Monsanto Co. in No. 80-2232 (CA7), pp. 27-34,
and the court did not address the point. We therefore decline to
reach it.
See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,
398 U. S. 144,
398 U. S. 147,
n. 2 (1970);
Duignan v. United States, 274 U.
S. 195,
274 U. S. 200
(1927).
In view of Monsanto's concession that a proper finding that
nonprice practices were part of a price-fixing conspiracy would
suffice to subject the entire conspiracy to
per se
treatment,
Sylvania is not applicable to this case. In
that case, only a nonprice restriction was challenged.
See
433 U.S. at
433 U. S. 51, n.
18. Nothing in our decision today undercuts the holding of
Sylvania that nonprice restrictions are to be judged under
the rule of reason. In fact, the need to ensure the viability of
Sylvania is an important consideration in our rejection of
the Court of Appeals' standard of sufficiency of the evidence.
See infra at
465 U. S.
763.
[
Footnote 7]
The Solicitor General (by brief only) and several other
amici suggest that we take this opportunity to reconsider
whether "contract[s], combination[s] . . . or conspirac[ies]" to
fix resale prices should always be unlawful. They argue that the
economic effect of resale price maintenance is little different
from agreements on nonprice restrictions.
See generally
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at
433 U. S. 69-70
(WHITE, J., concurring in judgment) (citing sources); Baker,
Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section
One Labyrinth: Is
Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 Va.L.Rev. 1457,
1465-1466 (1981). They say that the economic objections to resale
price maintenance that we discussed in
Sylvania, supra, at
433 U. S. 51, n.
18 -- such as that it facilitates horizontal cartels -- can be met
easily in the context of rule of reason analysis.
Certainly in this case we have no occasion to consider the
merits of this argument. This case was tried on
per se
instructions to the jury. Neither party argued in the District
Court that the rule of reason should apply to a vertical
price-fixing conspiracy, nor raised the point on appeal. In fact,
neither party before this Court presses the argument advanced by
amici. We therefore decline to reach the question, and we
decide the case in the context in which it was decided below and
argued here.
[
Footnote 8]
We do not suggest that evidence of complaints has no probative
value at all, but only that the burden remains on the antitrust
plaintiff to introduce additional evidence sufficient to support a
finding of an unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy.
[
Footnote 9]
The concept of "a meeting of the minds" or "a common scheme" in
a distributor-termination case includes more than a showing that
the distributor conformed to the suggested price. It means as well
that evidence must be presented both that the distributor
communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and that this was
sought by the manufacturer.
[
Footnote 10]
In addition, there was circumstantial evidence that Monsanto
sought agreement from the distributor to conform to the resale
price. The threat to cut off the distributor's supply came during
Monsanto's "shipping season," when herbicide was in short supply.
The jury could have concluded that Monsanto sought this agreement
at a time when it was able to use supply as a lever to force
compliance.
[
Footnote 11]
The newsletter also is subject to the interpretation that the
distributor was merely describing the likely reaction to unilateral
Monsanto pronouncements. But Monsanto itself appears to have
construed the flyer as reporting a price-fixing understanding. Six
weeks after the newsletter was written, a Monsanto official wrote
its author a letter urging him to "correct immediately any
misconceptions about Monsanto's marketing policies." App. A-98. The
letter disavowed any intent to enter into an agreement on resale
prices. The interpretation of these documents and the testimony
surrounding them properly was left to the jury.
[
Footnote 12]
Monsanto argues that the reference could have been to complaints
by Monsanto employees, rather than distributors, suggesting that
the price controls were merely unilateral action, rather than
accession to the demands of the distributors. The choice between
two reasonable interpretations of the testimony properly was left
for the jury.
See also Tr. 1298 (identifying source of one
complaint as a distributor).
[
Footnote 13]
The existence of the illegal joint boycott after Spray-Rite's
termination, a finding that the Court of Appeals affirmed and that
is not before us, is further evidence that Monsanto and its
distributors had an understanding that prices would be maintained,
and that price-cutters would be terminated. This last, however, is
also consistent with termination for other reasons, and is
probative only of the ability of Monsanto and its distributors to
act in concert.
[
Footnote 14]
Monsanto's contrary evidence has force, but we agree with the
courts below that it was insufficient to take the issue from the
jury. It is true that there was no testimony of any complaints
about Spray-Rite's pricing for the 15 months prior to termination.
But it was permissible for the jury to conclude that there were
complaints during that period from the evidence that they continued
after 1968 and from the testimony that they were mentioned at
Spray-Rite's post-termination meeting with Monsanto. There is also
evidence that resale prices in fact did not stabilize after 1968.
On the other hand, the former Monsanto salesman testified that
prices were more stable in 1969-1970 than in his earlier stint in
1965-1966.
Id. at 217. And, given the evidence that
Monsanto took active measures to stabilize prices, it may be that
distributors did not assent in sufficient numbers, or broke their
promises. In any event, we cannot say that the courts below erred
in finding that Spray-Rite produced substantial evidence of the
concerted action required by § 1 of the Sherman Act, and that --
despite the sharp conflict in evidence -- the case properly was
submitted to the jury.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.
As the Court notes, the Solicitor General has filed a brief in
this Court for the United States as
amicus curiae urging
us to overrule the Court's decision in
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373
(1911). That decision has stood for 73 years, and Congress has
certainly been aware of its existence throughout that time. Yet
Congress has never enacted legislation to overrule the
interpretation of the Sherman Act adopted in that case. Under these
circumstances, I see no reason for us to depart from our
longstanding interpretation of the Act. Because the Court adheres
to that rule and, in my view, properly applies
Dr. Miles
to this case, I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.