An application to stay, pending the filing and disposition of a
petition for a writ of certiorari, the District Court's judgment --
holding unconstitutional, and enjoining preliminary or final
elections under, a new electoral districting plan for the election
of members of the Boston City Council and the School Committee --
is denied. It is not reasonably probable that four Justices will
consider the issues involved to be sufficiently meritorious to
grant certiorari; nor is there a fair prospect that a majority of
the Court will conclude that the decision below was erroneous. The
inconvenience and delay imposed by the District Court's requirement
that the districting plan be revised before elections can go
forward are not so great as to warrant a stay.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, Circuit Justice.
The Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has
applied to me for a stay pending the filing and consideration by
this Court of a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the District Court for the District of Massachusetts
entered on July 26, 1983.
Latino Political Action Committee v.
City of Boston, 568 F.
Supp. 1012. That judgment found unconstitutional a new
electoral districting plan adopted by the Boston City Council and
approved by the Mayor of Boston for the election by district of
members of the City Council and the School Committee, and enjoined
the defendants from conducting preliminary or final elections under
the provisions of the plan. On August 2, 1983, the District Court
permitted the Attorney General to intervene in this matter and
denied his motions to stay the court's judgment pending appeal and
for relief from judgment. The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, on August 5, 1983, also denied the Attorney General's
request for a stay, 716 F.2d 68, and this application followed.
Page 463 U. S. 1320
The general principles that guide my consideration as a Circuit
Justice of this application are well settled:
"Relief from a single Justice is appropriate only in those
extraordinary cases where the applicant is able to rebut the
presumption that the decisions below -- both on the merits and on
the proper interim disposition of the case -- are correct. In a
case like the present one, this can be accomplished only if a
four-part showing is made. First, it must be established that there
is a 'reasonable probability' that four Justices will consider the
issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari or to note
probable jurisdiction. Second, the applicant must persuade [the
Circuit Justice] that there is a fair prospect that a majority of
the Court will conclude that the decision below was erroneous.
While related to the first inquiry, this question may involve
somewhat different considerations, especially in cases presented on
direct appeal. Third, there must be a demonstration that
irreparable harm is likely to result from the denial of a stay. And
fourth, in a close case it may be appropriate to 'balance the
equities' -- to explore the relative harms to applicant and
respondent, as well as the interests of the public at large."
Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U. S. 1306,
448 U. S.
1308 (1980) (BRENNAN, J., in chambers) (citations
omitted).
After carefully considering the opinions below and the
submissions of the applicant and respondents, I have concluded
that, under the circumstances of this case, it is not reasonably
probable that four Justices will consider the issues presented by
the applicant sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari; nor is
there, in my judgment, a fair prospect that a majority of the Court
will conclude that the decision below was erroneous. With respect
to the third
Rostker consideration, I have concluded that
the inconvenience and delay imposed by the District Court's
requirement that the districting plan be revised before elections
can go forward are not so great as to warrant a stay of the
judgment of the District Court.
Accordingly, the application is denied.