The Pecos River Compact was entered into by Texas and New Mexico
(and approved by Congress) to govern allocation of the waters of
the Pecos River, which rises in New Mexico and flows into Texas.
Article III(a) of the Compact requires that New Mexico
"not deplete by man's activities the flow of the Pecos River at
the New Mexico-Texas state line below an amount which will give to
Texas a quantity of water equivalent to that available to Texas
under the 1947 condition."
The Compact establishes the Pecos River Commission (Commission)
-- consisting of one Commissioner from each State and a nonvoting
representative of the United States -- and empowers it to make all
findings of fact necessary to administer the Compact. The two
voting Commissioners were unable to agree when a dispute arose
between the States concerning the methods for determining annual
shortfalls of state-line water flow with regard to Texas' right to
receive as much water as it would have received under the
consumption conditions prevailing in New Mexico in 1947. Texas
filed this action against New Mexico (the United States intervened
to protect its claims on the waters of the river), alleging that
New Mexico had breached its obligations under Art. III(a) of the
Compact and seeking a decree commanding New Mexico to deliver water
in accordance with the Compact. This Court appointed a Special
Master, who ultimately filed the report involved here, and the
parties filed various exceptions thereto.
Held:
1. Exceptions of the Government and New Mexico to the Master's
recommendation that either the United States Commissioner or some
other third party be given a vote on the Commission and be
empowered to participate in all Commission deliberations are
sustained. Once congressional consent is given to an interstate
compact as required by the Compact Clause, the compact is
transformed into a law of the United States, and unless the compact
is unconstitutional, no court may order relief inconsistent with
its express terms. Here, the Compact provides that the Government
Commissioner shall not have the right to vote, and no other third
party is given the right to vote on matters before the Commission.
This Court cannot rewrite the Compact so as to provide for a third,
tie-breaking vote. Moreover, the Court's equitable powers have
never been exercised so as to appoint quasi-administrative
officials
Page 462 U. S. 555
to control the division of interstate waters on a day-to-day
basis. Pp.
462 U. S.
564-566.
2. New Mexico's exception to the Master's alternative
recommendation to continue the suit as presently postured is
overruled, and the recommendation is accepted. There is no merit to
New Mexico's contention that this Court may do nothing more than
review the Commission's official actions, and that the case should
be dismissed if it is found either that there is no Commission
action to review or that actions taken by the Commission were not
arbitrary or capricious. This Court's original jurisdiction to
resolve controversies between two States extends to a suit by one
State to enforce its compact with another State or to declare
rights under a compact. Here, fundamental structural considerations
of the Compact militate against New Mexico's theory, since, if all
questions under the Compact had to be decided by the Commission in
the first instance, New Mexico could indefinitely prevent
authoritative Commission action solely by exercising its veto on
the Commission. Nor do the Compact's express terms constitute the
Commission as the sole arbiter of disputes over New Mexico's Art.
III obligations. Moreover, if authorized representatives of the
compacting States have reached an agreement on action to be taken
by the Commission, this Court will not review the Commission's
action at the behest of one of the States absent extraordinary
cause or a precise mandate from Congress. Pp.
462 U. S.
566-571.
3. Texas' exception to the Master's recommendation against
approval of Texas' motion to adopt a so-called "Double Mass
Analysis" method for determining when a shortfall in state-line
flows has occurred is overruled. The Compact provides that, until
the Commission adopts a more feasible method, an "inflow-outflow
method" shall be used to measure state-line shortfalls. The "Double
Mass Analysis" is not close enough to what the Compact terms an
"inflow-outflow method, as described in the Report of the
Engineering Advisory Committee" to make it acceptable for use in
determining New Mexico's compliance with its Art. III obligations.
While the Compact leaves the Commission free to adopt the "Double
Mass Analysis," this Court may not apply it against New Mexico in
the absence of Commission action. Pp.
462 U. S.
571-574.
Exceptions to Special Master's report sustained in part and
overruled in part.
BRENNAN,J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 462 U. S. 556
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
For the second time, we consider exceptions to a report of the
Special Master in this case. The States of Texas and New Mexico and
the United States have filed exceptions to a report submitted by
the Special Master on September 10, 1982 (1982 Report). We sustain
an exception in which both New Mexico and the United States concur,
overrule all other exceptions, and return the case to the Special
Master for a final decision on the basic issue in dispute --
whether New Mexico is in compliance with obligations imposed by the
Pecos River Compact.
I
The Pecos River rises in north-central New Mexico and flows in a
southerly direction into Texas until it joins the Rio Grande near
Langtry, Tex. [
Footnote 1] It
is the principal river in eastern New Mexico, draining roughly
one-fifth of the State, and it is a major tributary of the Rio
Grande.
Page 462 U. S. 557
Due in large part to many natural difficulties, [
Footnote 2] the Pecos barely supports a level
of development reached in the first third of this century. If
development in New Mexico were not restricted, especially the
groundwater pumping near Roswell, no water at all might reach Texas
in many years. As things stand, the amount of water Texas receives
in any year varies with a number of factors besides beneficial
consumption in New Mexico. These factors include, primarily,
precipitation in the Pecos Basin over the preceding several years,
evaporation in the McMillan and Alamogordo Reservoirs, and
nonbeneficial consumption of water by salt cedars and other
riverbed vegetation.
A
After 20 years of false starts, [
Footnote 3] in 1945, Texas and New Mexico commenced
negotiations on a compact to allocate the
Page 462 U. S. 558
waters of the Pecos Basin. A Compact Commission was formed,
consisting of three Commissioners, representing the two States and
the United States. In January, 1948, the Compact Commission's
engineering advisory committee submitted a lengthy report (1947
Study), the central portion of which was a set of river routing
studies describing six "conditions" of the Pecos, one of which
consisted of the actual conditions as of the beginning of 1947.
[
Footnote 4] Each of the
studies was embodied in a 41-column table accounting for all known
inflows and outflows of water on the river during each of the years
between 1905 and 1946. [
Footnote
5] The engineering advisory committee also drafted a Manual of
Inflow-Outflow Methods
Page 462 U. S. 559
of Measuring Changes in Stream-Flow Depletion (1948)
(Inflow-Outflow Manual), which contained charts and tables, derived
from data in the 1947 Study, to be used in determining how much
water Texas should expect to receive over any particular period for
any particular levels of precipitation, under the consumption
conditions prevailing in New Mexico in 1947.
On the basis of the 1947 Study and the Inflow-Outflow Manual,
the two States successfully negotiated the Pecos River Compact. It
was signed by the Commissioners from both States on December 3,
1948, and thereafter ratified by both state legislatures and -- as
required under the Compact Clause of the Constitution [
Footnote 6] -- approved by Congress.
Ch. 184, 63 Stat. 159. The 1947 Study and the Inflow-Outflow Manual
were incorporated into S.Doc. 109, and they unquestionably provided
the basis upon which Congress approved the Compact,
see
S.Rep. No. 409, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
The crucial substantive provision of the Pecos River Compact is
found at Art. III(a):
"New Mexico shall not deplete by man's activities the flow of
the Pecos River at the New Mexico-Texas state line below an amount
which will give to Texas a quantity of water equivalent to that
available to Texas under the 1947 condition."
The term "1947 condition" was expressly defined as "that
situation in the Pecos River Basin as described and defined in the
Report of the Engineering Advisory Committee." Art. II(g). In turn,
the Report was defined to include "basic data, processes, and
analyses utilized in preparing that report," Art. II(f), and
"deplete by man's activities" was defined to include any
"beneficial consumptive uses of water within the Pecos River
Basin," but to exclude diminutions of flow due to "encroachment
of
Page 462 U. S. 560
salt cedars" or "deterioration of the channel of the stream,"
Art. II(e).
The Compact also established the Pecos River Commission as a
permanent body, in more or less the same form that it had during
the negotiations on the Compact. It was to have three
Commissioners, one from each State and one representing the United
States, but the United States representative could not vote. Art.
V(a). Accordingly, the Commission could take official action only
with the concurrence of both state Commissioners. The Commission
was given broad powers to make all findings of fact necessary to
administer the Compact, Arts. V(d)(5)-(10), as well as to "[e]ngage
in studies of water supplies of the Pecos River" and to
"[c]ollect, analyze, correlate, preserve and report on data as
to the stream flows, storage, diversions, salvage, and use of the
waters of the Pecos River and its tributaries,"
Arts. V(d)(3), (4). [
Footnote
7]
For roughly 15 years, the Pecos River Commission functioned more
or less as had been contemplated in the Compact. It met regularly,
passed resolutions, and undertook studies of various questions of
importance to those who use the waters of the Pecos. The apparent
harmony that characterized the Commission in those years, however,
seems largely to have been the result of a tacit agreement to defer
disagreement on a problem of serious magnitude. For it became clear
soon after the Compact went into effect that the 1947 Study and,
more importantly, the tables in the Inflow-Outflow Manual did not
describe the actual state of the river. In almost every year
following adoption of the Compact, state-line flows were
significantly below the amount that one would have predicted on the
basis of the Inflow-Outflow Manual, with no obvious change either
in natural conditions along the river or in "man's activities."
The initial response of the Commission to this problem was to
authorize, in 1957, an ambitious "Review of Basic Data,"
Page 462 U. S. 561
which would essentially retrace the steps of the engineering
committee's 1947 Study to provide a more accurate description of
the "1947 condition." The Review of Basic Data was presented to the
Commission in 1960; it essentially duplicated the 1947 Study, but
using different periods of time, revised records, a number of
different assumptions, and different hydrological and mathematical
procedures. The Commission took no action on the Review of Basic
Data until two years later, when it directed the engineering
committee to proceed with a draft of a new Inflow-Outflow Manual,
and adopted as findings of fact a set of figures derived from the
new study showing that the cumulative shortfall of state-line flows
for the years 1950-1961 was approximately 53,000 acre-feet.
[
Footnote 8]
This was essentially the Commission's last action with respect
to the all-important question of Texas' right under the Compact to
receive as much water as it would have received under the "1947
condition." [
Footnote 9]
Disputes that had been deferred and avoided in the past now
surfaced. They came to a head at a special meeting of the
Commission in July, 1970, at which the Texas Commissioner stated
his position that, calculated according to the original
Inflow-Outflow Manual, there had been a cumulative shortfall in
state-line flows of 1.1 million
Page 462 U. S. 562
acre-feet for the years 1950-1969, that the Review of Basic Data
was "incomplete and replete with errors," and that Texas had a
right to an annual determination of departures in state-line flows
under the original assumptions of the 1947 Study until the
Commission adopted a different method. Thereafter, the Texas and
New Mexico staffs prepared different reports in 1971 and 1974 on
cumulative shortfalls under the "1947 condition," with Texas
relying on the original Inflow-Outflow Manual and New Mexico on the
Review of Basic Data. Attempts to mediate between the two positions
failed, and the Commission took no action for lack of agreement
between the two voting Commissioners.
B
In June, 1974, Texas invoked the original jurisdiction of this
Court under Art. III, 2, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution
and 28 U.S.C. 1251. Its bill of complaint alleged that New Mexico
had breached its obligations under Art. III(a) of the Compact
"by countenancing and permitting depletions by man's activities
within New Mexico to the extent that from 1950 through 1972 there
has occurred a cumulative departure of the quantity of water
available from the flow of the Pecos River at the Texas-New Mexico
State Line in excess of 1,200,000 acre-feet from the equivalent
available under the 1947 condition. . . ."
Texas sought a decree commanding New Mexico to deliver water in
accordance with the Compact. The United States intervened to
protect its own claims on the waters of the Pecos River, which had
been preserved in Arts. XI-XII of the Compact. We granted leave to
file the complaint, 421 U.S. 927 (1975), and appointed a Special
Master, 423 U.S. 942 (1975).
In 1979, the Special Master made his first report to this Court.
In that report, he recommended that we reject Texas' position that
the phrase "1947 condition" in Art. III(a) of the Compact should be
taken to mean an artificial condition
Page 462 U. S. 563
as described by the 1947 Study embodied in S.Doc. 109, however
erroneous the data in that study might have been. Instead, he
concluded that
"[t]he 1947 condition is that situation in the Pecos River Basin
which produced in New Mexico the man-made depletions resulting from
the stage of development existing at the beginning of the year 1947
. . . ,"
and that a new Inflow-Outflow Manual was required. 1979 Report
41. We approved the report in full.
446 U.
S. 540 (1980).
Over the following two years, the Special Master received
evidence on the question of what corrections to the 1947 Study and
the Inflow-Outflow Manual were required to produce an accurate
description of the 1947 condition, and thus of New Mexico's
obligations under Art. III(a) of the Compact. In his 1982 Report,
however, he concluded that resolution of these issues would require
that we "exercise administrative powers delegated to the [Pecos
River Commission]," and that "such exercise of administrative power
is beyond the judicial function." 1982 Report 27. Recognizing that
the Commission would be unlikely to act by unanimous vote of both
State Commissioners, and that continued impasse favored the
upstream State, the Special Master recommended:
"[T]he equity powers of the Court are adequate to provide a
remedy. If within a reasonable time . . . the States do not agree
on a tie-breaking procedure, the Court would be justified in
ordering . . . that either the representative of the United States,
or some other third-party, be designated and empowered to
participate in all Commission deliberations and act decisively when
the States are not in agreement. The order should provide that the
decision of the tie-breaker is final, subject only to appropriate
review by the Court. Upon the selection of a tie-breaker, the
States should be ordered to return to the Commission for
determination of this longstanding controversy."
Id. at 26.
Page 462 U. S. 564
At the same time, the Special Master rejected two pending
motions, one by New Mexico for dismissal of the case altogether and
one by Texas to adopt a simpler method than the Inflow-Outflow
Manual provides for determining the extent of shortfalls in
state-line water deliveries.
II
Both the United States and New Mexico have filed exceptions to
the Special Master's key recommendation -- that either the United
States Commissioner or some other third party be given a vote on
the Pecos River Commission and empowered to participate in all
Commission deliberations We sustain their exceptions.
Under the Compact Clause, two States may not conclude an
agreement such as the Pecos River Compact without the consent of
the United States Congress. However, once given, "congressional
consent transforms an interstate compact within this Clause into a
law of the United States."
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.
S. 433,
449 U. S. 438
(1981);
See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518,
54 U. S. 566
(1852). One consequence of this metamorphosis is that, unless the
compact to which Congress has consented is somehow
unconstitutional, no court may order relief inconsistent with its
express terms. Yet that is precisely what the Special Master has
recommended. The Pecos River Compact clearly delimits the role of
the United State Commissioner. Although the United States
Commissioner must be present at a Commission meeting in order to
provide a quorum and serves as its presiding officer, and although
the engineering advisers to the United States Commissioner have
consistently participated fully in the work of the various
engineering committees and subcommittees, Art. V(a) of the Compact
specifies that "the Commissioner representing the United States . .
. shall not have the right to vote in any of the deliberations of
the Commission." No other third party is given the right to vote on
matters before the Commission. To
Page 462 U. S. 565
provide a third, tie-breaking vote on regular Commission
business would be to alter fundamentally the structure of the
Commission.
Congress may vest a federal official with the responsibility to
administer the division of interstate streams.
See Arizona v.
California, 373 U. S. 546,
373 U. S.
564-567 (1963). Other interstate compacts, approved by
Congress contemporaneously with the Pecos River Compact, allow
federal representatives a vote on compact-created commissions, or
expressly provide for arbitration by federal officials of
commission disputes.
E.g., Upper Colorado Basin Compact,
63 Stat. 31, 35-37; Arkansas River Compact, 63 Stat. 145, 149-151;
Yellowstone River Compact, 65 Stat. 663, 665-666. The Pecos River
Compact clearly lacks the features of these other compacts, and we
are not free to rewrite it.
Without doubt, the structural likelihood of impasse on the Pecos
River Commission is a serious matter. In light of other States'
experience, Texas and New Mexico might well consider amending their
Compact to provide for some mutually acceptable method for
resolving paralyzing impasses such as the one that gave rise to
this suit. Nevertheless, the States' failure to agree on one issue,
however important, does not render the Compact void, nor does it
provide a justification for altering its structure by judicial
decree. The Commission
has acted on many matters by
unanimous vote. [
Footnote
10] We cannot say whether unanimity would have been achieved
had a tie-breaker stood ready to endorse one State's position over
the other's. Under the Compact as it now stands, the solution for
impasse is judicial resolution of such disputes as are amenable to
judicial resolution, and further negotiation for those disputes
that are not.
See infra at
462 U. S.
569-571.
Page 462 U. S. 566
Texas, in support of the Special Master's recommendation, argues
that reformation of the Compact is within this Court's equitable
powers. Indeed, in its complaint, Texas specifically requested that
we appoint a Master "to control the diversion, storage and use of
[the] Pecos River Basin waters within the State of New Mexico";
given the scope of the Commission's mandate, a tie-breaker on the
Commission would be the functional equivalent of such a Master.
Texas has not however, identified a single instance where we have
granted similar relief. [
Footnote 11] We have expressly refused to make indefinite
appointments of quasi-administrative officials to control the
division of interstate waters on a day-to-day basis, even with the
consent of the States involved.
E.g., Vermont v. New York,
417 U. S. 270
(1974);
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 710, 711 (1933).
Continuing supervision by this Court of water decrees would test
the limits of proper judicial functions, and we have thought it
wise not to undertake such a project.
Vermont v. New York,
supra, at
417 U. S.
277.
III
In the alternative, the Special Master recommends "continuance
of [this] suit as presently postured." 1982 Report 28. New Mexico
excepts to this recommendation insofar as it embodies a certain
conception of this Court's role in resolving the present dispute.
It contends that this Court may do nothing more than review
official actions of the Pecos River Commission, on the deferential
model of judicial review of administrative action by a federal
agency, and that this case
Page 462 U. S. 567
should be dismissed if we find either that there is no
Commission action to review or that the actions the Commission has
taken were not arbitrary or capricious. Thus, in New Mexico's view,
this suit may be maintained only as one for judicial review of the
Commission's quantification of the 1950-1961 shortfall, and the
implied acceptance of the Review of Basic Data which, New Mexico
argues, that entailed. [
Footnote
12] According to New Mexico, "[this] Court has no authority to
act
de novo or assume the powers of the Pecos River
Commission." Motion of New Mexico to Recommend Final Decree (filed
Feb.19, 1982), p. 2. We disagree.
There is no doubt that this Court's jurisdiction to resolve
controversies between two States, U.S.Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 1;
28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), extends to a properly framed suit to
apportion the waters of an interstate stream between States through
which it flows,
e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.
S. 125,
185 U. S. 145
(1902), or to a suit to enforce a prior apportionment,
e.g.,
Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U. S. 573
(1936). [
Footnote 13] It
also extends to a suit by one State to enforce its compact with
another State or to declare rights under a compact.
Virginia v.
West Virginia, 206 U. S. 290,
206 U. S.
317-319 (1907);
cf. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v.
Sims, 341 U. S. 22,
341 U. S. 30
(1951) (jurisdiction to interpret a compact on writ of certiorari);
Green v. Biddle,
8 Wheat. 1,
21 U. S. 91
(1823). If there is a compact, it is a law of the United States,
see supra at
462 U. S. 564,
and our first and last order of business is interpreting the
Page 462 U. S. 568
compact.
"Where Congress has so exercised its constitutional power over
waters, courts have no power to substitute their own notions of an
'equitable apportionment' for the apportionment chosen by
Congress."
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at
373 U. S.
565-566. Nevertheless, as
Virginia v. West
Virginia proves, the mere existence of a compact does not
foreclose the possibility that we will be required to resolve a
dispute between the compacting States.
The question for decision, therefore, is what role the Pecos
River Compact leaves to this Court. The Compact itself does not
expressly address the rights of the States to seek relief in the
Supreme Court, although it clearly contemplates some independent
exercise of judicial authority. [
Footnote 14] Fundamental structural considerations,
however, militate against New Mexico's theory. First, if all
questions under the Compact had to be decided by the Commission in
the first instance, New Mexico could indefinitely prevent
authoritative Commission action solely by exercising its veto on
the Commission. As New Mexico is the upstream State, with
effective
Page 462 U. S. 569
power to deny water altogether to Texas except under extreme
flood conditions, the Commission's failure to take action to
enforce New Mexico's obligations under Art. III(a) would invariably
work to New Mexico's benefit. [
Footnote 15] Under New Mexico's interpretation, this
Court would be powerless to grant Texas relief on its claim under
the Compact.
If it were clear that the Pecos River Commission was intended to
be the exclusive forum for disputes between the States, then we
would withdraw. But the express terms of the Pecos River Compact do
not constitute the Commission as the sole arbiter of disputes
between the States over New Mexico's Art. III obligations. Our
equitable power to apportion interstate streams and the power of
the States and Congress acting in concert to accomplish the same
result are to a large extent complementary.
See
Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution --
A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685, 705-708
(1925). Texas' right to invoke the original jurisdiction of this
Court was an important part of the context in which the Compact was
framed; indeed, the threat of such litigation undoubtedly
contributed to New Mexico's willingness to enter into a compact. It
is difficult to conceive that Texas would trade away its right to
seek an equitable apportionment of the river in return for a
promise that New Mexico could, for all practical purposes, avoid at
Will. [
Footnote 16] In the
absence of an explicit provision or other clear indications that a
bargain to that effect was made, we shall not construe a compact to
preclude a
Page 462 U. S. 570
State from seeking judicial relief when the compact does not
provide an equivalent method of vindicating the State's rights.
Cf. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. at
21 U. S. 91.
[
Footnote 17]
Considerations outside the Compact itself also render New
Mexico's theory of the role of this Court untenable. According to
New Mexico, Texas
may seek judicial review in this Court
of decisions actually made by the Commission -- presumably on the
votes of both States' Commissioners. That is not the proper
function of our original jurisdiction to decide controversies
between two States. In recent years, we have consistently
interpreted 28 U.S.C. 1251(a) as providing us with substantial
discretion to make case-by-case judgments as to the practical
necessity of an original forum in this Court for particular
disputes within our constitutional original jurisdiction.
See
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725,
451 U. S. 743
(1981);
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.
S. 493,
401 U. S. 499
(1971). We exercise that discretion with an eye to promoting the
most effective functioning of this Court within the overall federal
system.
See ibid. If authorized representatives of the
compacting States have reached an agreement
Page 462 U. S. 571
within the scope of their congressionally ratified powers,
recourse to this Court when one State has second thoughts is hardly
"necessary for the State's protection,"
Massachusetts v.
Missouri, 308 U. S. 1,
308 U. S. 18
(1939). [
Footnote 18] Absent
extraordinary cause, we shall not review the Pecos River
Commission's actions without a more precise mandate from Congress
than either the Compact or 28 U.S.C. § 1251 provides.
Therefore, we accept the Special Master's alternative
recommendation that this suit continue as presently framed.
IV
The Special Master also recommends that we deny a motion made by
Texas -- apparently at the Special Master's invitation -- to adopt
what it calls a "Double Mass Analysis" as the method for
determining when a shortfall in state-line flows has occurred. 1982
Report 21. Texas excepts to that recommendation. We overrule the
exception.
Once again, we turn to the provisions of the Compact. Article VI
provides:
"The following principles shall govern in regard to the
apportionment made by Article III of this Compact:"
* * * *
"(c) Unless and until a more feasible method is devised and
adopted by the Commission the inflow-outflow method, as described
in the Report of the Engineering Advisory Committee, shall be used
to: "
Page 462 U. S. 572
"(i) Determine the effect on the state-line flow of any change
in depletions by man's activities or otherwise, of the waters of
the Pecos River in New Mexico."
It is clear that the Commission has not adopted "a more feasible
method," so the question is whether Texas' "Double Mass Analysis"
fairly comes within the Compact phrase "Inflow-Outflow method, as
described in the Report of the Engineering Advisory Committee." If
it does not, then we may not use it to measure state-line
shortfalls in enforcing the Compact.
As an illustration of the method, [
Footnote 19] and to permit administration of the Compact
to begin, the Inflow-Outflow Manual provides a correlation curve
and set of tables for the critical reach of the river between
Alamogordo Dam and the state line.
See Appendix to this
opinion [omitted]. Plotted along the horizontal axis are
overlapping 3-year averages of the sums of four "index inflows" --
the actual, measured flow into Alamogordo Reservoir, and unmeasured
estimates of "flood inflows,"
see n 5,
supra, in three sub-reaches between
Alamogordo
Page 462 U. S. 573
Dam and the state line. The vertical axis measures corresponding
3-year averages of the measured "outflow" at the state line. The
data points form a smooth curve that, according to the Manual,
"fairly accurately cover[s] the entire range of expected water
supply so far as such a supply is affected by meteorological
factors" under the "1947 condition" as described in the 1947 Study.
S.Doc. 109, at 149.
At this point in the litigation, it has been decided that the
actual curve provided by the original Inflow-Outflow Manual does
not accurately describe the correlation between inflows and the
state-line outflow under the 1947 condition. The parties' evidence
now must be directed to drawing a new curve, like the old one but
using more accurate data, and the disputes between them involve
questions of which inflows should be "index inflows" and how the
historic values of those inflows should be deduced and incorporated
into the curve.
See n 21,
infra. Texas' motion to substitute its
"Double Mass Analysis" represents a bold effort to simplify this
initial process by reducing the number of index inflows to one,
directly measurable value -- the measured flow past Alamogordo Dam.
In essence, Texas' position is that this single inflow provides an
adequate index for all the inflows into the river that are more
difficult (if not impossible) to measure. If so, the correlation
curve described by plotting 3-year averages of the single inflow
against the state-line outflow would furnish an adequate benchmark
to which post-Compact flows could be compared to determine whether
Texas is receiving the water it may expect to receive under the
Compact. [
Footnote 20]
Page 462 U. S. 574
Although simplification would be desirable, and the question is
a close one, on balance we conclude that the "Double Mass Analysis"
is not close enough to what the Compact terms an "inflow-outflow
method, as described in the Report of the Engineering Advisory
Committee" to make it acceptable for use in determining New
Mexico's compliance with its Art. III obligations. The flows past
Alamogordo Dam do not always bear a physical relationship to the
state-line outflow. In its natural state, the Pecos actually dries
up for long periods of time between Alamogordo and the state line,
so the water that crosses the state line is not the same water that
passes the dam, except in periods of extreme flood. The Compact, by
reference to the 1947 Study, clearly contemplates that the adequacy
of state-line flows can be determined without taking into account
all inflows into the Pecos, but the intent of the Compact's framers
was clearly to use as much information as possible, rather than
relying on a single index inflow, even if that inflow reflects the
same meteorological factors that produce the other inflows. The
Inflow-Outflow Manual expressly indicates that the engineering
committee intended to develop more precise correlation curves for
smaller sub-reaches of the river, taking into account inflows not
incorporated into the curve it provided.
See S.Doc. 109,
at 150-151. The "Double Mass Analysis" represents a sharply
different approach to how to go about measuring shortfalls at the
state line, an approach which the Compact leaves the Commission
free to adopt, but which this Court may not apply against New
Mexico in the absence of Commission action.
V
In a pretrial order dated October 31, 1977, the Special Master
identified four broad questions to be resolved. The first was
settled by our approval of his 1979 Report,
446 U.
S. 540 (1980).
See supra at
462 U. S. 563.
The crucial question that remains to be decided is the fourth:
"[H]as New Mexico fulfilled her obligations under Article III(a) of
the Pecos River Compact?"
Page 462 U. S. 575
Pretrial Order 6. That question necessarily involves two
subsidiary questions. First, under the proper definition of the
"1947 condition,"
see supra at
462 U. S. 563,
what is the difference between the quantity of water Texas could
have expected to receive in each year and the quantity it actually
received? For the 1950-1961 period, that difference has been
determined by unanimous vote of the Commission; for 1962 to the
present, determining the extent of the shortfall will require
adjudicating disputes between the States as to specific issues
raised by the 1947 Study, the Review of Basic Data, and the
Inflow-Outflow Manual. The States have fully briefed their
positions, however, and the Special Master has already heard
extensive evidence on these questions. [
Footnote 21] Second, to what extent were the
shortfalls due to "man's activities in New Mexico"?
Time and again we have counseled States engaged in litigation
with one another before this Court that their dispute
"is one more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study and
by conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives
of the States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in
any court, however constituted."
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.
S. 296,
256 U. S. 313
(1921);
cf. Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. at
417 U. S.
277-278;
Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252 U.
S. 273,
252 U. S. 283
(1920);
Washington v. Oregon, 214 U.
S. 205,
214 U. S. 218
(1909). It is within this Court's power to determine whether New
Mexico is in compliance with Art. III(a) of the
Page 462 U. S. 576
Pecos River Compact, but it is difficult to believe that the
bona fide differences in the two States' views of how much water
Texas is entitled to receive justify the expense and time necessary
to obtain a judicial resolution of this controversy. With that
observation, we return this case to the Special Master for
determination of the unresolved issues framed in his pretrial
order, in a manner consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
From north to south, the Pecos River flows past Pecos and Santa
Rosa, N.M., and then into the Alamogordo Reservoir above Alamogordo
(or Sumner) Dam. It then passes Fort Sumner and traverses a
relatively desolate region in the central part of the State. From
Acme to Artesia, in the area around Roswell, the river is fed by a
large, slowly flowing aquifer. Below Artesia, the river passes
through a set of deltas and lakes formed by the now-deteriorated
McMillan and Avalon Dams, then flows past Carlsbad and into the Red
Bluff Reservoir, which straddles the state line and is used to
regulate the river in Texas.
[
Footnote 2]
In its natural state, the Pecos may dry up completely for weeks
at a time over fairly long reaches in central New Mexico. Much of
its annual flow comes in flash floods, carrying with them great
quantities of topsoil that both progressively destroy reservoirs,
by silting, and render the river's waters quite saline. The
nonflood "base" flow of the Pecos below Alamogordo Dam is supplied
to a large part by groundwater aquifers that empty into the river
in the reach between Acme and Artesia, N.M. The operation of these
aquifers is little understood. They are depleted by pumping from
wells in the Roswell area, and there is some suggestion that, at
times, heavy groundwater pumping in the area around Roswell may
actually reverse the direction of flow of the underground aquifer,
so that water flows away from the river.
See Texas' Brief
on the 1947 Condition (filed Aug. 21, 1978), p. 34. In addition, a
steady stream of underground brine enters the river at Malaga Bend,
some 10 miles above the Texas border, severely impairing the
quality of water that reaches Texas when the river is low. Salt
cedars, which consume large amounts of water, proliferate along its
channel and in the silt deposits at the heads of its
reservoirs.
[
Footnote 3]
In 1925, the States negotiated a compact for regulating the
river. It was approved by both state legislatures, but the Governor
of New Mexico vetoed its bill. In the early 1930's, the Texas
congressional delegation succeeded in holding up federal funding
for construction of the Alamogordo Dam until New Mexico agreed to
ensure that Texas received the same portion of flood flows
originating above Avalon Dam that it had received during the period
from 1905 to 1935. This agreement was signed in 1935 by the
Secretary of the Interior, the United States Senators from both
States, and representatives of the irrigation districts concerned,
and it was formally ratified by the Texas Legislature, but never by
the New Mexico Legislature. New Mexico did, however, sharply
restrict groundwater pumping in the Roswell area in 1937, thus
restoring to some extent the base flow of the river.
[
Footnote 4]
The six "conditions" studied by the engineering committee
represented various combinations of historical facts from different
periods and hypothetical assumptions about the existence,
condition, and operation of the dams and irrigation projects that
had been built since 1905.
See S.Doc. No. 109, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess., 9-11 (1949) (S.Doc. 109). The only one material to the
Compact as adopted is the "1947 condition," which assumed actual
conditions as of 1947, with some additional use by the Carlsbad and
Fort Sumner projects.
[
Footnote 5]
For instance, on each table column 14 showed depletion by pumps
between Acme and Artesia, column 15 showed inflows from aquifers in
the same reach, and column 16 showed depletion by salt cedars. Some
of the entries in the tables could be inferred more or less easily
from observed data --
e.g., the flow of the river past
specific gauges, or diversions to irrigation projects. Others, such
as the entries for salt-cedar depletions or evaporation from each
reservoir, could only be estimated, albeit with some degree of
reliability. However, many entries
e.g., the three columns
showing "flood inflows" and the two columns entitled "channel
losses" -- required a great deal of speculation, and to some extent
they may have been used as residual categories to "balance the
books."
See S.Doc. 109, at 41-42; Report of Review of
Basic Data to Engineering Advisory Committee, Pecos River
Commission 24 (1960) (stipulated exhibit No. 8) (Review of Basic
Data).
[
Footnote 6]
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . Compact
with another State, or with a foreign Power. . . ." U.S.Const.,
Art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
[
Footnote 7]
Further relevant provisions in Arts. V and VI are discussed
infra at
462 U. S. 568,
n. 14,
462 U. S.
571-572.
[
Footnote 8]
This figure was far less than the shortfall that would have been
found had the tables in the original Inflow-Outflow Manual been
used. The Commission did not determine whether any difference
between expected flows and actual flows was due to "man's
activities" in New Mexico, and later engineering committee reports
indicated that adjustments to the 1950-1961 figures were
contemplated.
[
Footnote 9]
The Commission did not meet at all between January, 1967, and
November, 1968, during which period the identities of four key
persons changed. Both the Texas Commissioner (first appointed
immediately after the Compact was ratified) and the Engineering
Advisor to the United States Commissioner (also chairman of the
engineering committee and principal author of the 1947 Study and
Inflow-Outflow Manual) died. The New Mexico and United States
Commissioners (the latter an important force in the original
compact negotiations) retired. Thus, by late 1968, administration
of the Compact was largely in the hands of people with no personal
connection to the Commission's early work.
[
Footnote 10]
For instance, the Commission has taken a number of concrete
actions with regard to salt-cedar eradication and salinity
alleviation, especially at Malaga Bend. Furthermore, it has
participated in and coordinated studies of various features of the
river, and it has maintained the numerous gauges and other
equipment used in such studies.
[
Footnote 11]
On occasion in the past, before the device of appointing special
masters in original jurisdiction cases became common, we have gone
so far as to appoint a commission with broad powers to resolve
factual questions in a controversy between two States,
see Iowa
v. Illinois, 147 U. S. 1 (1893),
but even then we declined to accept the commission's decisions
without providing the States an opportunity to challenge them,
see Iowa v. Illinois, 151 U. S. 238
(1894). We have, however, been willing to appoint a River Master
solely to perform ministerial tasks.
New Jersey v. New
York, 347 U. S. 995,
1002-1004 (1954).
[
Footnote 12]
We note that the Special Master's 1979 Report, which we
approved, decisively rejected New Mexico's argument that the Pecos
River Commission in fact adopted the Review of Basic Data, but that
same report did not suggest that we dismiss this action.
See 1979 Report 40-41, 44. Thus, at least by implication,
the argument New Mexico now advances was also rejected. New Mexico
did not object to those portions of the Special Master's Report,
although it did object to others. New Mexico's Objections to the
Report of the Special Master and Brief (filed Nov. 29, 1979).
[
Footnote 13]
That jurisdiction exists even though litigation of such disputes
is obviously a poor alternative to negotiation between the
interested States.
See Vermont v. New York, 417 U.
S. 270,
417 U. S.
277-278 (1974);
infra at
462 U. S.
575-576.
[
Footnote 14]
Article V(f) provides:
"Findings of fact made by the Commission shall not be conclusive
in any court, or before any agency or tribunal, but shall
constitute
prima facie evidence of the facts found."
That language is ambiguous as to the role of the Supreme Court,
but an earlier version of Art. V(f) -- one that was proposed by New
Mexico -- sheds further light: "The findings of the Commission
shall not be conclusive in any court or tribunal which may be
called upon to interpret or enforce this Compact." Minutes of
Meeting of the Pecos River Compact Commission, Sept. 28, 1943, p.
11 (proposed Art. XII, � 4). Since the only parties with rights and
duties to be enforced under any draft of the Compact were the
United States and the two signatory States, it is clear that the
New Mexico draft reflected the assumption that this Court might be
called upon to enforce the Compact. Article V(f) assumed its
present form at a late stage in the negotiations, and with no
discussion on the record; its change was most likely due to the
efforts of a federal drafting expert brought in after all
significant disputes had been resolved,
see Pecos River
Compact Commission Meeting, Nov. 8-13, 1948, p. 61, reprinted in
S.Doc. 109, at 101. In the light of the other factors discussed in
text, we need not consider whether, standing alone, this history
would be dispositive.
[
Footnote 15]
Cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S.
46,
206 U. S. 117
(1907).
See also Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact
Clause of the Constitution -- A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34
Yale L.J. 685, 701 (1925) ("[O]ne answer is clear: no one State can
control the power to feed or to starve, possessed by a river
flowing through several States"); Bannister, Interstate Rights in
Interstate Streams in the Arid West, 36 Harv.L.Rev. 960, 979-980
(1923) (describing practice in international law).
[
Footnote 16]
Note that, under Art. XIV of the Compact, Texas may withdraw
from the Compact only with the concurrence of the New Mexico State
Legislature.
[
Footnote 17]
In
Green v. Biddle, the owners of certain lands in
Kentucky sued their tenant to recover the lands. The tenant relied
on two Kentucky statutes which gave him a good defense to the
action, and the owners responded that the statutes were invalid as
violations of a compact between Kentucky and Virginia, ratified by
Congress, which provided that
"all private rights, and interests of lands within [Kentucky]
derived from the laws of Virginia prior to [the separation of
Kentucky from Virginia], shall remain valid and secure under the
laws of [Kentucky], and shall be determined by the laws now
existing in [Virginia]."
8 Wheat. at
21 U. S. 3. An
argument was made -- similar to New Mexico's argument in this case
-- that disputes concerning the compact could only be resolved by a
commission to be appointed under the terms of the agreement, and
not by the courts that would ordinarily resolve questions of title
to land. We rejected the argument because the possibility that one
State could defeat the rights of the other's citizens or allow the
occupants of the land to enrich themselves without title simply by
refusing to appoint commissioners "is too monstrous to be for a
moment entertained. The best feelings of our nature revolt against
a construction which leads to it."
Id. at
21 U. S. 91.
[
Footnote 18]
Cf. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S.
91,
406 U. S. 93
(1972) (original jurisdiction will not be taken where there is an
adequate alternative forum for resolution of the dispute). The
model case for invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction is
a dispute between States of such seriousness that it would amount
to
casus belli if the States were fully sovereign.
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.
S. 365,
263 U. S.
372-374 (1923);
Missouri v. Illinois,
200 U. S. 496,
200 U. S.
519-521 (1906). When it is able to act, the Commission
is a completely adequate means for vindicating either State's
interests. The need for burdensome original jurisdiction
litigation, which prevents this Court from attending to its
appellate docket, would seem slight.
[
Footnote 19]
The Inflow-Outflow Manual appended to the engineering
committee's 1947 Study describes the inflow-outflow method as
follows:
"The inflow-outflow method involves the determination of the
correlation between an index of the inflow to a basin as measured
at certain gaging stations and the outflow from the basin. It is
obviously impossible to measure all of the inflow. The gaging
stations which are utilized to measure a part of the inflow are
termed index inflow stations because the amount of water measured
at those stations is an acceptable index of the inflow to the
basin. From the plotting by years of the sum of the index inflows
against the outflow there is developed a correlation curve showing
the relationship between inflow and outflow. Any changes thereafter
in the basin which occur between the points of inflow and the point
of outflow and which affect the water supply of the basin can be
measured by the change in correlation between the inflow and
outflow from that indicated by the correlation curve previously
developed. For example, if over a period of years additional
depletions occur between the inflow points and the outflow point,
the correlation between the inflow and the outflow will change:
with a given inflow into the basin, there will be less
outflow."
S.Doc. 109 at 149.
[
Footnote 20]
It deserves emphasis that neither the Inflow-Outflow Manual in
any of its past or projected versions nor the Texas "Double Mass
Analysis" has anything to say about whether a particular shortfall
in state-line water deliveries is due to "man's activities," a
critical qualification on New Mexico's obligation to deliver water
under Art. III(a) of the Compact. At best, correlation curves for
sub-reaches of the river can be helpful in identifying where a
shortfall seems to originate.
[
Footnote 21]
New Mexico has generally relied on the Review of Basic Data.
Texas has submitted a document entitled "Texas
Workability'
Statement," filed Nov. 18, 1981, which identifies nine "[q]uestions
which must be resolved in connection with the flood inflow
computation." Id. at 4-5. Not all of them involve large
quantities of water. At this stage of the litigation, there seems
to be no more than three or four issues upon which the Special
Master will have to resolve difficult questions of fact or of
hydrological method. We leave to the Special Master's discretion
whether these issues should be considered as framed in § 4(b) of
his original pretrial order or whether a revised formulation would
be more appropriate. See Order of Dec. 29, 1981, pp. 5-7;
1982 Report 10-11.