Under Tennessee law, the father of an illegitimate child is
responsible for the child's support. Enforcement of this obligation
depends on the establishment of paternity. A Tennessee statute
provides that a paternity and support action must be filed within
two years of the child's birth unless the father has provided
support or has acknowledged his paternity in writing, or unless the
child is, or is liable to become, a public charge, in which case
the State or any person can bring suit at any time prior to the
child's 18th birthday. In May, 1978, appellant mother of an
illegitimate child born in November, 1968, brought a paternity and
support action in the Tennessee Juvenile Court against appellee
Brown, who moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it was
barred by the 2-year limitations period. The court held that the
limitations period violated,
inter alia, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it imposed a
restriction on the support rights of some illegitimate children
that was not imposed on the identical rights of legitimate
children. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed and upheld the
constitutionality of the 2-year limitations period.
Held: The 2-year limitations period in question denies
certain illegitimate children the equal protection of the law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.
462 U. S.
7-18.
(a) Restrictions on support suits by illegitimate children "will
survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are
substantially related to a legitimate state interest."
Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U. S. 91,
456 U. S. 99.
The period for obtaining paternal support has to be long enough to
provide a
Page 462 U. S. 2
reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in
illegitimate children to bring suit on their behalf; and any time
limit on that opportunity has to be substantially related to the
State's interest in preventing the litigation of stale or
fraudulent claims.
Id. at
465 U. S.
99-100. Pp.
462 U. S.
7-11.
(b) Here, the 2-year limitations period does not provide an
illegitimate child who is not covered by one of the exceptions in
the statute with an adequate opportunity to obtain support. The
mother's financial difficulties caused by the child's birth, the
loss of income attributable to the need to care for the child,
continuing affection for the child's father, a desire to avoid
family and community disapproval, and emotional strain and
confusion that often attend the birth of an illegitimate child, all
may inhibit a mother from filing a paternity suit within two years
after the child's birth. Pp.
462 U. S.
12-13.
(c) Nor is the 2-year limitations period substantially related
to the legitimate state interest in preventing the litigation of
stale or fraudulent claims. It amounts to a restriction effectively
extinguishing the support rights of illegitimate children that
cannot be justified by the problems of proof surrounding paternity
actions. The State's argument that the different treatment accorded
legitimate and illegitimate children is substantially related to
the above legitimate state interest is seriously undermined by the
exception for illegitimate children who are, or are likely to
become, public charges, since claims filed on behalf of these
children when they are more than two years old would be just as
stale or as vulnerable to fraud as claims filed on behalf of
illegitimate children who are not public charges at the same age.
Moreover, the fact that Tennessee tolls most actions during a
child's minority, when considered in combination with the above
factors, leads one to question whether the burden placed on
illegitimate children is designed to advance permissible state
interests. And the advances in blood testing render more attenuated
the relationship between a statute of limitations and the State's
interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent
claims. Pp.
462 U. S.
13-18.
638
S.W.2d 369, reversed and remanded.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 462 U. S. 3
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to decide the constitutionality of a
provision of a Tennessee statute [
Footnote 1] that imposes a 2-year limitations period on
paternity and child support actions brought on behalf of certain
illegitimate children.
I
Under Tennessee law, both fathers and mothers are responsible
for the support of their minor children.
See Tenn.Code
Ann. § 34-101 (1977);
Rose Funeral Home, Inc. v. Julian,
176 Tenn. 534, 539, 144 S.W.2d 755, 757 (1940);
Brooks v.
Brooks, 166 Tenn. 255, 257, 61 S.W.2d 654 (1933). This duty of
support is enforceable throughout the child's minority.
See
Blackburn v. Blackburn, 526
S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tenn.1975);
Whitt v.
Whitt, 490
S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tenn.1973).
See also Tenn.Code Ann.
§§ 36-820, 36-828 (1977). Tennessee law also makes the father of a
child born out of wedlock responsible for "the necessary support
and education of the child." § 36-223.
See also Brown v.
Thomas, 221 Tenn. 319, 323,
426
S.W.2d 496,
498
(1968). Enforcement of this obligation depends on the establishment
of paternity. Tennessee Code Ann. § 36-224(1) (1977) [
Footnote 2] provides for the filing
Page 462 U. S. 4
of a petition which can lead both to the establishment of
paternity and to enforcement of the father's duty of support. With
a few exceptions, however, the petition must be filed within two
years of the child's birth.
See § 36-224(2);
n 1,
supra.
In May, 1978, Frances Annette Pickett filed an action pursuant
to § 36-224(1) seeking to establish that Braxton Brown was the
father of her son, Jeffrey Lee Pickett, who was born on November 1,
1968. App. 3. Frances Pickett also sought an order from the court
requiring Brown to contribute to the support and maintenance of the
child.
Ibid. Brown denied that he was the father of the
child.
Id. at 13. It is uncontested that he had never
acknowledged the child as his own or contributed to the child's
support.
Id. at 5-6, 13-14; Brief for Appellants 5. Brown
moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was barred by the
2-year limitations period established by § 36-224(2). Frances
Pickett responded with a motion challenging the constitutionality
of the limitations period. App. 6-7, 13. [
Footnote 3]
The Juvenile Court held that the 2-year limitations period
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Page 462 U. S. 5
Amendment of the Federal Constitution and certain provisions of
the Tennessee Constitution.
Id. at 14. The court based its
conclusion on the fact that the limitations period governing
paternity actions imposed a restriction on the support rights of
some illegitimate children that was not imposed on the identical
rights of legitimate children.
Ibid. Without articulating
any clear standard of review, the court rejected the State's
argument that the 2-year limitations period was justified by the
State's interest in preventing the litigation of "stale or
spurious" claims.
Id. at 15. In the court's view, this
argument was undermined by the exception to the limitations period
established for illegitimate children who are, or are likely to
become, public charges, for
"the possibilities of fraud, perjury, or litigation of stale
claims [are] no more inherent in a case brought [for] a child who
is not receiving public assistance than [in] a case brought for a
child who is a public charge."
Ibid. [
Footnote
4]
On appeal, [
Footnote 5] the
Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Juvenile Court
and upheld the constitutionality of the 2-year limitations period.
638
S.W.2d 369 (1982). In addressing Frances Pickett's equal
protection and due process challenges to the statute, the court
first reviewed our decision in
Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U. S. 91
(1982), and several decisions from other state courts. Based on
this review, the court stated that the inquiry with respect to both
claims was
"essentially the same: whether the state's policy as
Page 462 U. S. 6
reflected in the statute affords a fair and reasonable
opportunity for the mother to decide in a rational way whether or
not the child's best interest would be served by her bringing a
paternity suit."
638 S.W.2d at 376. The court concluded that
"[t]he Legislature could rationally determine that two years is
long enough for most women to have recovered physically and
emotionally, and to be able to assess their and their children's
situations logically and realistically."
Id. at 379.
The court also found that the 2-year statute of limitations was
substantially related to the State's valid interest in preventing
the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.
Id. at 380.
The court justified the longer limitations period for illegitimates
who are, or are likely to become, public charges, on the ground
that
"[t]he state's countervailing interest in doing justice and
reducing the number of people on welfare is served by allowing the
state a longer time during which to sue."
Ibid. The court also suggested that
"the Tennessee statute is 'carefully tuned' to avoid hardship in
predictable groups of cases, since it contains an exception for
actions against men who have acknowledged their children in writing
or by supporting them, and it has been held that . . . regular or
substantial payments are not required in order to constitute
'support.'"
Id. at 379 (footnote omitted). Finally, the court found
that the uniqueness of the limitations period in not being tolled
during the plaintiff's minority did not
"alone requir[e] a holding of unconstitutionality of a two-year
period, as opposed to any other period which can end during the
plaintiff's minority."
Id. at 380. [
Footnote
6]
Page 462 U. S. 7
We noted probable jurisdiction. 459 U.S. 1068 (1982). We
reverse.
II
We have considered on several occasions during the past 15 years
the constitutional validity of statutory classifications based on
illegitimacy.
See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, supra; United
States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23
(1980);
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259
(1978);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.
S. 762 (1977);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.
S. 495 (1976);
Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U. S. 628
(1974);
New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,
411 U. S. 619
(1973);
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535
(1973);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
406 U. S. 164
(1972);
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance
Co., 391 U. S. 73
(1968);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
68 (1968). In several of these cases, we have held the
classifications invalid.
See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, supra;
Trimble v. Gordon, supra; Jimenez v. Weinberger, supra; New Jersey
Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, supra; Gomez v. Perez, supra; Weber
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra; Glona v. American
Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., supra; Levy v. Louisiana,
supra. Our consideration of these cases has been animated by a
special concern for discrimination against illegitimate children.
As the Court stated in
Weber:
"The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages
society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds
of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an
infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on
the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is
responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is
an ineffectual -- as well as an unjust -- way of deterring the
parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the
Page 462 U. S. 8
social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the
Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down
discriminatory laws relating to status of birth, whereas, in this
case, the classification is justified by no legitimate state
interest, compelling or otherwise."
406 U.S. at
406 U. S.
175-176 (footnotes omitted).
In view of the history of treating illegitimate children less
favorably than legitimate ones, we have subjected statutory
classifications based on illegitimacy to a heightened level of
scrutiny. Although we have held that classifications based on
illegitimacy are not "suspect," or subject to "our most exacting
scrutiny,"
Trimble v. Gordon, supra, at
430 U. S. 767;
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at
427 U. S. 506,
the scrutiny applied to them "is not a toothless one. . . ."
Id. at
427 U. S. 510.
In
United States v. Clark, supra, we stated that
"a classification based on illegitimacy is unconstitutional
unless it bears 'an evident and substantial relation to the
particular . . . interests [the] statute is designed to
serve.'"
445 U.S. at
445 U. S. 27.
See also Lalli v. Lalli, supra, at
439 U. S. 265
(plurality opinion) ("classifications based on illegitimacy . . .
are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not
substantially related to permissible state interests"). We applied
a similar standard of review to a classification based on
illegitimacy last Term in
Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U. S. 91
(1982). We stated that restrictions on support suits by
illegitimate children "will survive equal protection scrutiny to
the extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state
interest."
Id. at
456 U. S. 99.
Our decisions in
Gomez and
Mills are
particularly relevant to a determination of the validity of the
limitations period at issue in this case. In
Gomez, we
considered
"whether the laws of Texas may constitutionally grant legitimate
children a judicially enforceable right to support from their
natural fathers and at the same time deny that right to
illegitimate children."
409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 535. We
stated that "a State may not invidiously discriminate against
illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded
children generally,"
Page 462 U. S. 9
id. at
409 U. S. 538,
and held that.
"once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of
children to needed support from their natural fathers, there is no
constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an
essential right to a child simply because its natural father has
not married its mother."
Ibid. The Court acknowledged the "lurking problems with
respect to proof of paternity,"
ibid., and suggested that
they could not "be lightly brushed aside."
Ibid. But those
problems could not be used to form "an impenetrable barrier that
works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination."
Ibid.
In
Mills, we considered the sufficiency of Texas'
response to our decision in
Gomez. In particular, we
considered the constitutionality of a 1-year statute of limitations
governing suits to identify the natural fathers of illegitimate
children. 456 U.S. at
456 U. S. 92.
The equal protection analysis focused on two related requirements:
the period for obtaining paternal support has to be long enough to
provide a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in
illegitimate children to bring suit on their behalf; and any time
limit on that opportunity has to be substantially related to the
State's interest in preventing the litigation of stale or
fraudulent claims.
Id. at
456 U. S.
99-100.
The Texas statute failed to satisfy either requirement. The
1-year period for bringing a paternity suit did not provide
illegitimate children with an adequate opportunity to obtain
paternal support.
Id. at
456 U. S. 100.
The Court cited a variety of factors that make it unreasonable to
require that a paternity suit be brought within a year of a child's
birth.
Ibid. [
Footnote
7] In addition, the Court found that the 1-year limitations
Page 462 U. S. 10
period was not "substantially related to the State's interest in
avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims."
Id. at
456 U. S. 101.
The problems of proof surrounding paternity suits do not "justify a
period of limitation which so restricts [support rights] as
effectively to extinguish them."
Ibid. The Court could
"conceive of no evidence essential to paternity suits that
invariably will be lost in only one year, nor is it evident that
the passage of 12 months will appreciably increase the likelihood
of fraudulent claims."
Ibid. (footnote omitted). [
Footnote 8]
In a concurring opinion, JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by four other
Members of the Court, [
Footnote
9] suggested that longer limitations periods also might be
unconstitutional.
Id. at
456 U. S. 106.
[
Footnote 10] JUSTICE
O'CONNOR pointed out that the strength of the State's interest in
preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims was
"undercut by the countervailing state interest in ensuring that
genuine claims for child support are satisfied."
Id. at
456 U. S. 103.
This interest "stems not only from a desire to see that
justice
is done,' but also from a desire to reduce the number of
individuals forced to enter the welfare rolls." Ibid.
(footnote omitted). JUSTICE O'CONNOR also
Page 462 U. S. 11
suggested that the State's concern about stale or fraudulent
claims
"is substantially alleviated by recent scientific developments
in blood testing dramatically reducing the possibility that a
defendant will be falsely accused of being the illegitimate child's
father."
Id. at
456 U. S. 104,
n. 2. Moreover, JUSTICE O'CONNOR found it significant that a
paternity suit was "one of the few Texas causes of action not
tolled during the minority of the plaintiff."
Id. at
456 U. S. 104
(footnote omitted). She stated:
"Of all the difficult proof problems that may arise in civil
actions generally, paternity, an issue unique to illegitimate
children, is singled out for special treatment. When this
observation is coupled with the Texas Legislature's efforts to deny
illegitimate children any significant opportunity to prove
paternity and thus obtain child support, it is fair to question
whether the burden placed on illegitimates is designed to advance
permissible state interests."
Id. at
456 U. S.
104-105. Finally, JUSTICE O'CONNOR suggested that
"practical obstacles to filing suit within one year of birth could
as easily exist several years after the birth of the illegitimate
child."
Id. at
456 U. S. 105.
In view of all these factors, JUSTICE O'CONNOR concluded that there
was "nothing special about the first year following birth" that
compelled the decision in the case.
Id. at
456 U. S.
106.
Against this background, we turn to an assessment of the
constitutionality of the 2-year statute of limitations at issue
here.
III
Much of what was said in the opinions in
Mills is
relevant here, and the principles discussed in
Mills
require us to invalidate this limitations period on equal
protection grounds. [
Footnote
11]
Page 462 U. S. 12
Although Tennessee grants illegitimate children a right to
paternal support, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-223 (1977), and provides a
mechanism for enforcing that right, § 36-224(1), the imposition of
a 2-year period within which a paternity suit must be brought, §
36-224(2), restricts the right of certain illegitimate children to
paternal support in a way that the identical right of legitimate
children is not restricted. In this respect, some illegitimate
children in Tennessee are treated differently from, and less
favorably than, legitimate children. Under
Mills, the
first question is whether the 2-year limitations period is
sufficiently long to provide a reasonable opportunity to those with
an interest in illegitimate children to bring suit on their behalf.
456 U.S. at
456 U. S. 99. In
this regard, it is noteworthy that § 36-224(2) addresses some of
the practical obstacles to bringing suit within a short time after
the child's birth that were described in the opinions in
Mills. See 456 U.S. at
456 U. S. 100;
id. at
456 U. S.
105-106 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). The statute creates
exceptions to the limitations period if the father has provided
support for the child or has acknowledged his paternity in writing.
The statute also allows suit to be brought by the State or by any
person at any time prior to a child's 18th birthday if the child
is, or is liable to become, a public charge.
See n 1,
supra. This addresses
JUSTICE O'CONNOR's point in
Mills that a State has a
strong interest in preventing increases in its welfare rolls. 456
U.S. at
456 U. S.
103-104 (concurring opinion). For the illegitimate child
whose claim is not covered by one of the exceptions in the statute,
however, the 2-year limitations period severely restricts his right
to paternal support. The obstacles to filing a paternity and child
support suit within a year after the child's birth, which the Court
discussed in
Mills, see id. at
456 U. S. 100;
n 7,
supra, are likely
to persist during the child's second year as well. The mother may
experience financial difficulties caused not only by the child's
birth, but also by a loss of income attributable to the need to
care for the child. Moreover,
"continuing affection for the child's father, a desire to
Page 462 U. S. 13
avoid disapproval of family and community, or the emotional
strain and confusion that often attend the birth of an illegitimate
child,"
456 U.S. at
456 U. S. 100,
may inhibit a mother from filing a paternity suit on behalf of the
child within two years after the child's birth. JUSTICE O'CONNOR
suggested in
Mills that the emotional strain experienced
by a mother and her desire to avoid family or community disapproval
"may continue years after the child is born."
Id. at
456 U. S. 105,
n. 4 (concurring opinion). [
Footnote 12] These considerations compel a conclusion
that the 2-year limitations period does not provide illegitimate
children with "an adequate opportunity to obtain support."
Id. at
456 U. S.
100.
The second inquiry under
Mills is whether the time
limitation placed on an illegitimate child's right to obtain
support is substantially related to the State's interest in
avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.
Id.
at
456 U. S.
99-100. In this case, it is clear that the 2-year
limitations period governing paternity and support suits brought on
behalf of certain illegitimate children does not satisfy this
test.
First, a 2-year limitations period is only a small improvement
in degree over the 1-year period at issue in
Mills. It,
too, amounts to a restriction effectively extinguishing the support
rights of illegitimate children that cannot be justified by the
problems of proof surrounding paternity actions. As was the case in
Mills,
"[w]e can conceive of no evidence essential to paternity suits
that invariably will be lost in only
Page 462 U. S. 14
[two years], nor is it evident that the passage of [24] months
will appreciably increase the likelihood of fraudulent claims."
Id. at
456 U. S. 101
(footnote omitted).
Second, the provisions of § 36-224(2) undermine the State's
argument that the limitations period is substantially related to
its interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent
claims. As noted,
see supra at
462 U. S. 6, §
36-224(2) establishes an exception to the statute of limitations
for illegitimate children who are, or are likely to become, public
charges. Paternity and support suits may be brought on behalf of
these children by the State or by any person at any time prior to
the child's 18th birthday. The State argues that this distinction
between illegitimate children receiving public assistance and those
who are not is justified by the State's interest in protecting
public revenue.
See Brief for Appellee Leech 26-30.
Putting aside the question of whether this interest can justify
such radically different treatment of two groups of illegitimate
children, [
Footnote 13] the
State's argument does not address the different treatment accorded
illegitimate children who are not receiving public assistance and
legitimate children. This difference in treatment is allegedly
justified by the
Page 462 U. S. 15
State's interest in preventing the litigation of stale or
fraudulent claims. But as the exception for children receiving
public assistance demonstrates, the State perceives no prohibitive
problem in litigating paternity claims throughout a child's
minority. There is no apparent reason why claims filed on behalf of
illegitimate children who are receiving public assistance when they
are more than two years old would not be just as stale, or as
vulnerable to fraud, as claims filed on behalf of illegitimate
children who are not public charges at the same age. The exception
in the statute, therefore, seriously undermines the State's
argument that the different treatment accorded legitimate and
illegitimate children is substantially related to the legitimate
state interest in preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent
claims, and compels a conclusion that the 2-year limitations period
is not substantially related to a legitimate state interest.
Third, Tennessee tolls most actions during a child's minority.
See Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (1980). [
Footnote 14] In
Parlato v.
Howe, 470 F.
Supp. 996 (ED Tenn.1979), the court stated that
"[t]he legal disability statute represents a longstanding policy
of the State of Tennessee to protect potential causes of actions by
minors during the period of their minority."
Id. at 998-999. In view of this policy, the court held
that a statute imposing a limitations period on medical malpractice
actions "was not intended to interfere with the operation of the
legal disability statute."
Id. at 998.
Accord, Braden
v. Yoder, 592
S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. App.1979).
But see Jones v.
Black, 539
S.W.2d 123 (Tenn.1976) (1-year limitations
Page 462 U. S. 16
period governing wrongful death actions applies "regardless of
the minority or other disability of any beneficiary of the
action"). Many civil actions are fraught with problems of proof,
but Tennessee has chosen to overlook these problems in most
instances in favor of protecting the interests of minors. In
paternity and child support actions brought on behalf of certain
illegitimate children, however, the State instead has chosen to
focus on the problems of proof, and to impose on these suits a
short limitations period. Although the Tennessee Supreme Court
stated that the inapplicability of the tolling provision to
paternity actions did not "alone" require invalidation of the
limitations period, 638 S.W.2d at 380, it is clear that this
factor, when considered in combination with others already
discussed, may lead one "to question whether the burden placed on
illegitimates is designed to advance permissible state interests."
Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. at
456 U. S. 105
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring).
See also id. at
456 U. S. 106
(POWELL, J., concurring in judgment). [
Footnote 15]
Page 462 U. S. 17
Finally, the relationship between a statute of limitations and
the State's interest in preventing the litigation of stale or
fraudulent paternity claims has become more attenuated as
scientific advances in blood testing have alleviated the problems
of proof surrounding paternity actions. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR pointed
out in
Mills, these advances have "dramatically reduc[ed]
the possibility that a defendant will be falsely accused of being
the illegitimate child's father."
Id. at
456 U. S. 104,
n. 2 (concurring opinion).
See supra at
462 U. S. 10-11.
See also Little v. Streater, 452 U. S.
1,
452 U. S. 6-8,
452 U. S. 12,
452 U. S. 14
(1981). Although Tennessee permits the introduction of blood test
results only in cases "where definite exclusion [of paternity] is
established," Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-228 (1977);
see also §
24-7-112 (1980), it is noteworthy that blood tests currently can
achieve a "mean probability of exclusion [of] at least . . . 90
percent. . . ." Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell, & Krause,
Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in
Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 Family L.Q. 247, 256 (1976).
[
Footnote 16] In
Mills, the Court rejected the argument that recent
advances in blood testing negated the State's interest in avoiding
the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. 456 U.S. at
456 U. S. 98, n.
4. It is not inconsistent with this view, however, to suggest that
advances in blood testing render more attenuated the relationship
between a statute of limitations and the State's interest in
preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent paternity claims.
This is an appropriate consideration in determining whether a
Page 462 U. S. 18
period of limitations governing paternity actions brought on
behalf of illegitimate children is substantially related to a
legitimate state interest.
IV
The 2-year limitations period established by Tenn.Code Ann. §
36-224(2) (1977) does not provide certain illegitimate children
with an adequate opportunity to obtain support, and is not
substantially related to the legitimate state interest in
preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. It
therefore denies certain illegitimate children the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly,
the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Tennessee Code Ann. § 36-224(2) (1977) reads as follows:
"(2) Proceedings to establish the paternity of the child and to
compel the father to furnish support and education for the child
may be instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or after the
birth of the child, but shall not be brought after the lapse of
more than two (2) years from the birth of the child, unless
paternity has been acknowledged by the father in writing or by the
furnishing of support. Provided, however, that the department of
human services or any person shall be empowered to bring a suit in
behalf of any child under the age of eighteen (18) who is, or is
liable to become a public charge."
[
Footnote 2]
Tennessee Code Ann. § 36-224(1) (1977) reads as follows:
"(1) A petition to establish paternity of a child, to change the
name of the child if it is desired, and to compel the father to
furnish support and education for the child in accordance with this
chapter may be filed by the mother, or her personal representative,
or, if the child is likely to become a public charge by the state
department of human services or by any person. Said petition may be
filed in the county where the mother or child resides or is found
or in the county where the putative father resides or is found. The
fact that the child was born outside this state shall not be a bar
to filing a petition against the putative father. After the death
of the mother or in case of her disability said petition may be
filed by the child acting through a guardian or next friend."
[
Footnote 3]
Frances Pickett challenged the statute on equal protection and
due process grounds under both the Federal and State Constitutions.
App. 6-7. She also alleged that the statute amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment under both the Federal and State Constitutions.
Ibid. The Juvenile Court did not address this claim. The
Tennessee Supreme Court later noted that she did not seriously
press it before that court.
638
S.W.2d 369, 371 (1982). She also does not advance it before
this Court.
Pickett also sought permission to amend her complaint to bring
the paternity suit in the name of her child. App. 6.
After Pickett filed her motion challenging the constitutionality
of the statute the, State Attorney General was notified, and he
intervened to defend the statute.
See id. at 13; 638
S.W.2d at 371.
[
Footnote 4]
The court also found that the statute discriminated between
"children born out of wedlock who are receiving public
assistance and such children whose mothers are not receiving public
assistance."
App. 15-16. In this regard, the court pointed out that a
mother's fulfillment of her obligation to support her child does
not relieve the father of his duty of support.
Id. at
16.
The court granted Pickett permission to amend her complaint to
bring the suit in the name of her child.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 5]
The Juvenile Court
"allowed an interlocutory appeal by certifying that the
constitutionality of [Tenn.Code Ann.] § 36-224(2) was the sole
determinative question of law in the proceedings."
638 S.W.2d at 371.
[
Footnote 6]
The court also rejected the due process challenge to the
statute.
Id. at 376, 380.
In addition, the court found that the Juvenile Court had
committed a harmless error, from which Brown and the State did not
appeal, in allowing Pickett "to amend her complaint to add the name
of the child, by the mother as next friend, as a plaintiff."
Id. at 380. The court stated that § 36-224(1) "does not
permit an action to be brought by the child except in case of death
or disability of the mother."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 7]
The Court suggested that
"[f]inancial difficulties caused by childbirth expenses or a
birth-related loss of income, continuing affection for the child's
father, a desire to avoid disapproval of family and community, or
the emotional strain and confusion that often attend the birth of
an illegitimate child all encumber a mother's filing of a paternity
suit within 12 months of birth."
456 U.S. at
456 U. S. 100.
The Court also pointed out that
"[e]ven if the mother seeks public financial assistance and
assigns the child's support claim to the State, it is not
improbable that 12 months would elapse without the filing of a
claim."
Ibid. In this regard, the Court noted that
"[s]everal months could pass before a mother finds the need to
seek such assistance, takes steps to obtain it, and is willing to
join the State in litigation against the natural father."
Ibid. (footnote omitted).
[
Footnote 8]
The Court found no need to reach a due process challenge to the
statute.
Id. at
456 U. S.
97.
[
Footnote 9]
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BRENNAN, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN joined
JUSTICE O'CONNOR's concurring opinion.
Id. at
456 U. S. 102.
JUSTICE POWELL joined Part I of JUSTICE O'CONNOR's concurring
opinion, but did not join the Court's opinion.
Id. at
456 U. S. 106
(POWELL, J., concurring in judgment).
[
Footnote 10]
JUSTICE O'CONNOR wrote separately because she feared that the
Court's opinion might "be misinterpreted as approving the 4-year
statute of limitation now used in Texas."
Id. at
456 U. S.
102.
[
Footnote 11]
In this light, we need not reach Pickett's due process challenge
to the statute.
[
Footnote 12]
Problems stemming from a mother's emotional wellbeing are of
particular concern in assessing the validity of Tennessee's
limitations period because § 36-224(1),
see n 2,
supra, permits suit to be filed
only by the mother or by her personal representative if the child
is not likely to become a public charge. As the Tennessee Supreme
Court stated, § 36-224(1) "does not permit an action to be brought
by the child except in case of death or disability of the mother."
638 S.W.2d at 380. The Texas statute involved in
Mills
permitted suit to be brought by "
any person with an interest in
the child'. . . ." 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 100.
See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-33.
[
Footnote 13]
The State unquestionably has a legitimate interest in protecting
public revenue. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR pointed out in
Mills,
however, the State also has an interest in seeing that "
justice
is done'" by "ensuring that genuine claims for child support are
satisfied." 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 103
(concurring opinion). Moreover, an illegitimate child has an
interest not only in obtaining paternal support, but also in
establishing a relationship to his father. As the Juvenile Court
suggested in this case, these interests are not satisfied merely
because the mother is providing the child with sufficient support
to keep the child off the welfare rolls. App. 16. See
n 4, supra. The
father's duty of support persists even under these circumstances.
App. 16. See also Rose Funeral Home, Inc. v. Julian, 176
Tenn. 534, 539, 144 S.W.2d 755, 757 (1940); Brooks v.
Brooks, 166 Tenn. 255, 257, 61 S.W.2d 654 (1933). In any
event, we need not resolve this tension in this case. As we discuss
infra, the State's interest in protecting the public
revenue does not make paternity claims any more or less stale or
vulnerable to fraud.
[
Footnote 14]
Tennessee Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (1980) reads as follows:
"If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time
the cause of action accrued, either within the age of eighteen (18)
years, or of unsound mind, such person, or his representatives and
privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after the
removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the
particular cause of action, unless it exceed [
sic] three
(3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from the removal
of such disability."
[
Footnote 15]
There is some confusion about the relationship between §
28-1-106 and § 36-224.
Compare Brief for Appellants 18;
Tr. of Oral Arg. 10, 13,
with Brief for Appellee Leech
13-14, 18; Tr. of Oral Arg. 30-31, 37-38. Even assuming that the
limitations period in § 36-224(2) is tolled during the mother's
minority, the important point is that it is not tolled during the
minority of the child. As noted,
see supra at
462 U. S. 15, and
n. 14, statutes of limitations generally are tolled during a
child's minority. This certainly undermines the State's argument
that the different treatment accorded legitimate and illegitimate
children is justified by its interest in preventing the litigation
of stale or fraudulent claims.
It is not critical to this argument that the right to file a
paternity action generally is given to the mother. It is the
child's interests that are at stake. The father's duty of support
is owed to the child, not to the mother.
See Tenn.Code
Ann. § 36-223 (1977). Moreover, it is the child who has an interest
in establishing a relationship to his father. This reality is
reflected in the provision of § 36-224(1) that allows the child to
bring suit if the mother is dead or disabled.
Cf. S.Rep.
No. 93-1356, p. 52 (1974) ("[T]he interest primarily at stake in
[a] paternity action [is] that of the child"). Restrictive periods
of limitation, therefore, necessarily affect the interests of the
child, and their validity must be assessed in that light.
[
Footnote 16]
See also Stroud, Bundrant, & Galindo, Paternity
Testing: A Current Approach, 16 Trial 46 (Sept.1980) ("Recent
advances in scientific techniques now enable the properly equipped
laboratory to routinely provide attorneys and their clients with a
95-98 percent probability of excluding a man falsely accused of
paternity"); Terasaki, Resolution By HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity
Cases Not Excluded By ABO Testing, 16 J.Family L. 543 (1978).
See generally Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proof:
Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U.L.Rev.
1131 (1979).