In his action in Federal District Court, and in state
administrative and judicial proceedings, respondent, a white male,
asserted a variety of common law and statutory claims against
Arizona State University and certain of its officials (including
petitioners) arising out of incidents occurring while he was a
member of the University's football squad. One of the claims was
that three of the petitioners had engaged in a conspiracy to
intimidate and threaten various potential material witnesses in
order to prevent them from testifying "freely, fully and
truthfully" in the action, in violation of the first part of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The District Court dismissed
the entire complaint. The Court of Appeals, while affirming the
dismissal of certain of respondent's claims and remanding as to
others, reversed with respect to the claim at issue. The court
concluded that respondent's claims of witness intimidation, insofar
as they related to obstruction of justice at the state level, were
not actionable under the second part of § 1985(2) -- which
prohibits a conspiracy to obstruct the due course of justice in a
State "with intent to deny any citizen the equal protection of the
laws" -- because there was no sufficient allegation of racial or
class-based invidiously discriminatory animus. The court concluded,
however, that such an allegation -- which was held to be necessary
in
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S.
88, to avoid creating a general federal tort law with
regard to a portion of § 1985(3) -- was not applicable to alleged
intimidation of witnesses in the federal courts in violation of the
first part of § 1985(2).
Held: No allegations of racial or class-based
invidiously discriminatory animus are required to establish a cause
of action under the first part of § 1985(2). The statutory
provisions now codified at § 1985 were originally enacted as § 2 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and the substantive meaning of the
1871 Act has not been changed. The provisions relating to
institutions and processes of the Federal Government (including the
first part of § 1985(2)) -- unlike those encompassing activity that
is usually of primary state concern (including the second part of §
1985(2) and the part of § 1985(3) involved in
Griffin,
supra -- contain no language requiring that the conspirators
act with intent to deprive their victims of the equal protection of
the laws. Thus, the reasoning of
Griffin is not applicable
here, and, given the structure of § 2 of the 1871 Act, it is
clear
Page 460 U. S. 720
that Congress did not intend to impose a requirement of
class-based animus on persons seeking to prove a violation of their
rights under the first part of § 1985(2). The legislative history
supports this conclusion. Pp.
460 U. S.
724-727.
660 F.2d 1345, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent is a white football player of unknown political
affiliation who seeks to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)
(1976 ed., Supp. V) for an alleged conspiracy to intimidate
potential witnesses in a federal lawsuit. Petitioners argue that
the action must be dismissed because there is no claim that the
conspiracy was motivated by the kind of "racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" we held
to be necessary in
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S.
88,
403 U. S. 102
(1971). We reject their contention, because the critical language
in § 1985(3), the statute that applied to the
Griffin
conspiracy, does not apply to the violation of the first part of §
1985(2) alleged in this case.
I
The issue before us is narrow, and may be briefly stated. In
both federal and state tribunals, respondent Rutledge has asserted
a variety of common law and statutory claims against Arizona State
University and its officials arising out of incidents that occurred
while he was a member of the University's football squad. One of
his claims is that three of the petitioners -- the Arizona State
University athletic director, head football coach, and assistant
football coach --
Page 460 U. S. 721
engaged in a conspiracy to intimidate and threaten various
potential material witnesses in order to prevent them from
testifying "freely, fully and truthfully" in his lawsuit in federal
court. [
Footnote 1]
The District Court granted a motion to dismiss the entire
complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and that respondent had failed to allege
Page 460 U. S. 722
a violation of his civil rights. It concluded that respondent
had failed to state a § 1985 claim because he had not shown that he
was a member of an identifiable class, and because his general
allegations of a conspiracy were unsupported by specific facts.
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-2. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of all claims against the University and its Board of
Regents and of the vicarious liability claims against petitioner
Miller, remanded for further proceedings on the other state law
tort claims against petitioners, and affirmed the dismissal of all
federal civil rights claims against petitioners except the one at
issue here.
Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d
1345 (CA9 1981). [
Footnote
2]
The Court of Appeals construed respondent's allegations of
witness intimidation,
see n 1,
supra, as containing two components --
obstruction of justice at the state level, and interference with
federal litigation. The former was not actionable under the second
part of § 1985(2), [
Footnote 3]
the court held, because "there exists no sufficient allegation of
racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." 660 F.2d
at 1355. The court acknowledged that this Court's decision in
Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra, had interpreted a portion
of § 1985(3) to include such a requirement in order to avoid the
constitutional issues that would have attended enactment
Page 460 U. S. 723
of a general federal tort law. It decided that the same
principles applied to claims based on private conspiracies to
obstruct justice in state court proceedings.
But the Court of Appeals concluded that no allegations of
class-based animus were required under the first part of § 1985(2),
which proscribes intimidation of witnesses in the federal courts.
[
Footnote 4] It relied on the
plain language of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and on the
legislative history. Noting the Federal Government's unquestioned
constitutional authority to protect the processes of its own
courts, and the absence of any need to limit the first part of §
1985(2) to avoid creating a general federal tort law, the Court of
Appeals declined to impose the limitation set forth in
Griffin
v. Breckenridge. 660 F.2d at 1355.
Because other Circuits have read the first part of § 1985(2)
more narrowly,
see Kimble v. D. J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d
340, 346-348 (CA5) (en banc),
cert. denied, 454 U.
S. 1110 (1981);
Jones v. United States, 536
F.2d 269, 271 (CA8 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977), we granted certiorari limited to the question of statutory
construction, 458 U.S. 1120 (1982). As have the Courts of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit,
McCord v. Bailey,
204 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 345, 636 F.2d 606, 616 (1980),
cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981), and the Third Circuit,
Brawer
v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (1976), we agree with the Ninth
Circuit's analysis. [
Footnote
5]
Page 460 U. S. 724
II
The statutory provision that is now codified as § 1985 of Title
42 of the United States Code was originally enacted as § 2 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13. The length and style of § 2
of the 1871 Act, reprinted in full as an
460
U.S. 719app|>Appendix to this opinion, make it somewhat
difficult to parse. Nevertheless, if its several components are
carefully identified, its meaning becomes clear.
Although § 2 contained only one long paragraph when it was
originally enacted, that single paragraph outlawed five broad
classes of conspiratorial activity. In general terms, § 2
proscribed conspiracies that interfere with (a) the performance of
official duties by federal officers; (b) the administration of
justice in federal courts; (c) the administration of justice in
state courts; (d) the private enjoyment of "equal protection of the
laws" and "equal privileges and immunities under the laws"; and (e)
the right to support candidates in federal elections. As now
codified in § 1985, the long paragraph is divided into three
subsections. One of the five classes of prohibited conspiracy is
proscribed by § 1985(1), two by § 1985(2), and two by § 1985(3).
The civil remedy for a violation of any of the subsections is found
at the end of § 1985(3). The reclassification was not intended to
change the substantive meaning of the 1871 Act. [
Footnote 6]
Three of the five broad categories, the first two and the fifth,
relate to institutions and processes of the Federal Government --
federal officers, § 1985(1); federal judicial proceedings, the
first portion of § 1985(2); and federal elections, the second part
of § 1985(3). The statutory provisions dealing
Page 460 U. S. 725
with these categories of conspiratorial activity contain no
language requiring that the conspirators act with intent to deprive
their victims of the equal protection of the laws. Nor was such
language found in the corresponding portions of § 2 of the 1871
Act.
See Appendix to this opinion. [
Footnote 7]
The remaining two categories, however, encompass underlying
activity that is not institutionally linked to federal interests,
and that is usually of primary state concern. The second part of §
1985(2) applies to conspiracies to obstruct the course of justice
in state courts, and the first part of § 1985(3) provides a cause
of action against two or more persons who "conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another." [
Footnote 8] Each of these portions of
the statute contains language requiring that the conspirators'
actions be motivated by an intent to deprive their victims of the
equal protection of the laws.
This limiting language was construed in
Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88
(1971), a case in which a unanimous Court held that § 1985(3)
applies to purely private conspiracies. In explaining why that
holding would not create an open-ended federal tort law applicable
"to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of
others,"
id. at
403 U. S. 101,
we expressly stated:
Page 460 U. S. 726
"The language requiring intent to deprive of
equal
protection, or
equal privileges and immunities, means that
there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action.
The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the
equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all."
Id. at
403 U. S.
102.
Although
Griffin itself arose under the first clause of
§ 1985(3), petitioners argue that its reasoning should be applied
to the remaining portions of § 1985 as well. We cannot accept that
argument for three reasons. First, the scope of the
Griffin opinion is carefully confined to "the portion of §
1985(3) now before us,"
id. at 99;
see also id.
at
403 U. S. 102,
n. 9. There is no suggestion in the opinion that its reasoning
applies to any other portion of § 1985. Second, the analysis in the
Griffin opinion relied heavily on the fact that the
sponsors of the 1871 bill added the "equal protection" language in
response to objections that the "enormous sweep of the original
language" vastly extended federal authority and displaced state
control over private conduct.
Id. at
403 U. S.
99-100. That legislative background does not apply to
the portions of the statute that prohibit interference with federal
officers, federal courts, or federal elections. Third, and of
greatest importance, the statutory language that provides the
textual basis for the "class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus" requirement simply does not appear in the portion of the
statute that applies to this case.
See n 4,
supra.
Given the structure of § 2 of the 1871 Act, it is clear that
Congress did not intend to impose a requirement of class-based
animus on persons seeking to prove a violation of their rights
under the first clause of § 1985(2). [
Footnote 9] The legislative
Page 460 U. S. 727
history supports the conclusion we have drawn from the language
of the statute. Protection of the processes of the federal courts
was an essential component of Congress' solution to disorder and
anarchy in the Southern States. Neither proponents nor opponents of
the bill had any doubt that the Constitution gave Congress the
power to prohibit intimidation of parties, witnesses, and jurors in
federal courts. [
Footnote
10]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.
|
460
U.S. 719app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Section 2 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, 17 Stat. 13 (emphasis
supplied).
"That if two or more persons within any State or Territory of
the United States shall conspire together to overthrow, or to put
down, or to destroy by force the government of the United States,
or to levy war against the United States, or to oppose by force the
authority of the government of the United States, or by force,
intimidation, or threat to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution
of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or
possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority
thereof, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any person
from accepting or holding any office or trust or place of
confidence under the United States, or from discharging the duties
thereof, or by force, intimidation, or threat to induce any officer
of the United States to leave any State, district, or place where
his duties as such officer might lawfully be performed, or to
injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful
discharge of the duties of his office, or to injure his
Page 460 U. S. 728
person while engaged in the lawful discharge of the duties of
his office, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt,
hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duty,
or
by force, intimidation, or threat to deter any party or witness in
any court of the United States from attending such court, or from
testifying in any matter pending in such court fully, freely, and
truthfully, or to injure any such party or witness in his person or
property on account of his having so attended or testified, or
by force, intimidation, or threat to influence the verdict,
presentment, or indictment, of any juror or grand juror in any
court of the United States, or to injure such juror in his person
or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment
lawfully assented to by him, or on account of his being or having
been such juror, or shall conspire together, or go in disguise upon
the public highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose,
either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges or immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State
from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal
protection of the laws,
or shall conspire together for the
purpose of in any manner impeding, hindering, obstructing, or
defeating the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with
intent to deny to any citizen of the United States the due and
equal protection of the laws, or to injure any person in his person
or his property for lawfully enforcing the right of any person or
class of persons to the equal protection of the laws, or by
force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any citizen of the United
States lawfully entitled to vote from giving his support or
advocacy in a lawful manner towards or in favor of the election of
any lawfully qualified person as an elector of President or
Vice-President of the United States, or as a member of the Congress
of the United States, or to injure any such citizen in his person
or property on account of such support or advocacy, each and every
person so offending
Page 460 U. S. 729
shall be deemed guilty of a high crime, and, upon conviction
thereof in any district or circuit court of the United States or
district or supreme court of any Territory of the United States
having jurisdiction of similar offences, shall be punished by a
fine not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, as the
court may determine, for a period of not less than six months nor
more than six years, as the court may determine, or by both such
fine and imprisonment as the court shall determine. And if any one
or more persons engaged in any such conspiracy shall do, or cause
to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby any person shall be injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the person so injured
or deprived of such rights and privileges may have and maintain an
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or
deprivation of rights and privileges against any one or more of the
persons engaged in such conspiracy, such action to be prosecuted in
the proper district or circuit court of the United States, with and
subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other
remedies provided in like cases in such courts under the provisions
of the act of April ninth, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled
'An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication.'"
[
Footnote 1]
This is the essence of the § 1985(2) claim as described in the
briefs and arguments in this Court. The Court of Appeals recognized
that whether respondent had "adequately alleged a claim under the
first part of section 1985(2) is a close question," but decided it
in the affirmative.
Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents,
660 F.2d 1345, 1355 (CA9 1981). Under the liberal pleading rules of
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41,
355 U. S. 47-48
(1957), the Court of Appeals properly construed the amended
complaint as raising the issue presented to this Court on
certiorari.
Count Five of the amended complaint, which was added two days
after the filing of the original complaint in United States
District Court, does not expressly allege that witnesses were
intimidated in connection with a
federal court proceeding.
It alleges in part that:
"56. On information and belief, since the time of filing the
statutorily mandated claim with the Arizona Board of Regents,
defendants Kush, Miller and Horton have conspired to prevent, by
intimidation and threat, various material witnesses from freely,
fully and truthfully testifying as to matters raised in the within
complaint."
"57. On information and belief, since the time of filing the
statutorily mandated claim with the Arizona Board of Regents,
defendants Kush, Miller and Horton have conspired for the purpose
of hindering or obstructing the due course of justice with an
intent to deny the plaintiff equal protection of the laws by
threatening and intimidating potential material witnesses, to
prevent the plaintiff from lawfully enforcing his rights and to
'cover up' the wrongful acts of defendants Kush and Maskill."
App. to Pet. for Cert. E-11 to E-12.
These allegations might appear to describe only a conspiracy to
interfere with potential witnesses before the Arizona Board of
Regents. But � 56 reflects the specific language of the first
clause of § 1985(2), which relates to witness intimidation in
connection with federal proceedings,
see n 4,
infra, whereas � 57 closely
follows the wording of the second clause of that provision, which
applies to witness intimidation in state court proceedings,
see n 3,
infra. Paragraph 60 then alleges generally that § 1985(2)
has been violated by the defendants. Thus � 56 of the complaint can
fairly be read as alleging a conspiracy related to federal judicial
proceedings.
[
Footnote 2]
The Court of Appeals concluded:
"On remand, the district court may wish to require the appellant
to amend Count Five to make more particular his allegations under
part one of section 1985(2) and to eliminate those allegations
pertaining to the second part of that section. Nothing in this
opinion should be construed to prevent this course of action."
660 F.2d at 1355.
[
Footnote 3]
The second portion of § 1985(2) provides:
"[O]r if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of
impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the
due course of justice in any State or Territory,
with intent to
deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to
injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to
enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal
protection of the laws. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 4]
The first part of § 1985(2) provides:
"If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to
deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in
any court of the United States from attending such court, or from
testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and
truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or
property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to
influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or
petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his
person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or
indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having
been such juror. . . ."
[
Footnote 5]
Our limited grant of certiorari does not encompass the question
whether the alleged conspiracy to interfere with witnesses gave
rise to any recoverable damages. This issue remains open for
consideration by the District Court on remand from the Court of
Appeals.
[
Footnote 6]
When Congress passed legislation in 1874 to consolidate and
collect all federal statutes and laws in the Revised Statutes, 18
Stat. 113, it expressed no intention to change the meaning of the
laws, although minor changes in language were made to accommodate
the consolidation.
Cf. Pott v. Arthur, 104 U.
S. 735,
104 U. S. 736
(1881).
[
Footnote 7]
Although the provisions dealing with interference with federal
judicial proceedings and state judicial proceedings now appear
together in § 1985(2), they were separated by other material in the
original version of § 2.
See Appendix to this opinion.
[
Footnote 8]
For the second clause of § 1985(2),
see n 3,
supra. The first portion of §
1985(3), which actually contains two separate clauses, reads as
follows:
"If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go
in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another,
for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person
or class of person of the equal protection of the law, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose
of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State
or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such
State or Territory the equal protection of the laws. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 9]
We are unpersuaded by petitioners' argument that a contrary
conclusion is required because the authorization of remedies found
at the end of § 1985(3) applies to the entire section. The location
of the remedial language merely confirms our view that the meaning
of any part of § 1985 is informed by its entire text.
[
Footnote 10]
See Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 486 (1871)
(remarks of Rep. Cook, supporter);
id. at App. 220
(remarks of Sen. Thurman, opponent). The legislative history is
discussed accurately and persuasively by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in
McCord v. Bailey, 204
U.S.App.D.C. 334, 345, 636 F.2d 606, 615-617 (1980),
cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).