Respondent, a black employee of the United States Postal
Service, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, claiming that the Postal Service had discriminated against
him on account of his race by refusing to promote him. After a
bench trial, the District Court entered judgment for the Postal
Service, but the Court of Appeals ultimately reversed, holding that
the District Court had erred in requiring respondent to offer
direct proof of discriminatory intent and to show as part of his
prima facie case that he was "as qualified or more
qualified" than the people who were promoted.
Held: By framing the issue here in terms of whether a
prima facie case is established by an employee's showing
only that he was black, that he applied for a promotion for which
he possessed the minimum qualifications, and that the employer
selected a nonminority applicant, the parties and the Court of
Appeals have unnecessarily evaded the ultimate question of
discrimination
vel non. By establishing a
prima
facie case, the plaintiff creates a rebuttable presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against him, and to
rebut the presumption, the defendant must clearly set forth,
through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for
the plaintiff's rejection. But when the defendant fails to persuade
the district court to dismiss the action for lack of a
prima
facie case, and responds to the plaintiff's proof by offering
evidence of the reason for the plaintiff's rejection, as was done
here, the presumption drops from the case and the factfinder must
then decide the ultimate factual issue of whether the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Here, the
District Court erroneously thought that respondent was required to
submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent, and erroneously
focused on the question of
prima facie case, rather than
directly on the question of discrimination. Thus it is not clear
that its findings of fact in favor of the Postal Service were not
influenced by its mistaken view of the law; accordingly, the case
is remanded so that the District Court may decide on the basis of
the evidence before it whether the Postal Service discriminated
against respondent. Pp.
460 U. S.
713-717.
214 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 665 F.2d 1057, vacated and remanded.
Page 460 U. S. 712
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which BRENNAN, J., joined,
post, p.
460 U. S. 717.
MARSHALL, J., concurred in the judgment.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Louis Aikens filed suit under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. ยง 2000e
et seq., claiming that the United States Postal Service
discriminated against him on account of his race. Aikens, who is
black, claimed that the Postal Service had discriminatorily refused
to promote him to higher positions in the Washington, D.C. Post
Office where he had
Page 460 U. S. 713
been employed since 1937. After a bench trial, the District
Court entered judgment in favor of the Postal Service, but the
Court of Appeals reversed. 206 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 642 F.2d 514
(1980). We vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded for
reconsideration in light of
Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248
(1981).
453 U. S. 902
(1981).
On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier holding
that the District Court had erred in requiring Aikens to offer
direct proof of discriminatory intent. It also held that the
District Court erred in requiring Aikens to show, as part of his
prima facie case, that he was "as qualified or more
qualified" than the people who were promoted. 214 U.S.App.D.C. 239,
240, 241, 665 F.2d 1057, 1058, 1059 (1981) (per curiam). We granted
certiorari. [
Footnote 1] 455
U.S. 1015 (1982).
The Postal Service argues that an employee who has shown only
that he was black, that he applied for a promotion for which he
possessed the minimum qualifications, and that the employer
selected a nonminority applicant has not established a "
prima
facie" case of employment discrimination under Title VII.
Aikens argues that he submitted sufficient evidence that the Postal
Service discriminated against him to warrant a finding of a
prima facie case. [
Footnote 2] Because this case
Page 460 U. S. 714
was fully tried on the merits, it is surprising to find the
parties and the Court of Appeals still addressing the question
whether Aikens made out a
prima facie case. We think that,
by framing the issue in these terms, they have unnecessarily evaded
the ultimate question of discrimination
vel non. [
Footnote 3]
By establishing a
prima facie case, the plaintiff in a
Title VII action creates a rebuttable "presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against" him.
Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, at
450 U. S. 254.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.
S. 792 (1973). To rebut this presumption, "the defendant
must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible
evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection."
Burdine, 450 U.S. at
450 U. S. 255.
In other words, the defendant must "produc[e] evidence that the
plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."
Id. at
450 U. S.
254.
But when the defendant fails to persuade the district court to
dismiss the action for lack of a
prima facie case,
[
Footnote 4] and responds
Page 460 U. S. 715
to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the reason for
the plaintiff's rejection, the factfinder must then decide whether
the rejection was discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII.
At this stage, the
McDonnell-Burdine presumption "drops
from the case," 450 U.S. at
450 U. S. 255,
n. 10, and "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of
specificity."
Id. at
450 U. S. 255.
After Aikens presented his evidence to the District Court in this
case, the Postal Service's witnesses testified that he was not
promoted because he had turned down several lateral transfers that
would have broadened his Postal Service experience.
See
Tr. 311-313, 318-320, 325; App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a. The District
Court was then in a position to decide the ultimate factual issue
in the case.
The "factual inquiry" in a Title VII case is "[whether] the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."
Burdine, supra, at
450 U. S. 253.
In other words, is "the employer . . . treating
some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.'" Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U. S. 567,
438 U. S. 577
(1978), quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.
S. 324, 431 U. S. 335,
n. 15 (1977). The prima facie case method established in
McDonnell Douglas was
"never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather,
it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in
light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of
discrimination."
Furnco, supra, at
438 U. S. 577.
Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of
him if the plaintiff had properly made out a
prima facie
case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant.
The district court has before it all the evidence it needs to
decide whether "the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff."
Burdine, supra, at
450 U. S.
253.
On the state of the record at the close of the evidence, the
District Court in this case should have proceeded to this specific
question directly, just as district courts decide disputed
Page 460 U. S. 716
questions of fact in other civil litigation. [
Footnote 5] As we stated in
Burdine:
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. . . . [H]e may
succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence."
450 U.S. at
450 U. S. 256.
In short, the district court must decide which party's explanation
of the employer's motivation it believes.
All courts have recognized that the question facing triers of
fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult. The
prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. There will seldom
be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's mental processes.
But none of this means that trial courts or reviewing courts should
treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of
fact. Nor should they make their inquiry even more difficult by
applying legal rules which were devised to govern "the basic
allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof,"
Burdine, 450 U.S. at
450 U. S. 252,
in deciding this ultimate question. The law often obliges finders
of fact to inquire into a person's state of mind. As Lord Justice
Bowen said in treating this problem in an action for
misrepresentation nearly a century ago:
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his
digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the
state of a man's mind at a particular time is, but if it can be
ascertained, it is as much a fact as
Page 460 U. S. 717
anything else."
Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483
(1885).
The District Court erroneously thought that respondent was
required to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent,
see n 3,
supra, and erroneously focused on the question of
prima facie case, rather than directly on the question of
discrimination. Thus, we cannot be certain that its findings of
fact in favor of the Postal Service were not influenced by its
mistaken view of the law. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the
Court of Appeals, and remand the case to the District Court so that
it may decide, on the basis of the evidence before it, whether the
Postal Service discriminated against Aikens.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in the judgment.
[
Footnote 1]
We have consistently distinguished disparate treatment cases
from cases involving facially neutral employment standards that
have disparate impact on minority applicants.
See, e.g., Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.
S. 248,
450 U. S. 252,
n. 5 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U. S. 792,
411 U. S. 802,
n. 14 (1973).
[
Footnote 2]
Aikens showed that white persons were consistently promoted and
detailed over him and all other black persons between 1966 and
1974. Aikens has been rated as "
an outstanding supervisor whose
management abilities were far above average.'" App. 8. There was no
derogatory or negative information in his personnel folder. He had
more supervisory seniority and training and development courses
than all but one of the white persons who were promoted above him.
He has a master's degree, and has completed three years of
residence towards a Ph.D. Aikens had substantially more education
than the white employees who were advanced ahead of him; of the 12,
only 2 had any education beyond high school, and none had a college
degree. He introduced testimony that the person responsible for the
promotion decisions at issue had made numerous derogatory comments
about blacks in general and Aikens in particular. If the District
Court were to find, on the basis of this evidence, that the Postal
Service did discriminate against Aikens, we do not believe that
this would be reversible error.
[
Footnote 3]
As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or
circumstantial evidence. The trier of fact should consider all the
evidence, giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves. Thus,
we agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court should
not have required Aikens to submit direct evidence of
discriminatory intent.
See Teamsters v. United States,
431 U. S. 324,
431 U. S. 358,
n. 44 (1977) ("[T]he
McDonnell Douglas formula does not
require direct proof of discrimination").
[
Footnote 4]
It appears that, at one point in the trial, the District Court
decided that Aikens had made out a
prima facie case. When
Aikens concluded his case in chief, the Postal Service moved to
dismiss on the ground that there was no
prima facie case.
Tr. 256. The District Court denied this motion.
Id. at
259.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
[
Footnote 5]
Of course, the plaintiff must have an adequate "opportunity to
demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for
the employment decision," but rather a pretext.
Burdine,
450 U.S. at
450 U. S. 256.
There is no suggestion in this case that Aikens did not have such
an opportunity.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
concurring.
I join the Court's opinion. I write to stress the fact, however,
that, as I read its opinion, the Court today reaffirms the
framework established by
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U. S. 792
(1973), for Title VII cases. Under that framework, once a Title VII
plaintiff has made out a
prima facie case and the
defendant-employer has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment decision, the plaintiff bears the burden
of demonstrating that the reason is pretextual, that is, it is "not
the true reason for the employment decision."
Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.
S. 248,
450 U. S. 256
(1981). As the Court's opinion today implies,
ante at
460 U. S.
714-715, this burden "merges with the ultimate burden of
persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of
intentional discrimination." 450 U.S. at
450 U. S.
256.
This ultimate burden may be met in one of two ways. First, as
the Court notes, a plaintiff may persuade the court
Page 460 U. S. 718
that the employment decision, more likely than not, was
motivated by a discriminatory reason.
Ante at
460 U. S. 714,
460 U. S. 716,
and
460 U. S. 717.
In addition, however, this burden is also carried if the plaintiff
shows "that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence."
Burdine, 450 U.S. at
450 U. S. 256,
citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
411 U. S.
804-805. While the Court is correct that the ultimate
determination of factual liability in discrimination cases should
be no different from that in other types of civil suits,
ante at
460 U. S. 716,
the
McDonnell Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff
prevail when, at the third stage of a Title VII trial, he
demonstrates that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by
the employer is, in fact, not the true reason for the employment
decision.