In 1971, petitioner, who was then 19 years old, pleaded guilty
to the charge of carrying a pistol without a license in violation
of a provision of the District of Columbia Code and was placed on
probation for two years under § 5010(a) of the Federal Youth
Corrections Act (YCA). At the end of the 2-year probationary
period, he was unconditionally discharged from the YCA program. In
1980, petitioner was again convicted of carrying a pistol without a
license under the same provision of the District of Columbia Code,
and was sentenced to imprisonment as a felon, rather than a
misdemeanant, under the recidivist provision of the Code. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting
petitioner's contention that his earlier conviction could not
properly provide the basis for his being sentenced as a recidivist
because, following his successful completion of the 2-year
probationary term, that conviction had been expunged under §
5021(b) of the YCA, which provides that, where a youth offender has
been placed on probation, the court may thereafter, in its
discretion,
"unconditionally discharge such youth offender from probation
prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation
theretofore fixed by the court, which discharge shall automatically
set aside the conviction."
Held: Under the interpretation of § 5021(b) plainly
suggested by its language, the conviction of a youth offender
placed on probation under § 5010(a) is not set aside where, as
here, the court has not exercised its discretion to discharge him
unconditionally "prior to the expiration of the maximum period of
probation theretofore fixed by the court." This limitation is fully
consistent with the YCA's rehabilitation purposes, as well as with
Congress' intent to employ the set-aside as an incentive for
positive behavior by youths sentenced under the YCA. Accordingly,
the trial court was free to take petitioner's previous conviction
into account in imposing sentence under the recidivist provision of
the District of Columbia Code. Pp.
460 U. S.
663-668.
440
A.2d 1008, affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 460 U. S. 661
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a conviction upon which
a youth offender was sentenced to probation under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act of 1950, 18 U.S.C. § 5005
et seq., was
automatically set aside after he served his full term of
probation.
I
In 1971, petitioner Melvin Tuten, who was 19 years old, pleaded
guilty to the charge of carrying a pistol without a license in
violation of D.C.Code § 22-3204 (1981). [
Footnote 1] He was placed on probation for two years
under the Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1950 (YCA), 18 U.S.C. §
5005
et seq. At the end of the 2-year probationary period,
petitioner was unconditionally discharged from the YCA program.
In 1980, petitioner was tried and convicted of carrying a pistol
without a license under the same provision of the D.C.Code. The
prosecutor urged that petitioner's previous conviction made him
subject to the enhanced penalty provided
Page 460 U. S. 662
by D.C.Code § 22-3204 (1981) for one who previously "has been
convicted in the District of Columbia of a violation of this
section." The trial judge agreed and, based on the earlier
conviction, sentenced petitioner as a felon, rather than a
misdemeanant. The judge imposed a sentence of two to six years'
imprisonment.
On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
petitioner contended that the earlier conviction could not properly
provide the basis for his being sentenced as a recidivist because
that conviction had been expunged under the YCA, § 5021(b),
following his successful completion of the 2-year probationary
term. The court rejected this assertion and affirmed the sentence.
440
A.2d 1008 (1982). It relied primarily upon the "ordinary
meaning" of the language of § 5021. 440 A.2d at 1013. Section 5021
provides:
"(a) Upon the unconditional discharge by the Commission of a
committed youth offender before the expiration of the maximum
sentence imposed upon him, the conviction shall be automatically
set aside and the Commission shall issue to the youth offender a
certificate to that effect."
"(b) Where a youth offender has been placed on probation by the
court, the court may thereafter, in its discretion, unconditionally
discharge such youth offender from probation prior to the
expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by
the court, which discharge shall automatically set aside the
conviction, and the court shall issue to the youth offender a
certificate to that effect."
The court concluded that the automatic set-aside provision of
subsection (b) applies only to a youth offender who receives an
unconditional discharge before the expiration of his probationary
period. The court also stated that "the legislative history
contains no persuasive reasons" to depart from the ordinary meaning
of the statutory language, and noted that
Page 460 U. S. 663
"the case law and public policy support the plain meaning of the
statute." 440 A.2d at 1013. [
Footnote 2] We granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 905 (1982),
and we now affirm.
II
This Court has in previous decisions described and analyzed the
YCA in considerable detail in the course of deciding particular
issues arising under the Act.
See Ralston v. Robinson,
454 U. S. 201
(1981);
Durst v. United States, 434 U.
S. 542 (1978);
Dorszynski v. United States,
418 U. S. 424
(1974). The Act generally applies to persons under 22 years of age
at the time of their conviction [
Footnote 3] who are sentenced in federal courts or in
courts of the District of Columbia. [
Footnote 4]
"[T]he principal purpose of the YCA is to rehabilitate persons
who, because of their youth, are unusually vulnerable to the danger
of recidivism."
Ralston v. Robinson, supra, at
454 U. S. 206.
To achieve this purpose, the Act gives courts a number of
alternatives in sentencing youth offenders. First, a court may
commit a youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for
institutional treatment and supervision under the Act. 18 U.S.C. §§
5010(b) and (c). The Act affords the Attorney General a broad range
of discretion in providing institutional treatment, which includes
educational and vocational training, as well as psychiatric
counseling. §§ 5006(g),
Page 460 U. S. 664
5011, 5013.
See Dorszynski, supra, at
418 U. S. 434.
[
Footnote 5] Second, if the
court finds, as it did in this case, that a youth offender does not
need to be committed to custody, it may place him on probation
under the supervision of a probation officer or supervisory agent.
§ 5010(a). Finally, if the court finds that the defendant will not
benefit from rehabilitative treatment, it may sentence him under
any of the penalty provisions applicable to adult offenders. §
5010(d).
As we noted in
Durst v. United States, supra, at
434 U. S.
548,
"[a] particularly valuable benefit for the offender sentenced
under the YCA is the prospect of obtaining a certificate setting
aside his conviction"
under § 5021 of the Act. Congress' purpose in adopting § 5021
was to promote the rehabilitation of youth offenders by providing a
substantial incentive for positive behavior while serving a
sentence under the YCA. [
Footnote
6] Congress recognized that a criminal conviction often carries
with it numerous civil and social disabilities. For example, a
conviction may result in the loss of the rights to vote, to hold a
public office, to serve on a jury, and to practice various
occupations and professions. [
Footnote 7] As in this case, a conviction may also make an
offender subject to increased penalties for
Page 460 U. S. 665
subsequent convictions. Like various state expungement statutes,
[
Footnote 8] § 5021 enables an
eligible youth offender to reenter society and conduct his life
free from the disabilities that accompany a criminal conviction.
Dorszynski, supra, at
418 U. S. 429,
n. 6. [
Footnote 9]
Until 1961, the YCA's set-aside provision was applicable only to
a youth who was committed to the custody of the Attorney General
under § 5010(b) or § 5010(c) and was unconditionally discharged
prior to expiration of the maximum sentence imposed. [
Footnote 10] It was not applicable
to an offender who, like petitioner, was sentenced initially to
probation, rather than to confinement. The YCA was amended in 1961
to add § 5021(b), Pub.L. 87-336, 75 Stat. 750, in order to correct
this inconsistency in the Act.
See H.R.Rep. No. 433, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1961); S.Rep. No. 1048, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1 (1961). Under § 5021(b), youth offenders sentenced initially to
probation under § 5010(a) are afforded an opportunity to have their
convictions set aside similar to that which
Page 460 U. S. 666
had previously been afforded only to youth offenders sentenced
under §§ 5010(b) and (c).
We are now asked to decide when § 5021 requires the setting
aside of the conviction of a youth offender who has been placed on
probation. Petitioner maintains that after a youth offender
successfully completes the term of probation to which he was
initially sentenced, his conviction must be automatically set aside
under § 5021(b). As the court below noted, however, this
interpretation is contrary to the language of the statute itself,
which provides that a "discharge shall automatically set aside the
conviction" if the court
"unconditionally discharge[s] [the] youth offender from
probation
prior to the expiration of the maximum period of
probation theretofore fixed by the court."
(Emphasis added.) The clear import of § 5021(b) was described by
this Court in
Durst.
"[Section 5021(b)] extend[s] the benefit of a certificate
[setting aside the conviction] to youths sentenced to probation
under § 5010(a) when the court unconditionally discharges the youth
prior to expiration of the sentence of probation
imposed."
434 U.S. at
434 U. S. 548
(emphasis added).
See also Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at
418 U. S. 435.
Statements in the legislative history of the 1961 amendment echo
the language of § 5021(b) limiting the set-aside to youth offenders
discharged before their original probationary terms expire.
[
Footnote 11]
Page 460 U. S. 667
Under the interpretation of § 5021(b) plainly suggested by the
language of the statute, the conviction of a youth offender who has
been placed on probation under § 5010(a) is not set aside where, as
here, the court has
not exercised its discretion to
discharge him unconditionally "prior to the expiration of the
maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by the court," which
in this case was two years. This limitation is fully consistent
with the rehabilitative purposes of the YCA, as well as with
Congress' intent to employ the set-aside as an incentive for
positive behavior by youths sentenced under the Act. The incentive
might be significantly weaker if convictions were set aside
regardless of whether the youth offender, by his conduct during the
probationary period, had convinced the sentencing court to
discharge him before the expiration of his probationary term.
Although it would also have been reasonable for Congress to make
the set-aside available to any youth offender who completes
probation without incident, this result is certainly not compelled
by the purposes of the Act. Moreover, the remedial purposes of the
Act are not frustrated by the possibility that a court may
Page 460 U. S. 668
inadvertently fail to grant an early unconditional discharge.
[
Footnote 12] A youth
offender who believes that the sentencing court's failure to grant
an early unconditional discharge from probation was an oversight
may, following the completion of his probationary period, move that
court to exercise its discretion to grant him an early
unconditional discharge
nunc pro tunc, and to set aside
his conviction.
See United States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d 11,
13, n. 3 (CA6 1976). [
Footnote
13]
In short, the language of § 5021(b), the legislative history,
and the rehabilitative purposes of the YCA all point to a single
conclusion: that petitioner's previous conviction was not set aside
under § 5021(b) because he was unconditionally discharged from
probation upon the completion, not prior to the completion, of the
2-year term of probation to which he was initially sentenced under
§ 5010(a). The trial court was therefore free in this case to take
petitioner's previous conviction into account in imposing sentence
under the recidivist provision of the District of Columbia's penal
statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 22-3204 provides:
"No person shall within the District of Columbia carry either
openly or concealed on or about his person, except in his dwelling
house or place of business or on other land possessed by him, a
pistol, without a license therefor issued as hereinafter provided,
or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed.
Whoever violates this section shall be punished as provided in §
22-3215 [by a fine of not more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both], unless the violation occurs after he
has been convicted in the District of Columbia of a violation of
this section or of a felony, either in the District of Columbia or
in another jurisdiction, in which case he shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than 10 years."
[
Footnote 2]
Two courts have expressed a contrary view.
See United States
v. Arrington, 618 F.2d 1119, 1124 (CA5 1980),
cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1086 (1981);
United States v.
Sinkfield, 484 F.
Supp. 595,
598 (ND
Ga.1980).
Cf. United States v. Villar, 416 F.
Supp. 887, 889 (SDNY 1976).
[
Footnote 3]
18 U.S.C. § 5006(e). As we noted in
Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U. S. 424,
418 U. S. 433,
n. 9 (1974), the Act also applies in some circumstances to certain
convicted persons between the ages of 22 and 26. 18 U.S.C. § 4216.
It ordinarily does not apply to convicted persons under the age of
18, who are eligible for sentencing under the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5031
et seq. (1976 ed. and
Supp. V). It also does not apply to certain multiple offenders in
the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 22-3202(d)(1) (1981).
[
Footnote 4]
18 U.S.C. § 5024.
[
Footnote 5]
See also H.R.Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4
(1950);
United States v. Ward, 337 F.
Supp. 185, 193 (DC 1971).
Cf. Narcotic Addict
Rehabilitation Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 4251(c).
[
Footnote 6]
See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609 before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess., 14 (1949) (testimony of Judge Laws). Congress reaffirmed
this goal when it extended § 5021 to youth offenders initially
sentenced to probation.
See infra at
460 U. S.
665-666. Senator Dodd, who sponsored the 1961 amendment,
explained that the provision "provides an additional incentive for
maintaining good behavior by holding out to the youth an
opportunity to clear his record." 107 Cong.Rec. 8709 (1961).
[
Footnote 7]
See generally Special Project -- The Collateral
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand.L.Rev. 929 (1970);
S. Rubin, H. Weihofen, G. Edwards, & S. Rosenzweig, The Law of
Criminal Correction 611-632 (1963); P. Tappan, Loss and Restoration
of Civil Rights of Offenders, in National Probation and Parole
Association, Crime Prevention Through Treatment 86-104 (1952).
[
Footnote 8]
See, e.g., Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 1203.45 (West 1982);
Kan.Stat.Ann. § 21-4619 (1981); Minn.Stat. § 242.31 (1982).
[
Footnote 9]
See, e.g., Hearings,
supra, n 6, at 14 (testimony of Judge Laws)
("Committed youth offenders who earn their final discharge before
the end of their maximum term have their records cleared and all
their civil rights restored");
id. at 117 (letter from
Judge Wyche) ("I believe that a boy who makes one mistake should be
permanently forgiven that mistake if his subsequent conduct
indicates that he has changed his behavior. One blot on his record
may cause him great harm when he applies for a position in later
years").
See also United States Board of Parole Ann. Rep.
30 (1962) ("It was the intention of the authors of the statute that
such setting aside of conviction action would, in fact, expunge the
record of that conviction"). Of course, federal legislation may
impose disabilities even on persons whose convictions have been
expunged.
See Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc.,
ante p.
460 U. S. 103.
[
Footnote 10]
Generally, a youth offender would be considered for an early
discharge under § 5017 if there was a reasonable probability that
the youth offender would remain free from further law violations.
See United States Board of Parole,
supra, at
30.
[
Footnote 11]
See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 433, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3
(1961); S.Rep. No. 1048, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1961).
The only suggestion to the contrary contained in the legislative
history is a statement of Senator Dodd, who introduced the bill to
amend 18 U.S.C. § 5021 which was ultimately enacted as Pub.L.
87-336, 75 Stat. 750.
See supra at
460 U. S. 665
and this page. Describing the law as it existed before the addition
of subsection (b), he stated:
"Under section 5021 of title 18, a committed youth who is
unconditionally discharged before the expiration of the maximum
sentence imposed upon him automatically has his conviction set
aside. No such provision exists for the youth who is released from
probation.
His conviction remains on the record until the
original sentence expires. The law, as it stands now,
discriminates against the youth on probation who is generally
charged with a lesser offense."
107 Cong.Rec. 8709 (1961) (emphasis added). This remark implies
that, prior to the adoption of § 5021(b), the conviction of a youth
offender who was sentenced to probation would automatically be set
aside after his original term of probation expired. There is
nothing in the Act that so provided, however. Nor is there any
support in the prior legislative history of the Act or in the past
practices of courts or agencies under the Act to justify this
understanding. Indeed, the suggestion that convictions under the
YCA are automatically set aside after the original sentence expires
is flatly contradicted by Senator Dodd's subsequent observation
that § 5021 only "hold[s] out to the youth
an opportunity
to clear his record,"
ibid. (emphasis added), as well as
by statements contained in the Report submitted by Senator Dodd a
few months later.
See S.Rep. No. 1048,
supra. We
are therefore unwilling to assume that Congress would have relied
on the isolated remark spoken on the floor of the Senate when it
amended § 5021.
[
Footnote 12]
Prior to the expiration of a youth offender's term of probation,
a probation officer is required to file a report evaluating the
probationer's conduct and progress and reminding the court that an
early unconditional discharge will automatically set aside the
conviction.
See, e.g., Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures:
Probation Manual, Vol. X-A, § 5011 (1980). Such procedures ensure
that the court is made aware of its duty to decide whether granting
an early unconditional discharge is warranted in light of the
remedial ends of the YCA.
[
Footnote 13]
A person sentenced under a recidivist statute on the basis of a
prior conviction that is subsequently set aside under such a
procedure can move for a reduction of sentence from the second
sentencing court.
See, e.g., Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 35;
D.C.Super.Ct.Crim.Rule 35(a).