Held: Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1337 exists over petitioner common carrier's action in Federal
District Court, where petitioner alleged that respondent failed to
pay a specified amount in motor freight charges, as required by
petitioner's tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and that the action arose under the Interstate Commerce
Act.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Rice,
247 U. S. 201, is
controlling. Petitioner's suit cannot be characterized as a "simple
contract-collection action." A carrier's claim is, of necessity,
predicated on its tariffs regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act
-- not an understanding with the shipper.
Certiorari granted; 682 F.2d 811, reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner is a common carrier authorized by the Interstate
Commerce Commission to transport commodities. When respondent
allegedly failed to pay $661.41 in motor freight charges,
petitioner filed suit in United States District Court. Its
complaint alleged that respondent failed to pay for transport
services as required by petitioner's tariffs on file with the
Commission. The complaint also alleged that the action arose under
the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10741(a) (1976 ed., Supp.
V), and that the District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1337.
The District Court dismissed the matter for want of subject
matter jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 682 F.2d 811 (1982). Characterizing the suit as a "simple
contract-collection action," the court could not "discern any
proposition of federal law that a court need confront in deciding
what, if anything, can be recovered."
Id. at 812.
Page 460 U. S. 534
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, as construed by this Court,
the Court of Appeals was in error. In
Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U. S. 201
(1918), this Court squarely held that federal question jurisdiction
existed over a suit to recover $145 allegedly due the carrier for
an interstate shipment under tariffs regulated by the Interstate
Commerce Act.
"The Interstate Commerce Act requires carrier to collect and
consignee to pay all lawful charges duly prescribed by the tariff
in respect of every shipment. Their duty and obligation grow out of
and depend upon that act."
Id. at
247 U. S. 202.
Other federal courts have had no difficulty in following the clear
import of
Rice. See Madler v. Artoe, 494 F.2d 323
(CA7 1974);
Bernstein Bros. Pipe & Machinery Co. v. Denver
& R. G. W. R. Co., 193 F.2d 441 (CA10 1951);
Maritime
Service Corp. v. Sweet Brokerage De Puerto Rico, Inc., 537
F.2d 560 (CA1 1976).
The Court of Appeals' attempt to distinguish this "most
troublesome precedent" is wholly unconvincing. In its view,
Rice turned upon the fact that the carrier billed the
shipper for an additional amount that, while authorized by lawful
tariffs, was contrary to the parties' understanding.
* Unlike
petitioner's complaint, the complaint in
Rice could not
have alleged that the shipper agreed to pay the amount sought; the
carrier there had to rely exclusively on the Act to override the
parties' understanding. There is no support for this novel
interpretation in
Rice or elsewhere. That the consignee
attempted to avoid payment by invoking an estoppel
Page 460 U. S. 535
defense is an accurate enough portrayal of the facts, but does
not obscure that the claim arose under federal law. "As to
interstate shipments," the Court stated, "the parties are held to
the responsibilities imposed by the federal law, to the exclusion
of all other rules of obligation." 247 U.S. at
247 U. S. 203.
A carrier's claim is, of necessity, predicated on the tariff -- not
an understanding with the shipper. This was true in
Rice
and is equally true here. Under the Court of Appeals' approach, the
question of federal jurisdiction would depend upon the defenses
pleaded by the shipper -- but we have long ago settled that it is
the character of the action, and not the defense, which determines
whether there is federal question jurisdiction.
Public Service
Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.
S. 237,
344 U. S. 248
(1952);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco Inc.,
415 U. S. 125,
415 U. S. 127
(1974). In short, the Court of Appeals has simply confused the
factual contours of
Rice for its unmistakable holding.
Perhaps unsure of its distinction of
Rice, the Court of
Appeals went on to "doubt that
Rice is still good law."
Needless to say, only this Court may overrule one of its
precedents. Until that occurs,
Rice is the law, and the
decision below cannot be reconciled with it. The petition for
certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
* In
Rice, the parties had an understanding requiring
the carrier to assess all charges immediately upon the delivery of
livestock. This arrangement allowed the shipper to include the
transportation costs in the price at which the livestock was sold.
The dispute resulted from the carrier's billing the shipper after
the delivery and sale of the livestock for an additional $145 to
cover disinfecting the freight cars. This additional charge
complied with lawful tariffs.