Respondents filed petitions in the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals asking for waivers of that court's District of Columbia Bar
admission rule that requires applicants to have graduated from a
law school approved by the American Bar Association. The court
issued per curiam orders denying the petitions. Respondents then
filed complaints in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, challenging the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals' denials of their waiver petitions and also challenging the
constitutionality of the bar admission rule. The District Court
dismissed the complaints on the ground that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded.
Held:
1. The proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals were judicial in nature. They involved a "judicial inquiry"
in which the court was called upon to investigate, declare, and
enforce "liabilities as they [stood] on present or past facts and
under laws supposed already to exist."
Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210,
211 U. S. 226.
With respect to both respondents, the court adjudicated claims of a
present right to admission to the Bar. Pp.
460 U. S.
476-482.
2. United States district courts have no jurisdiction over
challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out
of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the
state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those
decisions may be had only in this Court. Thus, to the extent that
respondents sought review in the District Court of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals' denials of their petitions for waiver,
the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their
complaints. But United States district courts do have subject
matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules
promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceedings, which do
not require review of a final state court judgment in a particular
case. Accordingly, here the District Court has jurisdiction over
the elements of respondents' complaints involving a general attack
on the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Bar admission
rule. Pp.
460 U. S.
482-488.
213 U.S.App.D.C. 119, 661 F.2d 1295, vacated and remanded.
Page 460 U. S. 463
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
460 U. S.
488.
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide in this case what authority the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have to
review decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
bar admission matters. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, reversing the United States District
Court, held that the District Court had jurisdiction to review the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' denials of the respondents'
requests for waivers of a bar admission rule that requires
applicants to have graduated from an approved law school. We vacate
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, and remand the case for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
I
We have discussed in detail in earlier opinions the changes in
the structure of the District of Columbia court system effected by
the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970. Pub.L. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473.
See Key v. Doyle,
434 U. S. 59
(1977);
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.
S. 389 (1973). For purposes of this case,
Page 460 U. S. 464
three provisions of that legislation are crucial. One provision
made
"[f]inal judgments and decrees of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals . . . reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United
States in accordance with section 1257 of title 28, United States
Code."
§ 111, 84 Stat. 475 (codified at D.C.Code § 11-102 (1981)).
Another provision amended 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to specify that the term
"highest court of a State" as used in § 1257 includes the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals. § 172(a)(1), 84 Stat. 590. These
provisions make the judgments of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, like the judgments of state courts, directly reviewable in
this Court. Cases no longer have to proceed from the local courts
to the United States Court of Appeals and then to this Court under
28 U.S.C. § 1254.
See Key v. Doyle, supra, at
434 U. S. 64.
The third provision authorized the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals to
"make such rules as it deems proper respecting the examination,
qualification, and admission of persons to membership in its bar,
and their censure, suspension, and expulsion."
§ 111, 84 Stat. 521 (codified at D.C.Code § 11-2501(a) (1981)).
This provision divested the United States District Court of its
former authority to supervise admission to the District of Columbia
Bar.
Pursuant to its new rulemaking authority, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals adopted, as part of its general rules,
Rule 46I (1973), which governs admission to the bar. Rule 46I(b)(3)
states:
"(3) Proof of Legal Education. An applicant who has graduated
from a law school that at the time of graduation was approved by
the American Bar Association or who shall be eligible to be
graduated from an approved law school within 60 days of the date of
the examination will be permitted to take the bar examination.
Under no circumstances shall an applicant be admitted to the bar
without having first submitted to the Secretary to
Page 460 U. S. 465
the Committee [on Admissions] a certificate verifying that he
has graduated from an approved law school. [
Footnote 1]"
Neither of the respondents graduated from an approved law
school. Their efforts to avoid the operation of Rule 46I(b)(3) form
the foundation of this case.
A
Respondent Feldman did not attend law school. Instead, he
pursued an alternative path to a legal career provided by the State
of Virginia involving a highly structured program of study in the
office of a practicing attorney.
See Va.Code § 54-62
(1982). In addition to his work and study at a law firm in
Charlottesville, Va., Feldman formally audited classes at the
University of Virginia School of Law. For the final six months of
his alternative course of study, Feldman served as a law clerk to a
United States District Judge.
Having passed the Virginia bar examination, Feldman was admitted
to that State's Bar in April, 1976. In March of that year he had
begun working as a staff attorney for the Baltimore, Md. Legal Aid
Bureau. He continued in that job until January, 1977. Like the
District of Columbia, Maryland has a rule limiting access to the
bar examination to graduates of ABA-approved law schools, but the
Maryland Board of Law Examiners waived the rule for Feldman.
Feldman passed the Maryland examination and later was admitted to
that State's Bar.
In November, 1976, Feldman applied to the Committee on
Admissions of the District of Columbia Bar for admission to the
District Bar under a rule which, prior to its recent amendment,
allowed a member of a bar in another jurisdiction to seek
membership in the District Bar without examination.
Page 460 U. S. 466
In January, 1977, the Committee denied Feldman's application on
the ground that he had not graduated from an approved law school.
Initially, the Committee stated that waivers of Rule 46I(b)(3), or
exceptions to it, were not authorized. Following further contact
with the Committee, however, Feldman was granted an informal
hearing. After the hearing, the Committee reaffirmed its denial of
Feldman's application, and stated that only the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals could waive the requirement of graduation
from an approved law school.
In June, 1977, Feldman submitted to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals a petition for admission to the bar without
examination. App. 1a. Alternatively, Feldman requested that he be
allowed to sit for the bar examination.
Id. at 5a. In his
petition, Feldman described his legal training, work experience,
and other qualifications. He suggested that his professional
training and education were "equal to that received by those who
have attended an A.BA.-approved law school."
Id. at 4a. In
view of his training, experience, and success in passing the bar
examinations in other jurisdictions, Feldman stated that
"the objectives of the District of Columbia's procedures and
requirements for admission to the Bar will not be frustrated by
granting this petition."
Ibid.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not act on
Feldman's petition for several months. In March, 1978, Feldman's
counsel wrote to the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals to urge favorable action on Feldman's petition. The
letter stated that Feldman had "abundantly demonstrated his fitness
to practice law," and suggested that "it would be a gross injustice
to exclude him from the Bar without even considering his individual
qualifications."
Id. at 6a. The letter went on to state
that,
"[i]n the unique circumstances of his case, barring Mr. Feldman
from the practice of law merely because he has not graduated from
an accredited law school would raise important questions
Page 460 U. S. 467
under the United States Constitution and the federal antitrust
laws -- questions that Mr. Feldman is prepared to pursue in the
United States District Court if necessary."
Id. at 6a-7a. In support of Feldman's position, the
letter again stressed the strength of his training and the breadth
of his experience. While acknowledging that a strict reading of
Rule 46I(b)(3) prevented Feldman from taking the bar examination,
Feldman's counsel suggested that the court was not precluded from
considering "Mr. Feldman's application on its merits."
Id.
at 9a. The court has plenary power to regulate the licensing of
attorneys, which, in the view of Feldman's counsel, includes the
discretion to waive the requirements of Rule 46I in a deserving
case. In view of Feldman's "unusually high qualifications for
admission," his case provided "an ideal occasion for the exercise
of such discretion."
Ibid.
Feldman's counsel also pointed out that the court had granted
waivers of the rule in the past, and suggested that a
"failure to consider Mr. Feldman's application would be highly
arbitrary, and would raise serious questions about the fairness and
even-handedness of the Court's policies regarding bar
admissions."
Id. at 10a. He went on to state that
"serious questions under the United States Constitution are
raised by any bar admissions procedure which automatically rejects
applicants who have not graduated from an A.B.A.-accredited law
school, without any opportunity to show that their experience and
education provide equivalent evidence of their fitness to practice
law."
Id. at 10a-11a. Feldman's counsel cited case authority
in support of his position. Finally, Feldman's counsel stated
that
"[t]he federal antitrust laws provide an alternative basis for
questioning the legality of a bar admissions procedure which
presumes applicants to be unqualified if they lack a law degree and
denies them any opportunity to show that their individual training
and experience still qualify them to practice law."
Id. at 12a. Feldman's counsel also cited cases in
support of this position.
Page 460 U. S. 468
In late March, 1978, the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals responded to the letter from Feldman's counsel.
Id. at 16a. The Chief Judge stated that, while the
Committee on Admissions had recognized Mr. Feldman's "exceptional
opportunity for training" and his fine personal qualities, the
purpose of the rule at issue was
"to prevent the Committee and the Court from assuming the
practicably impossible task of making separate subjective
evaluations of each applicant's training and education; hence, an
objective and reasonable standard as prescribed by the rule must be
utilized."
Ibid. In this light, the court decided not to waive the
rule and upheld the Committee's denial of Feldman's
application.
On March 30, 1978, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
issued a per curiam order denying Feldman's petition.
Id.
at 18a. The order stated simply that "[o]n consideration of the
petition of Marc Feldman to waive the provisions of Rule 46 of the
General Rules of this Court, it is ORDERED that applicant's
petition is denied."
Ibid.
In May, 1978, Feldman filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' refusal to waive Rule
46I(b)(3) on his behalf.
Id. at 35a. [
Footnote 2] The complaint stated that the
"[d]efendants' refusal to consider plaintiff's individual
qualifications to practice law is unlawful in view of his
demonstrated fitness and competence, as well as the prior admission
to the D.C. bar of several other individuals who did not attend an
accredited law school."
Id. at 36a. Feldman sought
"a declaration that defendants' actions have violated the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution and the Sherman Act, and . . . an
injunction requiring defendants either
Page 460 U. S. 469
to grant plaintiff immediate admission to the District of
Columbia bar or to permit him to sit for the bar examination as
soon as possible."
Ibid. [
Footnote
3]
Page 460 U. S. 470
The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on
the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
action.
Id. at 78a, 79a. [
Footnote 4] The court found that the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals' order denying Feldman's petition was a judicial
act "which fully encompassed the constitutional and statutory
issues raised."
Id. at 82a. The court stated that, if it
were
"to assume jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit,
it would find itself in the unsupportable position of reviewing an
order of a jurisdiction's highest court."
Ibid.
B
Respondent Hickey began the study of law in March, 1975 at the
Potomac School of Law, Washington, D.C., after concluding a
distinguished 20-year career as a pilot in the United States Navy.
At the time he entered Potomac, Hickey was aware that it had not
been accredited by the ABA, but he thought that he could transfer
at some later date to an ABA-approved school. Shortly after Hickey
started his studies, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
granted waivers of Rule 46I(b)(3) to graduates of the International
School of Law, a new and unapproved school in the area. The court
granted waivers to members of the 1975, 1976, and 1977 graduating
classes of International. This practice encouraged Hickey to
believe that he also would be able to obtain a waiver of the rule.
In November, 1977, however, the Court of Appeals denied Potomac's
petition for a temporary waiver of the rule, and announced that it
would no longer grant waivers to future International
graduates.
Page 460 U. S. 471
In April, 1978, Hickey submitted to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals a petition for waiver of Rule 46I(b)(3) so that he
could sit for the bar examination.
Id. at 19a. In his
petition, Hickey described his career in the Navy and his law
school record. He also submitted affidavits from four law
professors attesting to his competence in his legal studies. Hickey
went on to suggest that it would be unfair to deny him, or other
students currently enrolled at Potomac, a waiver after they had
pursued three years of legal education in reliance on the court's
previous policy of granting waivers to International graduates.
[
Footnote 5] Hickey pointed out
that denying his petition for waiver would impose an especially
severe burden on him in view of his age and his status as a husband
and father.
Hickey also suggested that it would be burdensome for him to
attempt to comply with Rule 46I(b)(4), which permits graduates of
unapproved law schools to sit for the bar examination after
completing 24 credit hours at an approved law school. [
Footnote 6] Furthermore, Hickey
contended that he would be unable to comply with the rule, because
the ABA had instructed approved law schools in the District of
Columbia to deny admission to nondegree candidates for completion
of the 24-credit-hour requirement.
Finally, Hickey stated that his 20 years of military service had
demonstrated
"far beyond that of the average bar exam
Page 460 U. S. 472
candidate, that he possesses the qualities essential to a good
lawyer, including: judgment, maturity, courage in the face of
adversity, concern for his fellow man, commitment to our society
and attention to detail."
App. 24a. He suggested that "[f]ar more than most, [he had]
earned the right to sit for the bar examination."
Ibid.
.
On June 12, 1978, the court issued a per curiam order denying
Hickey's petition for a waiver.
Id. at 49a. The order
stated that the court had considered the petition and Hickey's
contention that the ABA had instructed approved law schools in the
District of Columbia to deny admission to nondegree candidates for
completion of the 24-credit-hour requirement. The court stated:
"The American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure,
as amended -- 1977, permit enrollment of persons in petitioner's
category under Standard 506(ii) if they can satisfy the requirement
for admission set forth in Standard 502."
Ibid. [
Footnote
7]
In July, 1978, Hickey filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' denial of his waiver
petition.
Id. at 60a. [
Footnote 8] Hickey alleged that the denial of his petition
violated the Fifth Amendment and the federal antitrust laws.
Id. at 64a-65a. The allegations and prayer for relief in
Hickey's complaint were virtually identical to the
Page 460 U. S. 473
allegations and prayer for relief in Feldman's complaint,
see n 3,
supra, except that Hickey simply sought an order requiring
the defendants to allow him to sit for the bar examination at the
earliest possible date. App. 66a.
The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
Hickey's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Id. at 142a. In this regard, the court stated that
"[i]t is well settled that the admission and exclusion of
attorneys by the members of the highest court of a state is the
exercise of a judicial function which may be reviewed only by the
United States Supreme Court."
Id. at 143a. In the District Court's view, Hickey was
seeking review of the defendants' denial of his petition for
admission to the bar examination. The court suggested that
"[t]he constitutional challenge to that denial is wholly and
directly intertwined with plaintiff's efforts to secure an
exemption from Rule 46, and the allegations of the complaint and
the relief requested concern essentially the application of the
Rule to his own particular case."
Ibid. In this light, the court concluded that
"there is no basis for the extraordinary attempt to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court on a matter entrusted by the Congress to
the D.C. Court of Appeals."
Ibid. [
Footnote
9]
Page 460 U. S. 474
C
Both Hickey and Feldman appealed the dismissals of their
complaints to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. [
Footnote
10] The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissals of
Hickey's and Feldman's antitrust claims on the ground that they
were insubstantial.
Feldman v. Gardner, 213 U.S.App.D.C.
119, 122, 661 F.2d 1295, 1298 (1981). [
Footnote 11] The court, however, concluded that the
waiver proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
"were not judicial in the federal sense, and thus did not foreclose
litigation of the constitutional contentions in the District
Court."
Ibid. The court therefore reversed the dismissals
of the constitutional claims and remanded them for consideration on
the merits.
Ibid.
Although the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged that
"review of a final judgment of the highest judicial tribunal of a
state is vested solely in the Supreme Court of the United States,"
id. at 134, 661 F.2d at 1310 (footnote omitted), and that
the United States District Court therefore is without authority to
review determinations by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in judicial proceedings, the court found that the District Court
has jurisdiction over these cases because the proceedings in the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals "were not judicial. . . ."
Ibid. The court based this conclusion on a finding that
neither Feldman nor Hickey asserted in their waiver petitions "any
sort of
right to be admitted to the District of Columbia
bar, or even to take the examination therefor."
Id. at
139, 661 F.2d at 1315
Page 460 U. S. 475
(emphasis in original). Feldman and Hickey simply sought an
exemption from the rule. In particular, Hickey did not present any
legal arguments, nor did "he demand admission to the examination as
a matter of legal entitlement."
Ibid. He "merely asked the
court to exercise its administrative discretion to permit him to
take the test."
Ibid. This amounted to a request that the
court "make a policy decision equating his personal qualities with
accredited legal education, not an adjudication requiring resort to
legal principles."
Ibid. (footnote omitted).
The District of Columbia Circuit found Feldman's case more
difficult,
id. at 140, 661 F.2d at 1316, but still
concluded that the proceedings on his waiver petition were not
judicial in nature, because the "claim-of-right element" was
lacking.
Ibid. Feldman's petition did not "claim that a
refusal of his waiver request would deny him any right at all."
Ibid. Instead, the petition "invoked the administrative
discretion of [the court], simply asking that it temper its rule in
his favor, for personal and not legal reasons."
Ibid. The
District of Columbia Circuit rejected the argument that the letter
from Feldman's counsel, which raised certain legal arguments,
changed the nature of the proceedings.
Id. at 140-141, 661
F.2d at 1316-1317. The District of Columbia Circuit stated:
"We are unable to discern in the letter any desire that the
court consider Feldman's legal criticisms of the rule on their
merits, or hand down a decision dealing with them. The letter made
unmistakably clear that these criticisms would be litigated, if at
all, in the District Court. . . ."
Ibid. (footnotes omitted). [
Footnote 12]
Page 460 U. S. 476
II
The District of Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that the
United States District Court is without authority to review final
determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
judicial proceedings. Review of such determinations can be obtained
only in this Court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
See also
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers,
398 U. S. 281,
398 U. S. 296
(1970);
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.
S. 413,
263 U. S. 415,
263 U. S. 416
(1923). A crucial question in this case, therefore, is whether the
proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were
judicial in nature. [
Footnote
13]
A
This Court has considered the distinction between judicial and
administrative or ministerial proceedings on several occasions. In
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.
S. 210 (1908), railroads challenged in federal court the
constitutionality of rail passenger rates set by the State
Corporation Commission. The question presented by the case was
whether the federal court was free to enjoin implementation of the
rate order.
Id. at
211 U. S. 223.
In considering this question, we assumed that the State Corporation
Commission was, at
Page 460 U. S. 477
least for some purposes, a court.
Id. at
211 U. S. 224.
We held, however, that the federal court could enjoin
implementation of the rate order because the Commission had acted
in a legislative, as opposed to a judicial, capacity in setting the
rates.
Id. at
211 U. S. 226.
In reaching this conclusion, we stated:
"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces
liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws
supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end.
Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and changes
existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter
to all or some part of those subject to its power. The
establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and
therefore is an act legislative, not judicial, in kind. . . ."
Ibid.
We went on to suggest that the nature of a proceeding "depends
not upon the character of the body, but upon the character of the
proceedings."
Ibid. See generally Roudebush v.
Hartke, 405 U. S. 15,
405 U. S. 20-22
(1972);
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.
S. 820,
367 U. S. 827
(1961);
Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace,
288 U. S. 249,
288 U. S. 259
(1933);
Public Service Co. v. Corboy, 250 U.
S. 153,
250 U. S.
161-162 (1919).
In
In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561
(1945), we considered the petitioner's challenge to the
constitutionality of a State Supreme Court's refusal to admit him
to the practice of law. At the outset, we noted that the record was
not in the "customary form," because the state court had not
treated the proceeding as "judicial."
Id. at
325 U. S. 563.
In fact, the state court contested our certiorari jurisdiction on
the ground that the state court proceedings had not been judicial
in nature, and that no case or controversy therefore existed in
this Court under Art. III of the Federal Constitution.
Id.
at
325 U. S.
564-565. In considering this contention, we conceded
that the state court proceedings might not have been judicial under
state law, and that the denial of the petitioner's application for
admission to the bar was treated
"as a ministerial act which is performed by virtue of the
judicial power, such as the appointment
Page 460 U. S. 478
of a clerk or bailiff or the specification of the requirements
of eligibility or the course of study for applicants for admission
to the bar, rather than a judicial proceeding."
Id. at
325 U. S. 566.
We stated, however, that in determining the nature of the
proceedings "we must for ourselves appraise the circumstances of
the refusal."
Ibid.
In conducting this appraisal, we first stated:
"A case arises, within the meaning of the Constitution, when any
question respecting the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States has assumed 'such a form that the judicial power is
capable of acting on it.' . . . A declaration on rights as they
stand must be sought, not on rights which may arise in the future,
and there must be an actual controversy over an issue, not a desire
for an abstract declaration of the law. The form of the proceeding
is not significant. It is the nature and effect which is
controlling."
Id. at
325 U. S.
566-567, quoting
Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 9 Wheat. 738,
22 U. S. 819
(1824) (citations omitted). Applying this standard, we noted that
the state court had concluded that the report of the Committee on
Character and Fitness, which refused to issue a favorable
certificate, should be sustained. The state court, therefore,
considered the petitioner's petition "on its merits." 325 U.S. at
325 U. S. 567.
Although "no entry was placed by the Clerk in the file, on a
docket, or in a judgment roll,"
ibid., we found that the
state court had taken "cognizance of the petition and passed an
order which [was] validated by the signature of the presiding
officer."
Ibid. (footnote omitted). We stated:
"Where relief is thus sought in a state court against the action
of a committee, appointed to advise the court, and the court takes
cognizance of the complaint without requiring the appearance of the
committee or its members, we think the consideration of the
petition by the Supreme
Page 460 U. S. 479
Court, the body which has authority itself, by its own act, to
give the relief sought, makes the proceeding adversary in the sense
of a true case or controversy."
"A claim of a present right to admission to the bar of a state
and a denial of that right is a controversy. When the claim is made
in a state court and a denial of the right is made by judicial
order, it is a case which may be reviewed under Article III of the
Constitution when federal questions are raised and proper steps
taken to that end, in this Court."
Id. at
325 U. S.
567-569 (footnote omitted).
B
These precedents clearly establish that the proceedings in the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals surrounding Feldman's and
Hickey's petitions for waiver were judicial in nature. The
proceedings were not legislative, ministerial, or administrative.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not
"loo[k] to the future and chang[e] existing conditions by making
a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those
subject to its power."
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. at
211 U. S. 226.
Nor did it engage in rulemaking or specify "the requirements of
eligibility or the course of study for applicants for admission to
the bar. . . ."
In re Summers, supra, at
325 U. S. 566.
Nor did the District of Columbia Court of Appeals simply engage in
ministerial action. Instead, the proceedings before the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals involved a "judicial inquiry" in which
the court was called upon to investigate, declare, and enforce
"liabilities as they [stood] on present or past facts and under
laws supposed already to exist."
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line
Co., supra, at
211 U. S.
226.
In his petition to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
discussed in detail,
supra at
460 U. S.
466-468, Feldman contended that he possessed "the
requisite fitness and good moral character necessary to practice
law in this jurisdiction." App. 1a. In support of his position, he
described in detail his legal
Page 460 U. S. 480
training and experience. He asserted that his professional
education and training were "equal to that received by those who
have attended an A.B.A.-approved law school."
Id. at 4a.
He further argued that granting his petition would not frustrate
the objectives of the District of Columbia's procedures and
requirements for admission to the bar. In his later letter,
see
supra at
460 U. S.
466-467, Feldman pointed out that the court's former
practice of granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law
schools raised questions about the fairness of denying his
petition. He also made explicit legal arguments against the rule
based both on the Constitution and on the federal antitrust laws.
[
Footnote 14] All of this
was done against the background of an existing rule.
In essence, Feldman argued on policy grounds that the rule
should not be applied to him because he had fulfilled the spirit,
if not the letter, of Rule 46I(b)(3). Alternatively, he argued in
his letter that the rule was invalid. In short, he was seeking "a
declaration on rights as they [stood] . . . not on rights which
[might] arise in the future. . . ."
In re Summers, 325
U.S. at
325 U. S. 567.
This required the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to
determine in light of existing law and in light of Feldman's
qualifications and arguments whether Feldman's petition should be
granted. The court also had before it legal arguments against the
validity of the rule. When it issued a per curiam order denying
Feldman's petition, it determined as a legal matter that Feldman
was
Page 460 U. S. 481
not entitled to be admitted to the bar without examination or to
sit for the bar examination. The court had adjudicated Feldman's
"claim of a present right to admission to the bar,"
id. at
325 U. S. 568,
and rejected it. This is the essence of a judicial proceeding.
The same conclusion obtains with respect to the proceedings on
Hickey's petition for waiver. In his petition,
see supra
at
460 U. S.
471-472, Hickey asserted that he was substantively
qualified to sit for the bar examination. In support of his
position, he submitted affidavits supporting his competence and
described in detail his military service and legal education. He
also argued that he had relied on the court's former policy of
granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law schools in
developing a reasonable expectation that he would be granted a
waiver as well. Moreover, he suggested that ABA policy made it
impossible for him to pursue the alternative route under the rules
to being permitted to sit for the bar examination. Finally, he
argued, based on equitable considerations such as his age, military
service, and status as a father and husband, that he should be
granted a waiver. He stated that "[f]ar more than most," he had
"earned the right to sit for the bar examination." App. 24a.
As in Feldman's case, Hickey's petition called upon the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals to consider policy and equitable
arguments in deciding whether to waive the rule. The fact that
Hickey did not cite case authority in support of his arguments or
make any explicitly legal contentions does not render the
proceedings nonjudicial. The court still was required to determine
if Hickey's qualifications and background fulfilled the basic
purposes of the rule sufficiently to justify a waiver and, if not,
whether equitable considerations compelled a waiver. These are
essentially judicial inquiries. They resulted in a per curiam order
that denied Hickey's petition and explicitly rejected his
contention that ABA policy prevented him from acquiring 24 credit
hours from an accredited law school.
Page 460 U. S. 482
Admittedly, the proceedings in both Feldman's case and Hickey's
case did not assume the form commonly associated with judicial
proceedings. As we said in
In re Summers, supra, however,
"[t]he form of the proceeding is not significant. It is the nature
and effect which is controlling."
Id. at
325 U. S. 567.
[
Footnote 15]
III
A
A determination that the proceedings on Feldman's and Hickey's
petitions were judicial does not finally dispose of this case. As
we have noted,
supra at
460 U. S. 476,
a United States District Court has no authority to review final
judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such
judgments may be had only in this Court. Therefore, to the extent
that Hickey and Feldman sought review in the District Court of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' denial of their petitions
for waiver, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over their complaints. Hickey and Feldman should have sought review
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' judgments in this
Court. [
Footnote 16] To the
extent
Page 460 U. S. 483
that Hickey and Feldman mounted a general challenge to the
constitutionality of Rule 46I(b)(3), however, the District Court
did have subject matter jurisdiction over their complaints.
The difference between seeking review in a federal district
court of a state court's final judgment in a bar admission
matter
Page 460 U. S. 484
and challenging the validity of a state bar admission rule has
been recognized in the lower courts and, at least implicitly, in
the opinions of this Court.
In
Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596 (CA10 1976), the
plaintiff challenged in United States District Court the
constitutionality of a state court decision denying his application
for admission to the bar. In concluding that the District Court
lacked
Page 460 U. S. 485
subject matter jurisdiction over the action, the Court of
Appeals stated:
"We concur in the district court's finding that it is without
subject matter jurisdiction to review a final order of the [State]
Supreme Court denying
a particular application for
admission to the [state bar]. This rule applies even though,
as here, the challenge is anchored to alleged deprivations of
federally protected due process and equal protection rights."
Id. at 599 (emphasis in original). During the course of
its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated:
"The United States District Court, in denying [the plaintiff]
relief, declared that there is a subtle but fundamental distinction
between two types of claims which a frustrated bar applicant might
bring to federal court: the first is a constitutional challenge to
the state's general rules and regulations governing admission; the
second is a claim, based on constitutional or other grounds, that
the state has unlawfully denied a particular applicant admission.
The Court held that, while federal courts do exercise jurisdiction
over many constitutional claims which attack the state's power to
license attorneys involving challenges to either the rulemaking
authority or the administration of the rules, . . .
such is not
true where review of a state court's adjudication of a particular
application is sought. The Court ruled that the latter claim
may be heard, if at all, exclusively by the Supreme Court of the
United States."
Id. at 597 (emphasis in original). [
Footnote 17]
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in
Doe v.
Pringle, supra, properly emphasized the distinction between
general challenges to state bar admission rules and claims that a
state court has unlawfully denied a particular applicant admission.
We have recognized that state supreme courts may act in a
nonjudicial capacity in promulgating rules regulating the bar.
See, e.g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union,
446 U. S. 719,
446 U. S. 731
(1980);
Lathrop v.
Page 460 U. S. 486
Donohue, 367 U.S. at
367 U. S. 827
(plurality opinion);
In re Summers, 325 U.S. at
325 U. S. 566.
Challenges to the constitutionality of state bar rules, therefore,
do not necessarily require a United States district court to review
a final state court judgment in a judicial proceeding. Instead, the
district court may simply be asked to assess the validity of a rule
promulgated in a nonjudicial proceeding. If this is the case, the
district court is not reviewing a state court judicial decision. In
this regard, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 does not act as a bar to the district
court's consideration of the case, and, because the proceedings
giving rise to the rule are nonjudicial, the policies prohibiting
United States district court review of final state court judgments
are not implicated. United States district courts, therefore, have
subject matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar
rules, promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceedings,
which do not require review of a final state court judgment in a
particular case. They do not have jurisdiction, however, over
challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out
of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the
state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those
decisions may be had only in this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
B
Applying this standard to the respondents' complaints, it is
clear that their allegations that the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying their
petitions for waiver, and that the court acted unreasonably and
discriminatorily in denying their petitions in view of its former
policy of granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law
schools,
see n 3,
supra, required the District Court to review a final
judicial decision of the highest court of a jurisdiction in a
particular case. These allegations are inextricably intertwined
with the District of Columbia
Page 460 U. S. 487
Court of Appeals' decisions, in judicial proceedings, to deny
the respondents' petitions. The District Court, therefore, does not
have jurisdiction over these elements of the respondents'
complaints.
The remaining allegations in the complaints, however, involve a
general attack on the constitutionality of Rule 46I(b)(3).
See n 3,
supra. The respondents' claims that the rule is
unconstitutional because it creates an irrebuttable presumption
that only graduates of accredited law schools are fit to practice
law, discriminates against those who have obtained equivalent legal
training by other means, and impermissibly delegates the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals' power to regulate the bar to the
American Bar Association, do not require review of a judicial
decision in a particular case. The District Court, therefore, has
subject matter jurisdiction over these elements of the respondents'
complaints. [
Footnote
18]
In deciding that the District Court has jurisdiction over those
elements of the respondents' complaints that involve a general
challenge to the constitutionality of Rule 46I(b)(3), we expressly
do not reach the question of whether the doctrine of
res
judicata forecloses litigation on these elements of
Page 460 U. S. 488
the complaints. We leave that question to the District Court on
remand. [
Footnote 19]
IV
The judgment of the District of Columbia Circuit is vacated, and
the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Under Rule 46I(b)(4), a graduate of an unaccredited law
school
"may be permitted admission to an examination only after
receiving credit for 24 semester hours of study in a law school
that at the time of study was approved by the American Bar
Association and with Committee approval."
[
Footnote 2]
The complaint named as defendants the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in his official capacity, the Committee on Admissions, and
the Chairman and Secretary of that Committee. App. 37a-38a.
[
Footnote 3]
In his complaint, Feldman specifically alleged that the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals' refusal to admit him to the bar
violated the Fifth Amendment in five respects. First, Feldman
alleged that Rule 46I(b)(3), by limiting bar membership to
graduates of accredited law schools, creates an irrebuttable
presumption that only graduates of such schools are fit to practice
law in the District of Columbia, and thereby deprives persons who
have pursued alternative methods of legal training of their liberty
and property without due process of law. App. 42a. Second, Feldman
alleged that the rule impermissibly and irrationally discriminates
against persons who have obtained equivalent legal training by
other means, and therefore denies such persons the equal protection
of the laws.
Ibid. Third, Feldman alleged that, by
conclusively presuming that only graduates of accredited law
schools are fit to practice law in the District of Columbia, the
rule impermissibly delegates to the American Bar Association the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' power to regulate the
practice of law, and therefore deprives persons with alternative
legal training of their property and liberty without due process of
law.
Ibid. Fourth, Feldman alleged that, by refusing to
consider whether his individual qualifications and training were
equivalent to graduation from an accredited law school, and for
that reason justified a waiver of the rule, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously and
deprived him of his liberty and property without due process of
law.
Ibid. Finally, Feldman alleged that, because the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals had repeatedly waived the
rule in the past to permit admission to the bar of persons who had
not graduated from approved law schools, the court acted
unreasonably and discriminatorily in refusing to consider his
individual qualifications and both denied him the equal protection
of the laws and deprived him of his liberty and property without
due process of law.
Id. at 43a.
The complaint also included an allegation that, by limiting
membership in the District of Columbia Bar to graduates of approved
law schools, the defendants had entered into a combination in
restraint of trade and had attempted to monopolize, and in fact had
monopolized, the practice of law in the District of Columbia.
Ibid.
In his prayer for relief, Feldman asked for a declaration that
Rule 46I, "either on its face or as applied to plaintiff,"
ibid., violates the Fifth Amendment; that the defendants'
refusal to consider his individual qualifications and training
violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment; and that the
defendants' rejection of his application because he did not
graduate from an approved law school violated the federal antitrust
laws.
Id. at 43a-44a. Feldman requested an order requiring
the defendants to admit him to the bar without examination or to
allow him to sit for the bar examination at the earliest possible
date or to determine whether his training and qualifications had
provided him with the same competence to practice law as graduates
of approved law schools.
Id. at 44a.
[
Footnote 4]
The defendants also asserted
res judicata as a ground
for their motion to dismiss.
Id. at 80a.
[
Footnote 5]
Hickey also suggested that the court's former policy of granting
waivers to the members of the first three graduating classes of a
new law school should be continued in view of the difficulty of
meeting "the strict standards for ABA approval in the mere three
years between the inception of a new law school and its first
graduation."
Id. at 23a.
[
Footnote 6]
Hickey also asserted that it was unnecessary for him to take 24
more credit hours at an approved law school in view of the breadth
of the legal education he already had received. He stated that he
had completed 87 credit hours covering all of the subjects included
in the bar examination. To take 24 more credit hours, he would have
to enroll in elective courses not even tested by the bar
examination.
Id. at 23a-24a.
[
Footnote 7]
At the direction of the court, the Clerk of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals had written to the ABA to determine
whether it had
"'instructed, as a matter of policy, the approved law schools in
the District of Columbia to deny admission to non-degree
candidates, as Potomac graduates will be, for completion of the 24
credit hour requirement.'"
Id. at 138a. The ABA responded by citing Standard 506,
which permits, among other things,
"the enrollment in a limited number of courses of non-degree
candidates who are students enrolled in other colleges, members of
the bar, graduates of other approved law schools, or other persons
who have successfully completed at least three years toward a
bachelor's degree at a regionally accredited college or
university."
Id. at 140a.
[
Footnote 8]
The complaint named as defendants the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals and its individual judges in their official capacities.
Id. at 61a.
[
Footnote 9]
The District Court pointed out that, if the issues concerning
the validity of the rule had been raised in the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, that "court could and would have
entertained and determined them."
Id. at 143a. The court
stated that, if that course had been followed "this Court would
have been precluded in any event from thereafter entertaining those
same issues."
Id. at 144a. The court also noted that it
had been advised by counsel for the defendants that the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals was still willing to consider those
matters. The court suggested that it
"would be a violation of the principles of comity and judicial
economy in these circumstances for this Court to exercise
jurisdiction even if such jurisdiction exists."
Ibid. Finally, the court dismissed the antitrust claims
on the ground that the antitrust laws "do not apply to the kind of
action being challenged."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 10]
Although the cases were not consolidated, the District of
Columbia Circuit dealt with them in a single opinion because they
raised nearly identical legal issues and were argued on the same
day.
Feldman v. Gardner, 213 U.S.App.D.C. 119, 122, n. 3,
661 F.2d 1295, 1298, n. 3 (1981).
[
Footnote 11]
We denied respondents' cross-petitions for certiorari from the
disposition of the antitrust claims.
Feldman v. District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, 458 U.S. 1106 (1982);
Hickey v.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 458 U.S. 1106 (1982).
Those claims, therefore, are not before us.
[
Footnote 12]
The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the petitioners'
alternative argument that consideration of the legal issues Feldman
sought to raise in the District Court was barred by principles of
res judicata. Feldman v. Gardner, supra, at 144,
661 F.2d at 1320. The court did so on the ground that the
proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were
nonjudicial in nature.
Ibid.
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
id. at 145, 661 F.2d at 1321, Judge Robb expressed the
view that the District Court had no jurisdiction to review the
orders of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Ibid.
He noted that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has the
status of a state supreme court, and stated:
"The adverse decisions in the appellants' cases were reviewable
in the Supreme Court of the United States. Although the appellants
cast their petitions to the Court of Appeals in terms of requests
for waivers, the petitions in essence were demands that the court
declare the petitioners qualified to sit for the bar examination.
Those demands were denied by en banc orders of the Court of
Appeals. The denials were judicial acts, and as such were
reviewable on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. They were
not reviewable in the District Court."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 13]
As the District of Columbia Circuit recognized, it is a question
of federal law whether "a particular proceeding before another
tribunal was truly judicial" for purposes of ascertaining the
jurisdiction of a federal court.
Feldman v. Gardner,
supra, at 134, 661 F.2d at 1310.
See In re Summers,
325 U. S. 561,
325 U. S. 566
(1945).
[
Footnote 14]
The fact that Feldman's counsel stated in the letter that he was
prepared to pursue constitutional and antitrust challenges to the
rule in federal district court if Feldman's petition was denied is
irrelevant to a consideration of whether these issues were before
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. This case is not like
England v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners,
375 U. S. 411
(1964), which arose in the abstention context, and discussed a
litigant's right to reserve his federal claims for consideration by
a federal court even though he might be required to inform the
state court of the nature of his federal claims so that a state
statute could be construed in light of those claims.
[
Footnote 15]
Our conclusion that the proceedings before the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals were judicial in nature is consistent
with our grants of certiorari to review state court decisions on
bar-related matters in such cases as
Schware v. New Mexico
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232
(1957),
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,
353 U. S. 252
(1957),
Konigserg v. State Bar of California, 366 U. S.
36 (1961),
In re Anastaplo, 366 U. S.
82 (1961),
Willner v. Committee on Character,
373 U. S. 96
(1963),
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U. S.
1 (1971), and
In re Stolar, 401 U. S.
23 (1971). Last Term, we again recognized the judicial
nature of state bar disciplinary proceedings in
Middlesex
County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn.,
457 U. S. 423
(1982).
[
Footnote 16]
It is possible that review of a state court decision by this
Court could be barred by a petitioner's failure to raise his
constitutional claims in the state courts. In
Cardinale v.
Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437
(1969), we stated that
"[i]t was very early established that the Court will not decide
federal constitutional issues raised here for the first time on
review of state court decisions."
Id. at
394 U. S. 438.
See also Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.
S. 351,
410 U. S. 352
(1973);
Hill v. California, 401 U.
S. 797,
401 U. S. 805
(1971);
Street v. New York, 394 U.
S. 576,
394 U. S. 582
(1969).
Cf. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.
S. 423,
360 U. S.
436-437 (1959) ("There can be no question as to the
proper presentation of a federal claim when the highest state court
passes on it. . . . We think this sufficient here to satisfy the
statutory requirement that the federal right sought to be
vindicated in this Court be one claimed below. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3)"
(footnote omitted));
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.
S. 238,
395 U. S. 242
(1969);
Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.
S. 129,
377 U. S. 133
(1964). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has relied on this limit on our certiorari jurisdiction to hold
that a federal district court has jurisdiction over constitutional
claims asserted by a plaintiff who has been denied admission to a
state bar in a state court judicial proceeding if he failed to
raise his constitutional claims in the state court. In
Dasher
v. Supreme Court of Texas, 658 F.2d 1045 (1981), the Court of
Appeals stated:
"The record gives no indication that [the plaintiff] asserted
the federal constitutional claims which are the basis of her § 1983
action -- that the denial of her application for admission to the
bar examination deprived her of a constitutionally protected
liberty and property interest in pursuing the practice of law in
Texas, constituted a violation of equal protection and infringed
upon her constitutionally protected right to travel -- in the Texas
Supreme Court. Since 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) authorizes the Supreme
Court to review only judgments in state court cases in which a
federal issue was raised and adjudicated, . . . it is apparent that
[the plaintiff's] case could not have been reviewed on a writ of
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court following the Texas
Supreme Court's denial of her motion. Since [the plaintiff's] §
1983 complaint states claims for relief grounded in federal
constitutional rights, claims which were not presented to the Texas
Supreme Court, her § 1983 suit does not constitute an impermissible
effort to seek review of a state court judgment in a lower federal
court."
Id. at 1051 (footnote omitted).
The Court of Appeals' reasoning in
Dasher is flawed. As
we noted in
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive
Engineers, 398 U. S. 281
(1970), "lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in
direct review of state court decisions."
Id. at
398 U. S. 296.
If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district
court are inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial in
a judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff's application for
admission to the state bar, then the district court is in essence
being called upon to review the state court decision. This the
district court may not do.
Moreover, the fact that we may not have jurisdiction to review a
final state court judgment because of a petitioner's failure to
raise his constitutional claims in state court does not mean that a
United States district court should have jurisdiction over the
claims. By failing to raise his claims in state court, a plaintiff
may forfeit his right to obtain review of the state court decision
in any federal court. This result is eminently defensible on policy
grounds. We have noted the competence of state courts to adjudicate
federal constitutional claims.
See, e.g., Sumner v. Mata,
449 U. S. 539,
449 U. S. 549
(1981);
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S.
90,
449 U. S. 105
(1980);
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.
S. 372,
430 U. S. 383
(1977). We also noted in
Cardinale that one of the
policies underlying the requirement that constitutional claims be
raised in state court as a predicate to our certiorari jurisdiction
is the desirability of giving the state court the first opportunity
to consider a state statute or rule in light of federal
constitutional arguments. A state court may give the statute a
saving construction in response to those arguments. 394 U.S. at
394 U. S.
439.
Finally, it is important to note, in the context of this case,
the strength of the state interest in regulating the state bar. As
we stated in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.
S. 773 (1975),
"[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is
especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary
governmental function of administering justice, and have
historically been 'officers of the courts.'"
Id. at
421 U. S. 792.
See also Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar
Assn., supra, at
457 U. S.
434-435;
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.
S. 438,
439 U. S. 442
(1979). In
MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (CA9 1969), the
court stated:
"[O]rders of a state court relating to the admission,
discipline, and disbarment of members of its bar may be reviewed
only by the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari to the
state court, and not by means of an original action in a lower
federal court. The rule serves substantial policy interests arising
from the historic relationship between state judicial systems and
the members of their respective bars, and between the state and
federal judicial systems."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 17]
See also Brown v. Board of Bar Examiners, 623 F.2d 605
(CA9 1980).
[
Footnote 18]
In reaching these conclusions regarding the District Court's
jurisdiction over particular elements of the respondents'
complaints, we necessarily refuse to accept in their entirety
either the petitioners' argument that
"the sum and substance of respondents' federal court actions
were to obtain review of the prior adverse decisions of the D.C.
Court of Appeals in their individual cases,"
Brief for Petitioners 23, n. 9; Reply Brief for Petitioners 4-7,
or the respondents' argument that their complaints involved general
challenges to the constitutionality of Rule 46I(b)(3) without
seeking review of particularized decisions of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals adjudicating their right to practice law.
See Brief for Respondent Hickey 11; Brief for Respondent
Feldman 41. As discussed above, a close reading of the complaints
discloses that the respondents mounted a general challenge to the
constitutionality of the rule, and sought review of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals' decisions in their particular cases.
[
Footnote 19]
The District Court did not reach the question of whether the
doctrine of
res judicata barred further litigation on the
respondents' claims in either Feldman's case, App. 79a, or
Hickey's,
id. at 142a.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
There are many crafts in which the State performs a licensing
function. That function is important, not only to those seeking
access to a gainful occupation, but to the members of the public
served by the profession as well. State-created rules governing the
grant or denial of licenses must comply with constitutional
standards, and must be administered in accordance with due process
of law. Given these acknowledged constitutional limitations on
action by the State, it should be beyond question that a federal
district court has subject matter jurisdiction over an individual's
lawsuit raising federal constitutional challenges either to
licensing rules themselves or to their application in his own case.
[
Footnote 2/1] Curiously, however,
the Court today ignores basic jurisdictional principles when it
decides a jurisdictional issue affecting the licensing of members
of the legal profession.
The Court holds that respondents may make a general
constitutional attack on the rules governing the admission of
lawyers to practice in the District of Columbia. I agree. But the
Court also concludes that a United States district
Page 460 U. S. 489
court has no subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that those
rules have been administered in an unconstitutional manner.
According to the Court's opinion, respondents' contentions that bar
admission rules have been unconstitutionally applied to them by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals somehow constitute
impermissible attempts to secure appellate review of final
judgments of that court.
See ante at
460 U. S. 482,
460 U. S.
483-484, n. 16. There are two basic flaws in the Court's
analysis.
First, neither Feldman nor Hickey requested the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals to pass on the validity of Rule 46I(b)(3)
or to grant them admission to the bar or the bar examination as a
matter of right. Rather, each of them asked the court to waive the
requirements of the rule for a variety of reasons. I would not
characterize the court's refusal to grant a requested waiver as an
adjudication. Unlike the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois
reviewed in
In re Summers, 325 U.
S. 561 (1945), the order of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals did not determine a claim of right, nor did it
even apply standard equitable principles to a prayer for relief.
Rather, that court performed no more and no less than the
administrative function of a licensing board. As the United States
Court of Appeals wrote, Hickey asked the court "to make a policy
decision equating his personal qualities with accredited legal
education, not an adjudication requiring resort to legal
principles,"
Feldman v. Gardner, 213 U.S.App.D.C. 119,
139, 661 F.2d 1295, 1315 (1981) (footnote omitted), and Feldman
"invoked the administrative discretion of that body, simply asking
that it temper its rule in his favor, for personal, and not legal,
reasons,"
id. at 140, 661 F.2d at 1316. Rejection of those
petitions was not "adjudicative," and was therefore not susceptible
to certiorari review in this Court.
Second, even if the refusal to grant a waiver were an
adjudication, the federal statute that confers jurisdiction
upon
Page 460 U. S. 490
the United States District Court to entertain a constitutional
challenge to the rules themselves also authorizes that court to
entertain a collateral attack upon the unconstitutional application
of those rules. The Court's opinion fails to distinguish between
two concepts: appellate review and collateral attack. If a
challenge to a state court's decision is brought in United States
district court and alleges violations of the United States
Constitution, then by definition it does not seek appellate review.
It is plainly within the federal question jurisdiction of the
federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V). There may be
other reasons for denying relief to the plaintiff -- such as
failure to state a cause of action, claim or issue preclusion, or
failure to prove a violation of constitutional rights. [
Footnote 2/2] But it does violence to
jurisdictional concepts for this Court to hold, as it does, that
the federal district court has no jurisdiction to conduct
independent review of a specific claim that a licensing body's
action did not comply with federal constitutional standards. The
fact that the licensing function in the legal profession is
controlled by the judiciary is not a sufficient reason to immunize
allegedly unconstitutional conduct from review in the federal
courts. I therefore respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V) provides: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."
[
Footnote 2/2]
Constitutional challenges to specific licensing actions may, of
course, fail on the merits. But in my view, if plaintiffs
challenging a bar admissions decision by a state court prove facts
comparable to the allegations made by the plaintiff in error and
appellant in
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.
S. 356 (1886), they would clearly be entitled to relief
in the United States district court. If they were seeking admission
to any other craft regulated by the State, they would
unquestionably have such a right.