A civilian employee of the United States Navy died in the crash
of an aircraft operated by the United States Air Force and
manufactured by petitioner. The United States paid death benefits
to the employee's survivors under the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act (FECA). Thereafter, the employee's administrator
filed suit against petitioner in Federal District Court, seeking
damages for the employee's wrongful death and for injuries suffered
prior to her death. Petitioner, asserting a right to
indemnification under the Federal Tort Claims Act, impleaded the
United States as a third-party defendant. Petitioner settled the
administrator's claim and moved for summary judgment in the
third-party action. The Government moved to dismiss the third-party
claim on the ground that it was barred by FECA's exclusive
liability provision, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c), which prohibits actions
against the United States by
"an employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next
of kin, [or] any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages
from the United States . . . because of the [employee's] injury or
death."
The District Court, concluding that § 8116(c) did not bar the
indemnity claim, granted summary judgment for petitioner. The Court
of Appeals reversed.
Held: Section 8116(c) does not bar petitioner's
third-party indemnity action against the United States. Section
8116(c) was intended to govern only the rights of employees, their
relatives, and people claiming through or on behalf of them.
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.
S. 597. These are the only categories of parties who
benefit from the "
quid pro quo" compromise of FECA
commonly found in workers' compensation legislation whereby
employees are guaranteed the right to immediate, fixed benefits,
regardless of fault and without need for litigation, but in return
lose the right to sue the Government. Pp.
460 U. S.
193-199.
215 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 665 F.2d 1330, reversed and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER,
C.J., joined,
post, p.
460 U. S.
199.
Page 460 U. S. 191
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, a federal
employee may not bring a tort suit against the Government on the
basis of a work-related injury, but may seek recovery from a third
party. The issue here is whether such a third party may seek
indemnity from the Government for its tort liability to the
employee.
I
On April 4, 1975, a C-5A aircraft operated by the United States
Air Force and manufactured by petitioner Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
crashed near Saigon, South Vietnam. [
Footnote 1] Almost 150 people died in the crash, including
Ann Nash Bottorff, a civilian employee of the United States Navy.
The United States paid death benefits to Bottorff's survivors under
the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. § 8101
et seq.
Thereafter, Bottorff's administrator filed suit against
Lockheed, as the manufacturer of a "defective product," in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Page 460 U. S. 192
He sought damages for Bottorff's wrongful death and for the
injuries she suffered prior to her death. Lockheed, asserting a
right to indemnification under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, impleaded the United States as a
third-party defendant. [
Footnote
2]
Lockheed settled the administrator's claim and moved for summary
judgment in the third-party action. The Government did not dispute
that it was primarily responsible for the fatal crash, nor did it
challenge the terms of the settlement. Rather, the Government moved
to dismiss the third-party claim on the ground that it was barred
by 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c), FECA's exclusive liability provision:
"The liability of the United States . . . under [FECA] with
respect to the injury or death of an employee is exclusive and
instead of all other liability of the United States . . . to the
employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of
kin, and any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages
from the United States . . . because of the injury or death. . .
."
The District Court, concluding that § 8116(c) did not bar the
indemnity claim, granted summary judgment for Lockheed.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed.
Thomas v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 215 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 665 F.2d 1330 (1981). It concluded
that § 8116(c) barred Lockheed's third-party claim against the
United States. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals
relied primarily on several decisions by other Courts of Appeals.
See, e.g., Kudelka v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
541 F.2d 651, 658-660 (CA7 1976);
Galimi v. Jetco, Inc.,
514 F.2d 949 (CA2 1975). The court recognized, however, that its
holding was contrary to that reached in
Wallenius Bremen
G.m.b.H. v. United
Page 460 U. S.
193
states, 409 F.2d 994 (CA4 1969),
cert. denied,
398 U.S. 958 (1970). [
Footnote
3]
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 456 U.S. 913
(1982). We now reverse.
II
Section 8116(c) is specific and detailed. It prohibits actions
against the United States by an
"employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of
kin, [or] any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages
from the United States . . . because of the [employee's] injury or
death."
Lockheed is not within any of the specified categories. If §
8116(c) applies, therefore, it can only be because Lockheed is an
"other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United
States." The Government argues that the language is broad enough to
include Lockheed. We must decide if Congress intended that
result.
A
FECA's exclusive liability provision was enacted in
substantially its present form in 1949. FECA Amendments of 1949, §
201, 63 Stat. 861 (enacting FECA § 7(b)) (currently codified at 5
U.S.C. § 8116(c)). It was designed to protect the Government from
suits under statutes, such as the Federal
Page 460 U. S. 194
Tort Claims Act, that had been enacted to waive the Government's
sovereign immunity. In enacting this provision, Congress adopted
the principal compromise -- the "quid pro quo" -- commonly found in
workers' compensation legislation: employees are guaranteed the
right to receive immediate, fixed benefits, regardless of fault and
without need for litigation, but in return they lose the right to
sue the Government.
See H.R.Rep. No. 729, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess., 14-15 (1949); S.Rep. No. 836, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 23
(1949). This compromise is essentially the same as that found, for
example, in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA). [
Footnote 4]
See 33 U.S.C. § 905(a).
In
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.
S. 597 (1963), the Court considered FECA's exclusive
liability provision and carefully reviewed its legislative history.
That case arose out of the collision between an Army dredge and a
vessel owned by Weyerhaeuser. A federal employee injured in the
collision recovered FECA compensation from the Government and tort
damages from Weyerhaeuser. Weyerhaeuser brought suit against the
United States under the Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112, 46
U.S.C. § 781
et seq., seeking the damages that it could
have recovered from another private shipowner. Included in its
claim, under the admiralty divided damages rule, was the
Government's share of the employee's tort recovery.
The Government challenged the inclusion of any part of the tort
damages paid to the employee on the ground that FECA's exclusive
liability provision protected the United States from such claims.
In particular, the Government argued --
Page 460 U. S. 195
much as it does in this case -- that third parties plainly were
included within the general phrase "anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages." Brief for United States in
Weyerhaeuser S.S.
Co. v. United States, O.T. 1962, No. 65, pp. 5, 8-11.
See 372 U.S. at
372 U. S. 600.
The Court, however, rejected this argument. It first pointed out
that the statute was ambiguous.
"[T]he general language upon which the Government relies follows
explicit enumeration of specific categories: employees, their
representatives, and their dependents. Under the traditional rule
of statutory construction which counsels against giving to general
words a meaning totally unrelated to the more specific terms of a
statute, we think the meaning of the statutory language is far from
'plain.'"
Id. at
372 U. S.
600-601. The Court then reviewed the legislative history
of the exclusive liability provision, and concluded that it had
been intended to govern only the relationship "between the
Government, on the one hand, and its employees and their
representatives or dependents, on the other."
Id. at
372 U. S. 601.
The Court summarized its review of the legislative history as
follows:
"There is no evidence whatever that Congress was concerned with
the rights of unrelated third parties, much less of any purpose to
disturb settled doctrines of admiralty law affecting the mutual
rights and liabilities of private shipowners in collision
cases."
Ibid. (footnote omitted). [
Footnote 5]
The
Weyerhaeuser Court reinforced its conclusion with a
discussion of the "nearly identical" LHWCA provision.
Id.
at
372 U. S. 602.
The Court observed that, under
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U. S. 124
(1956), a shipowner
Page 460 U. S. 196
was entitled to obtain indemnification from an injured
longshoreman's employer for damages that were recovered against the
shipowner but were based on the employer's negligence. Although
Ryan relied on the existence of a contractual relationship
between the shipowner and the employer, the same result was reached
in a series of later cases where "the contractual relationship was
considerably more attenuated." 372 U.S. at
372 U. S. 603.
In
Weyerhaeuser, there was no contractual relationship,
but there was a well-established admiralty rule that had "governed
with at least equal clarity the correlative rights and duties" at
issue in the case.
Ibid.
B
The Court's reasoning in
Weyerhaeuser applies with
equal force in the present case. [
Footnote 6] The Government advances the same arguments
before us now that it unsuccessfully advanced in
Weyerhaueser. To paraphrase the
Weyerhaueser
Court's conclusion,
"[t]here is no evidence whatever that Congress was concerned
with the rights of unrelated third parties, much less of any
purpose to disturb settled doctrines of [tort] law affecting the
mutual rights and liabilities of private [parties] in [indemnity]
cases."
Id. at
372 U. S. 601.
Section 8116(c) was intended to govern only the rights of
employees, their relatives, and people claiming through or on
behalf of them. [
Footnote 7]
These are the only categories of parties who benefit from the
"
quid pro quo" compromise that FECA adopts.
See
Wallenius Bremen, 409 F.2d at 995.
Page 460 U. S. 197
The Government seeks to distinguish
Weyerhaeuser, but
the present situation is nearly identical. Here, as in
Weyerhaeuser, a third party has been forced to pay tort
damages for the death or injury of a federal employee covered by
FECA, and the third party seeks to recover a portion of its
payment. Here the basis for the suit against the United States is
the Federal Tort Claims Act, rather than the Public Vessels Act,
but that difference is irrelevant. Congress intended § 8116(c) to
apply to suits under both Acts without distinction.
See
H.R.Rep. No. 729, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1949); S.Rep. No. 836,
81st Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1949). Here Lockheed relies on
substantive indemnity law, [
Footnote 8] while the private shipowner in
Weyerhaeuser relied on the admiralty divided damages rule,
but this is the same irrelevant
Page 460 U. S. 198
distinction. The Federal Tort Claims Act permits an indemnity
action against the United States "in the same manner and to the
same extent" that the action would lie against "a private
individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674;
see
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.
S. 666,
431 U. S.
669-670 (1977) (citing
United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 340 U. S. 543
(1951)). The Public Vessels Act permits an action to recover
collision damages on essentially the same terms. To the extent that
the basis for the underlying cause of action could make any
difference, the indemnity theories on which Lockheed relies are as
well established as the divided damages rule was in
Weyerhaeuser.
C
The most relevant changes since
Weyerhaeuser have been
in the LHWCA Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 1251. While these changes
are illuminating, they do not help the Government's position. Under
the amended LHWCA, an injured longshoreman's employer is no longer
liable to a shipowner for tort damages that the shipowner has paid
the employee.
See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). Congress thus
overruled the result in
Ryan, supra, and abolished the
shipowner's indemnity action. But in so doing, Congress
also abolished the injured employee's seaworthiness remedy
against the shipowner -- a strict liability action that the Court
had recognized in
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sielacki,
328 U. S. 85
(1946). In other words, Congress abolished the third-party
indemnity action only in conjunction with a "quid pro quo" to
benefit the third parties. Here there has been no FECA amendment to
abolish the third-party indemnity action recognized in
Weyerhaeuser. The Government nevertheless invites us to
abolish the action without the benefit of an amendment. We are
requested to do this even though Congress has provided no "
quid
pro quo" as it thought appropriate in the LHWCA context. We
decline the invitation.
Page 460 U. S. 199
III
The District Court held that Lockheed had a right to indemnity
under the governing substantive law, but the Court of Appeals did
not rule on that question. Accordingly, we do not consider it. We
adhere to the decision in
Weyerhaeuser, and hold only that
FECA's exclusive liability provision, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c), does not
directly bar a third-party indemnity action against the United
States. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand
the case for further consideration consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The crash occurred during a mission to evacuate over 250 orphans
from Vietnam shortly before the fall of Saigon. The incident is
discussed in greater detail in
Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 212 U.S.App.D.C. 87, 90-91, 658 F.2d 835, 838-839
(1981) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994
(1982).
[
Footnote 2]
Lockheed also asserted other claims against the United States
that are not currently before the Court.
[
Footnote 3]
In
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379,
402-404 (CA9),
cert. dism'd sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), the court concluded that
FECA's exclusive liability provision does not bar a third-party
indemnification action against the United States. The court held,
however, that the Government nevertheless was not liable to the
third party. Since there was no underlying tort liability on the
Government's part toward the employee, there was no basis for
indemnification.
We note that the decision whether or not to allow third-party
indemnity actions is a problem common to all workers' compensation
systems. Professor Larson has described this issue as "[p]erhaps
the most evenly balanced controversy in all of workers'
compensation law." Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers'
Compensation Employer, 1982 Duke L.J. 483, 484.
[
Footnote 4]
The FECA exclusive liability provision was modeled on the
analogous provisions of LHWCA and the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law. By 1949, the New York courts already had
construed the New York law to permit third-party indemnity actions
against the employer.
See, e.g., Westchester Lighting Co. v.
Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15
N.E.2d 567 (1938);
Gorham v. Arons, 76 N.Y.S.2d 850
(Sup.Ct.N.Y. Cty.1947);
Clements v. Rockefeller, 189 Misc.
885, 70 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Cty.1947).
[
Footnote 5]
Contrary to suggestions in the dissent,
post at
460 U. S. 199,
460 U. S. 200,
460 U. S. 201,
there is no indication that the
Weyerhaeuser Court
balanced FECA's exclusive liability provision against the divided
damages rule. On the contrary, the holding in
Weyerhaeuser
relates simply to congressional intent. Whatever Congress might
have done, it did not intend FECA's exclusive liability provision
to override the rights of unrelated third parties -- including
rights asserted under the Public Vessels Act on the basis of the
divided damages rule.
[
Footnote 6]
We reject the Government's suggestion that
Weyerhaeuser
was wrongly decided.
See Brief for United States 22. We
note that, in the 20 years since
Weyerhaeuser was decided,
Congress has not modified FECA's exclusive liability provision to
include third parties. This is particularly significant in view of
the 1966 codification of FECA, which included amendments to the new
§ 8116(c).
See Pub.L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 52.
[
Footnote 7]
As counsel for Lockheed suggested at oral argument, a guardian
ad litem for an employee's minor dependent could be an
"other person" under § 8116(c). Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-8.
[
Footnote 8]
The validity of Lockheed's underlying substantive claim is not
before us. The District Court ruled that, as a matter of
substantive law, indemnity is available to Lockheed against the
United States. The Court of Appeals did not find it necessary to
rule on this issue.
Since the validity of the substantive indemnity claim is not
before us, the LHWCA cases on which the dissent relies,
post at
460 U. S.
200-202, are entirely irrelevant. In
Halcyon Lines
v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.
S. 282 (1952), decided 4 years before
Ryan and
11 years before
Weyerhaeuser, the Court merely held that a
substantive right of contribution did not exist in the
circumstances of that case. The Court explicitly left open the
issue whether such a right to contribution, if it were to exist,
would be subject to LHWCA's exclusive liability provision. 342 U.S.
at
342 U. S. 286,
and n. 12.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Erie Lackawanna R.
Co., 406 U. S. 340
(1972) (per curiam), is nothing more than a three-sentence
reaffirmation of
Halcyon.
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,
431 U. S. 666
(1977), which the dissent finds "similar,"
post at
460 U. S. 202,
also offers no support to the Government's position on this point.
The issue in
Stencel, again relating to the underlying
substantive claim, was whether the Government's waiver of sovereign
immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act applied to an indemnity
action based on an injury to a serviceman. Relying primarily on the
military nature of the action, we held that the doctrine of
Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135
(1950), precluded the substantive claim without regard to any
exclusive liability provision. It is clear that the Government has
waived its sovereign immunity here.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
dissenting.
The Court's opinion, and especially its unquestioning
application of
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States,
372 U. S. 597
(1963), do not show why this case presents "
the most
evenly-balanced controversy in all of workers' compensation law.'"
Ante at 460 U. S. 193,
n. 3. Because I believe the balance tips in the opposite direction,
I respectfully dissent.
In
Weyerhaeuser, the Court found that the plaintiff's
right to recover outweighed the limitation of liability provision
of the statute. This is not surprising, since the plaintiff's right
to recover was based on the ancient admiralty rule of divided
damages. [
Footnote 2/1] The divided
damages rule is basic to admiralty and to the relationships of
vessels at sea. Under this rule,
Weyerhaeuser had a direct
right of action against the United States for the injuries it
sustained in the collision. Thus, the only issue was whether one
item of damage, the recovery of the federal employee against
Weyerhaeuser, could be included in Weyerhaeuser's action against
the Government.
Page 460 U. S. 200
The Court stated that it had long since
"held that the full scope of the divided damages rule must
prevail over a statutory provision which . . . limited the
liability of one of the shipowners with respect to an element of
damages incurred by the other in a mutual fault collision.
The
Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540."
372 U.S. at
372 U. S. 603.
We thought that Congress, in enacting § 8116(c), did not show "any
purpose to disturb settled doctrines of admiralty law affecting the
mutual rights and liabilities of private shipowners in collision
cases."
Id. at
372 U. S. 601
(footnote omitted).
It is true that the
Weyerhaeuser opinion states that §
8116(c) does not bear on "the rights of unrelated third parties."
Ibid. This view is not controlling. The Court's finding on
the primacy of the divided damages rule shows that that rule was
adequate to overcome § 8116(c), and that the comments on
congressional intent were dictum.
Weyerhaeuser holds that
the divided damages rule is more important than the limitation of
liability provision of the statute, and that therefore the latter
must yield.
In other cases involving a "
nearly identical,'"
ante at 460 U. S. 195,
quoting Weyerhaeuser, supra, at 372 U. S. 602,
statute, the Court has found that the limitation of liability
aspects of a workers' compensation scheme outweigh an unrelated
third party's right to recover. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship
Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.
S. 282 (1952), and Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Erie Lackawanna R. Co., 406 U. S. 340
(1972) (per curiam.), we refused to allow unrelated third-party
tortfeasors to obtain contribution from employers who were covered
by the limitation of liability provisions of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. In each
case, we thought there was no competing principle as strong as the
divided damages rule that would overcome the limitation of
liability aspect of the statute. [Footnote 2/2]
Page 460 U. S. 201
There can be no doubt that a principal purpose of § 8116(c) was
to limit the amount that the Government would have to pay on
account of injuries to its employees.
See S.Rep. No. 836,
81st Cong., 1st Sess., 23, 30 (1949) (Section 8116(c) will lead to
"savings to the United States, both in the damages recovered and in
the expense of handling the lawsuits"). As the Court pointed out in
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.
S. 145,
286 U. S. 159
(1932), any workers' compensation statute exists in part to provide
"for employers a liability which is limited and determinate." The
balance that must be drawn, then, is between the doctrine that
gives Lockheed a right to recover and the limitation on liability
provided in § 8116(c). We know that, in
Weyerhaeuser, the
right was found to be more important, and that, in
Halcyon and
Atlantic, the
limitation was
found to be more important.
In this case, we are presented with a tort indemnity claim
presented pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, particularly 28
U.S.C. § 2674. The Court states, without explanation, that this
claim is "as well established as the divided damages rule."
Ante at
460 U. S. 198.
However well established Lockheed's claim may be, [
Footnote 2/3] it is not the same kind of claim that
we approved in
Weyerhaeuser and
Ryan. Those cases
turned on the special relationship between the third party and the
employer created by ancient maritime law or by voluntary agreement.
The only relationship Lockheed can
Page 460 U. S. 202
claim in this case comes from the Government's breach of a duty
of care owed to Bottorff. In this respect, Lockheed's claim is like
the claims for contribution the Court rejected in
Halcyon
and
Atlantic; it is an indirect sharing of responsibility
among wrongdoers, and not a breach of a direct duty to
Lockheed.
We considered a similar indemnity claim in
Stencel Aero
Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.
S. 666 (1977). The underlying injury in
Stencel
was caused when the ejection seat of a jet fighter malfunctioned
during a midair emergency, and the Air National Guard pilot was
permanently injured. The pilot sued Stencel, the manufacturer of
the ejection system, for negligence. Stencel cross-claimed against
the United States for indemnity. Its claim, like Lockheed's claim
in this case, was that it was, at most, passively negligent, while
the Government's active negligence caused the injuries. Both claims
were brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The pilot, like
Bottorff, was entitled to statutory payments, in that case under
the Veterans' Benefits Act.
We affirmed the dismissal of Stencel's cross-claim, even though
no limitation of liability statute applied to the case, because we
found that the limitation of liability principle of
Feres v.
United States, 340 U. S. 135
(1950), precluded Stencel's indemnity claim. We did not consider
whether the result would be different if Stencel had relied upon a
more direct theory of liability, but
Stencel does stand
for the proposition that an indemnity claim of this kind is not
sufficient to overcome a limitation on the liability of the United
States. [
Footnote 2/4]
Page 460 U. S. 203
The Court's opinion today does more than permit a new and, in my
view, inappropriate kind of claim to defeat the limitation of
liability principle. It also greatly expands the liability to which
the Government may be subjected on account of injuries to its
employees. Both the divided damages rule and contribution require
joint tortfeasors to share liability. An indemnitor, however, is
required to pay the full amount of the judgment against the
indemnitee. [
Footnote 2/5] W.
Prosser, Law of Torts § 51, p. 310 (4th ed.1971). This increased
liability weighs on the side of refusing to permit recovery in this
case.
For these reasons, I am convinced that we should retain the
balance our earlier decisions would require. Where a third party
has a direct action against the Government that fits into the same
category as the claims we have allowed in the past, it may include
a claim for damages it has paid to a Government employee. But where
the third party's claim is an indirect action based on contribution
or indemnity, Congress' clear intent to limit the liability of the
United States should prevail. I would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"In
The North Star, 106 U. S. 17 (1882), Mr. Justice
Bradley traced the doctrine back to the Laws of Oleron, which date
from the 12th century, and its roots no doubt go much deeper."
Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, Inc., 417 U.
S. 106,
417 U. S. 110
(1974).
[
Footnote 2/2]
In
Kopke, supra, we reaffirmed
Halcyon and
Atlantic. We permitted contribution in
Kopke
because the limitation of liability provision did not apply to the
defendant, so the injured plaintiff could have sued him directly.
In another LHWCA case, however, we upheld the third party's right
to recover.
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp., 350 U. S. 124
(1956), "relied on the existence of a contractual relationship
between the [third-party] shipowner and the employer."
Ante at
350 U. S. 196.
The holding of
Ryan is that a contract that provides for
employer liability, like the divided damages rule, is a
sufficiently compelling basis of liability to overcome the
limitation of liability principle.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The parties seek to show the status of indemnity actions in
1949, when the statute was enacted. What is important is not
whether indemnity actions existed, but whether permitting such
actions would be consistent with the limitation of liability
principle Congress has enacted.
[
Footnote 2/4]
The Court is mistaken when it states that
Stencel was
decided "without regard to any exclusive liability provision."
Ante at
460 U. S. 197,
n. 8.
Stencel pointed out that a factor in
Feres
was the compensation paid to servicemen without regard to the
Government's negligence. 431 U.S. at
431 U. S. 671.
It then characterized
Feres as establishing that the
veterans' benefits statute "provides an upper limit of liability
for the Government as to service-connected injuries,"
id.
at
431 U. S. 673,
thus establishing a limitation of liability principle similar to
that enacted in § 8116(c). The Court in
Stencel balanced
this principle against Stencel's right to recover, 431 U.S. at
431 U. S.
672-673, just as a limitation of liability provision is
balanced against a third party's right to recover when this
question is faced under any other workers' compensation scheme.
[
Footnote 2/5]
In this case, the parties have agreed that the Government will
pay only a part of Lockheed's settlement with Bottorff.
See App. 105-106; Brief for United States 4, and n. 4. The
agreement establishing the proportion the Government will pay was
filed under seal in the District Court. Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, however, the Government's liability is determined under
state law. There is no reason to believe that future claimants will
make similar agreements, and no way for the Court to oblige them to
do so.