SPENCER v. ISRAEL, 460 U.S. 1102 (1983)
U.S. Supreme Court
SPENCER v. ISRAEL , 460 U.S. 1102 (1983)460 U.S. 1102
Amos G. SPENCER
v.
Thomas ISRAEL, Warden
No. 82-5950
Supreme Court of the United States
April 18, 1983
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting from denial of certiorari.
A defendant's right to due process is violated when the trial judge, in charging the jury on the issue of criminal intent, "require[s] the jury, if satisfied as to [specified] facts . . ., to find intent unless the defendant offer[s] evidence to the contrary." Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 515, 2454 (1979). Such a presumption is inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
At petitioner's trial on the charge of first-degree murder, the trial judge twice instructed the jury as follows:
For reasons fully elaborated by three federal judges who have
considered the constitutionality of an identical instruction, the
instruction in this case was impermissible because it described a
mandatory presumption of intent. See Pigee v. Israel, 670 F.2d
690, 697- 699 (CA7) (Baker, J., dissenting) cert. denied, 459
U.S. --- (1982); Austin v. Israel, 516 F.
Supp. 461 (E.D.Wis. 1981); Harris v. Israel, 515 F.
Supp. 568 (E.D.Wis.1981). The decision below, which denied
petitioner's request for the issuance of a certificate of probable
cause to appeal, therefore cannot be squared with Sandstrom. I
would grant certiorari to correct the lower court's clear departure
from this Court's precedents.
U.S. Supreme Court
SPENCER v. ISRAEL , 460 U.S. 1102 (1983) 460 U.S. 1102 Amos G. SPENCERv.
Thomas ISRAEL, Warden
No. 82-5950 Supreme Court of the United States April 18, 1983 On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting from denial of certiorari. A defendant's right to due process is violated when the trial judge, in charging the jury on the issue of criminal intent, "require[s] the jury, if satisfied as to [specified] facts . . ., to find intent unless the defendant offer[s] evidence to the contrary." Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 515, 2454 (1979). Such a presumption is inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Page 460 U.S. 1102 , 1103 At petitioner's trial on the charge of first-degree murder, the trial judge twice instructed the jury as follows: