Before 1972, coverage under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act) extended only to injuries
sustained by workers on the actual "navigable waters of the United
States (including any dry dock)." In 1972, the Act was amended by
expanding the "navigable waters" situs to include certain adjoining
land and by adding a status requirement that employees covered by
the Act be "engaged in maritime employment" within the meaning of §
2(3) of the Act. In this case, an employee (Churchill) of
respondent construction firm was injured while performing his job
on the deck of a cargo barge being used in the construction of a
sewage treatment plant extending over the Hudson River in New York.
Churchill's claim for compensation under the LHWCA was
administratively denied on the ground that he was not "engaged in
maritime employment" under § 2(3). On Churchill's petition for
review, in which the Director of the Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs (Director) (petitioner here) participated as
respondent in support of Churchill, the Court of Appeals held that
Churchill was not in "maritime employment" because his employment
lacked a "significant relationship to navigation or to commerce on
navigable waters."
Held:
1. Where Churchill is a party respondent under this Court's Rule
19.6 and has filed a brief arguing for his coverage under the Act,
there is a justiciable controversy before the Court. Accordingly,
it is unnecessary to consider whether the Director, as the official
responsible for administration and enforcement of the Act, has Art.
III standing as an aggrieved party to seek review of the decision
below. The Director's petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) brings
Churchill before the Court, and he, as the injured employee, has a
sufficient interest in the question at issue to give him standing
to urge consideration of the merits of the Court of Appeals'
decision. Pp.
459 U. S.
302-305.
2. Churchill, as a marine construction worker injured while
performing his job upon actual navigable waters, was "engaged in
maritime employment"
Page 459 U. S. 298
within the meaning of § 2(3), and thus was covered by the
amended Act. Pp.
459 U. S.
305-325.
(a) There is no doubt that Churchill would have been covered by
the Act before it was amended in 1972. Pp.
459 U. S.
305-312.
(b) There is nothing in the legislative history or in the 1972
Amendments themselves to indicate that Congress intended to
withdraw coverage from employees injured on navigable waters in the
course of their employment as that coverage existed before the 1972
Amendments, or that it intended the status language of § 2(3) to
require that such an employee show that his employment possessed a
direct or substantial relation to navigation or commerce in order
to be covered. On the contrary, the legislative history indicates
that Congress did not intend to "exclude employees traditionally
covered." Moreover, Congress explicitly deleted language from the
Act that was found in
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
370 U. S. 114, to
be responsible for the "jurisdictional dilemma" created by the
"maritime but local" doctrine whereby a maritime worker was often
required to make a perilous jurisdictional "guess" as to which of
the two mutually exclusive compensation schemes,
i.e., the
federal or the state scheme, was applicable to cover his injury.
Pp.
459 U. S.
313-325.
652 F.2d 255, reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL,
JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment,
post, p.
459 U. S. 325.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
459 U. S.
325.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1972, Congress amended the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424, as
Page 459 U. S. 299
amended, 33 U.S.C. § 901
et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V)
(hereinafter LHWCA or Act). Before 1972, LHWCA coverage extended
only to injuries sustained on the actual "navigable waters of the
United States (including any dry dock)." 44 Stat. (part 2) 1426. As
part of its 1972 Amendments of the Act, Congress expanded the
"navigable waters"
situs to include certain adjoining land
areas, § 3(a), 86 Stat. 1251, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). At the same time,
Congress added a
status requirement that employees covered
by the Act must be "engaged in maritime employment" within the
meaning of § 2(3) of the Act. [
Footnote 1] We granted certiorari in this case, 455 U.S.
937 (1982), to consider whether a marine construction worker, who
was injured while performing his job upon actual navigable waters,
[
Footnote 2] and who would have
been covered by the Act before 1972, is "engaged in maritime
employment," and thus covered by the amended Act. [
Footnote 3] We hold that the worker is
"engaged in maritime employment" for purposes of
Page 459 U. S. 300
coverage under the amended LHWCA. Accordingly, we reverse the
decision below.
I
The facts are not in dispute. Respondent Perini North River
Associates (Perini) contracted to build the foundation of a sewage
treatment plant that extends approximately 700 feet over the Hudson
River between 136th and 145th Streets in Manhattan. The project
required that Perini place large, hollow circular pipes called
caissons in the river, down to embedded rock, fill the caissons
with concrete, connect the caissons together above the water with
concrete beams, and place precast concrete slabs on the beams. The
caissons were delivered by rail to the shore, where they were
loaded onto supply barges and towed across the river to await
unloading and installation.
The injured worker, Raymond Churchill, was an employee of Perini
in charge of all work performed on a cargo barge used to unload
caissons and other materials from the supply barges and to set
caissons in position for insertion into the embedded rock.
Churchill was on the deck of the cargo barge giving directions to a
crane operator engaged in unloading a caisson from a supply barge
when a line used to keep the caissons in position snapped and
struck Churchill. He sustained injuries to his head, leg, and
thumb. [
Footnote 4]
Churchill filed a claim for compensation under the LHWCA. Perini
denied that Churchill was covered by the Act, and, after a formal
hearing pursuant to § 19 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919 (1976 ed. and
Supp. V), an Administrative Law Judge determined that Churchill was
not "engaged in maritime employment" under § 2(3) of the Act
because his job lacked "some relationship to navigation and
commerce on navigable waters." App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a.
Churchill and the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs
Page 459 U. S. 301
(Director), appealed to the Benefits Review Board, pursuant to §
21(b)(3) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3). The Board affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge's denial of coverage on the theory that
marine construction workers involved in building facilities not
ultimately used in navigation or commerce upon navigable waters are
not engaged in "maritime employment." 12 BRBS 929, 933 (1980).
[
Footnote 5] One Board Member
dissented, arguing that
"all injuries sustained in the course of employment by employees
over 'navigable waters,' as that term was defined prior to the 1972
Amendments, are covered under the [amended] Act."
Id. at 935. [
Footnote
6]
Churchill then sought review of the Board's decision in the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, under § 21(c) of the Act,
33 U.S.C. § 921(c). [
Footnote
7] The Director participated as respondent, and filed a brief
in support of Churchill's position. The Second Circuit denied
Churchill's petition, relying on its decision in
Fusco v.
Perini North River Associates, 622 F.2d 1111 (1980),
cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981). According to the Second Circuit,
Churchill was not in "maritime employment," because his employment
lacked a "
significant relationship to navigation or to commerce
on navigable waters.'" Churchill v. Perini North River
Associates, 652 F.2d 255, 256, n. 1 (1981). The Director now
seeks review of the Second Circuit denial of Churchill's petition.
The Director agrees with the position taken by the dissenting
member of the Benefits Review Board: the LHWCA does not
require
Page 459 U. S. 302
that an employee show that his employment possesses a
"significant relationship to navigation or to commerce," where, as
here, the employee is injured while working upon the actual
navigable waters in the course of his employment, and would have
been covered under the pre-1972 LHWCA. [
Footnote 8]
II
Before we consider whether Churchill is covered by the Act, we
must address Perini's threshold contention that the Director does
not have standing to seek review of the decision below. According
to Perini, the Director's only interest in this case is in
furthering a different interpretation of the Act than the one
rendered by the Administrative Law Judge, the Benefits Review
Board, and the Court of Appeals. [
Footnote 9]
Perini's claim ignores the procedural posture in which this case
comes before the Court. That posture makes it unnecessary for us to
consider whether the Director, as the agency
Page 459 U. S. 303
official "responsible for the administration and enforcement" of
the Act, [
Footnote 10] has
standing as an aggrieved party to seek review of the decision
below. [
Footnote 11] The
Director is not alone in arguing that Churchill is covered under
the LHWCA. Churchill, the injured employee, is before the Court as
well. He has filed a brief in support of the Director's request for
a writ of certiorari, and a brief addressing the merits of his
claim, in which he presents the same arguments presented by the
Director. But, for some reason that is not entirely clear,
Churchill has not elected to seek review as a petitioner, and by
virtue of the Rules of this Court, he is considered a party
Page 459 U. S. 304
respondent. [
Footnote 12]
It is in this procedural context that Perini's challenge to Art.
III standing must be considered. Perini concedes that the Director
was a proper party respondent before the Court of Appeals in this
litigation. [
Footnote 13] As
party respondent below, the Director is entitled under 28 U.S.C. §
1254(1) to petition for a writ of certiorari. Although the Director
has statutory authority to seek review in this Court, he
may not have Art. III standing to argue the merits of
Churchill's claim, because the Director's presence does not
guarantee the existence of a justiciable controversy with respect
to the merits of Churchill's coverage under the LHWCA. However, the
Director's petition makes Churchill an automatic respondent under
our Rule 19.6, and, in that capacity, Churchill "may seek reversal
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals on any ground urged in that
court."
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center,
447 U. S. 773,
447 U. S.
783-784, n. 14 (1980). The Director's petition, filed
under 28
Page 459 U. S. 305
U.S.C. § 1254(1), brings Churchill before this Court, and there
is no doubt that Churchill, as the injured employee, has a
sufficient interest in this question to give him standing to urge
our consideration of the merits of the Second Circuit decision.
The constitutional dimension of standing theory requires, at the
very least, that there be an "actual injury redressable by the
court."
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U. S. 26,
426 U. S. 39
(1976). This requirement is meant
"to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will
be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society,
but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action,"
as well as to assure "an actual factual setting in which the
litigant asserts a claim of injury in fact."
Valley Forge
Christian College v. American United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464,
454 U. S. 472
(1982). The presence of Churchill as a party respondent arguing for
his coverage under the Act assures that an admittedly justiciable
controversy is now before the Court.
III
The question of Churchill's coverage is an issue of statutory
construction and legislative intent. For reasons that we explain
below, there is no doubt that Churchill, as a marine construction
worker injured upon actual navigable waters in the course of his
employment upon those waters, would have been covered by the LHWCA
before Congress amended it in 1972. In deciding whether Congress
intended to restrict the scope of coverage by adding the 2(3)
status requirement, we must consider the scope of coverage under
the pre-1972 Act and our cases construing the relevant portions of
that Act. We must then focus on the legislative history and
purposes of the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA to determine their
effect on preexisting coverage.
Page 459 U. S. 306
A
Beginning with our decision in
Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U. S. 205
(1917), we held that there were certain circumstances in which
States could not, consistently with Art. III, § 2, of the
Constitution, provide compensation to injured maritime workers.
[
Footnote 14] If the
employment of an injured worker was determined to have no "direct
relation" to navigation or commerce, and "the application of local
law [would not] materially affect" the uniformity of maritime law,
then the employment would be characterized as "maritime but local,"
and the State could provide a compensation remedy.
Grant
Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.
S. 469,
257 U. S. 477
(1922).
See also Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.
S. 233,
257 U. S. 242
(1921). If the employment could not be characterized as "maritime
but local," then the injured employee would be left without a
compensation remedy.
After several unsuccessful attempts to permit state compensation
remedies to apply to injured maritime workers whose employment was
not local, [
Footnote 15]
Congress passed the LHWCA in 1927, 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424. Under
the original statutory scheme, a worker had to satisfy five primary
conditions in order to be covered under the Act. First, the worker
had to satisfy the "negative" definition of "employee" contained in
§ 2(3) of the 1927 Act in that he could not be a "master or member
of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to
load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net."
Id. at 1425. [
Footnote
16] Second, the
Page 459 U. S. 307
worker had to suffer an "injury" defined by § 2(2) as
"accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of
employment. . . ."
Ibid. Third, the worker had to be
employed by a statutory "employer," defined by § 2(4) as
"an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime
employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the
United States (including any dry dock)."
Ibid. [
Footnote
17] Fourth, the worker had to meet a "situs" requirement
contained in § 3(a) of the Act that limited coverage to workers
whose "disability or death results from an injury occurring upon
the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry
dock)."
Id. at 1426. Fifth, § 3(a) precluded federal
compensation unless "recovery for the disability or death through
workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by
State law."
Ibid.
Federal compensation under the LHWCA did not initially extend to
all maritime employees injured on the navigable waters in the
course of their employment. As mentioned, § 3(a) of the 1927 Act
permitted federal compensation only if compensation "may not
validly be provided by State law."
Ibid. This language was
interpreted to exclude from LHWCA coverage those employees whose
employment was "maritime but local."
See, e.g., Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U. S. 22
(1932). Application of the "maritime but local" doctrine required
case-by-case determinations, and a worker was often required to
make a perilous jurisdictional "guess" as to which of two mutually
exclusive compensation schemes was applicable to cover his injury.
Employers faced uncertainty as to whether their contributions to a
state insurance fund would be sufficient to protect them from
liability.
In
Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.
S. 249 (1942), this Court recognized that, despite its
many cases involving the
Page 459 U. S. 308
"maritime but local" doctrine, it had "been unable to give any
guiding, definite rule to determine the extent of state power in
advance of litigation. . . ."
Id. at
317 U. S. 253.
Employees and employers alike were thrust on "[t]he horns of [a]
jurisdictional dilemma."
Id. at
317 U. S. 255.
[
Footnote 18]
Davis
involved an employee
Page 459 U. S. 309
who was injured while dismantling a bridge from a standing
position on a barge. We upheld the application of the state
compensation law in
Davis not because the employee was
engaged in "maritime but local" employment, but because we viewed
the case as in a "twilight zone" of concurrent jurisdiction where
LHWCA coverage was available and where the applicability of state
law was difficult to determine. We held that doubt concerning the
applicability of state compensation Acts was to be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of the state remedy. Relying in part
on
Davis, the Court in
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance
Co., 370 U. S. 114
(1962), created further overlap between federal and state coverage
for injured maritime workers. In
Calbeck, we held that the
LHWCA was
"designed to ensure that a compensation remedy existed for all
injuries sustained by employees [of statutory employers] on
navigable waters, and to avoid uncertainty as to the source, state
or federal, of that remedy."
Id. at
370 U. S. 124.
Our examination in
Calbeck of the "complete legislative
history" of the 1927 LHWCA revealed that Congress did not intend to
incorporate the "maritime but local" doctrine in the Act.
Id. at
370 U. S.
120.
"Congress used the phrase 'if recovery . . . may not validly be
provided by State law' in a sense consistent with the delineation
of coverage as reaching injuries occurring on navigable
waters."
Id. at
370 U. S. 126.
[
Footnote 19]
Before 1972, there was little litigation concerning whether an
employee was "in maritime employment" for purposes of being the
employee of a statutory employer:
"Workers who
Page 459 U. S. 310
are not seamen but who nevertheless suffer injury on navigable
waters are, no doubt (or so the courts have been willing to
assume), engaged in 'maritime employment.'"
G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty 428 (2d ed.1975)
(Gilmore & Black). One case in which we did discuss the
maritime employment requirement was
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales,
Inc., 314 U. S. 244
(1941). In
Parker, the injured worker, hired as a janitor,
was drowned while riding in one of his employer's motorboats
keeping lookout for hidden objects under the water. When the
employee's beneficiary sought LHWCA compensation, the employer
argued that the employment was "
so local in character'" that
the State could validly have provided a remedy, and the § 3(a)
language ("if recovery . . . may not validly be provided by State
law") precluded federal relief. Id. at 314 U. S. 246.
A unanimous Court rejected the employer's argument, and held that
the employee was engaged in maritime employment, and that LHWCA
coverage extended to an employee injured on the navigable waters in
the course of his employment, without any further inquiry whether
the injured worker's employment had a direct relation to navigation
or commerce. [Footnote 20]
In abolishing the "jurisdictional dilemma" created by the "maritime
but local" doctrine, Calbeck relied heavily on Parker,
see 370 U.S. at 370 U. S.
127-128.
Page 459 U. S. 311
It becomes clear from this discussion that the 1927 Act, as
interpreted by
Parker, Davis, and
Calbeck,
provided coverage to those employees of statutory "employers,"
injured while working upon navigable waters in the course of their
employment. Indeed, the consistent interpretation given to the
LHWCA before 1972 by the Director, the Deputy Commissioners, the
courts, and the commentators was that (except for those workers
specifically excepted in the statute),
any worker injured
upon navigable waters in the course of employment was "covered . .
. without any inquiry into what he was doing (or supposed to be
doing) at the time of his injury." Gilmore & Black, at 429-430.
[
Footnote 21] As a marine
construction
Page 459 U. S. 312
worker required to work upon navigable waters, and injured while
performing his duties on navigable waters, there can be no doubt
that Churchill would have been covered under the 1927 LHWCA.
Page 459 U. S. 313
B
In its "first significant effort to reform the 1927 Act and the
judicial gloss that had been attached to it," Congress amended the
LHWCA in 1972.
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo,
432 U. S. 249,
432 U. S. 261
(1977). The purposes of the 1972 Amendments were to raise the
amount of compensation available under the LHWCA, to extend
coverage of the Act to include certain contiguous land areas, to
eliminate the longshoremen's strict liability seaworthiness remedy
against shipowners, to eliminate shipowner's claims for
indemnification from stevedores, and to promulgate certain
administrative reforms.
See S.Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 1
(1972) (hereinafter S.Rep.); H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441 (1972)
(hereinafter H.R.Rep.).
For purposes of the present inquiry, the important changes
effected by the 1972 Amendments concerned the definition of
"employee" in § 2(3), 33 U.S.C. § 902(3), and the description of
coverage in § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). These amended sections
provide:
"The term 'employee' means any person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in
longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship
repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not
include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net."
§ 2(3), 33 U.S.C. § 902(3).
"Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of
the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock,
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
Page 459 U. S. 314
repairing, or building a vessel). . . ."
§ 3(a), as set forth in 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). [
Footnote 22]
"The 1972 Amendments thus changed what had been essentially only
a 'situs' test of eligibility for compensation to one looking to
both the 'situs' of the injury and the 'status' of the
injured."
Northeast Marine Terminal Co., supra, at
432 U. S.
264-265. In expanding the covered situs in § 3(a),
Congress also removed the requirement, present in § 3(a) of the
1927 Act, that federal compensation would be available only if
recovery "may not validly be provided by State law." The definition
of "injury" remained the same, [
Footnote 23] and the definition of "employer" was changed
to reflect the new definition of "employee" in § 2(3). [
Footnote 24]
Page 459 U. S. 315
The Director and Churchill claim that, when Congress added the
status requirement in § 3(a), providing that a covered employee
must be "engaged in maritime employment," it intended to restrict
or define the scope of the increased coverage provided by the
expanded situs provision in § 3(a), but that Congress had no
intention to exclude from coverage workers, like Churchill, who
were injured upon actual navigable waters,
i.e., navigable
waters as previously defined, in the course of their employment
upon those waters.
According to Perini, Congress intended to overrule legislatively
this Court's decision in
Calbeck, and the status
requirement was added to ensure that both the landward coverage
and seaward coverage would depend on the nature of the
employee's duties at the time he was injured. Perini's theory,
adopted by the court below, is that all coverage under the amended
LHWCA requires employment having a "significant relationship to
navigation or to commerce on navigable waters." [
Footnote 25] Perini argues further that
Churchill cannot meet the status test because he was injured while
working on the construction of a foundation for a sewage treatment
plant -- an activity not typically associated with navigation or
commerce on navigable waters.
We agree with the Director and Churchill. We are unable to find
any congressional intent to withdraw coverage of the LHWCA from
those workers injured on navigable waters in the course of their
employment, and who would have been covered by the Act before 1972.
As we have long held,
"[t]his Act must be liberally construed in conformance with
Page 459 U. S. 316
its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous
results."
Voris v. Eikel, 346 U. S. 328,
346 U. S. 333
(1953).
See also Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v.
Norton, 284 U. S. 408,
284 U. S. 414
(1932);
Northeast Marine Terminal Co., 432 U.S. at
432 U. S.
268.
It is necessary to consider the context in which the 1972
Amendments were passed, especially as that context relates directly
to the coverage changes that were effected. Despite the fact that
Calbeck extended protection of the LHWCA to all employees
injured upon navigable waters in the course of their employment,
LHWCA coverage still stopped at the water's edge -- a line of
demarcation established by
Jensen. In
Nacirema
Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U. S. 212
(1969), we held that the LHWCA did not extend to longshoremen whose
injuries occurred on the pier attached to the land. We recognized
that there was much to be said for the uniform treatment of
longshoremen irrespective of whether they were performing their
duties upon the navigable waters (in which case they would be
covered under
Calbeck), or whether they were performing
those same duties on a pier. We concluded, however, that, although
Congress could exercise its authority to cover land-based maritime
activity, "[t]he invitation to move that [
Jensen] line
landward must be addressed to Congress, not to this Court." 396
U.S. at
396 U. S. 224.
See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.
S. 202,
404 U. S. 216
(1971).
"Congress responded with the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Amendments of 1972."
P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v.
Ford, 444 U. S. 69,
444 U. S. 73
(1979). The 1972 Amendments were enacted after Committees in both
the House and Senate prepared full Reports that summarized the
general purposes of the legislation and contained an analysis of
the changes proposed for each section.
See S.Rep.,
supra; H.R.Rep.,
supra. These legislative Reports
indicate clearly that Congress intended to "
extend
coverage to protect
additional workers." S.Rep. at 1
(emphasis
Page 459 U. S. 317
added). [
Footnote 26]
Although the legislative history surrounding the addition of the
status requirement is not as clear as that concerning the reasons
for the extended situs, it is clear that,
"with the definition of 'navigable waters' expanded by the 1972
Amendments to include such a large geographical area, it became
necessary to describe affirmatively the class of workers Congress
desired to compensate."
Northeast Marine Terminal Co., supra, at
432 U. S. 264.
This necessity gave rise to the status requirement:
"The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not
engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel,
just because they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters
used for such activity."
S.Rep. at 13; H.R.Rep. at 11. This comment
Page 459 U. S. 318
indicates that Congress intended the status requirement to
define the scope of the extended landward coverage. [
Footnote 27]
There is nothing in these comments, or anywhere else in the
legislative Reports, to suggest, as Perini claims, that Congress
intended the status language to require that an employee injured
upon the navigable waters in the course of his employment had to
show that his employment possessed a direct (or substantial)
relation to navigation or commerce in
Page 459 U. S. 319
order to be covered. Congress was concerned with injuries on
land, and assumed that injuries occurring on the actual navigable
waters were covered, and would remain covered. [
Footnote 28] In discussing the added status
requirement, the Senate Report states explicitly that the "maritime
employment" requirement in § 3(a) was not meant to "exclude other
employees traditionally covered." S.Rep. at 16. We may presume
"that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the
law,"
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.
S. 677,
441 U. S.
696-697 (1979), and that their use of "employees
traditionally
Page 459 U. S. 320
covered" was intended to refer to those employees included in
the scope of coverage under
Parker, Davis, and
Calbeck. [
Footnote
29]
Other aspects of the statutory scheme support our understanding
of the "maritime employment" status requirement. Congress removed
from § 3(a) the requirement that, as a prerequisite to federal
coverage, there can be no valid recovery under state law. [
Footnote 30] As we noted in our
discussion in Part
Page 459 U. S. 321
459 U. S.
supra, the continued use of the "maritime but local"
doctrine occurred after passage of the 1927 Act, because the
original coverage section contained this requirement that Congress
explicitly deleted in 1972. Surely, if Congress wished to repeal
Calbeck and other cases legislatively, it would do so by
clear language, and not by removing from the statute the exact
phrase that
Calbeck found was responsible for continued
emphasis on the "maritime but local" doctrine. [
Footnote 31]
Congressional intent to adhere to
Calbeck is also
indicated by the fact that the legislative Reports clearly
identified those decisions that Congress wished to overrule by the
1972 Amendments. As mentioned above, the 1972 Amendments had other
purposes apart from an expansion of coverage to shoreside areas.
Two other purposes involved the elimination of a strict liability
unseaworthiness remedy against a vessel owner afforded to
longshoremen by
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U. S. 85
(1946), and an indemnity claim against the stevedore by the vessel
owner afforded by
Ryan
Page 459 U. S. 322
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,
350 U. S. 124
(1956). The legislative Reports explicitly identified these
decisions as intended to be overruled legislatively by the 1972
Amendments.
See S.Rep. at 8-12; H.R.Rep. at 4-8. It is,
therefore, highly unlikely that Congress would have intended to
return to the "jurisdictional monstrosity" that
Calbeck
sought to lay to rest without at least some indication of its
intent to do so.
In considering the scope of the status test as applied to
land-based employees in
Northeast Marine Terminal Co., we
rejected the "point of rest" theory proposed by the employer, under
which landward coverage under the 1972 Amendments would include
only the portion of the unloading process that takes place before
longshoremen place the cargo onto the dock. We reasoned that the
"point of rest" concept is
"[a] theory that nowhere appears in the Act, that was never
mentioned by Congress during the legislative process, that does not
comport with Congress' intent, and that restricts the coverage of a
remedial Act designed to extend coverage. . . ."
The absence of the concept, "claimed to be so well known in the
industry is both conspicuous and telling." 432 U.S. at
432 U. S.
278-279,
432 U. S. 275.
In the same sense, the absence of even the slightest congressional
allusion to the "maritime but local" doctrine, a concept that
plagued maritime compensation law for over 40 years and that would
have the effect of restricting coverage in the face of
congressional intent not to "exclude other employees traditionally
covered," is equally conspicuous and telling.
Finally, we note that our conclusion concerning the continued
coverage of employees injured on actual navigable waters in the
course of their employment is consistent with, and supported by,
our recent decision in
Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,
447 U. S. 715
(1980). In
Sun Ship, the issue before the Court was
whether extended shoreside coverage under the 1972 Amendments had
the effect of displacing concurrent
Page 459 U. S. 323
state remedies for landward injuries. After a review of the
development of the "maritime but local" doctrine, and review of
certain portions of the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments,
we concluded that those Amendments were not intended to resurrect
the dilemma, created by mutually exclusive spheres of jurisdiction,
that
Calbeck and
Davis eliminated. Our reasoning
was based, in part, on the removal by Congress of the language in
the 1927 Act that made federal compensation available if recovery
could not validly be provided by state law: "[T]he deletion of that
language in 1972 -- if it indicates anything -- may logically only
imply acquiescence in Calbec[k]. . . ." 447 U.S. at
447 U. S.
721.
Sun Ship held that, with respect to land-based
injuries, "the . . . extension of federal jurisdiction supplements,
rather than supplants, state compensation law."
Id. at
447 U. S. 720.
If we were to hold that the addition of the status requirement was
meant to exclude from coverage some employees injured on the actual
navigable waters in the course of their employment, a most peculiar
result would follow. Concurrent jurisdiction will exist with
respect to the class of employees to whom Congress extended
protection in 1972, while employees "traditionally covered" before
1972 would be faced with a hazardous pre-
Davis choice of
two exclusive jurisdictions from which to seek compensation. Such
an anomalous result could not have been intended by Congress. We
also note that a return to exclusive spheres of jurisdiction for
workers injured upon the actual navigable waters would be
inconsistent with express congressional desire to extend LHWCA
jurisdiction landward in light of the inadequacy of most state
compensation systems.
See S.Rep. at 12; H.R.Rep. at
10.
In holding that we can find no congressional intent to affect
adversely the pre-1972 coverage afforded to workers injured upon
the actual navigable waters in the course of their employment, we
emphasize that we in no way hold that Congress
Page 459 U. S. 324
meant for such employees to receive LHWCA coverage merely by
meeting the situs test, and without any regard to the "maritime
employment" language. [
Footnote
32] We hold only that, when a worker is injured on the actual
navigable waters in the course of his employment on those waters,
he satisfies the status requirement in § 2(3), and is covered under
the LHWCA, providing, of course, that he is the employee of a
statutory "employer," and is not excluded by any other provision of
the Act. [
Footnote 33] We
consider these employees to be "engaged in maritime employment" not
simply because they are injured in a historically maritime locale,
but because they are required to perform their employment duties
upon navigable waters. [
Footnote
34]
Page 459 U. S. 325
IV
In conclusion, we are unable to find anything in the legislative
history or in the 1972 Amendments themselves that indicate that
Congress intended to withdraw coverage from employees injured on
the navigable waters in the course of their employment as that
coverage existed before the 1972 Amendments. On the contrary, the
legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to
"exclude other employees traditionally covered." Moreover, Congress
explicitly deleted the language from § 3(a) that we found in
Calbeck to be responsible for the "jurisdictional dilemma"
caused by two mutually exclusive spheres of jurisdiction over
maritime injuries. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 2(3) of the Act, 86 Stat. 1251, 33 U.S.C. 902(3),
provides:
"The term 'employee' means any person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in
longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship
repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not
include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net."
[
Footnote 2]
We use the expression "actual navigable waters" to describe the
covered situs as it existed in the 1927 LHWCA, 44 Stat. (part 2)
1424: "navigable waters of the United States (including any dry
dock)."
Id. at 1426. As explained below, the 1972
Amendments to the LHWCA expanded the concept of "navigable waters"
to include certain adjoining shoreside areas. § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. §
903(a).
[
Footnote 3]
In
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo,
432 U. S. 249
(1977), we examined the scope of the § 2(3)
status
requirement as it applied to injuries that occurred on the newly
covered landward
situs. In that case, we expressly
declined to speculate whether congressional addition of the status
requirement meant that "Congress excluded people who would have
been covered before the 1972 Amendments; that is, workers who are
injured on the navigable waters as previously defined."
Id. at
432 U. S. 265,
n. 25.
[
Footnote 4]
At the time Churchill was injured, he was working on a barge in
actual navigable waters. There is no claim that he was standing on
the foundation of the sewage treatment plant.
[
Footnote 5]
The Board also determined that Churchill's duties did not make
him a "person engaged in longshoring operations" under § 2(3) of
the LHWCA.
[
Footnote 6]
The dissenting Board member also relied on this Court's decision
in
Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.
S. 715 (1980), to support his position.
[
Footnote 7]
Title 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) provides in pertinent part:
"(c) Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order
of the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States
court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred by
filing in such court within sixty days following the issuance of
such Board order a written petition praying that the order be
modified or set aside. . . ."
[
Footnote 8]
The Ninth Circuit is in agreement with the Second Circuit
position.
See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957
(1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976). The Fifth
Circuit takes a position contrary to that of the Second Circuit and
Ninth Circuit.
See Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc.,
680 F.2d 1034 (1982) (en banc) (Tate, J.).
[
Footnote 9]
Perini bases its standing argument on § 21(c) of the Act, 33
U.S.C. § 921(c).
See n
7,
supra. According to Perini, the Director is not
"adversely affected or aggrieved" by the decision below, and does
not have standing before this Court. Perini relies on several Court
of Appeals decisions which, in construing § 21(c), have held the
Director to be without statutory standing in cases before the
Courts of Appeals.
See Fusco v. Perini North River
Associates, 601 F.2d 659 (CA2 1979),
vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 444 U.S. 1028,
adhered to on
remand, 622 F.2d 1111 (CA2 1980),
cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1131 (1981);
Director, OWCP v. Donzi Marine, Inc.,
586 F.2d 377 (CA5 1978); and
I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v.
Benefits Review Board, 542 F.2d 903 (CA4 1976),
vacated
and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Adkins v. I.T.O. Corp. of
Baltimore, 433 U.S. 904,
adhered to on remand, 563
F.2d 646 (1977).
Section 21(c) is not relevant to our present inquiry. Perini
concedes that § 21(c) applies, on its face, to statutory review
before the courts of appeals. Moreover, the cases on which Perini
relies do not purport to address the Art. III standing issue.
[
Footnote 10]
20 CFR § 802.410(b) (1982). Section 39 of the Act, as set forth
in 33 U.S.C. § 939, provides that
"the Secretary [of Labor] shall administer the provisions of
this chapter, and for such purpose the Secretary is authorized (1)
to make such rules and regulations . . . as may be necessary in the
administration of this chapter."
The Secretary has assigned enforcement and administration
responsibilities to the Director.
[
Footnote 11]
We acknowledge that, on three occasions, this Court has granted
petitions for certiorari to review cases brought by the Director.
See Director, OWCP v. Walter Tantzen, Inc., 446 U.S. 905
(1980),
vacating and remanding Walter Tantzen, Inc. v.
Shaughnessy, 601 F.2d 670 (CA2 1979),
revised on
remand, 624 F.2d 5 (1980);
Director, OWCP v.
Rasmussen, 436 U.S. 955 (1978); and
Director, OWCP v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 433 U.S. 904 (1977),
vacating and remanding Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v.
Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (CA5 1976),
adhered to on
remand, 575 F.2d 79 (1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S.
967 (1979).
Tantzen and
Jacksonville Shipyards were both
summary dispositions, and
Rasmussen was decided on the
merits,
see Director, OWCP v. Rasmussen, 440 U. S.
29 (1979). In none of these cases did we have occasion
to consider whether the Director had standing in his own right to
seek review of a decision of the Benefits Review Board
with
which the Director disagreed. In
Rasmussen, the
employer and the insurer also petitioned for certiorari, and the
cases were consolidated. It was not necessary to consider the issue
of the Director's standing in that case, because a justiciable
controversy was before the Court by virtue of the petition of the
employer and insurer. In both
Tantzen and
Jacksonville, the Director had defended a Board decision
in the Courts of Appeals as the federal respondent, and continued
to defend the Board decision before this Court.
See
n 13,
infra.
[
Footnote 12]
This Court's Rule 19.6 provides in part:
"All parties other than petitioners shall be respondents, but
any respondent who supports the position of a petitioner shall meet
the time schedule for filing papers which is provided for that
petitioner. . . ."
Under Rule 19.6, Churchill is a party in this Court by virtue of
his being a party in the proceedings below. Moreover, he has
demonstrated his continued stake in the outcome of this case by
filing in support of the Director at both the certiorari and merits
stages of the proceedings.
[
Footnote 13]
The fact that Perini concedes that the Director was a proper
party respondent before the Court of Appeals in this case means
that no question is thereby presented concerning whether the
Director, as party respondent below, is a "party" for purposes of
28 U.S.C. 1254(1), which states that a writ of certiorari may be
"granted upon the petition of any party" below.
Given that the parties do not question the identity of the
federal respondent, it is not necessary for us to decide the issue
explicitly left open by the Court in
Northeast Marine Terminal
Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. at
432 U. S. 256,
n. 11, as to whether the Director is a proper party respondent in
the Court of Appeals. Although we declined to address this issue,
because the parties did not raise it in
Northeast Marine
Terminal, we noted that
"[t]he Department of Labor has recently promulgated a regulation
making it clear that the Director of OWCP is the proper federal
party in a case of this nature. 42 Fed.Reg. 16133 (Mar.1977)."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 14]
Article III, § 2, extends the federal power "to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." In
Jensen, we held
that state compensation Acts could not cover longshoremen injured
seaward of the water's edge. The line of demarcation between land
and water became known as the "
Jensen line."
[
Footnote 15]
See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.
S. 149 (1920);
Washington v. W. C. Dawson &
Co., 264 U. S. 219
(1924).
[
Footnote 16]
Section 3(a), 44 Stat. (part 2) 1426, also excluded from
coverage "[a]n officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of any
political subdivision thereof "
[
Footnote 17]
The 1927 Act did not contain any provision that an injured
employee must be "engaged in maritime employment" at the time of
injury in order to be covered. Rather, the Act employed the
expression "maritime employment" only as part of the definition of
a statutory "employer."
[
Footnote 18]
In
Davis, our concern for the employer's dilemma was
related to the fact that, because the employer did not know with
any certainty whether his employee would be covered under the
LHWCA,
"[t]he employer's contribution to a state insurance fund may
therefore wholly fail to protect him against the liabilities for
which it was specifically planned."
317 U.S. at
317 U. S. 255.
We resolved that dilemma in
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance
Co., 370 U. S. 114
(1962), by making it clear to employers that, if they required
their employees to work upon actual navigable waters, those
employees would be covered by the LHWCA. The dissent takes this
certainty in favor of LHWCA coverage to mean that, in 1972,
Congress wanted to ensure that employers like Perini would have
only to pay for
state compensation benefits, and would not
have to obtain more costly LHWCA protection.
The dissent's concern about duplicative insurance seems
exaggerated for two reasons. First, even under the dissent's view
of coverage, both state and federal remedies are available to
injured workers, and employers with employees working on the shore
would have to contribute to state compensation funds in the event
that an employee covered by the LHWCA's shoreside extension sought
state compensation, or an employee was deemed for whatever reason
not to be eligible for LHWCA relief. "[T]he 1972 extension of
federal jurisdiction supplements, rather than supplants, state
compensation law."
Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447
U.S. at
447 U. S.
720.
We also note that the dissent argues that, before 1972, the
financial burden of duplicative coverage was not heavy, because
LHWCA benefits were lower than they now are, and insurance carriers
would cover LHWCA operations for a nominal addition to state
compensation program premiums. There is nothing in the record in
this case, in the legislative history, or, for that matter, in the
dissent, concerning whether the relative spread between state and
federal insurance premiums is higher now than before 1972.
Second, the dissent's view clearly does not result in any
certainty whatsoever for employers like Perini with respect to
whether those employers have to pay for LHWCA coverage. If any
Perini employee (including Churchill) were to engage in loading,
unloading, or repairing of the barge on which Churchill was
working, the employee would be covered. Indeed, if Churchill
himself had to make some minor mechanical adjustment on the barge
and was injured while doing so, he would be covered, under the
dissent's view.
[
Footnote 19]
We noted in
Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, supra,
that, in extending LHWCA coverage into the "maritime but local"
zone,
Calbeck did not overturn
Davis "by treating
the federal statute as exclusive." 447 U.S. at
447 U. S.
718-719. Rather,
Calbeck eliminated the
"jurisdictional dilemma" that resulted from the existence of two
spheres of exclusive jurisdiction, by making injuries within the
"maritime but local" sphere compensable under either state or
federal law.
[
Footnote 20]
The majority opinion in
Davis assumed that, if the
claimant in that case sought federal relief, and such relief was
awarded at the administrative stage of the proceedings, the Court
would have sustained the award under
Parker. In his
dissent in
Davis, Chief Justice Stone argued that the
federal Act applied to give exclusive relief in that case:
"after our decision in
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, . .
. [the
Davis claimant's] right of recovery under the
federal act can hardly be doubted."
317 U.S. at
317 U. S.
260.
Professor Robertson has noted that "
Parker should have
meant the abolition of the
maritime but local' exception," but
that Davis indicated that the doctrine had continued
vitality. D. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism 210 (1970).
Professor Robertson also states that, if the claimant in
Davis had sought federal, rather than state, compensation,
"the Parker case would certainly have said that [the
claimant] could get it." Id. at 211.
[
Footnote 21]
The dissent attempts to carve a new "maritime but local" area in
which the exclusive remedy is state compensation. The dissent
argues that Congress meant to exclude from LHWCA coverage all
employees who are not longshoremen or harbor workers, and that only
longshoremen and harbor workers possess the "direct link to
maritime commerce" necessary for LHWCA coverage. According to the
dissent, the pre-1972 case law, with the exception of
Parker, supports its position. The dissent's view rests on
a misreading of our decisions in
Davis and
Calbeck, and a failure to consider the impact of
Parker, Davis, and
Calbeck on the scope of
pre-1972 coverage.
The dissent points out that
Davis involved an employee
who sought state compensation, and it concludes that
Davis
says nothing about LHWCA coverage. The employee in
Davis
was standing on a barge and assisting in the dismantling of a
bridge, an activity that would clearly not have the "direct link to
maritime commerce" that the dissent suggests is required. Although
the
Davis employee sought state compensation, both the
Davis majority and the
Davis dissent assumed
that,
if the
Davis employee sought LHWCA
coverage,
Parker would require that he get it. In
Calbeck, the claimants were welders performing work on
vessels, but our holding in
Calbeck was clearly predicated
on
Parker and
Davis, and cannot properly be
characterized as a case where LHWCA coverage was predicated on the
existence of some "direct link to maritime commerce" or
"traditional" LHWCA employment. The dissent claims that, since
Churchill could be covered by a state compensation remedy, it is
consistent with
Calbeck to deny LHWCA coverage. This, of
course, neglects the fact that
Calbeck made clear that
"Congress brought under the coverage of the Act all such
injuries [suffered by employees working on the navigable waters]
whether or not a particular one was also within the constitutional
reach of a state workmen's compensation law."
370 U.S. at
370 U. S.
126-127.
Parker, Davis, and
Calbeck were read by the
lower federal and state courts not to limit LHWCA coverage only to
"traditional" maritime activities, but to cover injuries that
occurred on the navigable waters in the course of employment.
See, e.g., Nalco Chemical Corp. v. Shea, 419 F.2d 572 (CA5
1969) (a pilot salesman traveling to offshore platform);
Interlake S.S. Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (CA6 1964)
(watchman),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965);
Radcliff Gravel Co. v. Henderson, 138 F.2d 549 (CA5 1943)
(workers who trimmed sand and gravel loaded on barges after being
dredged from water bed),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 782
(1944);
Rex Investigative and Patrol Agency, Inc. v.
Collura, 329 F.
Supp. 696 (EDNY 1971) (land-based employee sent temporarily
onto vessel to act as watchman);
Standard Dredging Corp. v.
Henderson, 57 F. Supp. 770 (Ala.1944) (employee engaged in
dredging bed of intracoastal canal);
Ford v.
Parker, 52 F. Supp.
98 (Md.1943) (night watchman);
Perry v. Baltimore
Contractors, Inc., 202 So. 2d 694 (La.App.1967) (worker
injured while diving in order to assist in construction of a tunnel
under intracoastal canal),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028
(1968). This list is by no means exhaustive, and does not include
various administrative decisions.
In another case,
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. O'Rourke,
344 U. S. 334
(1953), we held that a statutory "employer" existed as long as the
employer had
any employee engaged in "maritime
employment," and that it was not necessary that the injured
employee be the
one employee that made his employer a
statutory "employer." However, we also held in that case that the
injured employee was, in fact, engaged in maritime employment when
he was working as a railway brakeman, removing railroad cars from a
car float by the use of an ordinary switch engine.
Id. at
344 U. S. 340.
Although
Pennsylvania R. Co. involved a question as to
which of two federal statutes applied to cover the employee's
injury (the LHWCA or the Federal Employers' Liability Act), and did
not involve an application of the "maritime but local" doctrine,
the Deputy Commissioners had interpreted
Pennsylvania R.
Co. to mean "that injury over the water means, without much
more inquiry, that they ought to grant [LHWCA] awards." Robertson,
supra, n. 20, at 220. In the two cases that came to us in
Calbeck, the Deputy Commissioners had granted LHWCA awards
on the basis of
Pennsylvania R. Co. See
Robertson,
supra, n
20, at 219-220.
[
Footnote 22]
We note that the new coverage section still provides that no
compensation shall be paid to
"[a]n officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of any political
subdivision thereof."
§ 3(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)(2).
[
Footnote 23]
"Injury" is defined in § 2(2), 33 U.S.C. § 902(2), as
"accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of
employment, and such occupational disease or infection as arises
naturally out of such employment or as naturally or unavoidably
results from such accidental injury, and includes an injury caused
by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee
because of his employment."
[
Footnote 24]
"Employer" is defined in § 2(4), 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) as
"an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime
employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the
United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock,
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
or building a vessel)."
The Reports also add:
"[T]he Committee has no intention of extending coverage under
the Act to individuals who are not employed by a person who is an
employer,
i.e., a person at least some of whose employees
are engaged, in whole or in part in some form of maritime
employment. Thus, an individual employed by a person none of whose
employees work, in whole or in part, on navigable waters, is not
covered even if injured on a pier adjoining navigable waters."
S.Rep. at 13; H.R.Rep. at 11.
We note that there is an apparent inconsistency between the
actual wording of § 2(4) and the expression in the legislative
history. Section 2(4) defines an "employer" to be the employer of
any employee engaged in maritime employment on the "navigable
waters" as defined by the 1972 Amendments to include the expanded
landward situs. The legislative history, however, appears to
contemplate that a statutory employer must have at least one
employee working over the
actual navigable waters before
any employee injured on the new land situs can be covered.
[
Footnote 25]
We see no real distinction between the "direct relationship"
test used to articulate the "maritime but local" doctrine and the
"significant relationship" test urged by Perini. In support of the
use of this test, Perini relies on the "maritime but local"
cases.
[
Footnote 26]
The reasons for the extended landward coverage are set forth in
Report sections labeled "Extension of Coverage to Shoreside
Areas":
"The present [1927] Act, insofar as longshoremen and
shipbuilders and repairmen are concerned, covers only injuries
which occur 'upon the navigable waters of the United States.' Thus,
coverage of the present Act stops at the water's edge; injuries
occurring on land are covered by State Workmen's Compensation laws.
The result is a disparity in benefits payable for death or
disability for the same type of injury depending on which side of
the water's edge and in which State the accident occurs."
"To make matters worse, most State Workmen's Compensation laws
provide benefits which are inadequate. . . . "
* * * *
"The Committee believes that the compensation payable to a
longshoreman or a ship repairman or builder should not depend on
the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury occurred on land
or over water. Accordingly, the bill would amend the Act to provide
coverage of longshoremen, harbor workers, ship repairmen, ship
builders, shipbreakers, and other employees engaged in maritime
employment (excluding masters and members of the crew of a vessel)
if the injury occurred either upon the navigable waters of the
United States or any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal,
building way, marine railway, or other area adjoining such
navigable waters customarily used by an employer in loading,
unloading, repairing, or building a vessel."
"The intent of the Committee is to permit a uniform compensation
system to apply to employees who would otherwise be covered by this
Act for part of their activity. . . ."
S.Rep. at 12-13; H.R.Rep. at 10-11.
[
Footnote 27]
Perini argues that Congress' intent to eliminate the problem
associated with movement from covered to noncovered areas will be
frustrated by our holding, because some employees may be deemed to
satisfy the status test while working upon the navigable waters,
but be deemed not to satisfy the status test when performing the
same activity on land.
We have had two opportunities to examine the scope of landward
coverage under the 1972 Amendments.
See Northeast Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249
(1977), and
P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U. S.
69 (1979). In neither case did we interpret the
"maritime employment" status provision to require an examination
into whether the employment had a "direct" or "significant
relationship to navigation or commerce." Rather, in both cases, we
decided that the employees were covered because they were "engaged
in longshoring operations," and thus fit one of the categories
explicitly enumerated by Congress as part of "maritime employment."
See 432 U.S. at
432 U. S. 271,
432 U. S. 273;
444 U.S. at
444 U. S.
82.
We have had no occasion as yet to determine other possible
applications of the status test to activities performed on the
expanded landward situs. Although we do not maintain that landward
coverage could never be determined by reference to anything but the
explicitly enumerated categories of activities in the § 2(3)
definition of "employee," we note that our cases to date have
focused on these explicit categories because the legislative
history indicates that Congress intended to extend landward
coverage to those specifically included occupations.
See
S. Rep, at 13; H.R.Rep. at 10-11.
See also Northeast Marine
Terminal Co., supra, at
432 U. S. 273.
Regardless of the potential difficulties that may arise in the
future in applying the status test to land-based injuries, it is
clear that, in extending coverage landward, Congress sought to make
available LHWCA compensation to those who, before the 1972
Amendments, regularly
did move from covered to noncovered
areas, but did not intend to withdraw coverage from those
employees, traditionally covered by the Act, who were injured in
the course of their employment on navigable waters as previously
defined.
[
Footnote 28]
Ignoring the references in the Committee Reports to the fact
that in 1972 Congress merely sought to extend benefits landward,
the dissent focuses instead on passages in the legislative history
which indicate that Congress wanted to extend benefits to certain
employees who regularly
did (in Congress' view) walk in
and out of coverage, and who performed the same tasks on land as
they performed over the actual navigable waters. The dissent
concludes from this that Congress sought to withdraw coverage from
those employees injured over the actual navigable waters in the
course of employment who would have been covered before 1972, and
who we now hold are "engaged in maritime employment" for purposes
of the amended LHWCA. The fact that Congress desired to extend
coverage landward for a certain group of employees does not tend to
prove that Congress sought to withdraw coverage from another group
of employees who were customarily covered before the 1972
Amendments. The dissent's view would relegate a number of employees
to state compensation remedies in the face of express and extensive
congressional findings that "most State Workmen's Compensation laws
provide benefits which are inadequate." S.Rep. at 12-13; H.R.Rep.
at 10.
The dissent claims that it "cannot find a single word" in the
legislative history to support LHWCA coverage of any employee who
is not a longshoreman or harbor worker.
Post at
459 U. S. 330.
The word that the dissent overlooks is "maritime" in § 2(3) of the
Act. Before 1972, employees such as Churchill were considered to be
engaged in "maritime" employment. In order to withdraw coverage
from employees, such as Churchill, who are maritime employees
injured in the course of their employment upon the actual navigable
waters, Congress would have had to ignore the consistent
interpretation given the Act before 1972 by the Director, the
Deputy Commissioners, the courts, and the commentators.
See n 21,
supra.
[
Footnote 29]
Perini cites our decision in
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
City of Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249
(1972), and argues that the LHWCA is premised upon admiralty
jurisdiction, which requires a connection between an employee and
traditional maritime activity. Perini's reliance on
Executive
Jet is misplaced. In that case, the only issue before the
Court was whether federal admiralty jurisdiction extended to tort
claims arising out of the crash of an airplane into navigable
waters on a flight "within the continental United States, which
[is] principally over land."
Id. at
409 U. S. 266.
Jurisdiction in
Executive Jet was predicated on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1), which provides that the federal district courts have
original and exclusive jurisdiction of "[a]ny civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction."
The explicit language of
Executive Jet makes it clear
that our discussion was occasioned by "the problems involved in
applying a locality-alone test of admiralty tort jurisdiction to
the crashes of aircraft" in a situation where "the fact that an
aircraft happens to fall in navigable waters, rather than on land,
is wholly fortuitous." 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 266,
266. Although the term "maritime" occurs both in 28 U.S.C. §
1333(1) and in § 2(3) of the Act, these are two different statutes
"each with different legislative histories and jurisprudential
interpretations over the course of decades."
Boudreaux v.
American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d 1034, 1060 (CA6 1982)
(footnote omitted). In addition, Churchill, as a marine
construction worker, was by no means "fortuitously" on the water
when he was injured.
[
Footnote 30]
The dissent argues that it is "now perfectly clear" that
Churchill (or any other "shore-based worker" injured upon actual
navigable waters) could have received a state compensation award,
and there should be no concern about such an employee's being left
without a remedy. This position is by no means "perfectly clear."
See, e.g., Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk and Associates, Inc.,
655 F.2d 589 (CA5 1981) (watchman injured while working on vessel
sought compensation under state scheme, and was denied recovery
because injury was covered under LHWCA -- Court of Appeals granted
LHWCA compensation, holding that, when Congress passed the 1972
Amendments, it took for granted that injuries occurring on the
actual navigable waters were covered under
Parker, Davis,
Pennsylvania R. Co., Calbeck, and the myriad lower court cases
applying our decisions);
Rex Investigative and Patrol
Agency, 329 F. Supp. at 698 (the court found that the injured
watchman's state compensation claim had been dismissed because the
"claim properly belonged before a federal, rather than a [New York]
state, agency").
[
Footnote 31]
Certain comments made in the debates preceding passage of the
1972 Amendments in the House indicate support for our view that
Congress intended to extend protection in 1972, and not to withdraw
protection. For example, Representative Steiger posed the following
question and answer to explain the coverage provision:
"Q.
The present law covers employees working on navigable
waters. Do the amendments change the scope of coverage?"
"A. Yes. The present law's coverage is limited to employees
working on navigable waters, including those working on dry docks.
The amendments will extend coverage to wharfs, terminals, marine
railways and other adjoining areas. . . ."
118 Cong.Rec. 36385 (1972) (emphasis in original).
See also id. at 36270-36271 (remarks of Sen. Williams);
id. at 36381-36382 (remarks of Rep. Daniels).
[
Footnote 32]
In both
Northeast Marine Terminal Co., 432 U.S. at
432 U. S.
263-264, and
P.C. Pfeiffer Co., 444 U.S. at
444 U. S. 78-79,
we recognized that the status requirement is occupational, and the
situs test is geographic.
[
Footnote 33]
See also, e.g., 1A E. Benedict, Admiralty §§ 17, 19
(7th rev. ed.1982); Gilmore & Black at 428-430; Robertson,
Injuries to Maritime Petroleum Workers: A Plea for Radical
Simplification, 55 Texas L.Rev. 973, 986-987 (1977); Comment,
Broadened Coverage under the LHWCA, 33 La.L.Rev. 683, 694 (1973);
Note, 64 N.C.L.Rev. 925, 940 (1976).
But see 4 A. Larson,
Law of Workmen's Compensation § 89.27, 89.41 (1982); Tucker,
Coverage and Procedure under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Subsequent to the 1972 Amendments, 66 Tulane
L.Rev. 1066, 1062 (1981).
[
Footnote 34]
Our holding, of course, extends only to those persons
"traditionally covered" before the 1972 Amendments. We express no
opinion whether such coverage extends to a worker injured while
transiently or fortuitously upon actual navigable waters, or to a
land-based worker injured on land who then falls into actual
navigable waters. Our decision today should not be read as
exempting water-based workers from the new status test. Rather, our
holding is simply a recognition that a worker's performance of his
duties upon actual navigable waters is necessarily a very important
factor in determining whether he is engaged in "maritime
employment."
Contrary to the suggestion by the dissent,
post at
459 U. S.
342-343, n. 26, there is no inconsistency in our failing
to decide the question of coverage as to these employees, and our
reliance on
Parker. In
Parker, we held that the
injured employee was engaged in "maritime employment" in a
situation where we did not discuss whether the employer was a
statutory "employer."
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in the judgment.
At the time of his injury, Churchill was engaged in unloading
materials from a supply barge to a cargo barge. This work is very
much like the work of longshoremen, who typically load and unload
vessels. Therefore, Churchill was "engaged in maritime employment"
within the meaning of § 2(3) of the Act, and was within its
coverage. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
Neither the legislative history nor the judicial history on
which the Court relies today justifies a departure from the
language of the statute defining the post-1972 coverage of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).
Indeed, when the issue is viewed in its proper historical
perspective, it becomes even more clear that a literal reading of
the Act will avoid anomalies that troubled Congress in 1972, as
well as unnecessary litigation and duplicate
Page 459 U. S. 326
insurance coverage in the post-1972 period. I shall first
comment on the statutory language, and then discuss its
history.
I
The principal focus of the statute is identified by its title,
as well as its text. It provides workers' compensation benefits for
injuries to longshoremen and harbor workers. [
Footnote 2/1] The coverage of the statute is defined by
two basic tests -- a
situs test, focusing on the place
where the injury occurred, and a
status test, focusing on
the character of the injured employee's occupation. An injured
person is entitled to compensation under the Act only if he
satisfied both tests at the time of the injury. The two tests work
together to provide comprehensive coverage for a large class of
workers who perform hazardous longshore and ship repair work.
The requisite occupational status is defined in § 2(3) of the
Act. It provides:
Page 459 U. S. 327
"The term 'employee' means any person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in
longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship
repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not
include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net."
33 U.S.C. § 902(3).
The term "maritime employment" expressly includes two important
subcategories, both of which are defined with reasonable clarity.
The question of construction that is presented is what, if any,
additional categories of employment are included within the term
"maritime employment." There are several independent reasons for
not giving the term an expansive, essentially open-ended
reading.
First, one of the oldest and most respected rules of statutory
construction teaches us that general terms should be construed in
the light of the specific examples that are expressly identified as
included therein. In this statute, the subcategories --
longshoremen and harbor workers -- are both described in detail,
and no other subcategory is even mentioned, giving rise to an
especially strong inference that Congress intended a snug fit
between "maritime employment" and the two subcategories. [
Footnote 2/2]
This inference is corroborated by the fact that Congress took
the trouble to add language making it clear that the statutory
Page 459 U. S. 328
concept of "maritime employment" was not intended to describe
either the master or a member of the crew of any vessel. [
Footnote 2/3] In short, the ordinary
meaning of the words "maritime employment" is actually excluded
from the description of the occupational categories that Congress
intended the LHWCA to cover.
It is also clear that the definition of "employee" is entirely
unaffected by where he may be injured; if a worker is not an
"employee" when ashore, he is not an "employee" when afloat.
Therefore, it is critically significant that the definition of
where "employees" are covered -- the situs provision -- reveals the
same limited concern for the same key occupations as the status
provision. An "employee" is covered only while on navigable waters
and on
"any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way,
marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an
employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a
vessel."
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (emphasis added).
If we ignore history and merely concentrate on the text of this
statute, the conclusion is inescapable that it merely provides
coverage for people who do the work of longshoremen and harbor
workers -- amphibious persons who are directly involved in moving
freight onto and off ships or in building, repairing, or destroying
ships. A "checker" is such a worker. [
Footnote 2/4] So are "terminal laborers,"
Northeast
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.
S. 249 (1977), "cotton headers,"
P.C. Pfeiffer Co.
v. Ford, 444 U. S. 69
(1979), and "warehousemen,"
ibid. A construction worker on
a sewage treatment plant plainly lacks this direct link to maritime
commerce, regardless of where he may have been working at the time
of his injury.
Page 459 U. S. 329
II
If we examine the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments
[
Footnote 2/5] -- without regard to
the text of the statute or judicial
Page 459 U. S. 330
decisions that are unmentioned in that history -- we must reach
the same conclusion. I cannot find a single word [
Footnote 2/6] in the Committee hearings, the
Committee Reports, or the legislative debates that even suggests
that any Congressman or Senator believed that the statute provided
coverage for anyone other than longshoremen, harbor workers, and
persons in the entirely separate categories that had been included
by special statutory enactment. [
Footnote 2/7]
Page 459 U. S. 331
At the opening of the House Subcommittee hearings, Congressman
Daniels explained his understanding of the existing scope of the
LHWCA [
Footnote 2/8] and the need
for amendments:
"This Act provides workmen's compensation protection to
longshoremen, ship repairmen, harbor workers at U.S. defense bases
outside the United States, and workers employed in private industry
in the District of Columbia."
"Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act are long overdue. Benefits under this act have not
been increased for 12 years, and the cost to the injured workers of
inadequate benefits has become a serious matter."
"For example, the law now allows a totally disabled worker to
receive two-thirds of his average weekly wages at the time of his
injury. However, since 1961, there has been a limitation of $70 per
week as the maximum payment for a permanent disability. This
statutory maximum results in a substantially lower payment than
two-thirds of the weekly wage for most longshoremen and District of
Columbia workers covered by this statute."
"More than 270,000 longshoremen and ship repairmen are covered
by this statute. In addition, another 300,000 employees of private
employers within the District of Columbia are protected by this
law, as well as an additional 200,000 workers in defense bases and
work on Outer Continental Shelf projects. "
Page 459 U. S. 332
"Last year, there were more than 109,000 injuries under this
statute; 240 of them fatal, 68,000 of them related to longshore
work, and another 27,000 involved District of Columbia
workers."
Hearings on H.R. 247
et al. before the Select
Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 46 (1972) (hereinafter House Hearings).
Throughout the hearings, the legislators were told over and over
again how important it was to increase the Act's benefits for
workers in the categories identified by Congressman Daniels.
[
Footnote 2/9] It seems plain that
these were the categories of employment that were understood by
Congress to define the traditional coverage of the Act.
When the House and Senate Committees reported out their
respective bills, they had granted the sought-after increase in
benefits. They had also amended the provisions defining the scope
of coverage, including the language of "status" and "situs"
discussed in the previous section. They had done so in response to
a problem in the scope of prior coverage. Before 1972,
longshoremen's and harbor workers' federal coverage had stopped at
the water's edge. Because their duties regularly took them off the
vessel and onto the
Page 459 U. S. 333
pier, they were constantly "walking in and out of coverage." On
the House side, Joseph Leonard, the international safety director
of the International Longshoremen's Association, spoke about the
hardship this system imposed:
"Federal compensation law stops at the gangplank to the pier.
When you come off of the gangplank, you come under a different law;
you come under the State. Thirty-six States cover these docks, and
maybe more now with the inland waterways."
"The longshoremen are the only workers in the United States who
must worry about their injury to determine the compensation. . . .
It is time for a Federal law for compensation for all
longshoremen."
Id. at 297. And on the Senate side, the Minority
Counsel brought this problem to the Senators' attention. [
Footnote 2/10]
Page 459 U. S. 334
The Committee amendments responded to this problem by defining
the protected situs to encompass the entire area in which members
of the protected class customarily perform their regular duties.
This definition of situs clearly precludes coverage for a
construction worker standing on a sewage treatment plant or a
bridge. Yet if one accepts the view of the claimant in this case,
the statute grants him coverage while aboard a floating vessel and
therefore expects him to walk in and out of coverage during a
typical workday. Such a view is flatly inconsistent with the
explicit intent of Congress to
"permit a uniform compensation system to apply to employees who
would otherwise be covered by this Act for [only] part of their
activity."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441, pp. 10-11 (1972); S.Rep. No. 92-1125, p.
13 (1972). [
Footnote 2/11] Only
if
Page 459 U. S. 335
we adhere to the language used by Congress to define the
relevant status harmoniously with the relevant situs can the
congressional purpose be achieved.
III
The pre-1972 judicial history of the LHWCA confirms my
construction of the 1972 Amendments, and also explains why the work
of longshoremen and harbor workers is described as "maritime
employment" in the statute. Only once during the 45-year interval
between the enactment of the LHWCA in 1927 and its amendment in
1972, in
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.
S. 244 (1941), did this Court uphold an award of
benefits under the LHWCA for a worker who was neither a
longshoreman nor a harbor worker. [
Footnote 2/12] That lonely decision rested on a concern
that is no longer significant, and surely provides an insufficient
predicate for the Court's all-inclusive interpretation of "maritime
employment." Before commenting specifically on the
Parker
case, however, I shall briefly identify the two principal chapters
in the pre-1972 history of the LHWCA.
The first chapter (which covers the period from 1917 to 1927)
explains why there was a need for federal legislation to provide
compensation for injured longshoremen and harbor workers. Prior to
1917, it was assumed that these workers were adequately protected
by whatever state legislation existed. In that year, however, this
Court held that the national
Page 459 U. S. 336
interest in the uniform regulation of maritime commerce
precluded state jurisdiction over injuries occurring on navigable
waters.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205 (1917). [
Footnote
2/13]
Over the classic dissents of two of our greatest Justices, the
Court adhered to that view even though Congress twice attempted to
authorize the exercise of state jurisdiction over these "maritime"
injuries. [
Footnote 2/14] The
so-called "
Jensen line" thus developed as a constitutional
limit on the exercise of state power over maritime employment.
The reasoning of the
Jensen case originally appeared to
foreclose the application of state workmen's compensation schemes
to any injury occurring on navigable waters. The Court soon made it
clear, however, that there was a somewhat vaguely defined area --
an area that became known as the "maritime but local" area -- in
which state jurisdiction survived. Thus, in 1922, five years before
the enactment of the LHWCA, the Court held that a carpenter injured
at work aboard an uncompleted ship that had been launched in the
Willamette River could recover under the Oregon Workmen's
Compensation Law.
Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co.
v.
Page 459 U. S. 337
Rohde, 257 U. S. 469
(1922). The national interest in uniformity that had been
considered paramount in
Jensen was not thought to be
materially prejudiced by Oregon's regulation of "certain local
matters." [
Footnote 2/15]
Unlike the work of the carpenter in
Rohde, the work of
the longshoreman was considered by the Court to have a character
that required regulation by a uniform federal scheme. That much was
made clear by the Court's opinion in
Northern Coal and Dock Co.
v. Strand, 278 U. S. 142
(1928), [
Footnote 2/16] a case
involving a fatal shipboard injury to a longshoreman.
"The unloading of a ship is not a matter of purely local
concern. It has direct relation to commerce and navigation, and
uniform rules in respect thereto are essential. The fact that
Strand worked for the major portion of the time upon land is
unimportant. He was upon the water in pursuit of his maritime
duties when the accident occurred."
Id. at
278 U. S. 144.
The LHWCA was enacted in 1927 to remedy this inability of the
States to provide adequate protection for longshoremen injured on
navigable waters. The fact that these workers had been
characterized as "maritime" in the cases that had denied them
adequate state protection explains why Congress later used the same
term in the LHWCA.
The second chapter (which covers the period from 1927 to 1972)
explains why it was necessary for Congress to limit the
Page 459 U. S. 338
coverage of the LHWCA to a defined category of employees. As
originally enacted in 1927, the LHWCA was merely intended to fill
the gap in state coverage that had been created by
Jensen
and its progeny. [
Footnote 2/17]
The provision that defined the scope of coverage, § 903(a) (which
remained unchanged until 1972), purported to exclude federal
coverage if recovery may "validly be provided by State law." At
first, the statutory language was taken literally, and state and
federal coverage were thought to be purely complementary and
mutually exclusive.
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.
22,
285 U. S. 39,
and n. 3 (1932). But given the imprecision of the
Jensen-Rohde line, that system risked serious unfairness:
if an injured employee asked for state benefits and was seaward of
the line, a literalist interpretation of the LHWCA would bar
recovery. An employee close to the line might easily misguess, miss
the statute of limitations, and end up with no benefits at all.
This Court responded to this potential for injustice in two
ways. Notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, which
purported to describe mutually exclusive spheres of state and
federal jurisdiction, [
Footnote
2/18] the Court first upheld a state award in a case in which
it was assumed that the federal statute would also apply,
Davis
v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249
(1942), and then upheld a federal award in a case in which the
Court assumed that recovery could "validly be provided
Page 459 U. S. 339
by State law."
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
370 U. S. 114
(1962). [
Footnote 2/19] But the
Court's mechanism for ensuring that no employee would go entirely
unprotected created a twilight zone of overlapping jurisdiction in
which many employers were required to obtain duplicate insurance
coverage. [
Footnote 2/20]
Moreover, the practice of defining coverage entirely by reference
to the place where an accident occurred gave rise to the anomalous
circumstance that longshoremen regularly walked in and out of
coverage during the performance of their routine duties.
Whatever force the
Jensen rule may once have had, it is
now perfectly clear that a shore-based worker who is normally
covered by a state compensation program may still recover state
benefits even though he is injured over navigable waters. Surely no
Member of this Court would question the
Page 459 U. S. 340
fact that the construction worker injured in this case could
have received a state award even though he was on a barge in the
Hudson River when he was injured. The concern about the inability
of the States to protect land-based workers who may temporarily
cross the
Jensen line is no longer significant -- surely
that concern provided no motivation whatsoever for the action
Congress took in 1972 when it amended the LHWCA.
On the other hand, the 1972 Congress clearly did have reason to
be concerned about the cost of duplicate insurance coverage and the
unpredictability of coverage that depends entirely on the
happenstance of where an accident occurs. As I have mentioned
above, [
Footnote 2/21] the
unpredictability of coverage was mentioned explicitly in the
legislative history. And the burdens of duplicate insurance for
employees who might occasionally walk into federal coverage became
substantially more onerous as a result of the 1972 changes that
made federal LHWCA benefits significantly higher than state
workers' compensation benefits. [
Footnote 2/22] Both of these concerns are alleviated by
defining the scope of the statutory coverage in terms of the
status of the covered employee. And both of these concerns
can only be aggravated by indiscriminately
Page 459 U. S. 341
extending coverage to an undefined group of workers who plainly
do not "load, unload, build, or repair ships."
All that remains to support the Court's rewriting of the statute
is the absence of an expressed intent to withdraw pre-1972
coverage. As I have already noted, that intent is adequately
demonstrated by the changes in the text of the statute itself.
[
Footnote 2/23] Even if that were
not sufficient, however, the Court is really objecting to nothing
more than a failure to mention a single case decided in 1942 --
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc. -- during the hearings or
the debates. But when one considers the highly unusual facts of
that case, it is unlikely that any Member of Congress had it in
mind, and virtually inconceivable that Congress would have wanted
to provide federal coverage for similar future cases. The employee
in the
Parker case -- a janitor for a small boat concern
located on the James River -- was not protected by a state
workmen's compensation program for a reason that had nothing to do
with the character of his employment or the place of his injury.
The employer did not have the minimum number of employees to bring
it under the Virginia statute.
See Motor Boat Sales, Inc. v.
Parker, 116 F.2d 789, 793 (CA4 1941). The happenstance that
the janitor was riding in a motorboat at the time of his injury
enabled the Court to find a basis for sustaining an award under the
LHWCA as it was then written. [
Footnote 2/24] Even if the presumption that Congress
understands the legal context in which it legislates justifies
Page 459 U. S. 342
the inference that it remembered this isolated case decided
three decades earlier, it by no means follows that Congress had a
duty to disavow the case explicitly in order to give effect to its
otherwise plainly expressed purpose. [
Footnote 2/25]
This case presents us with a straightforward problem of
statutory construction. The Court should begin its analysis with
the language of the statute itself. "Absent a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."
Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.
S. 102,
447 U. S. 108
(1980). In this case, the statutory language plainly encompasses
longshoremen and harbor workers; there is no affirmative evidence
of a legislative intent to provide coverage for any other type of
occupation. Surely there is no evidence of an intent to classify
the work of a janitor or a builder of sewage treatment plants as
"maritime employment." [
Footnote
2/26]
Page 459 U. S. 343
Because the claimant in this case was neither a longshoreman nor
a harbor worker, I would affirm the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
[
Footnote 2/1]
By reason of several specific statutory enactments, the LHWCA's
compensation scheme is, or has been, also applied to:
(a) employees on defense bases, Act of Aug. 16, 1941, ch. 357, §
1, 55 Stat. 622 (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. §§
1651-1654);
(b) employees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities such as
post exchanges, Act of June 19, 1952, Pub.L. 397, § 2, 66 Stat. 139
(codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. §§ 8171-8173);
(c) employees of Government contractors injured overseas by
war-risk hazards, Act of Dec. 2, 1942, ch. 668, Title I, § 102, 56
Stat. 1031 (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 1702);
(d) workers in the District of Columbia, Act of May 17, 1928,
ch. 612, 45 Stat. 600, repealed by Act of July 1, 1980, D.C. Law
3-77, § 3,
see D.C.Code § 36-301 (1981); and
(e) workers on oil drilling rigs on the Outer Continental Shelf,
Act of Aug. 7, 1953, Pub.L. 212, § 4(C), 67 Stat. 463 (codified, as
amended, at 43 U.S.C. § 1333(C))
In this case, however, we are concerned with the coverage
provided by the LHWCA itself.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Coincidentally, two authors named Sutherland have made this
point in language that is strikingly suitable to this case.
See W. Sutherland, The Shipbuilder's Assistant 77 (1756)
("[T]he straiter and
snuger the Sheer lies, the less Wind
is held to hinder the Motion of the Ship") (emphasis added); J.
Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 273 (1891)
(footnote omitted) ("The words "other persons," following in a
statute the words "warehousemen" and "wharfinger," must be
understood to refer to other persons
ejusdem generis,
viz., those who are engaged in a like business, or who conduct
the business of warehousemen or wharfingers with some other
pursuit, such as shipping, grinding, or manufacturing").
[
Footnote 2/3]
Seamen are protected under the Jones Act.
See 46 U.S.C.
§ 688.
[
Footnote 2/4]
See H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441, p. 11 (1972); S.Rep. No.
92-1125, p. 13 (1972);
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v.
Caputo, 432 U. S. 249
(1977).
[
Footnote 2/5]
The 1972 Amendments made two changes that are relevant here.
First, they modified the definitions in 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3) and
902(4). Before the Amendments, the definitions read:
"(3) The term 'employee' does not include a master or member of
a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load
or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net."
"(4) The term 'employer' means an employer any of whose
employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part,
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry
dock)."
§§ 902(3), (4) (1970 ed.). As amended in 1972, the definitions
read:
"(3) The term 'employee' means any person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in
longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship
repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not
include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net."
"(4) The term 'employer' means an employer any of whose
employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part,
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any
adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine
railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in
loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel)."
Second, the Amendments modified the section defining covered
injuries, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). Before the Amendments, it read:
"Compensation shall be payable under this Act in respect of
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of
the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the
disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may
not validly be provided by State law. No compensation shall be
payable in respect of the disability or death of -- "
"(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net; or"
"(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of any political
subdivision thereof."
§ 903(a) (1970 ed.). As amended in 1972, the section reads:
"Compensation shall be payable under this Act in respect of
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of
the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock,
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
or building a vessel). No compensation shall be payable in respect
of the disability or death of -- "
"(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net; or"
"(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of any political
subdivision thereof."
86 Stat. 1251, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act Amendments of 1972.
[
Footnote 2/6]
The Court assumes that the words "traditionally covered" in the
Committee Reports are intended to refer to employees who are not
longshoremen or harbor workers.
Ante at
459 U. S. 319,
quoting S.Rep. No. 92-1125, at 16.
See 459
U.S. 297fn2/1|>n. 1,
supra. In particular, the
Court assumes that the Committee was referring to the claimants in
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.
S. 244 (1941),
Davis v. Department of Labor,
317 U. S. 249
(1942), and
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
370 U. S. 114
(1962). As I point out in
459 U. S.
infra, the
Calbeck claimants were shipbuilders, a
subcategory of the statutorily defined class of harbor workers, who
are, of course, still covered under the 1972 Act;
Davis
held only that the claimant was entitled to state benefits; and
Parker was plainly not a "traditional" LHWCA case. None of
these cases was cited at any time in the hearings or the Reports.
In my opinion, the reference to the "traditional" coverage of the
Act was intended to identify the coverage of longshoremen and
harbor workers, as opposed to the special categories of coverage
defined by specific statutory enactment.
[
Footnote 2/7]
See 459
U.S. 297fn2/1|>n. 1,
supra.
[
Footnote 2/8]
None of the original bills proposing amendments to the LHWCA in
1972 embodied any change in the scope of coverage.
See
H.R. 247; H.R. 3505; H.R. 12006; H.R. 15023; S. 2318; S. 525; S.
1547 (all in 92d Cong., 2d Sess.). The changes were incorporated
between the hearings and the final Committee action.
See
H.R. 12006; S. 2318 (as reported). The hearings are nonetheless
relevant, because they give more direct evidence of what groups the
legislators intended to protect than does the history of pre-1972
Supreme Court decisions.
[
Footnote 2/9]
E.g., Statement of James Hodgson, Secretary of Labor,
House Hearings, at 47-64 (referring throughout to "longshoremen"
and the "longshore industry"); Statement of Ralph Hartman,
Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
id. at 67 ("reference to the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act seems to
suggest that the only industry involved is
longshoring,' which
fails to recognize that the act is also applicable to shipbuilding
and ship repair yards -- and to the District of Columbia");
Exhibits D1, D2, E, and F to Statement of James Flynn, New York
Shipping Association, id. at 98-100 (pointing out how
hazardous longshoring is); Statement of Howard McGuigan, AFL-CIO,
id. at 255-258 (pointing out how LHWCA benefits were far
below 66 2/3% of current wage levels in the longshore industry, in
the shipbuilding and ship repair industry, and in the District of
Columbia). Cf. Statement of John J. O'Donnell, Air Line
Pilots Association, id. at 327-329 (suggesting that
coverage be extended to flight crews).
[
Footnote 2/10]
The Minority Counsel, Eugene Mittelman, had the following
exchange with a representative of the AFL-CIO:
"Mr. MITTELMAN. My last question concerns the fact that the
longshoreman [
sic] applies only when the man is over the
navigable waters of the United States, and, under whole series of
court decisions, there has been established a line where the
provisions of the Longshore Act apply when the man is over the
water, and yet the provisions of the State workmen's compensation
law applies if the man is injured on land."
* * * *
"Do you have any position on this, concerning whether the
Federal law should be extended, really, so that a uniform system of
benefits is applicable to longshoremen, regardless of which side of
the waterline the injury occurred on?"
"Mr. McGUIGAN. The first position we would have is that
obviously there would be no incentive to cover him under the act
until we know the act gives him benefits superior to the State
workmen's compensation laws."
"Mr. MITTELMAN. I appreciate that. But assuming we would amend
the act to provide a reasonable schedule of benefits as proposed in
this bill, would you favor the principle of extending of the
Longshore Act to cover all longshore workers whether performed on
land or over water?"
* * * *
"Mr. O'BRIEN. . . . [I]f the act were amended to take up its
former place of prominence in the field of workmen's compensation,
we would certainly like to see the coverage of the act
extended."
Hearings on S. 2318
et al. before the Subcommittee on
Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., 73-74 (1972).
[
Footnote 2/11]
The language of the Committee Reports shows how clearly Congress
understood who was to be covered:
"The present Act, insofar as longshoremen and ship builders and
ship repairmen are concerned, covers only injuries which occur
'upon the navigable waters of the United States.' Thus, coverage of
the present Act stops at the water's edge; injuries occurring on
land are covered by State Workmen's Compensation laws. The result
is a disparity in benefits payable for death or disability for the
same type of injury depending on which side of the water's edge and
in which State the accident occurs."
* * * *
"The Committee believes that the compensation payable to a
longshoreman or a ship repairman or a builder should not depend on
the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury occurred on land
or over water. Accordingly, the bill would amend the Act to provide
coverage of longshoremen, harbor workers, ship repairmen, ship
builders, shipbreakers, and other employees engaged in maritime
employment (excluding masters and members of the crew of a vessel)
if the injury occurred either upon the navigable waters of the
United States or any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal,
building way, marine railway, or other area adjoining such
navigable waters customarily used by an employer in loading,
unloading, repairing, or building a vessel."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441, at 10; S.Rep. No. 92-1125, at 12-13.
[
Footnote 2/12]
Arguably, one other case, mentioned in a footnote of the Court's
opinion,
ante at
459 U. S. 312,
n. 21, echoed
Parker's broad construction of the scope of
LHWCA coverage.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. O'Rourke,
344 U. S. 334
(1953). There, this Court struck down an award of benefits under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, reasoning that the employee
in that case -- a brakeman who worked moving freight cars onto "car
floats" -- could have recovered under the LHWCA. The opinion in
O'Rourke is somewhat cloudy, however, since it does not
explicitly state that the particular employee was engaged in
maritime employment, but only that his employer had such employees.
Id. at
344 U. S.
339-340. Like the cases on which the Court relies,
O'Rourke was not mentioned in the 1972 legislative
history.
[
Footnote 2/13]
The Court reasoned:
"The work of a stevedore in which the deceased was engaging is
maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the
injuries which he received were likewise maritime; and the rights
and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were matters
clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction."
"If New York can subject foreign ships coming into her ports to
such obligations as those imposed by her Compensation Statute,
other States may do likewise. The necessary consequence would be
destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime matters
which the Constitution was designed to establish, and freedom of
navigation between the States and with foreign countries would be
seriously hampered and impeded."
244 U.S. at
244 U. S. 217
(citation omitted).
[
Footnote 2/14]
See id. at
244 U. S.
218-223 (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149,
253 U. S.
166-170 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Washington
v. W. C. Dawson Co., 264 U. S. 219,
264 U. S.
228-239 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 2/15]
In explaining why the holding in
Rohde was consistent
with
Jensen and subsequent cases, the Court stated:
"In each of them, the employment or contract was maritime in
nature, and the rights and liabilities of the parties were
prescribed by general rules of maritime law essential to its proper
harmony and uniformity. Here, the parties contracted with reference
to the state statute; their rights and liabilities had no direct
relation to navigation, and the application of the local law cannot
materially affect any rules of the sea whose uniformity is
essential."
257 U.S. at
257 U. S.
477.
[
Footnote 2/16]
The
Strand case was decided in 1928, but arose out of
an injury that had occurred in 1924, prior to the enactment of the
LHWCA.
[
Footnote 2/17]
"The main impetus for the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act was the need to correct a gap made plain by
decisions of this Court. We believe that there is only one
interpretation of the proviso in § 3(a) which would accord with the
aim of Congress; the field in which a state may not validly provide
for compensation must be taken, for the purposes of the Act, as the
same field which the
Jensen line of decision excluded from
state compensation laws. Without affirming or rejecting the
constitutional implications of those cases, we accept them
as the measure by which Congress intended to mark the scope of the
Act they brought into existence."
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. at
314 U. S.
250.
[
Footnote 2/18]
See Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. at
317 U. S. 261
(Stone, C.J., dissenting);
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance
Co., 370 U.S. at
370 U. S. 132
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 2/19]
The Court relies heavily on the proposition that Congress did
not wish "to repeal
Calbeck" (
ante at
459 U. S.
321). It is, of course, true that the claimants in that
case are still covered by the Act. What Congress repealed was the
statutory language that appeared to preclude coverage for harbor
workers like the
Calbeck claimants who were injured in the
maritime but local area. The problem confronted by the Court in
Calbeck simply no longer exists.
[
Footnote 2/20]
In 1942, this Court observed:
"The horns of the jurisdictional dilemma press as sharply on
employers as on employees. In the face of the cases referred to
above, the most competent counsel may be unable to predict on which
side of the line particular employment will fall. The employer's
contribution to a state insurance fund may therefore wholly fail to
protect him against the liabilities for which it was specifically
planned. If this very case is affirmed, for example, the employer
will not only lose the benefit of the state insurance to which he
has been compelled to contribute, and by which he has thought
himself secured against loss for accidents to his employees; he
must also, by virtue of the conclusion that the employee was
subject to the federal act at the time of the accident, become
liable for substantial additional payments. He will also be subject
to fine and imprisonment for the misdemeanor of having failed, as
is apparently the case, to secure payment for the employee under
the federal act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 938, 932."
Davis, 317 U.S. at
317 U. S. 255.
On that point, the dissenter was in complete agreement.
See
id. at
317 U. S. 262
(Stone, C.J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 2/21]
See supra at
459 U. S.
332-334
[
Footnote 2/22]
Before 1972, the financial burden of duplicate coverage had not
been particularly heavy. LHWCA benefits were low, and insurance
carriers offered to cover operations subject to the LHWCA for only
a nominal addition to the state workers' compensation premiums.
See Note, 50 Calif.L.Rev. 342, 347 (1962); Comment, 30
NACCA L.J. 200, 203, 206 (1964); Gardner, Remedies for Personal
Injuries to Seamen, Railroadmen, and Longshoremen, 71 Harv.L.Rev.
438, 449-450, and n. 34 (1958).
Today, of course, things are quite different. In 1981, LHWCA
premiums averaged 252 percent higher than California construction
worker premiums, and 160 percent higher than Florida premiums.
See Testimony of the Associated General Contractors of
America, Hearings on S. 1182 before the Subcommittee on Labor of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resource, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 924-936 (1981).
[
Footnote 2/23]
The "status" provision replaced the "unless recovery may validly
be provided by state law" language that was being construed in
Parker and
Calbeck.
[
Footnote 2/24]
In 1942, as it does today, the LHWCA expressly excluded coverage
of injuries to members of the crew of any vessel and to persons who
load or unload small boats.
See 459
U.S. 297fn2/5|>n. 5,
supra. Thus, a janitor could
not recover on the theory that he was a member of the crew of the
motorboat, or that he helped to load or unload the motorboat. It is
difficult to explain the narrow category of workmen associated with
motorboat operations for whom
Parker expressed concern or
for whom the Court preserves coverage today.
[
Footnote 2/25]
The Court cites three cases from the Federal District Courts,
three from the Courts of Appeals, and one from a state appellate
court in which workers who were not longshoremen or harbor workers
were stated to have been covered by the LHWCA before 1972.
Ante at
459 U. S. 312,
n. 21. It uses these cases to support its argument that it would
have been a radical and unsettling change for the 1972 Congress to
limit post-1972 coverage to people who perform the work of
longshoremen and harbor workers. I would draw a somewhat different
inference. It is hard to believe that Congress had in mind such a
light sprinkling of cases during the 45-year interval between 1927
and 1972 when it spoke of the traditional coverage of the Act,
especially given Congressman Daniels' reminder that, in 1970, there
were 68,000 injuries to longshoremen.
See supra at
459 U. S.
332.
[
Footnote 2/26]
I note some tension among different components of the Court's
opinion with regard to whether the janitor in
Parker would
be covered after 1972. On the one hand, the Court states:
"Before 1972 . . .
any worker injured upon navigable
waters in the course of employment was 'covered . . . without any
inquiry into what he was doing (or supposed to be doing) at the
time of his injury. . . .'"
Ante at
459 U. S.
311.
"We are unable to find any congressional intent to withdraw
coverage of the LHWCA from those workers injured on navigable
waters in the course of their employment, and who would have been
covered by the Act before 1972."
Ante at
459 U. S. 315.
"Congress . . . assumed that injuries occurring on the actual
navigable waters were covered, and would remain covered."
Ante at
459 U. S. 319.
On the other hand, it concludes:
"Our holding, of course, extends only to those persons
'traditionally covered' before the 1972 Amendments. We express no
opinion whether such coverage extends to a worker injured while
transiently or fortuitously upon actual navigable waters. . . . Our
decision today should not be read as exempting water-based workers
from the new status test. Rather, our holding is simply a
recognition that a worker's performance of his duties upon actual
navigable waters is necessarily a very important factor. . . ."
Ante at
459 U. S. 324,
n. 34.
Similarly, at one point, the Court says
"[Congress'] use of 'employees traditionally covered' was
intended to refer to those employees included in the scope of
coverage under
Parker, Davis, and
Calbeck,"
anteat
459 U. S.
319-320, but at another point, it concedes that those
very cases were read "not to limit LHWCA coverage only to
"traditional" maritime activities,"
ante at
459 U. S. 312,
n. 21.
I agree with the Court that the post-1972 Act provides coverage
for "traditional" maritime activities. However, as I have indicated
supra, at
459 U. S.
328-335, Congress understood such activities to be those
of longshoremen and harbor workers, not janitors and construction
workers.