After President Carter announced certain trade restrictions with
the Soviet Union because of its intervention in Afghanistan,
respondent International Longshoremen's Association announced that
its members would not handle any cargo bound to, or coming from,
the Soviet Union. When an affiliated local union refused to load
certain goods (not included in the Presidential embargo) bound for
the Soviet Union, petitioners (hereafter collectively referred to
as the Employer) brought suit in Federal District Court against
respondents, the international union, its officers and agents, and
the local union (hereafter collectively referred to as the Union),
pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. The
Employer alleged that the Union's work stoppage violated the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement which contained a no-strike
clause and a provision requiring arbitration of disputes. As
requested by the Employer, the court ordered the Union to arbitrate
the question whether the work stoppage violated the collective
bargaining agreement, and granted a preliminary injunction pending
arbitration. The court reasoned that the political motivation
behind the work stoppage rendered inapplicable § 4 of the Norris-La
Guardia Act, which prohibits injunctions against strikes "in any
case involving or growing out of any labor dispute." The Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court's order insofar as it required
arbitration, but disagreed with the conclusion that the Norris-La
Guardia Act was not applicable.
Held:
1. The Norris-La Guardia Act applies to this case, which
involves a "labor dispute" even though the work stoppage was
politically motivated. Pp.
457 U. S. 709-720.
(a) The plain language of the Act -- prohibiting injunctions in
"any" labor dispute and defining "labor dispute" to include "any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment" -- does
not except labor disputes having their genesis in political
protests. Here, the Employer sought injunctive relief as to the
dispute over whether the work stoppage violated the no-strike
clause of the bargaining agreement, not as to
Page 457 U. S. 703
the event that triggered the stoppage. The term "labor dispute"
must not be narrowly construed, the critical element in determining
whether the Act applies being whether, as here, "the
employer-employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy."
Columbia River Packers Assn. v. Hinton, 315 U.
S. 143,
315 U. S. 147.
The existence of noneconomic motives does not make the Act
inapplicable. Pp.
457 U. S.
710-715.
(b) The legislative history of both the Norris-La Guardia Act
and the 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act
indicates that the Norris-La Guardia Act was intended to apply to
politically motivated work stoppages. Pp.
457 U. S.
715-719.
(c) The Norris-La Guardia Act's broad prohibitions will not be
constricted, except in narrowly defined situations where
accommodation of the Act to specific congressional policy is
necessary. Pp.
457 U. S.
719-720.
2. Nor may the Union's work stoppage here be enjoined, pending
arbitration, under the rationale of
Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235, and
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.
S. 397, on the asserted ground that the dispute
underlying the stoppage is arbitrable under the collective
bargaining agreement. While
Boys Markets recognized an
exception to the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La
Guardia Act when the employer sought to enforce the union's
contractual obligation to arbitrate grievances rather than to
strike over them,
Buffalo Forge makes it clear that a
Boys Markets injunction pending arbitration may not issue
unless the dispute underlying the work stoppage is arbitrable. Here
the underlying dispute, whether viewed as an expression of the
Union's "moral outrage" at Soviet military policy or as an
expression of sympathy for the people of Afghanistan, is plainly
not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement. Thus the
strike may not be enjoined pending the arbitrator's ruling on the
legality of the strike under the no-strike clause of the collective
bargaining agreement. Pp.
457 U. S.
720-723.
626 F.2d 455, affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p.
457 U. S. 724.
BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which POWELL, J.,
joined,
post, p.
457 U. S. 724.
POWELL, J.,
post, p.
457 U. S. 729,
and STEVENS, J.,
post, p.
457 U. S. 730,
filed dissenting opinions.
Page 457 U. S. 704
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider the power of a federal court to enjoin
a politically motivated work stoppage in an action brought by an
employer pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), to enforce a union's
obligations under a collective bargaining agreement. We first
address whether the broad anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 101
et
seq., apply to politically motivated work stoppages. Finding
these provisions applicable, we then consider whether the work
stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of
Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235
(1970), and
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers,
428 U. S. 397
(1976), pending an arbitrator's decision on whether the strike
violates the collective bargaining agreement.
I
On January 4, 1980, President Carter announced that, due to the
Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, certain trade with the
Soviet Union would be restricted. Superphosphoric acid (SPA), used
in agricultural fertilizer, was not included in the Presidential
embargo. [
Footnote 1] On
January 9, 1980,
Page 457 U. S. 705
respondent International Longshoremen's Association (ILA)
announced that its members would not handle any cargo bound to, or
coming from, the Soviet Union or carried on Russian ships.
[
Footnote 2] In accordance with
this resolution, respondent local union, an ILA affiliate, refused
to load SPA bound for the Soviet Union aboard three ships that
arrived at the shipping terminal operated by petitioner
Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. (JBT), at the Port of
Jacksonville, Fla., during the month of January, 1980.
In response to this work stoppage, petitioners JBT, Hooker
Chemical Corp., and Occidental Petroleum Co. (collectively referred
to as the Employer) [
Footnote
3] brought this action
Page 457 U. S. 706
pursuant to § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), against
respondents ILA, its affiliated local union, and its officers and
agents (collectively referred to as the Union). The Employer
alleged that the Union's work stoppage violated the collective
bargaining agreement between the Union and JBT. The Employer sought
to compel arbitration under the agreement, requested a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction pending arbitration,
and sought damages.
The agreement contains both a broad no-strike clause and a
provision requiring the resolution of all disputes through a
grievance procedure, ending in arbitration. [
Footnote 4] The no-strike clause provides:
"During the term of this Agreement, . . . the Union agrees there
shall not be any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever, . . . for
any cause whatsoever; such causes including but not limited to,
unfair labor practices by the Employer or violation of this
Agreement. The right of employees not to cross a bona fide picket
line is recognized by the Employer. . . ."
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida ordered the Union to process its grievance in accordance
with the contractual grievance procedure. The District Court also
granted the Employer's request for a preliminary injunction pending
arbitration, reasoning that the political
Page 457 U. S. 707
motivation behind the work stoppage rendered the Norris-La
Guardia Act's anti-injunction provisions inapplicable.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's order to the extent it required
arbitration of the question whether the work stoppage violated the
collective bargaining agreement.
New Orleans Steamship Assn. v.
General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (1980). [
Footnote 5] However, the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the District Court's conclusion that the provisions
of the Norris-La Guardia Act are inapplicable to politically
motivated work stoppages. Relying on
Buffalo Forge, the
Court of Appeals further held that the Employer was not entitled to
an injunction pending arbitration, because the underlying dispute
was not arbitrable. We granted certiorari, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981),
and agree with the Court of Appeals that the provisions of the
Norris-La Guardia Act apply to this case, and that, under
Buffalo Forge, an injunction pending arbitration may not
issue.
II
Section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act provides in part:
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any
case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any
person or persons participating or interested in such dispute . . .
from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following
acts:"
"(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment."
47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 104.
Page 457 U. S. 708
Congress adopted this broad prohibition to remedy the growing
tendency of federal courts to enjoin strikes by narrowly construing
the Clayton Act's labor exemption from the Sherman Act's
prohibition against conspiracies to restrain trade,
see 29
U.S.C. § 52.
See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess., 7-8, 10-11 (1932). This Court has consistently given the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act a broad
interpretation, recognizing exceptions only in limited situations
where necessary to accommodate the Act to specific federal
legislation or paramount congressional policy.
See, e.g., Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. at
398 U. S.
249-253;
Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Indiana R. Co., 353 U. S. 30,
353 U. S. 39-42
(1957)
The
Boys Markets exception, as refined in
Buffalo
Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397
(1976), is relevant to our decision today. In
Boys
Markets, this Court re-examined
Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195
(1962), which held that the Norris-La Guardia Act precludes a
federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a
collective bargaining agreement, even where that agreement contains
provisions for binding arbitration of the grievance concerning
which the strike was called. 398 U.S. at
398 U. S.
237-238. The Court overruled
Sinclair and held
that, in order to accommodate the anti-injunction provisions of
Norris-La Guardia to the subsequently enacted provisions of §
301(a) and the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, it was
essential to recognize an exception to the anti-injunction
provisions for cases in which the employer sought to enforce the
union's contractual obligation to arbitrate grievances rather than
to strike over them. 398 U.S. at
398 U. S.
249-253. [
Footnote
6]
After
Boys Markets, the Courts of Appeals divided on
the question whether a strike could be enjoined under the
Boys
Page 457 U. S. 709
Markets exception to the Norris-La Guardia Act pending
arbitration, when the strike was not over a grievance that the
union had agreed to arbitrate. [
Footnote 7] In
Buffalo Forge, the Court resolved
this conflict and held that the
Boys Markets exception
does not apply when only the question whether the strike violates
the no-strike pledge, and not the dispute that precipitated the
strike, is arbitrable under the parties' collective bargaining
agreement. [
Footnote 8]
The Employer argues that the Norris-La Guardia Act does not
apply in this case because the political motivation underlying the
Union's work stoppage removes this controversy from that Act's
definition of a "labor dispute." Alternatively, the Employer argues
that this case fits within the exception to that Act recognized in
Boys Markets as refined in
Buffalo Forge. We
review these arguments in turn.
III
At the outset, we must determine whether this is a "case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute" within the meaning
of § 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104. Section 13(c)
of the Act broadly defines the term "labor dispute" to include "any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment." 47 Stat.
73, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c). [
Footnote
9]
Page 457 U. S. 710
The Employer argues that the existence of political motives
takes this work stoppage controversy outside the broad scope of
this definition. This argument, however, has no basis in the plain
statutory language of the Norris-La Guardia Act or in our prior
interpretations of that Act. Furthermore, the argument is
contradicted by the legislative history of not only the Norris-La
Guardia Act but also the 1947 amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).
A
An action brought by an employer against the union representing
its employees to enforce a no-strike pledge generally involves two
controversies. First, there is the "underlying dispute," which is
the event or condition that triggers the work stoppage. This
dispute may or may not be political, and it may or may not be
arbitrable under the parties' collective bargaining agreement.
Second, there is the parties' dispute over whether the no-strike
pledge prohibits the work stoppage at issue. This second dispute
can always form the basis for federal court jurisdiction, because §
301(a) gives federal courts jurisdiction over "[s]uits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
It is beyond cavil that the second form of dispute -- whether
the collective bargaining agreement either forbids or permits the
union to refuse to perform certain work -- is a "controversy
concerning the terms or conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. §
113(c). This § 301 action was brought to resolve just such a
controversy. In its complaint, the Employer did not seek to enjoin
the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, nor did it ask
the District Court to decide whether the Union was justified in
expressing disapproval of the Soviet Union's actions. Instead, the
Employer
Page 457 U. S. 711
sought to enjoin the Union's decision not to provide labor, a
decision which the Employer believed violated the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. It is this contract dispute, and
not the political dispute, that the arbitrator will resolve, and on
which the courts are asked to rule.
The language of the Norris-La Guardia Act does not except labor
disputes having their genesis in political protests. Nor is there
any basis in the statutory language for the argument that the Act
requires that
each dispute relevant to the case be a labor
dispute. The Act merely requires that the case involve "any" labor
dispute. Therefore, the plain terms of § 4(a) and § 13 of the
Norris-La Guardia Act deprive the federal courts of the power to
enjoin the Union's work stoppage in this § 301 action, without
regard to whether the Union also has a nonlabor dispute with
another entity. [
Footnote
10]
The conclusion that this case involves a labor dispute within
the meaning of the Norris-La Guardia Act comports with this Court's
consistent interpretation of that Act. [
Footnote 11] Our
Page 457 U. S. 712
decisions have recognized that the term "labor dispute" must not
be narrowly construed, because the statutory definition itself is
extremely broad and because Congress deliberately included a broad
definition to overrule judicial decisions that had unduly
restricted the Clayton Act's labor exemption from the antitrust
laws. For example, in
Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama
S.S. Co., 362 U. S. 365,
362 U. S. 369
(1960), the Court observed:
"Th[e] Act's language is broad. The language is broad because
Congress
was intent upon taking the federal courts out of the
labor injunction business except in the very limited
circumstances left open for federal jurisdiction under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. The history and background that led Congress
to take this view have been adverted to in a number of prior
opinions of this Court in which we refused to give the Act narrow
interpretations that would have restored many labor dispute
controversies to the courts."
(Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)
The critical element in determining whether the provisions of
the Norris-La Guardia Act apply is whether "the employer-employee
relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy."
Page 457 U. S. 713
Columbia River Packers Assn., Inc. v. Hinton,
315 U. S. 143,
315 U. S. 147
(1942). In this case, the Employer and the Union representing its
employees are the disputants, and their dispute concerns the
interpretation of the labor contract that defines their
relationship. [
Footnote 12]
Thus, the employer-employee relationship is the matrix of this
controversy.
Nevertheless, the Employer argues that a "labor dispute" exists
only when the Union's action is taken in its own "economic
self-interest." The Employer cites
Musicians v. Carroll,
391 U. S. 99
(1968), and
Columbia River Packers Assn., supra, for this
proposition. In these cases, however, the Court addressed the very
different question whether the relevant parties were "labor" groups
involved in a labor dispute for the purpose of determining whether
their actions were exempt from the antitrust laws. [
Footnote 13] These cases do not hold
Page 457 U. S. 714
that a union's noneconomic motive inevitably takes the dispute
out of the Norris-La Guardia Act, but only that the protections of
that Act do not extend to labor organizations when they cease to
act as labor groups or when they enter into illegal combinations
with nonlabor groups in restraint of trade. [
Footnote 14] Here, there is no question that the
Union is a labor group, representing its own interests in a dispute
with the Employer over the employees' obligation to provide
labor.
Even in cases where the disputants did not stand in the
relationship of employer and employee, this Court has held that the
existence of noneconomic motives does not make the Norris-La
Guardia Act inapplicable. For example, in
New Negro Alliance v.
Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552
(1938), this Court held that the Norris-La Guardia Act prohibited
an injunction against picketing by members of a civic group, which
was aimed at inducing a store to employ Negro employees. In
determining that the group and its members were "persons interested
in a labor dispute" within the meaning of § 13, the Court found it
immaterial that the picketers, who were neither union organizers
nor store employees, were not asserting economic interests commonly
associated with labor unions --
e.g., terms and conditions
of employment in the narrower sense of wages, hours, unionization,
or betterment of working conditions.
Id. at
303 U. S. 560.
Although the lower courts found Norris-La Guardia inapplicable
because the picketing was motivated by the group's "political" or
"social" goals of improving the position of Negroes generally, and
not by the desire to improve specific conditions of employment,
this Court reasoned: "The Act does not concern itself
Page 457 U. S. 715
with the background or the motives of the dispute."
Id.
at
303 U. S.
561.
B
The Employer's argument that the Union's motivation for engaging
in a work stoppage determines whether the Norris-La Guardia Act
applies is also contrary to the legislative history of that Act.
The Act was enacted in response to federal court intervention on
behalf of employers through the use of injunctive powers against
unions and other associations of employees. This intervention had
caused the federal judiciary to fall into disrepute among large
segments of this Nation's population.
See generally S.Rep.
No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 8, 16-18 (1932); 75 Cong.Rec. 4915
(1932) (remarks of Sen. Wagner).
Apart from the procedural unfairness of many labor injunctions,
one of the greatest evils associated with them was the use of tort
law doctrines, which often made the lawfulness of a strike depend
upon judicial views of social and economic policy.
See,
e.g., Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance
Arbitration, 30 Rocky Mountain L.Rev. 247, 256 (1958). In debating
the Act, its supporters repeatedly expressed disapproval of this
Court's interpretations of the Clayton Act's labor exemption --
interpretations which permitted a federal judge to find the Act
inapplicable based on his or her appraisal of the "legitimacy" of
the union's objectives. [
Footnote 15]
See, e.g., 75 Cong.Rec. 4916 (1932)
(remarks of Sen. Wagner) (definition of labor dispute expanded to
override
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U. S. 443
(1921) (holding a strike and picketing with the purpose of
unionizing a plant not a labor dispute because the objectives were
not legitimate and there was no employer-employee relationship
between the disputants)); 75 Cong.Rec. at
Page 457 U. S. 716
5487-5488 (remarks of Rep. Celler) (bill brought forth to remedy
decisions allowing injunction in
Duplex and in
Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters, 274 U. S.
37 (1927) (holding that decision by workers not to work
on nonunion goods not a labor dispute)).
See also 75
Cong.Rec. at 4686 (remarks of Sen. Hebert) (Committee minority
agreed that injunctions should not have issued in
Bedford
and
Duplex).
See generally H.R.Rep. No. 669, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess., 8, 10-11 (1932). The legislative history is
replete with criticisms of the ability of powerful employers to use
federal judges as "strike-breaking" agencies; by virtue of their
almost unbridled "equitable discretion," federal judges could enter
injunctions based on their disapproval of the employees'
objectives, or on the theory that these objectives or actions,
although lawful if pursued by a single employee, became unlawful
when pursued through the "conspiracy" of concerted activity.
See, e.g., 75 Cong.Rec. at 4928-4938, 5466-5468,
5478-5481, 5487-5490.
Furthermore, the question whether the Norris-La Guardia Act
would apply to politically motivated strikes was brought to the
attention of the 72d Congress when it passed the Act. Opponents
criticized the definition of "labor dispute" in § 13(c) on the
ground that it would cover politically motivated strikes.
Representative Beck argued that federal courts should have
jurisdiction to enjoin political strikes like those threatened by
labor unions in Europe.
Id. at 5471-5473 (discussing
threatened strike by British unions protesting the cancellation of
leases held by Communist Party members, and threatened strikes by
Belgian unions protesting a decision to supply military aid to
Poland). [
Footnote 16] In
response, Representative Oliver argued that the federal courts
should not have the power to enjoin such strikes.
Id. at
5480-5481.
Page 457 U. S. 717
Finally, Representative Beck offered an amendment to the Act
that would have permitted federal courts to enjoin strikes called
for ulterior purposes, including political motives. This amendment
was defeated soundly.
See id. at 5507.
Further support for our conclusion that Congress believed that
the Norris-La Guardia Act applies to work stoppages instituted for
political reasons can be found in the legislative history of the
1947 amendments to the NLRA. That history reveals that Congress
rejected a proposal to repeal the Norris-La Guardia Act with
respect to one broad category of political strikes. [
Footnote 17] The House bill included
definitions of various kinds of labor disputes.
See H.R.
3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2, 1 Legislative History of the LMRA
158, 160 (1947) (Leg.Hist.); H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1, 119 (1947), 1 Leg.Hist. 292, 309-310. Of relevance here,
§ 2(13) defined a "sympathy" strike as a strike
"called or conducted not by reason of any dispute between the
employer and the employees on strike or participating in such
concerted interference, but rather by reason of either (A) a
dispute involving another employer or other employees of the same
employer, or (B)
disagreement with some governmental
policy."
H.R. 3020, § 2(13), 1 Leg.Hist. 168 (emphasis added). Section 12
of the House bill made this kind of strike "unlawful concerted
activity," and "it remove[d] the immunities that the present laws
confer upon persons who engage in them." H.R.Rep. No. 245,
supra, at 23, 1 Leg.Hist.
Page 457 U. S. 718
314. In particular, the Norris-La Guardia Act would not apply to
suits brought by private parties to enjoin such activity, and
damages could be recovered.
See H.R.Rep. No. 245,
supra, at 23-24, 43-44, 1 Leg.Hist. 314-315, 334-335. In
explaining these provisions, the House Report stated that strikes
"against a policy of national or local government, which the
employer cannot change," should be made unlawful, and that
"[t]he bill makes inapplicable in such suits the Norris-La
Guardia Act, which heretofore has protected parties to industrial
strife from the consequences of their lawlessness."
H.R.Rep. No. 245,
supra, at 24, 44, 1 Leg.Hist. 315,
335.
The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version, which had
eliminated these provisions of the House bill. [
Footnote 18] The House Managers' statement
accompanying the Conference Report explained that its
recommendation did not go as far as the House bill, that § 8(b)
prohibits jurisdictional strikes and illegal secondary boycotts,
and that the Board,
not private parties, may petition a
district court under § 10(k) or § 10(
l) to enjoin these
activities notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia
Act. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 36, 42-43, 57,
58-59 (1947), 1 Leg.Hist. 540, 546-547, 561, 562-563. In short,
Congress declined in 1947 to adopt a broad "political motivation"
exception to the Norris-La Guardia Act for strikes in protest of
some governmental policy. Instead, if a strike of this nature
Page 457 U. S. 719
takes the form of a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8(b),
Congress chose to give the Board, not private parties, the power to
petition a federal district court for an injunction.
See
29 U.S.C. §§ 160(k), 160(
l).
Cf. Longshoremen v.
Allied International, Inc., 456 U. S. 212
(1982).
C
This case, brought by the Employer to enforce its collective
bargaining agreement with the Union, involves a "labor dispute"
within any common sense meaning of that term. Were we to ignore
this plain interpretation and hold that the political motivation
underlying the work stoppage removes this controversy from the
prohibitions of the Norris-La Guardia Act, we would embroil federal
judges in the very scrutiny of "legitimate objectives" that
Congress intended to prevent when it passed that Act. The
applicability not only of § 4, but also of all of the procedural
protections embodied in that Act, would turn on a single federal
judge's perception of the motivation underlying the concerted
activity. [
Footnote 19] The
Employer's interpretation is simply inconsistent with the
Page 457 U. S. 720
need, expressed by Congress when it enacted the Norris-La
Guardia Act, for clear "mileposts for judges to follow." 75
Cong.Rec. 4935 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bratton).
In essence, the Employer asks us to disregard the legislative
history of the Act and to distort the definition of a labor dispute
in order to reach what it believes to be an "equitable" result. The
Employer's real complaint, however, is not with the Union's
political objections to the conduct of the Soviet Union, but with
what the Employer views as the Union's breach of contract. The
Employer's frustration with this alleged breach of contract should
not be remedied by characterizing it as other than a labor dispute.
We will not adopt by judicial fiat an interpretation that Congress
specifically rejected when it enacted the 1947 amendments to the
NLRA.
See generally n 17,
supra. In the past, we have consistently
declined to constrict Norris-La Guardia's broad prohibitions except
in narrowly defined situations where accommodation of that Act to
specific congressional policy is necessary. We refuse to deviate
from that path today.
IV
Alternatively, the Employer argues that the Union's work
stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of
Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235
(1970), and
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers,
428 U. S. 397
(1976), because the dispute underlying the work stoppage is
arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement. In making
this argument, the Employer disavows its earlier argument that the
underlying dispute is purely political, and asserts that the
Union's work stoppage was motivated by a disagreement with the
Employer over the management-rights clause in the collective
bargaining agreement. The Solicitor General, in an
amicus
brief filed on behalf of the United States, agrees with the
Employer that the work stoppage may be enjoined pending
arbitration. He contends that, in addition to the political
dispute, disputes concerning both the management rights
Page 457 U. S. 721
clause and the work conditions clause underlie the work
stoppage, and that at least one of these disputes is arguably
arbitrable. [
Footnote
20]
We disagree.
Buffalo Forge makes it clear that a
Boys Markets injunction pending arbitration should not
issue unless the dispute underlying the work stoppage is
arbitrable. The rationale of
Buffalo Forge compels the
conclusion that the Union's work stoppage, called to protest the
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, may not be enjoined
pending the arbitrator's decision on whether the work stoppage
violates the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining
agreement. The underlying dispute, whether viewed as an expression
of the Union's "moral outrage" at Soviet military policy or as an
expression of sympathy for the people of Afghanistan, is plainly
not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement.
The attempts by the Solicitor General and the Employer to
characterize the underlying dispute as arbitrable do not withstand
analysis. The "underlying" disputes concerning the management
rights clause or the work conditions clause simply did not trigger
the work stoppage. To the contrary, the applicability of these
clauses to the dispute, if any, was triggered by the work stoppage
itself. Consideration of
Page 457 U. S. 722
whether the strike intruded on the management rights clause or
was permitted by the work conditions clause may inform the
arbitrator's ultimate decision on whether the strike violates the
no-strike clause. Indeed, the question whether striking over a
nonarbitrable issue violates other provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement may itself be an arbitrable dispute. The fact
remains, however, that the strike itself was not over an arbitrable
dispute, and therefore may not be enjoined pending the arbitrator's
ruling on the legality of the strike under the collective
bargaining agreement.
The weaknesses in the analysis of the Employer and the Solicitor
General can perhaps best be demonstrated by applying it to a pure
sympathy strike, which clearly cannot be enjoined pending
arbitration under the rationale of
Buffalo Forge. If this
work stoppage were a pure sympathy strike, it could be
characterized alternatively as a dispute over the Employer's right
to choose to do business with the employer embroiled in a dispute
with a sister union, as a dispute over management's right to assign
and direct work, or as a dispute over whether requiring the union
to handle goods of the employer whose employees are on strike is an
unreasonable work condition. [
Footnote 21] None of these characterizations, however,
alters the fact, essential to the rationale of
Buffalo
Forge, that the strike was not over an arbitrable issue, and
therefore did not directly frustrate the arbitration process.
The Employer's argument that this work stoppage may be enjoined
pending arbitration really reflects a fundamental
Page 457 U. S. 723
disagreement with the rationale of
Buffalo Forge, and
not a belief that this rationale permits an injunction in this
case. The Employer apparently disagrees with the
Buffalo
Forge Court's conclusion that, in agreeing to broad
arbitration and no-strike clauses, the parties do not bargain for
injunctive relief to restore the
status quo pending the
arbitrator's decision on the legality of the strike under the
collective bargaining agreement, without regard to what triggered
the strike. Instead, they bargain only for specific enforcement of
the union's promise to arbitrate the underlying grievance before
resorting to a strike.
See 428 U.S. at
428 U. S.
410-412. The Employer also apparently believes that
Buffalo Forge frustrates the arbitration process and
encourages industrial strife.
But see id. at
428 U. S. 412.
[
Footnote 22] However, this
disagreement with
Buffalo Forge only argues for
reconsidering that decision. [
Footnote 23] It does not justify distorting the rationale
of that case beyond recognition in order to reach the result urged
by the Employer.
V
In conclusion, we hold that an employer's § 301 action to
enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
allegedly violated by a union's work stoppage involves a "labor
dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-La Guardia Act, without
regard to the motivation underlying the union's
Page 457 U. S. 724
decision not to provide labor. Under our decisions in
Boys
Markets and
Buffalo Forge, when the underlying
dispute is not arbitrable, the employer may not obtain injunctive
relief pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality of the
strike under the collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
On February 25, 1980, the embargo was extended to include SPA
along with other products. On April 24, 1981, President Reagan
lifted the SPA embargo as part of his decision to remove
restrictions on the sale of grain to the Soviets. By telegrams
dated April 24, 1981, and June 5, 1981, the International
Longshoremen's Association recommended to its members that they
resume handling goods to and from the Soviet Union. Although the
work stoppage is no longer in effect, there remains a live
controversy over whether the collective bargaining agreement
prohibits politically motivated work stoppages, and the Union may
resume such a work stoppage at any time. As a result, this case is
not moot.
See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers,
428 U. S. 397,
428 U. S. 403,
n. 8 (1976).
[
Footnote 2]
The President of the ILA made the following announcement:
"In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file
members of the Union, the leadership of the ILA today ordered
immediate suspension in handling all Russian ships and all Russian
cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA
workers are employed."
"
* * * *"
"The reason for this action should be apparent in light of
international events that have affected relations between the U.S.
& Soviet Union."
"However, the decision by the Union leadership was made
necessary by the demands of the workers."
"It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian
cargoes under present conditions of the world."
"People are upset, and they refuse to continue the business as
usual policy as long as the Russians insist on being international
bully boys. It is a decision in which the Union leadership
concurs."
Brief for Respondents 2, n. 2.
[
Footnote 3]
JBT is a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxy Chemical Corp., which is
a subsidiary of Hooker. Ownership of all these corporations is
ultimately vested in Occidental. Hooker Chemical Co. manufactures
SPA at a manufacturing facility in Florida. Pursuant to a bilateral
trade agreement between Occidental and the Soviet Union, SPA is
shipped to the Soviet Union from the JBT facility in
Jacksonville.
[
Footnote 4]
The grievance and arbitration clause provides in relevant
part:
"Matters under dispute which cannot be promptly settled between
the Local and an individual Employer shall . . . be referred . . .
to a Port Grievance Committee. . . . In the event this Port
Grievance Committee cannot reach an agreement . . . the dispute
shall be referred to the Joint Negotiating Committee. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"A majority decision of this Committee shall be final and
binding on both parties and on all Employers signing this
Agreement. In the event the Committee is unable to reach a majority
decision within 72 hours after meeting to discuss the case, it
shall employ a professional arbitrator. . . ."
[
Footnote 5]
The Union concedes that the question whether the work stoppage
violates the no-strike clause is arbitrable. In a consolidated
case, the Court of Appeals upheld an injunction issued by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
enforcing an arbitrator's decision that the ILA work stoppage
violated a collective bargaining agreement. 626 F.2d at 469.
[
Footnote 6]
In
Boys Markets, the underlying dispute was clearly
subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures of the
collective bargaining agreement, and the strike clearly violated
the no-strike clause.
[
Footnote 7]
See cases cited in
Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at
428 U. S. 404,
n. 9.
[
Footnote 8]
In
Buffalo Forge, the strike at issue was a sympathy
strike in support of sister unions negotiating with the employer.
The Court reasoned that there was no need to accommodate the
policies of the Norris-La Guardia Act to § 301 and to the federal
policy favoring arbitration when a strike is not called over an
arbitrable dispute, because such a strike does not directly
frustrate the arbitration process by denying or evading the union's
promise to arbitrate. 428 U.S. at
428 U. S.
407-412.
[
Footnote 9]
Section 13(c) provides:
"(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee."
[
Footnote 10]
Of course, there are exceptions to the Act's prohibitions
against enjoining work stoppages.
See, e.g., Boys Market, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235
(1970). The employer may obtain an injunction to enforce an
arbitrator's decision that the strike violates the collective
bargaining agreement, and can recover damages for the violation
pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
See, e.g.,
Buffalo Forge, supra, at
428 U. S. 405.
See also infra at
457 U. S. 718-719, and n. 18 (discussing Board's
authority under 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(k), 160(1), to petition for an
injunction upon finding reasonable cause to believe that the strike
is an unfair labor practice).
[
Footnote 11]
The Employer's reliance on
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,
437 U. S. 556
(1978), to argue that a politically motivated strike is not a labor
dispute is misplaced. In
Eastex, we addressed whether
certain concerted activity was protected under 7 of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 157, and we recognized that
"[t]here may well be types of conduct or speech that are so
purely political or so remotely connected to the concerns of
employees as employees as to be beyond the protection of [§
7]."
Id. at
437 U. S. 570,
n. 20. Although the definition of a "labor dispute" in § 2(9) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(9), is virtually identical to that in §
13(c) of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c), and the two
provisions have been construed consistently with one another,
e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.
S. 219,
312 U. S. 234,
n. 4 (1941), this similarity does not advance the Employer's
argument. Union activity that prompts a "labor dispute" within the
meaning of these sections may be protected by § 7, prohibited by §
8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b), or neither protected nor prohibited. The
objective of the concerted activity is relevant in determining
whether such activity is protected under § 7 or prohibited by §
8(b), but not in determining whether the activity is a "labor
dispute" under § 2(9).
Moreover, the conclusion that a purely political work stoppage
is not protected under § 7 means simply that the employer is not
prohibited by § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), from
discharging or disciplining employees for this activity. It hardly
establishes that no "labor dispute" existed within the meaning of §
2(9). Similarly, if the employees protested such sanctions under
the collective bargaining agreement, an arbitrator might ultimately
conclude that the sanctions were proper, but this would not alter
the obvious fact that the matter is a labor dispute.
[
Footnote 12]
A labor dispute might be present under the facts of this case
even in the absence of the dispute over the scope of the no-strike
clause. Regardless of the political nature of the Union's
objections to handling Soviet-bound cargo, these objections were
expressed in a work stoppage by employees against their employer,
which focused on particular work assignments. Thus, apart from the
collective bargaining agreement, the employer-employee relationship
would be the matrix of the controversy. We need not decide this
question, however, because this case does involve a dispute over
the interpretation of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement.
[
Footnote 13]
In
Musicians, the Court held that, although orchestra
leaders acted as independent contractors with respect to certain
"club-date" engagements, the union's involvement with the leaders
was not a combination with a nonlabor group in violation of the
Sherman Act. In finding that the leaders were a "labor group," and
a party to a labor dispute, the Court relied on the
"'presence of a job or wage competition or some other economic
interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests between the
union members and the independent contractors.'"
391 U.S. at
391 U. S. 106
(quoting the opinion of the District Court). In Columbia
River
Packers Assn., the Court found that the union was merely an
association of independent fish sellers involved in a controversy
with fish buyers over a contract for the sale of fish; they were
not employees of the buyers, nor did they seek to be. 315 U.S. at
315 U. S.
147.
The Employer's reliance on
Bakery Drivers v. Wagshal,
333 U. S. 437
(1948), is similarly misplaced. In that case, the Court held only
that a controversy between two businessmen over delivery times or
methods of payment does not become a labor dispute merely because a
union representative, with or without his employer's consent,
sought to obtain payment pursuant to a particular method.
Id. at
333 U. S.
443-444.
[
Footnote 14]
The Employer's economic-motive analysis also leads to the
untenable result that strikes in protest of unreasonably unsafe
conditions and some sympathy strikes are not "labor disputes."
[
Footnote 15]
See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.
S. 443,
254 U. S.
468-469 (1921).
See also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Stone Cutters, 274 U. S. 37,
274 U.S. 54-55 (1927).
[
Footnote 16]
The thrust of this objection was that the Act's definition of a
labor dispute "takes no account whatever of the motives and
purposes with which a nationwide strike or boycott can be commenced
and prosecuted." 75 Cong.Rec. 5472 (1932) (remarks of Rep.
Beck).
[
Footnote 17]
In relying on this history, we do not argue that congressional
rejection of a broad repeal of the Norris-La Guardia Act precludes
accommodation of that Act to the LMRA.
See Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195,
370 U. S.
204-210 (1962). In
Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks, 398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 249,
this Court put that argument to rest. Rather, we rely on this
legislative history because it demonstrates that Congress believed
that the Norris-La Guardia Act did apply to controversies
concerning politically motivated work stoppages. Furthermore, in
this case, unlike
Boys Markets, we are not asked to
accommodate the Norris-La Guardia Act to a specific federal Act or
to the strong policy favoring arbitration.
[
Footnote 18]
The Senate had declined to adopt these provisions of the House
bill. The Senate Report explained that it did not want to impair
labor's social gains under the Norris-La Guardia Act and the NLRA
of 1935, but instead wanted to remedy "specific types of injustice"
or "clear inequities" by "precise and carefully drawn legislation."
S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. , 1 (1947), 1 Leg.Hist. 407.
Some of the concerted activities listed in § 12 of the House bill
were made unfair labor practices, and the National Labor Relations
Board, not private parties, could petition a district court for
injunctions against certain unfair labor practices.
See
S.Rep. No. 105,
supra, at 35, 40, 1 Leg.Hist. 441, 446
(reciting proposed revisions to NLRA, §§ 8(b), 10(k),
10(
l)).
[
Footnote 19]
This proposed exception does not limit the judge's discretion to
consideration of specified external conduct or of provisions in a
collective bargaining agreement, as does the
Boys Markets
exception. It provides no guidance to judges in dealing with
concerted activity arguably designed to achieve both political and
labor-related goals. Such mixed-motivation cases are bound to
arise. For example, in
United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, 519 F.2d 1236 (CA5 1975), miners picketed another
employer for importing coal from South Africa. The Court of Appeals
held that the Norris-La Guardia Act applied, and that the
Boys
Markets exception was not available, because "the miners'
action was not aimed at [their employer] at all, but rather at the
national policy of this country's permitting the importation of
South African coal." 519 F.2d at 1247 (footnote omitted). Under the
political motivation exception, even if the miners had picketed
because slave labor was employed to mine the imported coal, the
Norris-La Guardia Act might not apply. Minor variations in the
facts would endow the courts with, or divest them of, jurisdiction
to issue an injunction, and would create difficult linedrawing
problems.
[
Footnote 20]
The management-rights clause provides:
"The Management of the Employer's business and the direction of
the workforce in the operation of the business are exclusively
vested in the Employer as functions of Management. Except as
specifically provided in the Agreement, all of the rights, powers,
and authority Employer had prior to signing of this Agreement are
retained by the Employer."
The work-conditions clause provides:
"Where hardship is claimed by the Union because of unreasonable
or burdensome conditions or where work methods or operations
materially change in the future, the problem shall first be
discussed between the local and Management involved. In the event
an agreement cannot be reached, either party may refer the dispute
to the Joint Negotiating Committee and, if the matter cannot be
resolved by that Committee, either party may then refer the
question to an arbitrator in accordance with the procedure set
forth in Clause 15(B)."
[
Footnote 21]
In fact, the employer in
Buffalo Forge made just such a
claim. In addition to alleging breach of the no-strike clause, it
claimed that the strike was caused by "refusal to follow a
supervisor's instructions to cross the . . . picket line."
Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at
428 U. S. 401.
The District Court found that the strike was in sympathy with the
sister union, and was not over a dispute that the parties were
contractually bound to arbitrate.
Id. at
428 U. S.
402-403. On appeal, the employer did not press its
argument that the work stoppage was in part a protest over
truckdriving assignments.
Id. at
428 U. S. 403,
n. 8.
[
Footnote 22]
The Employer argues that industrial strife is encouraged because
employers are given the incentive to discharge or discipline the
workers for refusing to work, which is likely to precipitate
further strikes. According to this argument, the strike, which
began over a nonarbitrable dispute, is transformed into a dispute
over an arbitrable issue,
i.e., the employer's right under
the collective bargaining agreement to discipline these workers,
and may be enjoined under the
Boys Markets/Buffalo Forge
exception.
See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis,
614 F.2d 1110, 1111114 (CA6 1980),
aff'd on other grounds,
451 U. S. 451 U.S.
401 (1981). This Court has not addressed the validity of this
"transformation" analysis.
See Complete Auto Transit In. v.
Reis, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 405,
n. 4.
[
Footnote 23]
The Employer has also requested that we reconsider our decision
in
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers. We decline this
invitation.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
Based on the legislative history of the Norris-La Guardia Act,
29 U.S.C. § 101
et seq., and our previous cases
interpreting it,
e.g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery
Co., 303 U. S. 552
(1938), the Court correctly concludes that this case involves a
labor dispute within the meaning of § 4 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
104. The Court also correctly determines that, under
Buffalo
Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397
(1976), no injunction may issue pending arbitration because the
underlying political dispute is not arbitrable under the collective
bargaining agreement. Unless the Court is willing to overrule
Buffalo Forge, the conclusion reached by the Court in this
case is inescapable. Therefore, I concur in the judgment.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins,
dissenting.
I
This case in no sense involves or grows out of a labor dispute
as that term is defined in § 13(C) of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29
U.S.C. § 113(C).
See ante at
457 U. S.
709-710, n. 9. Section 13(c) defines a labor dispute as
"any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment. . .
." [
Footnote 2/1] The dispute in
this case is a political dispute, and has no relation to any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment.
Page 457 U. S. 725
If Congress had intended to bar federal courts from issuing
injunctions in political disputes, it could have simply prohibited
federal courts from enjoining strikes, rather than limiting its
prohibition to controversies concerning terms or conditions of
employment. Accordingly, I disagree with the Court's conclusion
that the Norris-La Guardia Act bars a federal court from enjoining
this politically motivated work stoppage.
The International Longshoremen's Association objects to the
Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. As a consequence, it
announced that it would not handle any cargo bound to, or coming
from, the Soviet Union, or any cargo carried on Soviet ships. This
case commenced after the union, pursuant to its political position,
refused to load superphosphoric acid onto certain ships bound for
the Soviet Union. The union has no objection to any terms or
conditions of employment; it would have loaded the superphosphoric
acid on any non-Soviet ship bound for a destination other than the
Soviet Union. No one has suggested that the union's action is
actually motivated to obtain concessions concerning employment
conditions. The union refused to handle the cargo simply because a
foreign country invaded a neighboring country and the union desired
to express its opposition to the invasion. Thus, the plain meaning
of § 13(c) leads to the conclusion that this case does not involve
or grow out of a labor dispute, because the union members are not
seeking to change their terms or conditions of employment.
As the Court recognizes, we have held that the test of whether
the Norris-La Guardia Act applies is whether "the employer-employee
relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy."
Columbia
River Packers Assn., Inc. v. Hinton,\ 315 U.
S. 143, 315 U. S. 147
(1942); quoted ante
at 457 U. S.
712-713. Federal Courts of Appeals have stated that
unions are protected by the Norris-La Guardia Act when they act to
advance the economic interests of their members. See, e.g.,
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,\
362 F.2d
Page 457 U. S. 726
649, 654 (CA5 1966). These cases illustrate the plain meaning of
§ 13(c)'s definition of labor dispute -- the Norris-La Guardia Act
protects union organizational efforts and efforts to improve
working conditions.
The Court errs gravely in finding that the matrix of this
controversy is the union's relationship with the petitioners. The
union's dispute with the petitioners merely flows from its decision
to demonstrate its opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan. No
economic interests of union members are involved; indeed, the
union's policy is contrary to its members' economic interests,
since it reduces the amount of available work. [
Footnote 2/2] Thus, the cases generally explicating
the meaning of § 13(c) lend no support to the notion that this case
involves a labor dispute.
The federal courts have consistently recognized that the
Norris-La Guardia Act does not apply to politically motivated work
stoppages concerning subjects over which employers have no control.
These courts, in cases which are, for all practical purposes,
indistinguishable from this case -- and which often involved the
International Longshoremen's Association -- properly concluded that
the Act only applies to economic disputes. [
Footnote 2/3] This Court has never before held, as
it
Page 457 U. S. 727
holds here, that the Norris-La Guardia Act protects strikes
resulting from political disputes, rather than from labor disputes.
Since the meaning of the words of the statute is plain, and since
the applicable precedent supports the conclusion that this is not a
labor dispute, we ought to conclude that politically motivated
strikes are outside the coverage of the Norris-La Guardia Act.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Finally, the Court argues that a common sense interpretation of
the meaning of the term "labor dispute" supports its conclusion.
But the "common sense" meaning of a term is not controlling when
Congress has provided, as it provided in § 13(c), an explicit
definition of a labor dispute. "Common sense" and legislative
history ought not change the meaning of the unambiguous words of a
statute. It is not contended that any act of petitioners to improve
the terms or conditions
Page 457 U. S. 728
of employment would have persuaded the union to load the ships.
Hence there is no labor dispute under the Norris-La Guardia
Act.
II
This case, together with our recent decision in
Longshoremen
v. Allied International, Inc., 456 U.
S. 212 (1982), illustrates the inherent flaw in the
holding in
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.
S. 397 (1976). If the Court cannot give to ordinary
words their ordinary meaning and grasp that the dispute in this
case is a purely political dispute, rather than having any relation
to a labor dispute, it should overrule
Buffalo Forge.
The controversy in
Allied International also resulted
from the International Longshoremen's Association's protest over
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There we held that the union's
refusal to unload shipments from the Soviet Union was a secondary
boycott prohibited by § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). The union is therefore liable for
damages as a result of its refusal to unload the shipments. Yet the
Court today holds that the union may not be enjoined from refusing
to load cargo onto ships bound for the Soviet Union.
This is all the more perplexing because the union entered into
an agreement with petitioners which contained an unequivocal
no-strike clause:
"During the term of this Agreement, . . . the Union agrees there
shall not be any strike
of any kind or degree whatsoever,
. . .
for any cause whatsoever."
(Emphasis added.)
Ante at
457 U. S. 706.
In
Allied International, this union was found liable for
damages caused to a party with which it had no such agreement.
Here, however, despite the existence of the no-strike agreement
between petitioners and the union, the Court holds that the union's
illegal acts may not be enjoined.
To reach this strange result, the Court first decides that this
case involves a labor dispute, rather than a political dispute, and
therefore is within the scope of the Norris-La Guardia
Page 457 U. S. 729
Act. The Court then contradicts itself and concludes that, since
the dispute is really a political protest over Soviet aggression,
it may not be enjoined under the
Buffalo Forge exception
to the rule of
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks,
398 U. S. 235
(1970), since a federal court cannot resolve the actual dispute.
This case, together with
Allied International, persuades
me that the artificial
Buffalo Forge exception should be
abolished. Rather than continuing to engage in mechanical and
contradictory analyses as to the character of disputes such as this
one, we should hold that a federal court may enjoin a strike
pending arbitration when the striking union has agreed to a
contract with a no-strike clause such as the one agreed to by
petitioners and the ILA. That is what we seemed to hold in
Boys
Markets, and we should not have tinkered with that holding in
Buffalo Forge.
There is no rational way to reconcile this holding with
Allied International. If we must overrule
Buffalo
Forge to come to a consistent result, we should do so.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Section 13(c) also includes union organizational activity within
its definition of labor dispute, but this case clearly does not
involve such activity.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court's reliance on
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552
(1938), is misplaced.
Ante at
457 U. S.
714-715. The picketers in that case might not have been
seeking to better their own personal economic position, but their
purpose was to affect the terms and conditions of employment of the
picketed store, since their object was to persuade the store to
employ Negroes. Section 13(c) explicitly states that the coverage
of the Act does not depend on whether "the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee."
Ante at
457 U. S. 710,
n. 9.
[
Footnote 2/3]
See Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers International
Union, 278 F.2d 49, 50-51 (CA2 1960) (politically motivated
blacklist of Egyptian ships to retaliate for Egyptian blacklist of
American ships that dealt with Israel is not "labor dispute"
triggering Norris-La Guardia);
West Gulf Maritime Assn. v.
International Longshoremen's Assn., 413 F.
Supp. 372 (SD Tex.1975),
summarily aff'd, 531 F.2d 574
(CA5 1976) (union's refusal, on political grounds, in violation of
a no-strike agreement, to load grain on a ship bound for the Soviet
Union does not present a "labor dispute").
[
Footnote 2/4]
The excerpts from the legislative history relied upon by the
Court fall short of the clear evidence required to overcome the
plain language of 13(c).
See, e.g., Bread Political Action
Committee v. FEC, 455 U. S. 577,
455 U. S. 581
(1982). In 1947, Congress declined to amend the federal labor laws
so that strikes protesting "disagreement with some governmental
policy" would not be protected by the Norris-La Guardia Act. H.R.
3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(13)(B) (1947), 1 Legislative
History of the LMRA 168 (1947);
ante at
457 U. S. 717.
However, the language of the rejected House version of the
amendment was quite broad. There are cases in which unions might
disagree with governmental policy and properly take collective
action protesting it in order to advance the legitimate economic
interests of union members if the terms or conditions of their
employment would be affected. Congress might have rejected the
House version because of fear that its broad reach would render
legitimate union activity unprotected.
In 1932, Congress rejected an amendment which would have
permitted federal courts to enjoin acts "performed or threatened
for an unlawful purpose or with an unlawful intent. . . ." 75
Cong.Rec. 5607 (1932);
ante at
457 U. S.
716-717. This amendment would have swept more broadly
than the plain language of § 13(c) as adopted. Indeed,
Representative Beck's amendment could have rendered the Norris-La
Guardia Act a nullity, since federal judges in the 1930's would
have been able to enjoin a strike merely by finding it motivated by
an "unlawful purpose." Thus the legislative history does not lead
to or compel a conclusion in this case contrary to the plain
language of § 13(c).
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The no-strike clause agreed to by the parties in this case could
scarcely be more emphatic:
"During the term of this Agreement, . . . the Union agrees there
shall not be any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever, . . . for
any cause whatsoever."
(Emphasis added.)
Ante at
457 U. S. 706.
Such a clause is one of the most significant provisions in the
bargaining agreement. One can fairly assume that the employer gave
considerable ground in other areas of the agreement to gain this
apparent guarantee that all disagreements would go first to
arbitration. Thus, under the plain language of the agreement of the
parties, the strike by the respondents should have been enjoined
pending arbitration.
But in labor law -- since this Court's decision in
Buffalo
Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397
(1976) -- plain language agreed to by a union does not bind it.
Buffalo Forge is an aberration. It cannot be reconciled
with labor law policy
Page 457 U. S. 730
of encouraging industrial peace through arbitration. It severely
undercuts
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks,
398 U. S. 235
(1970). In a word,
Buffalo Forge should be overruled.
The internal contradictions in today's decision by the Court
further illustrate absence of principle in
Buffalo Forge's
reasoning. The Court argues that now we must divide the dispute in
this case into the "underlying" dispute over Soviet policy and the
"other" dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause. I consider
this method of analysis artificial and unprincipled. On the one
hand, the Court must characterize the dispute in this case as a
labor dispute -- involving the scope of the no-strike clause -- to
bring the dispute within the scope of the Norris-La Guardia Act.
But on the other hand,
Buffalo Forge requires the Court to
contradict itself by insisting that the dispute is "really" over
Soviet aggression, and therefore that the rule of
Boy's
Market, and the federal policy in support of arbitration, are
inapplicable.
The Court should not have it both ways. So long as it adheres to
the aberrant analysis in
Buffalo Forge, I agree with THE
CHIEF JUSTICE that the dispute in this case must be viewed as a
political dispute outside the scope of the Norris-La Guardia Act. I
therefore join his dissenting opinion.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in
457 U. S. as
well as the reasons stated in Part I of my dissenting opinion in
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.
S. 397,
428 U. S.
415-424, I respectfully dissent.