Petitioner was arrested on a grocery store robbery charge
without a warrant or probable cause, based on an uncorroborated
informant's tip, and was taken to the police station, where he was
given
Miranda warnings, fingerprinted, questioned, and
placed in a lineup. After being told that his fingerprints matched
those on grocery items handled by one of the participants in the
robbery and after a short visit with his girlfriend, petitioner
signed a written confession. Over petitioner's objection, the
confession was admitted into evidence at his trial in an Alabama
state court, and he was convicted. The Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed, holding that the confession should not have been
admitted, but was, in turn, reversed by the Alabama Supreme
Court.
Held: Petitioner's confession should have been
suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest.
Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U. S. 590;
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200. Pp.
457 U. S.
689-694.
(a) A confession obtained through custodial interrogation after
an illegal arrest should be excluded unless intervening events
break the causal connection between the arrest and the confession
so that the confession is sufficiently an act of free will to purge
the primary taint. Pp.
457 U. S.
689-690.
(b) Here, there was no meaningful intervening event. The
illegality of the initial arrest was not cured by the facts that
six hours elapsed between the arrest and confession; that the
confession may have been "voluntary" for Fifth Amendment purposes
because
Miranda warnings were given; that petitioner was
permitted a short visit with his girlfriend; or that the police did
not physically abuse petitioner. Nor was the fact that an arrest
warrant, based on a comparison of fingerprints, was filed after
petitioner had been arrested and while he was being interrogated a
significant intervening event, such warrant being irrelevant to
whether the confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest. The
initial fingerprints, which were themselves the fruit of the
illegal arrest and were used to extract the confession, cannot be
deemed sufficient "attenuation" to break the connection between the
illegal arrest and the confession merely because they formed the
basis for the arrest warrant. Pp.
457 U. S.
690-693.
399
So. 2d 881, reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J.,
filed a dissenting
Page 457 U. S. 688
opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined,
post, p.
457 U. S.
694.
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the narrow question whether petitioner's
confession should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal
arrest. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the evidence was
properly admitted. Because the decision below is inconsistent with
our decisions in
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.
S. 200 (1979), and
Brown v. Illinois,
422 U. S. 590
(1975), we reverse.
I
In 1978, a grocery store in Montgomery, Ala., was robbed. There
had been a number of robberies in this area, and the police had
initiated an intensive manhunt in an effort to apprehend the
robbers. An individual who was at that time incarcerated on
unrelated charges told a police officer that "he had heard that
[petitioner] Omar Taylor was involved in the robbery." App. 4. This
individual had never before given similar information to this
officer, did not tell the officer where he had heard this
information, and did not provide any details of the crime. This tip
was insufficient to give
Page 457 U. S. 689
the police probable cause to obtain a warrant or to arrest
petitioner.
Nonetheless, on the basis of this information, two officers
arrested petitioner without a warrant. They told petitioner that he
was being arrested in connection with the grocery store robbery,
searched him, and took him to the station for questioning.
Petitioner was given the warnings required by
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966). At the station, he was fingerprinted, readvised of his
Miranda rights, questioned, and placed in a lineup. The
victims of the robbery were unable to identify him in the lineup.
The police told petitioner that his fingerprints matched those on
some grocery items that had been handled by one of the participants
in the robbery. After a short visit with his girlfriend and a male
companion, petitioner signed a waiver-of-rights form and executed a
written confession. The form and the signed confession were
admitted into evidence.
Petitioner objected to the admission of this evidence at his
trial. He argued that his warrantless arrest was not supported by
probable cause, that he had been involuntarily transported to the
police station, and that the confession must be suppressed as the
fruit of this illegal arrest. The trial court overruled this
objection, and petitioner was convicted. On appeal, the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed,
399 So. 2d 875 (1980), holding that the facts of this case are
virtually indistinguishable from those presented to this Court in
Dunaway v. New York, supra, and that the confession should
not have been admitted into evidence. The Alabama Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals,
399
So. 2d 881 (1981), and we granted certiorari, 454 U.S. 963
(1981).
II
In
Brown v. Illinois, supra, and
Dunaway v. New
York, supra, the police arrested suspects without probable
cause. The suspects were transported to police headquarters,
advised of their
Miranda rights, and interrogated. They
confessed
Page 457 U. S. 690
within two hours of their arrest. This Court held that the
confessions were not admissible at trial, reasoning that a
confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an
illegal arrest should be excluded unless intervening events break
the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the
confession, so that the confession is "
sufficiently an act of
free will to purge the primary taint.'" Brown v. Illinois,
supra, at 422 U. S. 602
(quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.
S. 471, 371 U. S. 486
(1963)). See also Dunaway v. New York, supra, at
442 U. S. 217.
This Court identified several factors that should be considered in
determining whether a confession has been purged of the taint of
the illegal arrest:
"[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the
presence of intervening circumstances, . . . and, particularly, the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct."
Brown v. Illinois, supra, at
422 U. S.
603-404 (citations and footnote omitted);
Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 218. The State bears the burden of proving
that a confession is admissible.
Ibid.
In
Brown and
Dunaway, this Court firmly
established that the fact that the confession may be "voluntary"
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, in the sense that
Miranda warnings were given and understood, is not by
itself sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. In this
situation, a finding of "voluntariness" for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment is merely a threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment
analysis.
See Dunaway v. New York, supra, at
442 U. S. 217.
The reason for this approach is clear:
"[t]he exclusionary rule, . . . when utilized to effectuate the
Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct
from those it serves under the Fifth"
Amendment.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 601.
If
Miranda warnings were viewed as a talisman that cured
all Fourth Amendment violations, then the constitutional guarantee
against unlawful searches and seizures would be reduced to a mere
"
form of words.'" Id. at 422 U. S. 603
(quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643,
367 U. S. 648
(1961)).
This case is a virtual replica of both
Brown and
Dunaway.
Page 457 U. S. 691
Petitioner was arrested without probable cause in the hope that
something would turn up, and he confessed shortly thereafter
without any meaningful intervening event. The State's arguments to
the contrary are unpersuasive. The State begins by focusing on the
temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession. It observes
that the length of time between the illegal arrest and the
confession was six hours in this case, while in
Brown and
Dunaway, the incriminating statements were obtained within
two hours. However, a difference of a few hours is not significant
where, as here, petitioner was in police custody, unrepresented by
counsel, and he was questioned on several occasions, fingerprinted,
and subjected to a lineup. The State has not even demonstrated the
amount of this time that was spent in interrogation, arguing only
that petitioner
"had every opportunity to consider his situation, to organize
his thoughts, to contemplate his constitutional rights, and to
exercise his free will."
Brief for Respondent 11.
The State points to several intervening events that it argues
are sufficient to break the connection between the illegal arrest
and petitioner's confession. It observes that petitioner was given
Miranda warnings three times. As our foregoing discussion
of
Brown and
Dunaway demonstrates, however, the
State's reliance on the giving of
Miranda warnings is
misplaced. The State also observes that petitioner visited with his
girlfriend and a male companion before he confessed. This claim
fares no better. According to the officer and petitioner, these two
visitors were outside the interrogation room where petitioner was
being questioned. After petitioner signed a waiver-of-rights form,
he was allowed to meet with these visitors. The State fails to
explain how this 5- to 10-minute visit, after which petitioner
immediately recanted his former statements that he knew nothing
about the robbery and signed the confession, could possibly have
contributed to his ability to consider carefully and objectively
his options and to exercise his free will. This suggestion
Page 457 U. S. 692
is particularly dubious in light of petitioner's uncontroverted
testimony that his girlfriend was emotionally upset at the time of
this visit. [
Footnote 1] If any
inference could be drawn, it would be that this visit had just the
opposite effect.
The State points to an arrest warrant filed after petitioner had
been arrested and while he was being interrogated as another
significant "intervening event." While petitioner was in custody,
the police determined that the fingerprints on some grocery items
matched those that they had taken from petitioner immediately after
his arrest. Based on this comparison, an arrest warrant was filed.
The filing of this warrant, however, is irrelevant to whether the
confession was the fruit of the illegal arrest. This case is not
like
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.
S. 356 (1972), where the defendant was brought before a
committing Magistrate who advised him of his rights and set bail.
Here, the arrest warrant was filed
ex parte, based on the
comparison of the fingerprints found at the scene of the crime and
petitioner's fingerprints, which had been taken immediately after
his arrest. The initial fingerprints,
Page 457 U. S. 693
which were themselves the fruit of petitioner's illegal arrest,
see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.
S. 721 (1969), and which were used to extract the
confession from petitioner, cannot be deemed sufficient
"attenuation" to break the connection between the illegal arrest
and the confession merely because they also formed the basis for an
arrest warrant that was filed while petitioner was being
interrogated. [
Footnote 2]
Finally, the State argues that the police conduct here was not
flagrant or purposeful, and that we should not follow our decisions
in
Brown and
Dunaway for that reason. However, we
fail to see any relevant distinction between the conduct here and
that in
Dunaway. In this case, as in
Dunaway, the
police effectuated an investigatory arrest without probable cause,
based on an uncorroborated informant's tip, and involuntarily
transported petitioner to the station for interrogation in the hope
that something would turn up. The fact that the police did not
physically abuse petitioner, or that the confession they obtained
may have been "voluntary" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, does
not cure the illegality of the initial arrest. Alternatively, the
State contends that the police conduct here argues for adopting a
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. To date, we have
not recognized such an exception, and we decline to do so here.
Page 457 U. S. 694
III
In sum, petitioner's confession was the fruit of his illegal
arrest. Under our decisions in
Brown v. Illinois and
Dunaway v. New York, the confession clearly should not
have been admitted at his trial. Accordingly, we reverse the
decision of the Alabama Supreme Court and remand this case for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
According to petitioner, his girlfriend became upset upon
hearing the officer advise petitioner to cooperate. App. 16.
Contrary to the allegations in the dissent, at no point did the
officer contradict petitioner's version of his girlfriend's
emotional state or petitioner's statement that his girlfriend was
present at the time the officer advised him to cooperate. In fact,
the testimony from both petitioner and the officer with respect to
this visit are consistent. The officer testified only that he
advised petitioner to cooperate between the time petitioner signed
a rights form at the commencement of this interrogation period and
the time that petitioner signed the statement of confession. Tr.
31, 136-137. He also testified that, during this same interval, he
allowed the short visit between petitioner and his girlfriend.
Ibid. The District Court made no findings of fact with
respect to these incidents. In any event, even assuming the
accuracy of the dissent's version of the facts,
compare
post at
457 U. S. 695,
and n. 2,
with Tr. 31, 136-137, the dissent offers no
explanation for its conclusion that this 5- to 10-minute visit
should be viewed as an intervening event that purges the taint of
the illegal arrest.
[
Footnote 2]
Petitioner also raises an ambiguous objection to the admission
of fingerprint evidence at his trial. The trial court granted
petitioner's motion to suppress the initial fingerprints as the
fruit of his illegal arrest under
Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U. S. 721
(1969), and granted the State's motion to take petitioner's
fingerprints at trial. The nature of petitioner's objection to the
admission of any fingerprint evidence at trial is unclear, and it
is also uncertain whether an objection to the procedure used for
taking the second set of fingerprints has been properly preserved
for our review. In any event, we need not reach this issue, because
we reverse the decision on the ground that the confession should
not have been admitted. To the extent that petitioner still may
challenge the fingerprinting procedure employed below, the state
courts should be given the opportunity to address this challenge in
the first instance.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL,
and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
The Court holds today that Omar Taylor's detailed confession was
the fruit of an illegal arrest, and consequently, should be
suppressed. Because I conclude that neither the facts nor the law
supports the Court's analysis, I respectfully dissent.
I
In the course of their investigation of the Moseley robbery,
Montgomery police questioned Charles Martin, who was being held on
unrelated rape and robbery charges. Martin stated that "he had
heard that Omar Taylor was involved in the robbery of Moseley's
Grocery," Tr. 6, but the police made no attempt to establish either
Martin's credibility as an informant or the reliability of the
information he provided. [
Footnote
2/1]
Based only on this tip, which did not provide probable cause,
Sergeants Alford and Rutland arrested Taylor a little before 3 p.m.
on January 4, 1979. At that time, they told him why he was being
arrested and advised him of his
Miranda rights, but asked
him no questions regarding the robbery. Tr. 20, 24. When they
arrived at the police station, the officers turned Taylor over to
detectives.
After Taylor had been fingerprinted and signed a form
Page 457 U. S. 695
acknowledging his
Miranda rights, Detective Wilson
questioned him for about 15 minutes, Tr. 48, and placed him in a
lineup before one of the victims, Mrs. Moseley.
Id. at
37-38. At the lineup, which lasted about an hour,
id. at
48, Mrs. Moseley was unable to identify the petitioner. Following
the lineup, Detective Wilson told Taylor that his fingerprints
matched the fingerprints removed from grocery items handled by one
of the robbers. Nevertheless, the petitioner denied knowledge of
the robbery.
Toward 9 p.m. that evening, Detective Hicks readvised Taylor of
his
Miranda rights, Tr. 25, and Taylor once again read and
signed a form setting forth his
Miranda rights. Tr. 28,
125. At no time did Taylor ask for a lawyer or indicate that he did
not want to talk to police.
Id. at 28-29, 35, 40. During
his 5- to 10-minute interview with Taylor, Detective Hicks
confronted him with the fingerprint evidence.
Id. at 36.
Hicks urged the petitioner to cooperate with the police, but
carefully refrained from making him any promises, stating that, at
most, he could inform the judge of the petitioner's cooperation.
Id. at 31, 34. Taylor continued to deny involvement in the
robbery.
Id. at 35-36.
Following this conversation, both the petitioner's girlfriend
and his neighbor came to the police station and requested to speak
with him. When Taylor indicated that he wanted to speak with his
friends, Detective Hicks left them alone in his office for several
minutes. [
Footnote 2/2] After that
meeting,
Page 457 U. S. 696
the petitioner confessed to the crime, and signed a detailed
written confession. [
Footnote
2/3]
Before trial, the petitioner moved to suppress his
confession,
Page 457 U. S. 697
arguing that it was the product of an illegal arrest, and that
it had been obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights. The trial judge assumed that the arrest was illegal,
[
Footnote 2/4] but found that the
confession was voluntary, consistent with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, and that "there were enough intervening factors between
the arrest and confession" to overcome the taint of the illegal
arrest.
Id. at 116. Accordingly, he admitted the
confession.
II
Although the Court misapprehends the facts of the present case,
it has stated correctly the controlling substantive law. In the
Court's words,
"a confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an
illegal arrest should be excluded unless intervening events break
the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession
so that the confession is 'sufficiently an act of free will to
purge the primary taint.'"
Ante at
457 U. S. 690
(quoting
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.
S. 590,
422 U. S. 602
(1975)).
In
Brown, this Court emphasized that "
Miranda
warnings are an important factor . . . in determining whether the
confession [was] obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest."
Id. at
422 U. S. 603.
[
Footnote 2/5] The Court did not
discount the significance
Page 457 U. S. 698
of other factors, however, noting that
"
Miranda warnings,
alone and
per se,
cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to
break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between
the illegality and the confession."
Ibid. Brown holds, therefore, that not only
Miranda warnings, but also
"[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the
presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all
relevant."
Id. at
422 U. S.
603-604 (footnotes and citations omitted).
In light of those factors, the
Brown Court reviewed the
record and found that
"Brown's first statement was separated from his illegal arrest
by less than two hours, and [that] there was no intervening event
of significance whatsoever."
Id. at
422 U. S. 604.
Moreover, the police conduct in arresting Brown was particularly
egregious. The "impropriety of the arrest was obvious," and the
"manner in which Brown's arrest was effected gives the appearance
of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and
confusion."
Id. at
422 U. S. 605.
The Court held that, as a consequence, the confession should have
been suppressed.
Four Terms later, in
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.
S. 200,
442 U. S. 204
(1979), this Court reaffirmed the
Brown rule that, in
order to use at trial statements obtained following an arrest on
less than probable cause,
"the prosecution must show not only that the statements meet the
Fifth Amendment voluntariness standard, but also that the causal
connection between the statements and the illegal arrest is broken
sufficiently to purge the primary taint of the illegal arrest."
Finding the facts in
Dunaway to be "virtually a replica
of the situation in
Brown,"
id. at
442 U. S. 218,
the Court held that the petitioner's confession should have been
suppressed. Critical to the Court's holding was its observation
that the petitioner
Page 457 U. S. 699
"confessed without any intervening event of significance."
Ibid. See id. at
442 U. S. 219
("No intervening events broke the connection between petitioner's
illegal detention and his confession").
III
Our task is to apply the law as articulated in
Brown
and
Dunaway to the facts of this case.
The first significant consideration is that, following his
unlawful arrest, Taylor was warned on three separate occasions that
he
"had a right to remain silent, [and] anything he said could be
used against him in a court of law[;] he had the right to have an
attorney present, [and] if he could not afford one, the State would
appoint one for him[;] he could answer questions, but he could stop
answering at any time."
Tr. 23. Under
Brown and
Dunaway, these
warnings must be counted as "an important factor . . . in
determining whether the confession [was] obtained by exploitation
of an illegal arrest,"
Brown v. Illinois, supra, at
422 U. S. 603,
though they are, standing alone, insufficient to prove that the
primary taint of an illegal arrest had been purged.
Second, in contrast to the facts in
Brown, the facts in
the present case show that the petitioner was not subjected to
intimidating police misconduct. In
Brown, police had
broken into the petitioner's house and searched it. When the
petitioner later came home, two officers pointed their guns at him
and arrested him, leading the Court to conclude that
"[t]he manner in which [the petitioner's] arrest was effected
gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise,
fright, and confusion."
422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 605.
By contrast, nothing in the record before us indicates that the
petitioner's arrest was violent, or designed to "cause surprise,
fright, and confusion." Instead, Montgomery officers approached
Page 457 U. S. 700
Taylor, asked him his name, and told him that he was under
arrest for the Moseley robbery. They then searched him, advised him
of his rights, and took him to the police station.
Third, while in both
Brown and
Dunaway there
was "no intervening event of significance whatsoever," 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 604,
in the present case, Taylor's girlfriend and neighbor came to the
police station and asked to speak with him. Before meeting with his
two friends, the petitioner steadfastly had denied involvement in
the Moseley robbery. Immediately following the meeting, the
petitioner gave a complete and detailed confession of his
participation in the armed robbery. This meeting between the
petitioner and his two friends, as described by the police in their
testimony at the suppression hearing, plainly constituted an
intervening circumstance.
Finally, the record reveals that the petitioner spent most of
the time between his arrest and confession by himself. [
Footnote 2/6] In
Dunaway and
Brown, by contrast, the defendants were interrogated
continuously before they made incriminating statements.
In sum, when these four factors are considered together,
[
Footnote 2/7] it is obvious that
there is no sufficient basis on which to overturn the trial court's
finding that "there were enough intervening factors" to overcome
the taint of the illegal arrest. In fact, I believe it is clear
that the State carried its burden of proof. The petitioner was
warned of his rights to remain silent
Page 457 U. S. 701
and to have a lawyer present, and there is no dispute that he
understood those rights or that he waived them voluntarily and
without coercion. After receiving three sets of such warnings, he
met with his girlfriend and neighbor,
at his request.
Following that meeting, at which no police officers were present,
the petitioner decided to confess to his participation in the
robbery. The petitioner's confession was not proximately caused by
his illegal arrest, but was the product of a decision based both on
knowledge of his constitutional rights and on the discussion with
his friends. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The police, however, suspected Martin of complicity in the
Moseley robbery, Tr. 15. It later developed that Martin had
instigated, planned, and participated in the robbery.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court's rather different account of this meeting apparently
stems from a decision to accept the testimony most favorable to the
holding it wants to reach. That decision, however, runs counter to
the longstanding practice of federal appellate courts to uphold the
denial of the motion to suppress if, in the absence of any express
findings by the district court, there is any reasonable view of the
evidence to support it.
See United States v. Payton, 615
F.2d 922, 923 (CA1),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969 (1980);
United States v. Vicknair, 610 F.2d 372, 376, n. 4 (CA5),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980). In the present case,
the officer testified that Taylor's
"girlfriend came to us and said she wanted to talk to Omar, and
we told Omar she was outside and he wanted to talk to her. And at
that time, we let him talk to her."
Tr. 35. Detective Hicks specifically denied that he had urged
Taylor to talk to his girlfriend.
Id. at 35, 133-134. The
detective acknowledged that he had told the petitioner that he
could inform the judge of the petitioner's cooperation, but he
expressly denied making any other statements to Taylor or his
girlfriend about "cooperation."
Id. at 31, 134.
The petitioner, of course, had a vastly different version. He
testified that the police had brought his girlfriend into the room
and told him, in her presence, that he was facing 10 years to life
in prison, but that, if he cooperated, they might be able to
arrange a suspended sentence or probation. Upon hearing that
remark, the petitioner's girlfriend became upset and began to cry,
at which point the police left the petitioner alone with his
friends.
Id. at 52. As we noted above, the police
expressly denied making any such statements. More importantly, upon
comparing the two versions, it becomes clear that, in an effort to
support its holding, the Court has parsed through the petitioner's
story and plucked those tidbits that the police did not expressly
contradict. This method of setting forth the facts of a case on
appellate review hardly comports with the rule that an appellate
court must adopt any reasonable view of the evidence that supports
the trial court's ruling.
Since there is nothing unreasonable about the police account of
the meeting between the petitioner and his friends, that version is
the one we must accept on review. At the hearing, Detective Hicks
testified that, after Taylor asked to speak with his friends, the
police left them alone together. There is no suggestion, other than
the petitioner's discredited version of the meeting, that the
police said anything to the petitioner's girlfriend, or that she
became upset. Thus, the Court errs in stating that the petitioner's
girlfriend became upset because of statements made by the police,
and in intimating that the police created a coercive atmosphere in
which the petitioner could not carefully consider his options and,
on the basis of his friends' advice, decide to confess to the
robbery.
[
Footnote 2/3]
In that confession, the petitioner stated that Charles Martin
approached him with guns and a plan to rob Moseley's Grocery.
Taylor's role in the robbery was to distract Mr. Moseley by buying
some groceries. Just before his accomplices pulled out their guns,
Taylor put down the groceries and walked outside to see whether an
approaching car was a police car. When he saw that it was not a
police car, he began to reenter the store, but stopped when he saw
the robbery taking place. Thereafter he fled, met his cofelons at a
preassigned place, and took his share of the money.
Id. at
128-132.
[
Footnote 2/4]
In fact, the State did not seriously contend that the arrest had
been based on probable cause.
See id. at 8, 10.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The holding in
Brown was derived from this Court's
seminal decision in
Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U. S. 471
(1963), in which we rejected a "but for" test for determining
whether to suppress evidence gathered following a Fourth Amendment
violation.
"We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous
tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in
such a case is"
"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality, or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."
"Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)."
Id. at 48788.
[
Footnote 2/6]
The petitioner confessed some six hours after his arrest. As
JUSTICE STEVENS noted in his concurring opinion in
Dunaway, the "temporal relationship between the arrest and
the confession may be an ambiguous factor," 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 220,
for a lengthy detention could be used to exploit an illegal arrest
at least as easily as a brief detention. In the present case, there
seems to be nothing remarkable, one way or the other, about the
length of detention.
[
Footnote 2/7]
The Court has taken each circumstance out of context and
examined it to see whether it alone would be enough to purge the
taint of the illegal arrest. The Court's failure to consider the
circumstances of this case as a whole may have contributed to its
erroneous conclusion.