Held: The United States, not California, has title to
oceanfront land created through accretion, resulting from
construction of a jetty, to land owned by the United States on the
coast of California. Pp.
457 U. S.
278-288.
(a) A dispute over accretions to oceanfront land where title
rests with or was derived from the Federal Government is to be
determined by federal law.
Hughes v. Washington,
389 U. S. 290;
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.
S. 653. Under federal law, accretion, whatever its
cause, belongs to the upland owner. Pp.
457 U. S.
278-283.
(b) This is not a case where, as a matter of choice of law,
state law should be borrowed and applied as the federal rule for
deciding the substantive legal issue. Congress addressed the issue
of accretions to federal land in the Submerged Lands Act, which
vested title in the States to the lands underlying the territorial
sea and confirmed the title of the States to the tidelands up to
the line of mean high tide, but which, in § 5, withheld from the
grant to the States all "accretions" to coastal lands acquired or
reserved by the United States. In light of this latter provision,
borrowing for federal law purposes a state rule that would divest
federal ownership is foreclosed. Moreover, this is not a case in
which federal common law must be created, since it has long been
settled under federal law that the right to future accretions is an
inherent and essential attribute of the littoral or riparian owner.
Pp.
457 U. S.
283-285.
(c) Only land underneath inland waters was included in the
initial grant to the States under the equal-footing doctrine,
United States v. California, 332 U. S.
19, and hence California cannot properly claim that
title to the land in question here was vested in the State by that
doctrine and confirmed by the Submerged Lands Act. The latter Act
was a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to dispose of
federal property and "did not impair the validity" of the
United States v. California decision,
United States v.
Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1,
363 U. S. 7,
363 U. S. 20. To
accept California's argument would require rejecting not only
Hughes, supra, but also the established federal rule that
accretions belong to the upland owner. Pp.
457 U. S.
285-286.
(d) Section 2(a)(3) of the Submerged Lands Act, defining "lands
beneath navigable waters" that fall within the Act's general grant
to the
Page 457 U. S. 274
States as including all "made" lands that formerly were lands
beneath navigable water, does not apply to the gradual process by
which sand accumulated along the shore, although caused by a jetty.
To the extent that accretions are to be considered "made" land,
they would fall within the reservation by the United States in the
Act of "all lands filled in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed by
the United States for its own use." In any event, § 5(a) of the Act
expressly withholds from the grant to the States all "accretions"
to lands reserved by the United States. Pp.
457 U. S.
286-288.
(e) Section 3(a) of the Submerged Lands Act, confirming the
title of persons who, on June 5, 1950, were entitled to lands
beneath navigable water "under the law of the respective states in
which the land is located," means nothing more than that state law
determines the proper beneficiary of the grant of land under the
Act. Federal law determines the scope of the grant under the Act in
the first instance. P.
457 U. S.
288.
The United States' motion for judgment on the pleadings
granted.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined.
REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined,
post, p.
457 U. S.
288.
Page 457 U. S. 275
JUSICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue before the Court is the ownership of oceanfront land
created through accretion to land owned by the United States on the
coast of California. The decision turns on whether federal or state
law governs the issue.
I
From the time of California's admission to the Union in 1850,
the United States owned the upland on the north side of the
entrance channel to Humboldt Bay, Cal. In 1859 and 1871, the
Secretary of the Interior ordered that certain of these lands,
which fronted on the Pacific Ocean, the channel, and Humboldt Bay
be reserved from public sale. [
Footnote 1] Since that time, the land has been
continuously possessed by the United States and used as a Coast
Guard Reservation. The Pacific shoreline along the Coast Guard site
remained subtantially unchanged until near the turn of the century,
when the United States began construction of two jetties at the
entrance to Humboldt Bay. [
Footnote
2] The jetty constructed on the north side of the entrance
resulted in fairly rapid accretion on the ocean side of the Coast
Guard Reservation, so that formerly submerged lands became uplands.
[
Footnote 3] One hundred and
eighty-four
Page 457 U. S. 276
acres of upland were created by the seaward movement of the
ordinary high-water mark. This land, which remains barren save for
a watchtower, is the subject of the dispute in this case.
The controversy arose in 1977 when the Coast Guard applied for
permission from California to use this land to construct the
watchtower. [
Footnote 4] At
this time. it became evident that both California and the United
States asserted ownership of the land. The United States eventually
built the watchtower without obtaining California's permission.
[
Footnote 5] Invoking our
original jurisdiction, California then filed this suit to
Page 457 U. S. 277
quiet title to the subject land. [
Footnote 6] We granted leave for California to file a bill
of complaint. 464 U.S. 809 (1981).
California alleges that upon its admission to the Union on
September 9, 1860, Act of Sept. 9, 1860, 9 Stat. 452, and by
confirmation in the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. §
1301
et seq., California became vested with absolute title
to the tidelands and the submerged lands upon which, after
construction of the jetties, alluvion was deposited, resulting in
formation of the subject land. Because the accretion formed on
sovereign state land, California maintains that its law should
govern ownership. Under California law, a distinction is drawn
between accretive changes to a boundary caused by natural forces
and boundary changes caused by the construction of artificial
objects. For natural accretive changes, the upland boundary moves
seaward as the alluvion is deposited, resulting in a benefit to the
upland owner.
Los Angeles v. Anderson, 206 Cal. 662, 667,
276 P. 789, 791 (1929). When accretion is caused by construction of
artificial works, however, the boundary does not move but becomes
fixed at the ordinary high-water mark at the time the artificial
influence is introduced.
Carpenter v. Santa
Monca, 63 Cal. App. 2d
772, 794, 147 P.2d 964, 975 (1944). It is not disputed that the
newly formed land in controversy was created by the construction of
the jetty. Therefore, if state law governs, California would
prevail.
Page 457 U. S. 278
By its answer, and supporting memoranda, the United States
contends that the formerly submerged lands were never owned by
California before passage of the Submerged Lands Act in 1953, and
that the disputed land was not granted to California by the Act.
The United States also submits that the case is governed by
federal, rather than state, law, and that, under long-established
federal law, accretion, whatever its cause, belongs to the upland
owner.
Jones v.
Johnston, 18 How. 150,
59 U. S. 156
(1856);
County of St. Clair v.
Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46,
90 U. S. 66
(1874);
Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.
S. 178,
134 U. S.
189-193 (1890);
Beaver v. United States, 350
F.2d 4, 10-11 (CA9 1965). [
Footnote
7] If such federal law controls, title to the deposited land
vested in the United States as the accretions formed.
Recognizing that the choice-of-law issue was clearly drawn,
California moved for summary judgment and the United States moved
for judgment on the pleadings. No essential facts being in dispute,
a special master was not appointed, and the case was briefed and
argued. We conclude that federal law governs the decision in this
case, and that the land in dispute is owned by the United
States.
II
In
Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles,
296 U. S. 10
(1935), the city filed suit to quiet its title to land claimed to
be tideland and to belong to the city by virtue of a grant from the
State. The defendant claimed by virtue of a patent from the United
States issued after California entered the Union. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Hughes, and with a single dissent,
Page 457 U. S. 279
the Court held that, if the land in question was tideland, the
title passed to California at the time of her admission to the
Union in 1850; that it remained to be determined whether the land
at issue was tideland; and that this issue was "necessarily a
federal question" controlled by federal law. The Court said:
"Petitioners claim under a federal patent which, according to
the plat, purported to convey land bordering on the Pacific Ocean.
There is no question that the United States was free to convey the
upland, and the patent affords no ground for holding that it did
not convey all the title that the United States had in the
premises. The question as to the extent of this federal grant, that
is, as to the limit of the land conveyed, or the boundary between
the upland and the tideland, is necessarily a federal question. It
is a question which concerns the validity and effect of an act done
by the United States; it involves the ascertainment of the
essential basis of a right asserted under federal law.
Packer
v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661,
137 U. S.
669,
137 U. S. 670;
Brewer-Elliott Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U. S.
77,
260 U. S. 87;
United
States v. Holt Bank, 270 U. S. 49,
270 U. S.
55,
270 U. S. 56;
United
States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64,
283 U. S.
75. Rights and interests in the tideland, which is
subject to the sovereignty of the State, are matters of local law.
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324,
94 U. S.
338;
Shively v. Bowlby, [
152 U.S.
1,]
152 U. S. 40;
Hardin v.
Jordan, 140 U. S. 371,
140 U. S.
382;
Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington R.
Co., 255 U. S. 56,
255 U. S.
63."
Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, supra, at
296 U. S. 22.
The Court went on to hold that tidelands extend to the mean
high-water line, which the Court then defined as a matter of
federal law.
There was no question of accretions to the shoreline of the
property involved in
Borax. But some 30 years later, Mrs.
Stella Hughes, the successor in interest to the owner of oceanfront
property patented by the United States prior to
Page 457 U. S. 280
the entry of the State of Washington into the Union, sued the
State seeking to quiet her title to accretions that had become
attached to her land and that had caused a seaward movement of the
shoreline. Under Washington law, the accretions belonged to the
State, the owner of the tidelands, and Mrs. Hughes would no longer
own property fronting on the ocean. Under federal law, accretions
are the property of the upland owner. The trial court found that
federal law applied. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding
that Washington law applied and that the State owned any land that
accreted after statehood.
Hughes v. State, 67 Wash.2d.
799,
410 P.2d 20
(1966).
We, in turn, reversed, reaffirming the decision in
Borax that federal law determined the boundary between
state-owned tidelands and property granted under a federal patent
and holding that the same law applied to determine the boundary
between state-owned tidelands and oceanfront property where
accretions had extended the shoreline seaward.
Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U. S. 290
(1967). [
Footnote 8] The
justification for employing federal law was the special nature of
the coastal boundary question:
"The rule deals with waters that lap both the lands of the State
and the boundaries of the intenational sea. This relationship, at
this particular point of the marginal sea, is too close to the
vital interest of the Nation in its own boundaries to allow it to
be governed by any law but the 'supreme Law of the Land.'"
Id. at
389 U. S. 293.
We went on to decide that, under federal law, the federal grantee
of the uplands had the right to the accumulated accretions.
Except for the fact that, in the present case, the upland to
which the accretions attached has always been owned by the United
States, this case and
Hughes are similarly situated.
Page 457 U. S. 281
Unless Hughes is to be overruled, judgment must be entered for
the United States.
California urges that, for all intents and purposes, Hughes has
already been eviscerated by
Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.
S. 363 (1977).
Corvallis involved a dispute
between the State of Oregon and an Oregon corporation over the
ownership of land that became part of a riverbed because of
avulsive changes in the river's course. The Oregon Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's award of the land to the corporation
because that was the result dictated by federal common law, which,
under
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.
S. 313 (1973), was the proper source of law. A majority
of this Court reversed, overruling
Bonelli and holding
that the disputed ownership of the riverbed should be decided
solely as a matter of Oregon law.
Bonelli's error was said
to have been reliance on the equal-footing doctrine as a source of
federal common law. [
Footnote
9] Once the equal-footing doctrine had vested title to the
riverbed in Arizona, "it did not operate after that date to
determine what effect on titles the movement of the river might
have." 429 U.S. at
429 U. S. 371.
State, rather than federal law, should have been applied.
California urges that, in rejecting
Bonelli and holding
that disputes about the title to lands granted by the United States
are to be settled by state law, the Court also rejected
Hughes, since that case involved land that had been
patented by the United States to private owners. We do not agree.
Corvallis itself recognized that federal law would
continue to apply if "there were present some other principle of
federal law requiring state law to be displaced." 429 U.S. at
429 U. S. 371.
For example, the effects of accretive and avulsive changes in
the
Page 457 U. S. 282
course of a navigable stream forming an interstate boundary is
determined by federal law.
Id. at
429 U. S. 375.
The
Corvallis opinion also recognized that
Bonelli did not rest upon
Hughes, and that the
Hughes Court considered oceanfront property "sufficiently
different . . . so as to justify a
federal common law' rule of
riparian proprietorship." 429 U.S. at 377, n. 6. The
Corvallis decision did not purport to disturb
Hughes.
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.
S. 653 (1979), made clear that
Corvallis also
does not apply "where the [United States] Government has never
parted with title and its interest in the property continues." 442
U.S. at
442 U. S. 670.
[
Footnote 10] The dispute in
Corvallis was between the State and a private owner of
land previously in federal possession. In contrast, the riparian
owner in
Wilson was the United States, holding reservation
land in trust for the Omaha Indian Tribe. The issue was the effect
of accretive or avulsive changes in the course of a navigable
stream. State boundaries were not involved. What we said in
Wilson is at least equally applicable here, where the
United States has held title to, occupied, and utilized the
littoral land for over 100 years:
"[T]he general rule recognized by
Corvallis does not
oust federal law in this case. Here, we are not dealing with land
titles merely derived from a federal grant, but with land with
respect to which the United States has never yielded title or
terminated its interest."
442 U.S. at
442 U. S.
670.
Page 457 U. S. 283
We conclude, based on
Hughes v. Washington and
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, that a dispute over
accretions to oceanfront land where title rests with or was derived
from the Federal Government is to be determined by federal law.
III
Controversies governed by federal law do not inevitably require
resort to uniform federal rules.
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,
supra, at
442 U. S. 672.
It may be determined as a matter of choice of law that, although
federal law should govern a given question, state law should be
borrowed and applied as the federal rule for deciding the
substantive legal issue at hand.
Board of Commissioners of
Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.
S. 343 (1939);
Royal Indemnity Co. v. United
States, 313 U. S. 289
(1941). This is not such a case. First, and dispositive in itself,
is the fact that Congress has addressed the issue of accretions to
federal land. The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301
et
seq., vested title in the States to the lands underlying the
territorial sea, which, in California's case, extended three miles
seaward from the ordinary low-water line. The Act also confirmed
the title of the States to the tidelands up to the line of mean
high tide. Section 5(a) of the Act, however, withheld from the
grant to the States all "accretions" to coastal lands acquired or
reserved by the United States. [
Footnote 11] 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a). In
Page 457 U. S. 284
light of this provision, borrowing for federal law purposes a
state rule that would divest federal ownership is foreclosed. In
Wilson, where we did adopt state law as the federal rule,
no special federal concerns, let alone a statutory directive,
required a federal common law rule.
Moreover, this is not a case in which federal common law must be
created. For over 100 years, it has been settled under federal law
that the right to future accretions is an inherent and essential
attribute of the littoral or riparian owner.
New
Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662,
35 U. S. 717
(1836);
County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. at
90 U. S. 68.
"'Almost all jurists and legislators, . . . both ancient and
modern, have agreed that the owner of the land thus bounded is
entitled to these additions.'"
Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. at
134 U. S. 189,
quoting
Banks v. Ogden,
2 Wall. 57,
69 U. S. 67
(1865). We rejected the invitation to rely on state law in
Hughes, which California readily admits is a case "in
which the facts and issues are essentially identical," Statement in
Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint 16, and we see no
reason at this juncture to adopt California's minority rule on
artificial accretions, [
Footnote
12] even if we were free to do so.
Page 457 U. S. 285
Applying the federal rule that accretions, regardless of cause,
accrue to the upland owner, we conclude that title to the entire
disputed land in issue is vested in the United States.
IV
Despite
Hughes and
Wilson, California claims
ownership of the disputed lands because all of the accretions were
deposited on tidelands and submerged lands, title to which,
California submits, was vested in the State by the equal-footing
doctrine and confirmed by the Submerged Lands Act. But California's
claim to the land underlying the territorial sea was firmly
rejected in
United States v. California, 332 U. S.
19 (1947), which held that only land underneath inland
waters was included in the initial grant to the States under the
equal-footing doctrine. Furthermore, the Submerged Lands Act was a
constitutional exercise of Congress' power to dispose of federal
property,
Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.
S. 272,
347 U. S.
273-274 (1954), and "did not impair the validity" of the
California decision,
United States v. Louisiana,
363 U. S. 1,
363 U. S. 7,
363 U. S. 20
(1960). [
Footnote 13] In any
event, whatever the ownership of the submerged lands, this
approach, based as it is on the equal-footing doctrine and the
federal statute, is not a claim that state law should govern, but a
claim that the historic rule that accretions belong to the upland
owner is wrong, and should be
Page 457 U. S. 286
replaced with a rule awarding title to the owner of the land on
which the accretions took place. To accept this submission,
however, would require rejecting not only
Hughes, but also
the long-established federal rule that accretions belong to the
upland owner -- a doctrine consistent with the majority rule
prevailing in the States.
See 457 U.
S. supra. Indeed, the proposed rule is also
inconsistent with California's own law that accretions attributable
to natural causes belong to the upland owner. For all these
reasons, we refuse the invitation to depart from the long-settled
rule. [
Footnote 14]
Independent of the above analysis, California claims that the
United States expressly surrendered title to the disputed land
through the Submerged Lands Act. California argues the subject land
falls within the general grant to the States of "lands beneath
navigable waters." Section 2(a)(3) of the Act defines "lands
beneath navigable waters" to include "all filled in, made, or
reclaimed lands which formerly were lands beneath navigable
waters." 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3). Because the jetty construction
caused fairly rapid accretion, and, but for the construction of the
jetties, the subject land would have remained submerged, California
submits the accretion-formed land is "made" land, whose title rests
in California by virtue of the Submerged Lands Act.
Page 457 U. S. 287
We do not read this provision of the Act as applying to the
gradual process by which sand accumulated along the shore, although
caused by a jetty affecting the action of the sea. [
Footnote 15] Moreover, to the extent that
the accretions are to be considered "made" land, they would fall
within the reservation by the United States of "all lands filled
in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed by the United States for its
own use." This follows from the congressional object to assure each
sovereign the continuing benefit of landfill and like work
performed by each. [
Footnote
16] In any event, § 5(a) of the Act expressly withholds from
the grant to the States all "accretions" to lands reserved by the
United States, and both California and the United States agree that
the exposure of the formerly submerged lands in dispute constitutes
"accretion." This reading of the Act adheres to the principle that
federal grants are to be construed strictly in favor of the United
States.
United States v. Grand River Dam Authority,
363 U. S. 229,
363 U. S. 235
(1960);
Page 457 U. S. 288
United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 353 U.
S. 112,
353 U. S. 116
(1957).
Finally, California submits that the Act granted title to the
State by confirming the title of persons who, on June 5, 1950, were
entitled to such lands "under the law of the respective States in
which the land is located. . . ." 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a). This
provision means nothing more than that state law determines the
proper beneficiary of the grant of land under the Act; it is clear
that federal law determines the scope of the grant under the Act in
the first instance.
V
We reaffirm today that federal law determines the boundary of
oceanfront lands owned or patented by the United States. Applying
the federal rule that accretions of whatever cause belong to the
upland owner, we find that title to the disputed parcel rests with
the United States. Accordingly, California's motion for summary
judgment is denied, and the United States' motion for judgment on
the pleadings is granted. The parties, or either of them, may,
before September 27, 1982, submit a proposed decree to carry this
opinion into effect, failing which the Court will prepare and enter
an appropriate decree at the next Term of Court.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Secretarial Order, December 27, 1859; Secretarial Order, Augut
19, 1871.
See Exhibit C to Exhibits in Support of
California's Motion for Leave to File Complaint.
[
Footnote 2]
Construction of the jetties commenced on the South Spit in 1889
and on the North Spit in 1890. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, San
Francisco District, Survey Report on Humboldt Bay, California, App.
1, Shoreline Changes 2-3, 8-9 (Feb. 10, 1950), Exhibit D (hereafter
cited as Corps Report). The north jetty was a massive work, having
a total length of 7,500 feet.
[
Footnote 3]
The United States and California agree that the seaward shift of
the shoreline was caused by the construction of the jetties. A
study by the Army Corps of Engineers found:
"With the inauguration of jetty construction in 1890, there
began a series of interruptions in normal littoral transport [of
sand]. With each increment in length of the jetties, the [Humboldt]
bar was pushed seaward. Consequent decrease in offshore depths
caused the shore to advance on each side of the inlet."
Id. at 8, � 21. After jetty construction,
". . . the Humboldt bar . . . shifted and reformed seaward of
its 1870 position, and the ocean high-water shore line along the
north spit . . . shifted seaward. The seaward advance of the north
spit shoreline was most pronounced upon reconstruction of the north
jetty in 1917."
Id. at 9, � 25.
[
Footnote 4]
California does not contend that, having applied for a state
permit, the United States is estopped from asserting its claim to
ownership of the disputed land. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. Such an
argument is foreclosed by
United States v. California,
332 U. S. 19,
332 U. S. 39-40
(1947) (footnote omitted):
"[O]fficers who have no authority at all to dispose of
Government property, cannot by their conduct, cause the Government
to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or
failure to act."
See also United States v. City and County of San
Francisco, 310 U. S. 16,
310 U. S. 31-32
(1940);
Utah v. United States, 284 U.
S. 534,
284 U. S.
545-546 (1932).
[
Footnote 5]
In May, 1978, California transmitted a proposed permit to the
United States to allow construction of the watchtower.
See
Corps Report, Exhibit F. A few days later, the Bureau of Land
Management of the Department of the Interior formally advised the
Coast Guard and the California Commission that the United States
claimed the disputed acreage as accretion. Letter of June 5, 1978,
attached to Corps Report, Exhibit G. The proposed permit was never
executed.
[
Footnote 6]
Disputes between a State and the United States over ownership of
property are fully within our original jurisdiction over cases in
"which a State shall be Party," Art. III, 2, cl. 2. Although our
jurisdiction over this matter is concurrent with that of the
district courts,
California v. Arizona, 440 U. S.
59,
440 U. S. 65
(1979); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2), we have previously indicated that
coastal boundary disputes are appropriately brought as original
actions in this Court.
United States v. Alaska,
422 U. S. 184,
422 U. S. 186,
n. 2 (1975).
The United States has waived its immunity to suit in actions
brought against it to quiet title to land. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f).
See California v. Arizona, supra, at
440 U. S.
65-68.
[
Footnote 7]
California's claim that
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,
442 U. S. 653,
442 U. S. 672
(1979), determined that there was no "federal common law" of
accretion and avulsion is a misunderstanding of that decision. We
said only that "[t]he federal law applied in boundary eases . . .
does not neeessarily furnish the appropriate rules to govern" a
case not involving a boundary dispute. Too much is also read into
dictum in
Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand
& Gravel Co., 429 U. S. 363,
429 U. S.
380-381, n. 8 (1977), taking issue with the dissent's
meaning of the term "federal common law."
[
Footnote 8]
All participating Justices joined except Justice Stewart, who
concurred on grounds that the State's claim to the property
constituted a taking without compensation. He rejected the
majority's application of federal law to the question. JUSTICE
MARSHALL took no part in the case.
[
Footnote 9]
The equal-footing principle holds that all States admitted to
the Union possess the same rights and sovereignty as the original
13 States.
Pollard's Lesee v.
Hagan, 3 How. 212,
44 U. S. 229
(1845);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S.
1,
152 U. S. 26,
152 U. S. 30
(1894).
[
Footnote 10]
The majority opinion in
Corvallis appears to recognize
that its rule does not extend to land remaining in federal
hands:
"'We hold the true principle to be this, that, whenever the
question in any Court, state or federal, is
whether a
title to land which had once been property of the United States has
passed, that question must be resolved by the laws of the United
States; but that,
whenever, according to these laws,
the title shall have passed, then that property, like all
other property in the state, is
subject to state
legislation so far as that legislation is consistent with the
admission that the title passed and vested according to the laws of
the United States.'"
429 U.S. at
429 U. S. 377
(quoting
Wilcox v.
Jackson, 13 Pet. 498,
38 U. S. 517
(1839); emphasis added by
Corvallis Court).
[
Footnote 11]
In relevant part, § 5(a) of the Act, 62 Stat. 32, 43 U.S.C.
1313(a), excepts from the grant to the States
"all tracts or parcels of land together with all accretions
thereto, . . . title to which has been lawfully and expressly
acquired by the United States . . . and . . . all lands expressly
retained by or ceded to the United States when the State entered
the Union. . . ."
Although "accretions" are expressly mentioned only in connection
with federal "acquired lands," accretions to retained lands should
be similarly excepted from the grant to the States. Former
Solicitor General Cox, in an opinion approved by the Attorney
General, explained:
"There can be no doubt that Congress intended each of the
various categories of lands excepted by section 5(a) to include
accretions. The terms of section 5(a) make this clear. The
customary rights of landowners are set forth in full in the first
of the several exceptions listed in section 5(a). Thus, it speaks
of 'all tracts or parcels of land together with all accretions
thereto, resources therein, or improvements thereon. . . .' Each of
the other exceptions speaks simply of 'all lands.' Obviously, the
more comprehensive word 'lands' was used instead of 'tracts or
parcels of land,' and the explicit reference to accretions,
resources and improvements was omitted in order to avoid
repetition. There is no reasonable basis for any other conclusion.
Congress would not have limited its exceptions of 'all accretions
thereto, resources therein, or improvements thereon' to lands
'lawfully and expressly acquired by the United States' from any
State or its grantees and then denied them where the lands were
'expressly retained' or 'acquired by the United States by eminent
domain proceedings, purchase, cession, gift, or otherwise in a
proprietary capacity. . . .'"
42 Op.Atty.Gen. 241, 264 (1963).
[
Footnote 12]
In
United States v. California, O.T. 1951, No. 6,
Orig., California argued that the
"Court should adopt the federal rule that accretions formed by
gradual and imperceptible degrees even though induced by artificial
structures accrue to the owner of the adjoining land."
Brief in Relation to Report of Special Master 90. California
suggested
"ample reasons why [the] exceptional California view should not
be extended and applied in determining the boundaries of the
marginal sea off California."
Id. at 91. Those reasons included the fact that the
California rule is contrary to that adopted by courts of most other
States, that the application of state law would lead to varying
results in different States, and that the California rule was
devised for wholly inapplicable reasons.
[
Footnote 13]
See also Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. at
374 U. S.
273-274;
United States v. California,
381 U. S. 139,
381 U. S.
145-148 (1965);
United States v. Louisiana,
389 U. S. 155,
389 U. S.
156-157 (1967);
Texas Boundary Case,
394 U. S. 1,
394 U. S. 2
(1969);
United States v. Maine, 420 U.
S. 515,
420 U. S.
524-526 (1975);
United States v. Louisiana,
446 U. S. 253,
446 U. S. 256,
446 U. S. 268
(1980).
[
Footnote 14]
For the same reasons, we reject California's alternative theory
that the equal-footing doctrine vests title in the State to all
lands that ever were tidelands. California argues that as
deposition occurred on submerged land, these areas went to a
tideland phase -- vesting title in the State -- before eventually
emerging as uplands. Federal law governs the scope of title
initially vested by the equal-footing doctrine; at most, this
argument suggests a different federal rule should apply to former
tidelands. The suggestion has little to recommend it. Even leaving
aside the concerns expressed in text, we see no reason for an
exceptional rule to apply to land that once was, but no longer is,
tideland. Moreover, implementation of the rule would require
plotting the high- and low-water lines at all intervening times
between statehood and the present.
[
Footnote 15]
The word "made" was inserted into the provision in a bill
introduced by Congressman Walter. H.R. 8137, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 2(a)(2) (1950). The Report on that measure describes it as "in
substance, the same" as earlier proposals omitting the term.
H.R.Rep. No. 2078, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1950). Throughout
Congress' consideration of the bill, there was no comment on the
"made" land provision. No Member of either House ever suggested
that § 1301(a)(3) covered accretions that were attributable to
artificial works. Against this background, we find no significance
in the two casual references by Robert Moses and Senator Daniel to
naturally formed accretions as "made." Hearings on S. J. Res. 13
et al. before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 158 (1953) (remarks of Robert
Moses);
id. at 193-194 (remarks of Sen. Daniel).
[
Footnote 16]
The interpretive opinion rendered by former Solicitor General
Cox, while including naturally formed islands within the "made"
language of § 2(a)(3), rejects the suggestion that accretion to the
mainland, whether or not directly attributable to artificial
causes, is included in the Submerged Lands Act grant to the States.
42 Op.Atty.Gen. at 259-265, 266-267. We express no opinion on the
Act's treatment of naturally formed islands in the marginal
sea.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE
O'CONNOR join, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment. I believe that our decision in
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.
S. 653 (1979), requires the application of federal
common law to resolve this title dispute between the United States
and California, and that § 5(a) of the Submerged Lands Act
indicates the source of that law.
The dispute in this case concerns the ownership of artificially
caused accretions on oceanfront property belonging to
Page 457 U. S. 289
the United States. The dispute centers on the legal effect of
the movement of the "mean high-water mark." That mark separates the
fastlands continuously owned by the United States from the
"tidelands" -- the area of partially submerged lands between the
mean high- and low-water marks. California's claim of title to the
tidelands is based upon the equal-footing doctrine. Because the
tidelands belong to it, and because the accretions formed on the
tidelands, California contends that state law applies to resolve
this title dispute between it and the United States. The rule
adopted by the California courts regarding artificially caused
accretions holds that title to accreted land vests with the State,
rather than the riparian or littoral owner. The United States
contends that federal common law applies, and argues that the
federal common law rule holds that title to land formed by
accretion vests in the owner of the riparian land.
The dispute in this case is similar to that in
Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe. We held in
Wilson that federal
common law and not state law governs title disputes resulting from
changes in the course of a navigable stream where an
instrumentality of the Federal Government is the riparian owner.
442 U.S. at
442 U. S.
669-671. The rule of
Oregon ex rel. State Land Board
v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.
S. 363 (1977), was distinguished. The
Corvallis
rule -- that state law governs -- applies where the dispute over
the legal effect of a shifting riverbed does not involve claims of
title by a federal instrumentality.
I agree with the Court that the
Wilson rule applies to
oceanfront property as well as riverfront property where the
Federal Government is the littoral owner.
Wilson should
apply to the movement of the high-water mark along the ocean in a
fashion similar to the way it applies to changes in the bed of a
navigable stream. In the instant case, as in
Wilson, it is
irrelevant that the accretion, as a geographical "fact," formed on
land within the State's dominion, be it a river bottom or the ocean
tidelands. The fact is that both
Page 457 U. S. 290
Wilson and the instant case concern title disputes over
changes in the shoreline where the Federal Government owns land
along the shoreline.
In
Wilson, we held that state law supplied the
applicable rule of decision even though federal common law applied
to resolve the title dispute. We found no need for a uniform
national rule, and no reason why federal interests should not be
treated under the same rules of property that would apply to
private persons. In contrast to
Wilson, however, I agree
with the Court that Congress, in § 5(a) of the Submerged Lands
Act,, has supplied the rule of decision. Section 5(a) withholds
from the grant to the States all accretions to coastal lands
acquired or reserved by the United States. I also agree with the
Court that California did not acquire the disputed lands pursuant
to the "made lands" provisions in § 2(a)(3).
Consequently, the Court's discussion regarding the continuing
vitality of
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.
S. 290 (1967), is dicta.
Hughes is unnecessary
to the resolution of choice-of-law issues in title disputes between
the Federal Government and a State or private person. Reliance on
Hughes would be necessary only if we were to hold that
federal common law, rather than state law, applied in a title
dispute between a federal patentee and a State or private persons
as to lands fronting an ocean. The instant case does not present
that issue. It is difficult to reconcile
Hughes with
Corvallis, and we should postpone that endeavor until
required to undertake it.
In summary, I think this case can be easily resolved as a title
dispute between the United States and California concerning the
legal effect of movement of the Pacific Ocean's high-water mark.
Wilson and the Submerged Lands Act resolve the dispute.
The continuing vitality of
Hughes should be left to
another day.