New York's Emergency Assistance (EA) Program, which is federally
funded under the Social Security Act (SSA), precludes the
furnishing of EA cash to persons receiving or eligible for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or of EA in any form to
replace a lost or stolen AFDC grant. Appellees, who had been denied
EA under these state provisions, brought a class action in Federal
District Court to enjoin enforcement of the provisions, alleging
that they conflicted with the SSA and violated equal protection.
Ultimately, on remand after its decision invalidating the state
provisions under the Supremacy Clause had been vacated by the Court
of Appeals, the District Court invalidated the no-cash provision as
a violation of equal protection, but upheld the loss-or-theft
provision. On a second appeal, the Court of Appeals held that both
provisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Held: Because the New York provisions conflict with a
valid federal regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare (Secretary) which proscribes inequitable
treatment of individuals or groups under an EA program, they are
invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Pp.
457 U. S.
137-146.
(a) Reliance on the SSA to find the New York provisions invalid
is not foreclosed by
Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.
S. 725. While
Quern emphasized that a State
retains considerable flexibility in determining which emergencies
to cover under its EA plan, it was not suggested that the Secretary
was stripped of all authority to review a plan that arbitrarily or
inequitably excluded a class of recipients. Pp.
457 U. S.
138-139.
(b) The Secretary's decision to apply the "equitable treatment"
regulation so as to forbid a State to exclude AFDC recipients from
its EA program is eminently reasonable, and deserves judicial
deference, especially where the legislative history leaves no doubt
that AFDC recipients were expected to be included in a state EA
program. Pp.
457 U. S.
139-145.
648 F.2d 801, affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 457 U. S. 133
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
New York has established an Emergency Assistance Program that
receives substantial federal funding under Title IV-A of the Social
Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(5). The program excludes
recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) from
emergency assistance in the form of cash. It also excludes public
assistance recipients (including AFDC recipients) from
reimbursement for lost or stolen grants, even though it provides
such reimbursement to other public benefit recipients. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that New York's
treatment of AFDC recipients is not inconsistent with the federal
Act and regulations, but violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Because we conclude that the New York law is invalid under the Act,
we affirm without reaching the equal protection issue.
I
Appellee Jeanne Bacon has two minor children, and depends
entirely on an AFDC grant to support her family. On June 1, 1977,
while she was shopping, her wallet and food stamps were stolen. She
promptly reported the theft to the police and to the New York
Department of Social Services (DSS). She requested emergency
assistance (EA) under the State's federally funded Emergency
Assistance Program, explaining that she had no money to purchase
food and other essential items for her household for the month. DSS
denied her request on the basis of a recent state law which
precludes the furnishing of any cash EA to persons receiving or
eligible
Page 457 U. S. 134
for AFDC, N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law §§ 350j(2)(c) and (3) (McKinney
Supp.1981) (the "no-cash" provision), or of EA in any form to
replace a lost or stolen public assistance grant, including an AFDC
grant. § 350-j(2)(e) (the "loss-or-theft" provision). [
Footnote 1] Appellee Gertrude Parrish
suffered a similar fate. An AFDC mother, she lost her food and AFDC
funds when her apartment was broken into and ransacked. She applied
for EA, and DSS denied her request on the same basis as it denied
relief to appellee Bacon. The other named appellees, Linda Selders
and Freddie Mae Goodwine, also
Page 457 U. S. 135
were denied EA after they cashed their AFDC checks and suffered
the loss of their money. [
Footnote
2]
Appellees brought this class action to enjoin enforcement of the
state law insofar as it denies EA pursuant to the no-cash provision
and the loss-or-theft provision. [
Footnote 3] Appellees argued that the law conflicts with
the Act and violates equal protection because it arbitrarily
discriminates against AFDC recipients: it provides cash EA to all
eligible recipients other than AFDC recipients, and provides EA for
lost or stolen public benefit grants to all public benefit
recipients (such as recipients of social security and Supplemental
Security Income)
Page 457 U. S. 136
other than those on public assistance (including AFDC
recipients).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on the
ground that the state provisions impermissibly narrowed the
eligibility standards imposed on state EA programs by § 406(e) of
the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(e), [
Footnote 4] and were thus invalid under the Supremacy
Clause.
Bacon v. Toia, 437 F.
Supp. 1371 (1977). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed.
Bacon v. Toia, 580 F.2d 1044
(1978). Shortly thereafter, this Court decided
Quern v.
Mandley, 436 U. S. 725
(1978), in which we held that § 406(e) imposes permissive, not
mandatory, standards on participating States. The Court of Appeals
granted a motion for rehearing, vacated the judgment of the
District Court, and remanded the case for further consideration
in
Page 457 U. S. 137
light of
Quern. On remand, the District Court changed
its prior decision and held that the New York law was not
inconsistent with the federal Act. In a subsequent opinion, the
District Court invalidated the no-cash provision as a violation of
equal protection, but upheld the loss-or-theft provision.
Bacon
v. Toia, 493 F.
Supp. 865 (1980). On the second appeal, the Court of Appeals
agreed with the District Court that our decision in
Quern
foreclosed a finding that the law violates the Supremacy Clause.
The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that both the no-cash and
loss-or-theft provisions violate equal protection.
Bacon v.
Toia, 648 F.2d 801 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction. 454
U.S. 1122.
II
Where a party raises both statutory and constitutional arguments
in support of a judgment, ordinarily we first address the statutory
argument in order to avoid unnecessary resolution of the
constitutional issue.
See Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U. S. 682,
442 U. S.
692-693 (1979);
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.
S. 528,
415 U. S. 543
(1974). [
Footnote 5] We
conclude that this case may be resolved
Page 457 U. S. 138
on statutory grounds. As we explain below, the New York no-cash
and loss-or-theft rules conflict with valid federal regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
(Secretary) (now the Secretary of Health and Human Services) which
proscribe inequitable treatment under the EA program. Thus, New
York's rules are invalid under the Supremacy Clause.
A
Before reviewing the federal regulations that we find to be
dispositive of this case, we first address appellant's claim that
reliance on the Act is foreclosed by our decision in
Quern v.
Mandley, supra. In that case, we carefully reviewed the nature
and scope of the EA program and examined one aspect of its
relationship to the AFDC program. [
Footnote 6] Under Title IV-A of the Act, state public
assistance plans approved by the Secretary are eligible for federal
financial assistance. AFDC is a major categorical aid program
funded under the Act -- indeed, it is "the core of the Title IV-A
system."
Id. at 728. States are required, as a condition
of federal funding under the AFDC program, to make assistance
available to all persons who meet statutory eligibility criteria.
Id. at 740; 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(10), 606(a). The EA
program is a supplement to such categorical assistance programs as
AFDC. It permits federal reimbursement to States which choose to
provide for temporary emergency assistance in their Title IV-A
plans. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(5). In contrast to AFDC, the EA program
establishes much broader eligibility standards, and is not limited
to persons eligible for AFDC. 42 U.S.C. § 606(e).
Plaintiffs in
Quern made the broad claim that a State
participating in the federal EA program may not limit eligibility
for EA more narrowly than the federal eligibility standards in §
406(e). The state plan at issue provided emergency assistance
Page 457 U. S. 139
only to certain AFDC families who were without shelter and to
applicants presumptively eligible for AFDC who were in immediate
need of clothing or household furnishings. We rejected the
plaintiffs' broad claim, and held that, unlike the AFDC program, §
406(e) establishes only permissive, not mandatory, eligibility
standards.
Quern did not address the statutory issue before us
today -- whether the complete and automatic exclusion of AFDC
recipients from a State's EA program is inconsistent with the Act
and applicable regulations. The Court had no occasion to consider
the question, since the EA program in that case included
only AFDC recipients. In addition, the only pertinent
federal regulations in
Quern undermined the plaintiffs'
claims and supported the State's rules.
See 436 U.S. at
436 U. S.
743-744, n.19; 45 CFR § 233.120 (1981). Here, on the
other hand, the Secretary has promulgated a regulation inconsistent
with New York's no-cash and loss-or-theft rules.
See 45
CFR § 233.10 (1981);
infra at
457 U. S.
139-142. [
Footnote
7] In short, although we emphasized in
Quern that a
State retains considerable flexibility in determining which
emergencies to cover under its EA plan, we hardly suggested that
the Secretary had been stripped of all authority to review a plan
that arbitrarily or inequitably excluded a class of recipients.
B
The Secretary, who is charged with administering federal funding
for EA under the Act, has promulgated the following regulation
applicable to state plans under Title IV-A, including EA
programs:
"(a)
State plan requirements. A State plan under title
I, IV-A, X, XIV, or XVI, of the Social Security Act must: "
Page 457 U. S. 140
"(1) Specify the groups of individuals, based on reasonable
classifications, that will be included in the program, and all the
conditions of eligibility that must be met by the individuals in
the groups. The groups selected for inclusion in the plan and the
eligibility conditions imposed must not exclude individuals or
groups on an arbitrary or unreasonable basis, and must not result
in inequitable treatment of individuals or groups in the light of
the provisions and purposes of the public assistance titles of the
Social Security Act."
45 CFR § 233.10 (1981). The Secretary has also issued
regulations exclusively addressed to the EA program. 45 CFR §
233.120 (1981). [
Footnote
8]
On the authority of these regulations, the Secretary has
specifically required the inclusion of AFDC recipients in any EA
program, and has disapproved New York's EA plan because it excludes
AFDC recipients as a class. Shortly after this Court's decision in
Quern, the Office of Family Assistance of the Social
Security Administration issued Action Transmittal SSA-AT-78 44
(OFA) addressed to state agencies administering approved public
assistance programs. The Transmittal explains that, after
Quern,
"States remain free, under Federal policy to develop their own
definition of
Page 457 U. S. 141
the kind of emergencies they will meet under this program."
App. 173a. Nevertheless,
"[a] State Plan must clearly specify that AFDC recipients are
included in it EA program. Other categories of needy families with
children may be included at State option; these categories must be
specified in the plan."
Id. at 174a (emphasis added). In an
amicus
brief filed at the invitation of the Court of Appeals below, the
Secretary confirmed that New York's exclusion of AFDC recipients
through its no-cash and loss-or-theft provisions violates federal
regulations, in particular the "equitable treatment" regulation, 45
CFR § 233.10 (1981). App. to Motion to Affirm 12a-17a. As the
Secretary interpreted that regulation, the discrimination in New
York's program is not justified by, or tailored to, the purposes of
the EA program.
Ibid. [
Footnote 9]
We agree that New York's law is invalid under the equitable
treatment regulation insofar as it automatically excludes AFDC
recipients from the EA program. The regulation, and the Secretary's
decision to apply it to strike down New York's no-cash and
loss-or-theft rules, clearly deserve judicial deference. We have
often noted that the interpretation of an agency charged with the
administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference.
See, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee, 454 U. S. 27
(1981);
Page 457 U. S. 142
Quern, 436 U.S. at
436 U. S. 738.
In light of the strong support in the legislative history for the
Secretary's conclusion that the automatic exclusion of AFDC
recipients from an EA program is inequitable in light of the
purposes of the EA program, we find such deference particularly
appropriate in this case.
C
In 1967, Congress thoroughly revised the Social Security Act,
including many of its public assistance provisions. The House and
Senate Committee Reports concerning the portion of the revision
that would ultimately become the EA program [
Footnote 10] make it unmistakably clear that
AFDC recipients were expected to benefit from the program. The
initial House Report states:
"Your committee understands that the process of determining
eligibility and authorizing payments frequently precludes the
meeting of emergency needs when a crisis occurs. In the event of
eviction, or when utilities are turned off, or when an alcoholic
parent leaves children without food, immediate action is necessary.
It frequently is unavailable under State programs today.
Page 457 U. S. 143
When a child is suddenly deprived of his parents by their
accidental death, or when the agency finds that the conditions in
the home are contrary to the child's welfare, the normal methods of
payment have to be suspended while new arrangements and court
referrals are made."
"To encourage public welfare agencies to move promptly and with
maximum effectiveness in such situations, the bill contains an
offer to the States of 50-percent participation in emergency
assistance payments. . . . The eligible families involved are those
with children under 21 who either are or have recently been living
with close relatives.
The families do not have to be receiving
or eligible upon application to receive AFDC (although they are
generally of the same type), but they must be without
available resources. . . . "
"Assistance might be in any form. . . . The provision is broad
enough that emergencies can be met in migrant families as
well
as those meeting residence requirements of the State's AFDC
program. Its utilization would be optional with the
States."
H.R.Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 (1967) (emphasis
added). This passage leaves the obvious implication that persons
who are eligible for AFDC benefits would receive EA. The Senate
Report is almost identical, except for an explanation of the
changes in the Senate bill. S.Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
165-166 (1967). [
Footnote
11] Indeed, in an earlier summary of this provision, the Senate
Report describes EA as one of a series of amendments that "would
set up new protections for the children in AFDC families."
Id. at 146. [
Footnote
12]
Page 457 U. S. 144
The House and Senate debates on this portion of the Social
Security Amendments, although abbreviated, buttress our
understanding of congressional intent. Senator Long, floor manager
of the bill, repeated the Senate Report's characterization of EA as
one of several changes that would establish "new protections for
the children in AFDC families." 113 Cong.Rec. 32592 (1967).
Comments by other legislators reveal a similar understanding.
[
Footnote 13] Testimony by
witnesses and statements introduced at the Senate hearings on the
bill are also illuminating. Many statements assume that AFDC would
be covered, and some reveal the belief that EA would be principally
an AFDC program. [
Footnote
14]
Page 457 U. S. 145
III
The Secretary's decision to apply the "equitable treatment"
regulation so as to forbid a State to exclude AFDC recipients from
its EA program is eminently reasonable, and deserves judicial
deference. The regulation explicitly forbids the
"inequitable treatment of individuals or groups in the light of
the provisions and purposes of the public assistance titles of the
Social Security Act."
45 CFR § 233.10 (1981). AFDC recipients are "the core of the
Title IV-A system,"
Quern, 436 U.S. at
436 U. S. 728,
and the principal group of beneficiaries under federally assisted
state welfare programs. Moreover, the legislative history reviewed
above leaves no doubt that AFDC recipients were expected to be
included in a state EA program receiving federal financial
assistance.
Because New York's no-cash [
Footnote 15] and loss-or-theft rules conflict with a
valid federal regulation, they are invalid under the Supremacy
Clause.
See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.
S. 281,
441 U. S.
295-296 (1979). In light of our disposition of this
Supremacy Clause claim, we do not address appellees' equal
protection argument. [
Footnote
16]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
New York Soc. Serv. Law § 350j (McKinney Supp.1981) provides in
pertinent part:
"2. For purposes of this section, the term 'emergency
assistance' means aid, care and services authorized during a period
not in excess of thirty days in any twelve month period to meet the
emergency needs of a child or the household in which he is living,
in the following circumstances:"
"(a) where the child is under twenty-one years of age; and"
"(b) the child is living with, or within the previous six months
has lived with, one or more persons specified in subdivision b of
section three hundred forty-nine of this chapter; and"
"(c)
in cases of applications for grants of cash assistance,
such child or such household is not categorically eligible for or
receiving aid to dependent children; and"
"(d) such emergency needs resulted from a catastrophic
occurrence or from a situation which threatens family stability and
which has caused the destitution of the child and/or home; and"
"(e) such occurrence or situation could not have been foreseen
by the applicant, was not under his control,
and, in the case
of a person receiving public assistance, did not result from the
loss, theft or mismanagement of a regular public assistance
grant; and"
"(f) the emergency grant being applied for will not replace or
duplicate a public assistance grant already made under section one
hundred thirty-one-a of this chapter."
"3. Emergency assistance to needy families with children shall
be provided to the extent of items of need and services set forth
in sections one hundred thirty-one and one hundred thirty-one-a of
this chapter. . . . Such emergency assistance, but not including
cash grants, may be furnished to a family eligible for aid to
dependent children only in the form of emergency services, and so
long as federal aid remains available, for emergency fuel grants in
the form of vendor restricted payments."
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 2]
The record indicates that appellees have standing to challenge
the no-cash as well as the loss-or-theft provision. In the case of
appellees Bacon, Parrish, and Goodwine, DSS purported to rely on
the loss-or-theft provision in denying EA. However, Parrish was
denied EA for lost food as well as lost money. The no-cash
provision, not the loss-or-theft provision, would appear to justify
denial of EA for the lost food, since that loss did not result from
the theft of her public assistance
grant.
In the case of appellee Selders, DSS denied EA for her lost cash
pursuant to an administrative memorandum that outlines both the
no-cash and the loss-or-theft exclusions for AFDC recipients. App.
34a-37a, 51a. It is therefore unclear which exclusion the State
purported to rely upon in denying assistance. However, Selders lost
a food stamp voucher as well as the cash from her AFDC grant. DSS
refused to provide the cash equivalent of the voucher. Although DSS
replaced the voucher, Selders was unable to make use of the
replacement, because she had no cash.
Bacon v.
Toia, 437 F.
Supp. 1371, 1376-1377 (SDNY 1977). Accordingly, it was the
State's no-cash rule that prevented her from obtaining effective
EA.
Id. at 1384-1385. Selders alone was denominated a
representative of the subclass of plaintiffs challenging the
no-cash rule.
Id. at 1381.
In light of these facts and appellant's concession that DSS
relied upon both the no-cash and the loss-or-theft provisions in
denying assistance, Brief for Appellant 7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 17,
we conclude that appellees have standing to challenge both
provisions.
[
Footnote 3]
Appellees also sought to enjoin enforcement of the statutory
provision denying replacement or duplication of a public assistance
grant already made. N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law 350j(2)(f) (McKinney
Supp.1981). They no longer seek relief with respect to that
provision, because the District Court determined that the provision
does not preclude EA in the event of a true emergency.
Bacon v.
Toia, 493 F.
Supp. 865, 875 (SDNY 1980).
[
Footnote 4]
Section 406(e) of the Act provides in part:
"(1) The term 'emergency assistance to needy families with
children' means any of the following, furnished for a period not in
excess of 30 days in any 12-month period, in the case of a needy
child under the age of 21 who is . . . living with any of the
relatives specified in subsection (a)(1) of this section in a place
of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or
their own home, but only where such child is without available
resources, the payments, care, or services involved as necessary to
avoid destitution of such child or to provide living arrangements
in a home for such child, and such destitution or need for living
arrangements did not arise because such child or relative refused
without good cause to accept employment or training for employment
-- "
"(A) money payments, payments in kind, or such other payments as
the State agency may specify with respect to, or medical care or
any other type of remedial care recognized under State law on
behalf of, such child or any other member of the household in which
he is living, and"
(B) such services as may be specified by the Secretary;
"but only with respect to a State whose State plan approved
under section 602 of this title includes provision for such
assistance."
"(2) Emergency assistance as authorized under paragraph (1) may
be provided . . . to migrant workers with families in the State or
in such part or parts thereof as the State shall designate."
81 Stat. 893.
[
Footnote 5]
Appellant argues that the statutory issue is not properly before
us. It is well accepted, however, that, without filing a
cross-appeal or cross-petition, an appellee may rely upon any
matter appearing in the record in support of the judgment below.
See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig,
426 U. S. 479
(1976) (per curiam);
Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406,
433 U. S. 419
(1977);
see also R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court
Practice 478 (5th ed.1978). Moreover, the statutory issue was
raised and decided in both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals.
Appellant also asserts that the appellees were required to file
a cross-appeal because they seek to modify the judgment below.
Acceptance of the appellees' statutory argument will allegedly
result in such a modification because "the injunction granted below
on the basis of constitutional right would be modified to one based
upon statute or regulation." Reply of Appellant to Motion to Affirm
8. Appellant cites no authority for this novel view that an
affirmance which does not alter the relief ordered in the judgment
below "modifies" the judgment simply because the affirmance rests
on a different legal basis than the court below adopted.
[
Footnote 6]
For a general discussion of the EA and AFDC programs,
see
Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. at
436 U. S.
728-729,
436 U. S.
735-736,
436 U. S. 739,
436 U. S.
742-743.
[
Footnote 7]
In a footnote, the Court reported that some States have narrowed
eligibility for EA programs by excluding AFDC recipients if the
emergency need is one theoretically covered by the basic assistance
grant.
Id. at 739-740, n. 16. This descriptive statement
is not, of course, an expression of opinion, much less a holding,
with respect to the issue before us.
[
Footnote 8]
These regulations were adopted pursuant to § 1102 of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1302, which provides the Secretary with authority to
"make . . . such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with
this chapter, as may be necessary to the efficient administration
of the functions with which [he] is charged under this
chapter."
We have described this provision as creating "broad rulemaking
powers."
Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.
S. 268,
393 U. S. 277,
n. 28 (1969). The Secretary has also argued that 45 CFR §
233.10(a)(1) (1981) is authorized pursuant to § 402(a)(5), 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(5), under which a state plan under Title IV-A
"must . . . provide such methods of administration . . . as are
found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper and efficient
operation of the plan."
See App. to Motion to Affirm 8a. This section applies
to all portions of a state plan under Title IV-A, including the EA
program.
See Quern, supra, at
436 U. S.
741-742.
[
Footnote 9]
It appears that the Secretary has consistently taken the
position that automatic exclusions of AFDC recipients from an EA
program violate the "equitable treatment" regulation, 45 CFR §
233.10 (1981). In an
amicus brief filed at the invitation
of the court in
Ingerson v. Pratt, Civ. Action No.
76-3255-S (Mass., Nov. 14, 1979), the Secretary stated that the
regulation applies to EA programs. The Office of Family Assistance
later determined that Massachusetts' "recipient status" rule
violates the regulation because it provides that the EA benefits
available to AFDC recipients will be affected by the amount
received in the AFDC grant, whereas the EA benefits available to
non-AFDC recipients will not be affected by the amount of
assistance received. Documentation of the U.S. Dept. of HEW
relating to
Ingerson v. Pratt, File of the Clerk of this
Court in No. 81-770. The District Court has invalidated this rule
(as well as another state rule) based on the "equitable treatment"
regulation.
Ingerson v. Pratt, Civ. Action No. 76-3255-S
(Mass., Feb. 8, 1982).
[
Footnote 10]
The EA program, a small part of the 1967 Social Security
Amendments, originated with the President's limited proposal to
extend temporary assistance to migratory workers.
See H.R.
5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 122-123 (1967). The assistance
"would be in an amount consistent with what the individuals
would receive if they were eligible under a public assistance plan
in the State in which they are living."
House Committee on Ways and Means, Section-by-Section Analysis
of H.R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (Comm. Print 1967). In the
House, the Ways and Means Committee adopted a much broader
proposal, very similar to the version ultimately enacted.
See H.R. 12080, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 137-139 (1967).
After House passage, the Senate made three changes -- increasing
the amount of time that emergency assistance would be available,
denying assistance if a child or relative refused without good
cause to accept employment, and more explicitly protecting migrant
workers. In conference, the second and third changes were accepted.
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 60 (1967). Congress
adopted the conference bill.
[
Footnote 11]
The Senate Report also inserts "AFDC" prior to the word
"eligibility" in the first sentence quoted in the text above -- yet
another indication that those eligible for or receiving AFDC were
presumed to be covered.
[
Footnote 12]
Other portions of the legislative documents indicate that the EA
program was viewed as an extension of the AFDC program. For
example, the House bill initially contained the title, "Emergency
Assistance for Certain Needy
Families with Dependent
Children." H.R. 12080, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 137 (1967)
(emphasis added). The bill as enacted placed the EA provisions
within Subchapter IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601
et seq., entitled "Aid to Families With Dependent
Children." 42 U.S.C. §§ 603(a)(5), 606(e). Moreover, numerous
historical documents place discussion of the EA program within an
"AFDC" category.
See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 97 (1967); Senate Committee on Finance, Social Security
Amendments of 1967: Comparison of H.R. 12080, As Passed by the
House of Representatives with Existing Law, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
37-38 (Comm. Print 1967); S.Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4,
165-166 (1967); Senate Committee on Finance, The Social Security
Amendments of 1967, Brief Summary of Major Provisions and Detailed
Comparison with Prior Law, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 68-69 (1968).
[
Footnote 13]
Congress expressed concern that categorical aid programs (which
include AFDC) were often too inflexible to afford immediate
emergency relief. The implicit assumption is that, if a state EA
plan covered emergency needs that were not promptly met under these
programs, persons receiving or eligible for aid under the programs
would receive EA. Thus, Senator Ribicoff emphasized that welfare
agencies need to have "flexibility" in dealing with emergencies;
and Senator Curtis explained that "[f]or a period of 30 days,
emergency assistance can be paid in cases where [EA recipients]
cannot meet other qualifications." 113 Cong.Rec. 32853, 36319
(1967).
[
Footnote 14]
Hearings on H.R. 12080 before the Senate Committee on Finance,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1034 (1967) (statement of Commissioner,
Louisiana Dept. of Public Welfare);
id. at App. As
(statement of Commissioner, Alabama Dept. of Pensions and
Security);
id. at App. A125 (statement of Governor of
Hawaii);
id. at App. A289 (statement of Rhode Island Dept.
of Social Welfare).
[
Footnote 15]
Appellant asserts that the no-cash rule does not discriminate
against AFDC recipients at all. On its face, of course, the rule
excludes AFDC as well as all other public assistance recipients,
and thus violates the regulation. But appellant claims that AFDC
recipients may obtain the same emergency benefits through special
grants under other provisions of the state welfare law. Both lower
courts rejected this claim, concluding that the special grant
provisions are more limited than EA provisions. 648 F.2d at 807
808; 493 F. Supp. at 872-873. In particular, the Court of Appeals,
after reviewing relevant state cases, determined that the state EA
program would provide grants in cases of loss caused by burglary or
public auction following eviction, and would provide food and other
immediate living expenses, while special grants would not cover
these items. 648 F.2d at 808. We have no reason to question the
conclusion of the lower courts, given their familiarity with state
law.
See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341,
426 U. S. 346
(1976).
Of course, we do not suggest that a State may not choose to
provide AFDC special grants for emergencies as an alternative to
including AFDC recipients within the EA program, if the special
grants are provided as promptly and for the same emergencies as the
EA grants.
Cf. Quern, 436 U.S. at
436 U. S.
734-739.
[
Footnote 16]
We do not reach the question whether the loss-or-theft provision
in N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law § 350-j (McKinney Supp.1981) is invalid as
applied to public assistance recipients other than those receiving
AFDC. The question presented in appellant's jurisdictional
statement refers only to the discrimination against AFDC
recipients; thus, appellant challenges the judgment below only
insofar as it requires the granting of EA to AFDC recipients.