Petitioner was convicted in Federal District Court of two counts
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which prohibits the transportation
"in interstate or foreign commerce [of] any . . . forged . . .
securities . . knowing the same to have been . . . forged." The
proof at trial showed that blank checks had been stolen in Ohio,
and that, several months later, petitioner used two of the checks,
on which signatures had been forged, to pay for a car and for a
boat and trailer purchased in separate transactions in
Pennsylvania. The trial court instructed the jury that, in order to
find petitioner guilty, it must find that he transported the checks
in a forged condition in "interstate commerce," and that such
transportation could take place entirely within Pennsylvania if it
was a "continuation of the movement that began out of state." The
court rejected petitioner's objection to the instruction on the
asserted ground that, under § 2314, the Government had the burden
of proving that the checks had been forged in Ohio before being
transported across state lines to Pennsylvania. The Court of
Appeals affirmed petitioner's convictions.
Held: Section 2314 does not require proof that the
securities were forged before being taken across state lines, and
thus the trial court's jury instructions were correct. Pp.
455 U. S.
647-659.
(a) Use of the past tense "forged" in § 2314 does not establish
Congress' intent to prohibit only the transportation of securities
that were forged before crossing state lines. Congress' use of the
phrase "interstate commerce," rather than "state borders," as well
as the legislative history of the phrase, shows that Congress
intended it to be as broad in scope as this Court's decisions
holding that interstate commerce begins well before state lines are
crossed and ends only when movement of the item in question has
ceased in the destination State. Moreover, § 2314's purpose of
aiding the States in detection and punishment of criminals who
evade state authorities by using channels of interstate commerce
supports the conclusion that Congress could not have intended to
require federal prosecutors to prove that the securities had been
forged before crossing state lines. Pp.
455 U. S.
648-656.
(b) The language of § 2314 does not raise significant questions
of ambiguity sufficient to warrant application of the principle of
lenity and construction
Page 455 U. S. 643
in petitioner's favor.
United States v. Bass,
404 U. S. 336
distinguished. Pp.
455 U. S.
657-658.
644 F.2d 274, affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
455 U. S.
659.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The petitioner was convicted of two counts of transporting a
forged security in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2314. He challenges his conviction on the ground that the statute
requires proof, concededly lacking at trial, that the securities
had been forged before being taken across state lines. Because of a
conflict among the Circuits on this issue of statutory
construction, we granted certiorari. 454 U.S. 815 (1981). For the
reasons stated below, we affirm the petitioner's conviction.
I
Petitioner Charles McElroy was indicted by a federal grand jury
on three counts. Counts 1 and 3 charged that, on two occasions, the
petitioner transported in interstate commerce falsely made and
forged securities from Ohio to Pennsylvania in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2314, the National Stolen Property Act. [
Footnote 1] Count 2 charged McElroy with
transporting
Page 455 U. S. 644
a stolen car in interstate commerce from Pennsylvania to Ohio in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312. [
Footnote 2]
According to the proof at trial, several blank checks [
Footnote 3] were stolen from Local 126
of the Laborers' International Union in Youngstown, Ohio, in late
March or early April, 1977. After the Union discovered the theft,
it closed the account on which the checks were drawn. Seventeen
months later, in October, 1978, the petitioner ordered a used
Corvette from the Don Allen Chevrolet Agency in Pittsburgh, Pa.,
for $6,706. Using the name "William Jones," the petitioner told the
salesman that he lived in Warrenville Heights, Ohio, but worked in
the Pittsburgh area. The petitioner returned the next day and paid
for the car with one of the stolen Union checks, on which a
signature had been forged. After learning the following day from
the drawee bank in Ohio that the account had been closed, the
dealership made no effort to negotiate the check. This transaction
formed the basis for count 1 (transportation of a forged check in
interstate commerce) and count 2 (transportation of a stolen
vehicle, the Corvette, in interstate commerce) of the
indictment.
In December, 1978, the petitioner sought to purchase a boat and
trailer from the Rini Marine Sales Co. in Beaver Falls, Pa.
Adhering to his previously successful scheme, he used the
fictitious name "William Jones" and gave an Ohio address for his
residence. One week after his initial inquiry, he paid for a boat
and trailer with one of the stolen Union checks, on
Page 455 U. S. 645
which a signature had been forged. Too late, Philip Rini, the
owner of Rini Marine Sales, became suspicious and telephoned the
Youngstown, Ohio, bank only to learn that the check had been stolen
and the signature forged. He, too, abandoned hope of negotiating
the check, and turned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
help. Count 3 arose from this transaction.
At the conclusion of the Government's case, the petitioner moved
for a judgment of acquittal on all three counts on the ground that
the Government had not submitted sufficient evidence for the case
to go to the jury. The petitioner contended that he was entitled to
an acquittal on count 2 because the Government failed to submit any
evidence showing that the petitioner had transported the Corvette
from Pennsylvania to Ohio, and on counts 1 and 3 because the
Government had not adduced any evidence showing that the petitioner
had caused the stolen checks to be brought through interstate
commerce into Pennsylvania. The trial court denied these motions.
[
Footnote 4]
After the petitioner rested, [
Footnote 5] the trial court instructed the jury that, in
order to find the petitioner guilty on counts 1 and 3, it must find
that he transported the check in a forged condition in "interstate
commerce," and that such transportation could take place entirely
within the State of Pennsylvania if it was a "continuation of the
movement that began out of state." Tr. 164A. [
Footnote 6] The petitioner unsuccessfully
objected
Page 455 U. S. 646
to this instruction, contending that, under § 2314, the
Government had the burden of proving that the check was forged in
Ohio before it was transported across the state line to
Pennsylvania. Tr. 92A. The petitioner was convicted on all three
counts, and sentenced to serve seven years on each of counts 1 and
3 and five years on count 2, the sentences on all three counts to
run concurrently.
The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, vacated the judgment on
count 2, holding that the Government had presented insufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction. [
Footnote 7] 644 F.2d 274 (CA3 1981) (en banc). The court
affirmed the judgment on counts 1 and 3, however, holding that the
Government had
Page 455 U. S. 647
presented sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, and
that the trial judge correctly had instructed the jury that the
Government need not prove that the stolen checks had been forged
before crossing state lines.
"It is immaterial whether the signatures were forged in Ohio or
in Pennsylvania. If at any point in the interstate movement the
check was in a forged condition, the statute was satisfied."
Id. at 279. All but one judge agreed with the
majority's construction of the phrase "interstate commerce" as used
in § 2314. [
Footnote 8]
II
The question presented by this case is one of statutory
construction. [
Footnote 9] The
petitioner claims that the language and legislative history of §
2314 demonstrate congressional intent to limit the reach of that
provision to those persons who transport forged securities across
state lines. As a fallback position, the petitioner contends that §
2314's use of the expression "interstate commerce" is sufficiently
ambiguous to
Page 455 U. S. 648
require this Court to apply the principle of lenity and construe
the provision in the petitioner's favor. [
Footnote 10]
A
Petitioner bases his initial argument on Congress' use of the
past tense "forged" in § 2314, from which he urges us to infer that
Congress intended to prohibit only the transportation of securities
that were forged before entering the stream of interstate commerce,
that is, before crossing state lines. Fundamental to the
petitioner's argument is the unarticulated assumption that
"interstate commerce," as used in the section, does not continue
after the security has crossed the state border. However, if
subsequent movement of the check in the destination State
constitutes interstate commerce, then a forgery of the check in the
course of that movement involves transportation of a forged
security in interstate commerce in violation of § 2314. Thus, the
validity of the petitioner's argument turns on whether the
statutory phrase "interstate commerce" comprehends movement of a
forged security within the destination State.
The paragraph of § 2314 under which the petitioner was convicted
prohibits the "transport[ation] in interstate or foreign commerce
[of] any . . . forged . . . securities . . knowing the same to have
been . . . forged." Title 18 U.S.C. § 10 provides that the "term
interstate commerce,' as used in this title, includes commerce
between one State . . . and another State." On their face, these
two provisions are not limited to unlawful activities that occur
while crossing state borders, but seemingly have a broader reach.
In particular, the language
Page 455 U. S.
649
of § 10 suggests that crossing state lines is not the sole
manifestation of "interstate commerce." [Footnote 11]
The origin of the "interstate commerce" element of § 2314 was
the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (Dyer Act), 41 Stat. 324,
[
Footnote 12] which was
enacted in 1919 to provide "severe punishment
Page 455 U. S. 650
of those guilty of the stealing of automobiles in interstate or
foreign commerce." H.R.Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong. , 1st Sess. , 1
(1919).
See S.Rep. No. 202, 66th Cong. , 1st Sess., 1
(1919) (describing the bill as designed to "punish the
transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate or foreign
commerce"). Representative Dyer, the sponsor of the bill that was
enacted, defended Congress' authority to enact the proposed law,
noting that the courts had upheld a variety of regulatory statutes
enacted under the Commerce Clause, including a criminal statute
declaring unlawful the "[l]arceny of goods from railroad cars being
transported in interstate commerce." 58 Cong.Rec. 5472 (1919).
[
Footnote 13] In response to
a question from Representative Anderson concerning possible
differences in the meaning of "interstate commerce" in §§ 2 and 4
of the Act, Representative Dyer replied:
"[I]f there is any difference there, which I do not see, the
matter would be construed by the Supreme Court, which has passed
many times upon what is meant by interstate and foreign
commerce."
Ibid. [
Footnote
14]
Page 455 U. S. 651
Plainly, Representative Dyer, the chief sponsor of the bill,
believed that the statutory meaning of "interstate commerce" could
be found in previous Supreme Court decisions using the
Page 455 U. S. 652
phrase to define the scope of congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause.
See also H.R.Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong.,
1st Sess., 3 4 (1919) (justifying Congress' authority to enact the
Dyer Act by reference to this Court's decisions holding that
Congress has plenary power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
interstate commerce).
Although the House Report accompanying the bill, as well as
several Members of Congress during the debates, stated that the Act
would prevent the transportation of stolen automobiles across state
lines, [
Footnote 15]
Congress' use of the more general
Page 455 U. S. 653
phrase "interstate commerce" and its reliance on this Court's
constitutional decisions defining the scope of "interstate
commerce" indicate that Congress intended the statutory phrase to
be as broad as this Court had used that phrase in Commerce Clause
decisions before 1919. [
Footnote
16] In those decisions, this Court had made clear that
interstate commerce begins well before state lines are crossed, and
ends only when movement of the item in question has ceased in the
destination State. [
Footnote
17] We conclude, therefore, that, in § 2314, Congress
intended
Page 455 U. S. 654
to proscribe the transportation of a forged security at any and
all times during the course of its movement in interstate commerce,
and that the stream of interstate commerce may continue after a
state border has been crossed. Consequently, the trial judge in
this case correctly instructed the jury that McElroy's
transportation of the forged check within Pennsylvania would
violate § 2314 if the jury found that movement to be a
"continuation of the movement that began out of state." Tr. 164A.
[
Footnote 18]
Moreover, the purpose underlying § 2314 leads us to conclude
that Congress did not intend to require federal prosecutors to
prove that the securities had been forged before crossing state
lines. In
United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.
S. 379,
329 U. S. 384
(1946), this Court observed that, in § 2314, Congress
"contemplated coming to the aid of the states in detecting and
punishing criminals whose offenses are complete under state law,
but who utilize the channels of interstate commerce to make a
successful getaway, and thus make the state's detecting and
punitive processes impotent."
(Footnote omitted.)
Page 455 U. S. 655
Given this broad purpose, we find it difficult to believe,
absent some indication in the statute itself or the legislative
history, that Congress would have undercut sharply that purpose by
hobbling federal prosecutors in their effort to combat crime in
interstate commerce. Under the petitioner's proposed construction,
a patient forger easily could evade the reach of federal law, yet
operate in the channels of interstate commerce. [
Footnote 19] As the Government points out
in its brief,
Page 455 U. S. 656
moreover, the petitioner's construction produces the anomalous
result that no federal crime would have been committed in this case
until the victims returned the forged checks to the out-of-state
drawee bank for payment. Brief for United States 18, n. 11.
[
Footnote 20] While Congress
could have written the statute to produce this result, there is no
basis for us to adopt such a limited reading. [
Footnote 21]
Page 455 U. S. 657
B
The petitioner argues alternatively that, even if a reading of §
2314 does not clearly support his interpretation, the provision is
ambiguous, and the ambiguity should be resolved by reading the
provision narrowly to require the checks to have been forged before
crossing the state line. For support, the petitioner cites
United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336
(1971), where this Court considered a challenge to a conviction
under 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a), which prohibits a convicted felon
from "receiv[ing], possess[ing], or transport[ing] in commerce or
affecting commerce . . . any firearm." The issue
Page 455 U. S. 658
framed by the Court was whether "in commerce or affecting
commerce" modified "possesses" as well as "transports," since the
respondent, a convicted felon, had been charged with possession of
a shotgun, but the Government had made no effort to show that he
had possessed the firearm "in commerce or affecting commerce." The
Court found both the language of the provision and its legislative
history ambiguous on this question, and decided on two grounds to
read the statute narrowly, that is, to read "in commerce or
affecting commerce" as modifying "possesses" as well as
"transports." The Court reasoned that ambiguity concerning the
reach of a criminal statute should be resolved by reading the
statute narrowly in order to encourage Congress to speak clearly,
thus giving the populace "fair warning" of the line between
criminal and lawful activity, and in order to have the Legislature,
not the courts, define criminal activity.
Id. at
404 U. S.
347-348. Also, absent a clear statement of purpose from
Congress, the Court was unwilling to read a federal criminal
statute in a way that would encroach on a traditional area of state
criminal jurisdiction.
The present case, however, does not raise significant questions
of ambiguity, for the statutory language and legislative history of
the Dyer Act indicate that Congress defined the term "interstate
commerce" more broadly than the petitioner contends. We hold that
Congress intended to use the term "interstate commerce" as this
Court had been using it in Commerce Clause cases before 1919. As we
observed in
United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.
S. 503,
348 U. S.
509-510 (1955), although
"criminal statutes are to be construed strictly . . . , this
does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the
narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of
the legislature."
(Footnote omitted.) [
Footnote
22]
Page 455 U. S. 659
III
Through § 2314, Congress has sought to aid the States in their
detection and punishment of criminals who evade state authorities
by using the channels of interstate commerce. Based on this
congressional purpose, the trial judge in the present case
correctly instructed the jury that they could find the petitioner
guilty of violating § 2314 if they found that the forgeries
occurred during the course of interstate commerce, which includes a
"continuation of a movement that began out of state," even though
movement of the forged checks was restricted to one State.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court below.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2314 provides in pertinent part:
"Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in
interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered,
or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing the same to have
been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited . . ."
"
* * * *"
"Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both."
[
Footnote 2]
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2312 provides:
"Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a motor
vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both."
[
Footnote 3]
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2311 states that, as used in §§ 2311-2318, the
term "[s]ecurities includes any . . . check."
[
Footnote 4]
Tr. 68A-78A.
[
Footnote 5]
The petitioner introduced no evidence.
[
Footnote 6]
The entire instruction on this issue was as follows:
"Well, [interstate commerce] means any movement or
transportation of these forged checks from one state into another,
and it includes all continuing movements of said forged check while
in the second state, in this case Pennsylvania, until the movement
of said forged check has ceased."
"Now, the Government must show that the checks were transported
in interstate commerce in a forged condition. However, the
transportation within the destination state here, Pennsylvania, may
be considered transportation in interstate commerce if it is a
continuation of the movement that began out of state."
"The Government need not exclude every speculative possibility
that the transportation may have been interrupted at some point,
nor need the Government show each step in the security's movement
in interstate commerce."
"Now, if you believe that the Government has shown that the
Defendant transported the checks while they were in a forged
condition within the State of Pennsylvania, the requirements of the
law are satisfied if that transportation was part of interstate
commerce. In other words, the check had to originate at sometime in
Ohio and had to have been transported at sometime in Pennsylvania
in order to effect interstate commerce. So the Government must
prove this Defendant transported the checks involved in Counts 1
and 3 of the indictment in interstate commerce between Ohio and
Pennsylvania, but need not prove the place in Ohio from which the
checks started or from where the Defendant started."
Id. at 164A-165A. After some discussion at the bench
with the lawyers, the judge further instructed the jury:
"As to Counts 1 and 3, the Government must prove with evidence
that convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant
caused the transportation of the two checks in question, that is,
in Counts 1 and 3, the check to Rini, the check to Don Allen
Chevrolet, in interstate commerce, from Ohio to Pennsylvania."
Id. at 181A.
[
Footnote 7]
That part of the Court of Appeals' judgment vacating the
conviction on count 2 is not before this Court.
[
Footnote 8]
Judge Adams, joined by Chief Judge Seitz, concurred in the
majority opinion on counts 1 and 3, but dissented from the court's
holding that the conviction on count 2 should be vacated. Although
he agreed that the trial judge correctly had instructed the jury on
counts 1 and 3, Judge Garth dissented from the affirmance on those
counts, arguing that the Government had presented insufficient
evidence to sustain the convictions. Judge Higginbotham concurred
with the majority opinion on count 2, but dissented from its
holdings on counts l and 3. He reasoned that § 2314 was ambiguous,
and that consequently the principle of lenity required the court to
construe the statute strictly against the Government and hold that
the statute was violated only if the security had been forged
before crossing state lines.
[
Footnote 9]
The petitioner concedes that Congress has authority under the
Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (which provides in part that
"Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among
the several States"), to enact a criminal statute prohibiting the
transportation in interstate commerce of a security that was not
forged until after crossing state lines. Consequently, the issue in
the present case is the meaning that Congress ascribed to the
phrase "interstate commerce" in § 2314.
[
Footnote 10]
Although the petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence on counts l and 3 in his petition for writ of certiorari,
this Court limited the grant of certiorari to the statutory
construction issue. Thus, we accept the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's
finding that,
"on each occasion, [the petitioner] made a trip from Ohio to
Pennsylvania, carrying with him a check that was forged either in
Ohio or Pennsylvania."
644 F.2d 274, 279 (CA3 1981).
[
Footnote 11]
The predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 10 was § 2(b) of the Dyer Act,
which stated that the term "interstate commerce" "shall include
transportation from one State . . . to another State." 41 Stat.
325.
[
Footnote 12]
The Act provided in part:
"SEC. 2. That . . . :"
"
* * * *"
"(b) The term 'interstate or foreign commerce' as used in this
Act shall include transportation from one State . . . to another
State. . . . "
"SEC. 3. That whoever shall transport or cause to be transported
in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle, knowing the same
to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or
both."
"SEC. 4. That whoever shall receive, conceal, store, barter,
sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle, moving as, or which is a
part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce,
knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine
of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five
years, or both."
The Act was expanded in 1934 to cover other types of stolen
property,
see National Stolen Property Act, 48 Stat. 794,
and in 1939 to cover forged securities.
See Act of Aug. 3,
1939, 53 Stat. 1178. Sections 3 and 4 were later codified as 18
U.S.C. §§ 2312 and 2313 respectively. None of the legislative
Reports or debates concerning these amendments, however, contains
any explanation of the "interstate commerce" requirement.
See H.R.Rep. No. 1462, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934)
(stating that the new Act was "designed to punish interstate
transportation of stolen property, securities, or money," and that
it was "drafted to follow the language of the Dyer Act, the
constitutionality of which has frequently been upheld in the
Federal courts"); S.Rep. No. 538, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934)
(approving a Justice Department memorandum stating that the purpose
of the Act is "to provide a penalty for knowingly transporting
stolen property in interstate or foreign commerce"); H.R.Rep. No.
422, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1939) (stating that the bill "widens
the scope of the National Stolen Property Act of 1934 . . . by
making its provisions applicable to embezzled property, securities
and money"); S.Rep. No. 674, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1939)
(approving a letter from the Attorney General stating in part that
the "principal purposes of the pending bill are to extend the
existing law to property that has been embezzled, and also to
forged or counterfeited securities").
[
Footnote 13]
Obviously, Representative Dyer believed that a federal crime
would be committed even though the larceny did not occur at the
exact moment that the railroad car crossed a state line. It is fair
to conclude from this example that he understood "interstate
commerce," as used in the Dyer Act, to have a broader meaning than
transportation across state lines.
[
Footnote 14]
The entire colloquy between Representatives Dyer and Anderson is
as follows:
"Mr. ANDERSON. I will ask the gentleman whether the committee
meant the same thing in its definition of interstate commerce in
section 2 as it meant in section 4?"
"Mr. DYER. I think so. If the gentleman will point out wherein
it differs, I shall be glad."
"Mr. ANDERSON. In the definition under section 2, interstate
commerce means transportation from one State to another, while if
you refer to section 4, you find there you have a vehicle or motor
car constituting interstate or foreign commerce, and you scarcely
have a sensible section."
"Mr. DYER. I will say to the gentleman that, if there is any
difference there, which I do not see, the matter would be construed
by the Supreme Court, which has passed many times upon what is
meant by interstate and foreign commerce. I think it really is not
necessary to put the definition in this bill. It was done at the
request of some of the members of the committee. The Supreme Court
has decided many times what is interstate commerce. I do not think
myself that any definition is necessary."
58 Cong.Rec. 5472 (1919).
Of course, the definition to which Representative Dyer refers
stated that interstate commerce "shall
include
transportation from one State . . . to another State." 41 Stat. 325
(emphasis added). The dissenting opinion entirely ignores Congress'
use of the word "include" in the 1919 Act, choosing instead to read
the definition as if Congress' only "objective . . . was to
proscribe the transportation of a stolen automobile from one State
to another."
Post at
455 U. S.
666.
In the 1934 National Stolen Property Act, 48 Stat. 794, Congress
expanded the coverage of the Dyer Act, and in § 2(a) provided that
"[t]he term
interstate . . . commerce' shall mean
transportation from one State . . . to any State." The House Report
makes clear that the "bill is drafted to follow the language of the
Dyer Act, the constitutionality of which has frequently been upheld
in the Federal courts." H.R.Rep. No. 1462, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2
(1934). Although a "change of [statutory] language is some evidence
of a change of purpose," Johnson v. United States,
225 U. S. 405,
225 U. S. 415
(1912), the inference of a change of intent is only "a workable
rule of construction, not an infallible guide to legislative
intent, and cannot overcome more persuasive evidence." United
States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554,
310 U. S. 561
(1940). Because the legislative history contains no indication that
the variation in the language had changed the meaning of
"interstate commerce," and, more importantly, because the House
Report states that the language of the 1934 Act was drafted to
follow the language of the Dyer Act, we conclude that Congress
intended nothing by the change in language. Moreover, in 1948,
Congress made an additional modification in the definition of
"interstate commerce," this time resubstituting the word "include"
and substituting the word "commerce" for the word "transportation"
to "avoid the narrower connotation" of the latter word. H.R.Rep.
No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A7 (1947). If any inference can be
drawn from these changes, both in 1934 and in 1948, it is only that
Congress intended no substantive change in the meaning of
"interstate commerce."
[
Footnote 15]
See H.R.Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1919)
(noting that "[t]hieves steal automobiles and take them from one
State to another and ofttimes have associates in this crime who
receive and sell the stolen machines");
id. at 3 ("The
power of the Congress to enact this law and to punish the theft of
automobiles in one State and the removing of them into another
State cannot be questioned");
id. at 4 ("No good reason
exists why Congress, invested with the power to regulate commerce
among the several States, should not provide that such commerce
should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen property from one
State to another"); 58 Cong.Rec. 5470 (1919) (remarks of Rep. Dyer)
(stating that "this bill is for the purpose of providing punishment
for those stealing automobiles and automobile trucks and taking
them from one State to another State");
id. at 5472
(remarks of Rep. Dyer) ("Section 3 provides for the punishment of a
thief stealing a car and transporting it from one State to
another");
id. at 5473 (remarks of Rep. Reavis) (stating
that he would support a broader bill that would make it a "felony
to transport stolen property of any kind from one State to
another");
ibid. (remarks of Rep. Igoe) ("The offense
sought to be reached in the act is the transportation, the taking
it across the line, taking it from one State to another");
id. at 6433 (remarks of Sen. Cummins) (stating that the
"bill is for the purpose of giving the Federal courts jurisdiction
for the punishment of" thieves who carry stolen automobiles across
state lines).
None of these statements, however, purports to limit the
statutory definition of interstate commerce to the act of crossing
state lines. Nor is there any basis to believe that Congress used
the phrase "interstate commerce" in the statute interchangeably
with "
interstate transportation' . . . or some such phrase
focusing on state lines." STEVENS, J., dissenting, post at
455 U. S.
663-664. While Congress may have been concerned
principally with thieves who cross state borders with stolen cars,
it did not so limit the language of the statute. Instead, Congress
drafted a more comprehensive statute that would reach criminals who
use interstate channels to avoid detection and punishment.
The dissenting opinion's alternative explanation -- that
Congress used the expression "
interstate commerce' merely to
indicate the source of its authority," post at
455 U. S. 665
-- is also unpersuasive. Although supporters of the bill were
careful to justify its constitutionality, nothing in the statutory
language or the legislative history indicates that Congress used
the constitutionally significant term "interstate commerce" in the
bill merely to point to its authority to enact such legislation.
Rather, the most rational inference is that Congress used the term
to specify the types of activities proscribed by the Act -- thefts
involving "interstate commerce" as that term had been interpreted
by this Court.
[
Footnote 16]
Some Circuits have even indicated that the statutory phrase
"interstate commerce" is coextensive with congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause.
See United States v. Poselli,
432 F.2d 879, 891 (CA9 1970) ("The sole reason for conditioning [§
2314's] prohibitions upon use of interstate commerce is to provide
a constitutional basis for the exercise of federal power"),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971);
United States v.
Ludwig, 523 F.2d 705, 707 (CA8 1975) (same),
cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976).
[
Footnote 17]
See Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321,
188 U. S. 358
(1903) (illustrating that a regulatory statute enacted under the
Commerce Clause can take the form of a prohibition, the Court
stated that "it cannot be doubted that Congress, under its power to
regulate commerce, may . . . provide for [cattle to be] inspected
before transportation begins");
Southern Pacific Terminal Co.
v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498,
219 U. S. 527
(1911) (goods are in "interstate . . . commerce when they have
actually started in the course of transportation to another
State, or [are] delivered to a carrier for transportation'")
(quoting Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517,
116 U. S. 525
(1886)); Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co.,
227 U. S. 111,
227 U. S.
122-123 (1913); Illinois Central R. Co. v.
Fuentes, 236 U. S. 157,
236 U. S. 163
(1915) ("generally when this interstate character has been
acquired, it continues at least until the load reaches the point
where the parties originally intended that the movement should
finally end").
The House Report on the Dyer Act cited
Champion v. Ames,
supra, to justify Congress' constitutional authority to enact
the Dyer Act. H.R.Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 4
(1919).
[
Footnote 18]
Even though Congress did not address the meaning of "interstate
commerce" in the 1934 and 1939 extensions of the Dyer Act, there is
no reason to believe that Congress abandoned its original meaning.
In fact, because the Supreme Court, between 1919 and 1939,
continued to define interstate commerce more broadly than merely as
commerce crossing state lines,
see, e.g., Champlain Realty Co.
v. Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366
(1922);
Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U. S.
95 (1929), there is ample reason to believe that
Congress intended § 2314 to have the same reach as its predecessor
section in the Dyer Act.
[
Footnote 19]
The facts of the present case illustrate this point. The
petitioner, who lived in Ohio at the time he forged the Union
checks,
see Tr. 16A, brought the stolen checks from Ohio
into Pennsylvania. He forged them at an unknown time and place to
purchase a boat and a car. Requiring prosecutors to prove on which
side of the border the petitioner forged the checks, when in fact
the petitioner had transported the forged checks in continuation of
a longer interstate journey, serves no purpose. In addition, as the
supporters of the Dyer Act recognized, federal authority may be
necessary to investigate fully the crime and to compel witnesses
from other States to testify.
See 58 Cong.Rec. 5475 (1919)
(remarks of Rep. Newton) ("all the witnesses from anywhere in the
United States can be compelled to appear and testify [before the
grand jury], and a full and complete investigation can be had in
every case, and when a case is called for trial, the barrier of the
State line having been swept away, the witnesses will be compelled
to appear and testify in open court"). Absent federal jurisdiction,
it may have been impossible, or at the least extraordinarily
difficult, to compel Union and bank officials from Ohio to testify
in a Pennsylvania state court that the checks had been stolen, when
they had been stolen, when the bank account had been closed, that
the signature on the checks had been forged, and that the
petitioner had no authority to write those checks.
There is no foundation for the fear expressed in the dissenting
opinion that our decision today is a broad expansion of federal
jurisdiction in criminal law.
Post at
455 U. S. 660.
The implications of this case are limited by the facts and its
holding that the forged check was transported in interstate
commerce only because that transportation was a continuation of a
longer journey that began out of state. If the entire transaction
-- obtaining and forging the checks, purchasing the car and boat,
and returning the checks to the bank for collection -- had occurred
solely within Ohio, it seems clear that the checks would not have
been "transport[ed] in interstate commerce." In light of today's
limited holding, the dissent's suggestion that we are overburdening
limited federal prosecutorial resources,
post at
455 U. S. 674,
is misplaced.
[
Footnote 20]
See also Pereira v. United States, 347 U. S.
1,
347 U. S. 9 (1954)
(holding that, since the fraudulently obtained checks had to be
sent to an out-of-state bank for collection, the petitioner was
guilty of violating § 2314 because he "
caused' [the check] to
be transported in interstate commerce").
[
Footnote 21]
The cases cited by the petitioner in support of his position do
not dissuade us from our conclusion, for none of the cases based
its holding on an analysis of the language, legislative history, or
purpose of § 2314. In
United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d
467, 469 (CA5 1972), for example, the court simply quoted the
pertinent language of § 2314 and held, without analysis or citation
to authority, that it
"is obvious that, to prove the commission of an offense under
this portion of section 2314, the Government must show that the
instrument traveled interstate in its forged or altered
condition."
See United States v. Hilyer, 543 F.2d 41, 43 (CA8 1976)
(citing only
Owens for the proposition that § 2314
requires proof that the security was forged before crossing state
lines);
United States v. Sparrow, 635 F.2d 794, 796 (CA10
1980) (en banc) (citing only
Owens and
Hilyer for
its holding that "the plain meaning of [§ 2314] requires the
prosecution to show that the security was in a forged or altered
condition at the time of its interstate passage"),
cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1004 (1981).
We note that our holding today is consistent with other cases
construing similar federal statutes designed to combat theft in the
channels of interstate commerce. In
United States v.
Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830 (CA2 1980),
cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1111 (1981), the court reviewed a challenge to a conviction
under the "foreign commerce" aspect of the first paragraph of §
2314 (transportation of stolen goods in interstate or foreign
commerce). In that case, the defendant had been arrested shortly
before he shipped stolen telephone equipment from New York to Doha,
Qatar. The court rejected the defendant's claim that no federal
offense had occurred because no international boundary had been
crossed, holding that "Congress was not aiming only at stolen goods
moving across a technical boundary line, but also wanted to reach
shipments in the course of such a crossing." 629 F.2d at 837.
In
Barfield v. United States, 229 F.2d 936 (CA5 1956),
the defendant challenged his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2312,
which prohibits the interstate transportation of stolen vehicles,
using the same "interstate commerce" language as used in § 2314.
See n 2,
supra. The court rejected the defendant's argument that
the Government's failure to show that he had driven the car across
a state border required acquittal.
"[A]ny driving, whether wholly within the state of origin, state
of destination, or from and to, if done as a substantial step in
the furtherance of the intended interstate journey is, we think,
within the act."
229 F.2d at 939.
See United States v. Lambert, 580 F.2d
740, 743 (CA5 1978).
Cases reviewing other statutes, with slightly different
"interstate commerce" provisions, arrive at the same result that we
reach today. In
United States v. Tobin, 576 F.2d 687
(CA5),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978), the defendants
were convicted of receiving and conspiring to sell stolen goods
"moving as, or which are a part of, or which constitute interstate
. . . commerce" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315. The court
rejected the defendants' argument that the stolen goods had been
taken out of interstate commerce by coming to rest, holding
that,
"[s]o long as its movement within the destination state can be
considered a continuation of the movement that began out of state,
the prerequisite of 18 U.S.C. § 2315 is satisfied."
576 F.2d at 692.
See United States v. Luman, 624 F.2d
152, 155 (CA10 1980) (18 U.S.C. § 2315);
United States v.
Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 624-625 (CA9 1979) (18 U.S.C. § 2315),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980);
United States v.
Garber, 626 F.2d 1144, 1148 (CA3 1980) (construing similar
language in 18 U.S.C. § 659, the court held that "[d]elays enroute
do not deprive shipments of continued characterization as
interstate or foreign so long as the goods have not yet reached
their destination"),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079 (1981);
United States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d 297, 299-300 (CA4 1968)
(18 U.S.C. § 659);
United States v. Hiscott, 586 F.2d
1271, 1274 (CA8 1978) (18 U.S.C. § 2313);
United States v.
Goble, 512 F.2d 458, 469 (CA6 1975) (18 U.S.C. § 2313).
[
Footnote 22]
We reject the petitioner's suggestion that our holding today
reads § 2314 as if Congress intended to "expand the authority of
the Federal Government over the entire field of criminal fraud."
Brief for Petitioner 23. Rather, our holding is consistent with the
expressed congressional purpose to apprehend forgers who use state
boundaries to evade detection and punishment by state authorities.
Had the petitioner not used interstate channels to pass his forged
checks, he would not have been subject to punishment under §
2314.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The words "transportation in interstate or foreign commerce"
appear in a host of federal criminal statutes. [
Footnote 2/1] These statutes prohibit the
interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles, forged checks,
prostitutes, explosives, obscene materials, kidnap victims,
counterfeit phonograph records, and numerous other items. In all of
these statutes, the predicate for federal jurisdiction might
reasonably be identified in either of two ways: first, as I read
the statutory language, it might require that the subject be
transported
Page 455 U. S. 660
across a state line; second, as the Court reads this language,
it may merely require that the subject be transported during an
interstate journey.
In this case, the evidence indicates that petitioner transported
stolen checks from Ohio into Pennsylvania. We must assume, because
of insufficient contrary evidence, that petitioner did not forge
the checks until he was on the Pennsylvania side of his interstate
journey. The Court holds that this evidence proves a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2314, which, in pertinent, part proscribes the
transportation in interstate commerce of forged checks. [
Footnote 2/2] According to the Court, a
forged check is transported in interstate commerce as long as the
check was in a forged condition at some point during the
defendant's journey from one State to another. Consistent with this
rationale, it was not even necessary that the Government proved
that the checks crossed state lines. [
Footnote 2/3] Under the Court's analysis, petitioner
would have violated § 2314 if he had left his home in Ohio, picked
up a forged check in Pittsburgh, and negotiated it in Beaver Falls.
[
Footnote 2/4]
If the Court's reading of this language is consistently applied
to all of the statutes in which the same jurisdictional predicate
appears, this is an extremely important case. If the Court's
holding is limited to the situation in which a check has been
carried across a state line and then forged in the
Page 455 U. S. 661
destination State, the holding is not very significant. Although
it would be illogical to limit the holding in that way, a review of
the relevant legislative history will demonstrate that the holding
should not be extended to its logical conclusion. That review also
demonstrates, I believe, that today's holding does not faithfully
reflect the intent of Congress.
I
"[T]he issue in the present case is the meaning that Congress
ascribed to the phrase
interstate commerce' in § 2314."
Ante at 455 U. S. 647,
n. 9. More specifically, the question is "whether the statutory
phrase `interstate commerce' comprehends movement of a forged
security [wholly] within the destination State," ante at
455 U. S. 648,
or whether petitioner is correct that Congress intended "to limit
the reach of that provision to those persons who transport forged
securities across state lines," ante at 455 U. S. 647.
For the answer to this question, the Court correctly looks to the
legislative history of § 3 of the Dyer Act, the precursor of §
2314. The interstate commerce language that was enacted as § 3 of
the Dyer Act in 1919 has been retained in § 2314; for our purposes,
the subsequent enactments in 1934 and 1939 merely expanded the
coverage of § 3 to other types of stolen property and to forged
securities, respectively.
Section 3 of the Dyer Act proscribes, in accurate paraphrase,
the transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor vehicles.
See 41 Stat. 325. The phrase, standing alone, admittedly
is ambiguous. It is clarified by § 2(b) of the same statute, which
provides that "[t]he term
interstate . . . commerce' as used in
this Act shall include transportation from one State . . . to
another State." Ibid. Any lingering ambiguity is dispelled
by the legislative history.
The problem that gave rise to the legislation, the House
Judiciary Committee reported, was that
"[t]hieves steal automobiles and take them from one State to
another and ofttimes
Page 455 U. S. 662
have associates in this crime who receive and sell the stolen
machines."
H.R.Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1919) (hereafter
H.R.Rep. No. 312). In a discussion of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause, the Committee manifested its intention to
proscribe only this problem:
"The power of the Congress to enact this law and to punish the
theft of automobiles in one State and the removing of them into
another State cannot be questioned,"
id. at 3;
"[n]o good reason exists why Congress, invested with the power
to regulate commerce among the several States, should not provide
that such commerce should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen
property from one State to another."
Id. at 4. In introducing the bill to the House,
Representative Dyer opened his remarks by stating that
"this bill is for the purpose of providing punishment for those
stealing automobiles and automobile trucks and taking them from one
State to another State."
58 Cong.Rec. 5470 (1919). He described §§ 3 and 4 of the Act,
the precursors of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2315, as follows:
"It provides, gentlemen, for only two things. Section 3 provides
for the punishment of a thief stealing a car and transporting it
from one State to another. Section 4 provides for the receipt of
the stolen car by thieves in another State for the purpose of
selling and disposing of it."
58 Cong.Rec. 5472 (1919). Representative Igoe stated that "[t]he
offense sought to be reached in the act is the transportation, the
taking it across the line, taking it from one State to another."
Id. at 5473. Senator Cummins, in introducing the House
bill to the Senate, described its purpose to be "to punish the
transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate or foreign
commerce."
Id. at 6433. He explained:
"I want Senators to know what the bill is. The favorite place
for such thefts is near a State line, where vehicles are carried
quickly across the State line, and there is
Page 455 U. S. 663
very great difficulty in securing the punishment of the
offender. The bill is for the purpose of giving the Federal courts
jurisdiction for the punishment of such an offender."
Ibid. [
Footnote 2/5]
Representative Bee, like Representative Reavis, objected to the
bill because it "single[d] out automobiles" for special treatment.
Id. at 5473. Representative Reavis stated that he would
"be very glad indeed to vote for a bill making it a felony to
transport stolen property of any kind from one State to another."
Ibid.
The Court's expansive interpretation of the interstate commerce
phrase in § 3 of the Dyer Act is far broader than any that was
expressed by the Committees and the Members of the 66th Congress.
The Court offers several reasons for its reading of the statute,
but none withstands analysis.
A
The Court first reasons that, by using the phrase
"transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor vehicles" in
the statute, Congress must have intended to proscribe more than the
"transportation across state lines of stolen motor vehicles" or the
"interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles." The Court's
reasoning from the text, however, is flawed in two respects.
First, the House Report and the Members of Congress who
described the Dyer Act proscription as the "interstate
Page 455 U. S. 664
transportation of stolen motor vehicles," or some such phrase
focusing on state lines, used these phrases interchangeably with
the phrase "transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor
vehicles," which was the formulation included in the proposed and
enacted bill. The point is illustrated by Representative Dyer's
descriptions of the interstate commerce element of the bill. For
example, the final paragraph of the House Report that he submitted
begins with the sentence, "The purpose of the proposed law is to
suppress crime in interstate commerce." H.R.Rep. No. 312, at 4. Two
sentences later, however, the Report urges that Congress, pursuant
to its power to regulate commerce, should "provide that such
commerce should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen property
from one State to another."
Ibid. Representative Dyer
opened his remarks to the House with the statement that "this bill
is for the purpose of providing punishment for those stealing
automobiles and automobile trucks and taking them from one State to
another State." 58 Cong.Rec. 470 (1919). It is inconceivable that
Representative Dyer or any of the other legislators who used
interchangeably the various phrases [
Footnote 2/6] nevertheless intended the statutory
formulation "transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor
vehicles" to mean any more than "interstate transportation of
stolen motor vehicles" or "transportation across state lines of
stolen motor vehicles" or "transportation of stolen motor vehicles
from one State to another."
The second flaw in the Court's textual analysis is its reference
to 18 U.S.C. § 10 for the definition of "interstate commerce."
See ante at
455 U. S.
648-649. Section 10 provides that "[t]he term
interstate commerce', as used in this title, includes commerce
between one State . . . and another State." t merits reiteration,
however, that "interstate commerce" is defined much more narrowly
in the Dyer Act and the National
Page 455 U. S.
665
Stolen Property Act of 1934. Section 2(b) of the Dyer Act
provides that the term "shall include transportation from
one State . . . to another State." 41 Stat. 325 (emphasis added).
Section 2(a) of the 1934 enactment provides that the term "shall
mean transportation from one State . . . to another
State." 48 Stat. 794 (emphasis added). When Congress revised the
Federal Criminal Code in 1948, it consolidated several definitions
of "interstate commerce" into § 10. The Reviser's Notes state only
that,
"[i]n addition to slight improvements in style, the word
'commerce' was substituted for 'transportation' in order to avoid
the narrower connotation of the word 'transportation,' since
'commerce' obviously includes more than 'transportation.'"
Notes following 18 U.S.C. § 10. For purposes of divining the
intent of Congress in enacting the Dyer Act in 1919, the National
Stolen Property Act in 1934, and the amendments thereto in 1939, we
must refer to the definition by which those Congresses understood
the reach of those criminal statutes.
B
There is a logical explanation -- albeit an unarticulated one --
for Congress' use of the arguably broader formulation in the
statute when its intent was so clearly less ambitious. This
explanation is derived from the part of the legislative history in
which the constitutionality of the proposed Dyer Act was justified
by reference to this Court's expositions of the scope of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The Court infers
from one such part of the legislative history that "Congress
intended the statutory phrase to be as broad as this Court had used
the phrase in Commerce Clause decisions before 1919."
Ante
at
455 U. S. 653.
If the legislative history is examined through 1919 lenses, instead
of from a distance of six decades, however, the only supportable
conclusion is that Congress used the phrase "interstate commerce"
merely to indicate the source of its authority to proscribe
Page 455 U. S. 666
conduct that had previously been regulated solely by the
States.
In the Court's words, the House Report
"justif[ied] Congress' authority to enact the Dyer Act by
reference to this Court's decisions holding that Congress has
plenary power under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate
commerce."
Ante at
455 U. S. 652.
From this discussion in the House Report, the Court draws the
conclusion that Congress meant to adopt as the definition of the
statutory term this Court's construction of the
constitutional term "interstate commerce." That conclusion
does not logically follow from its premise, and is without any
support in the legislative history.
The part of the House Report cited by the Court begins with this
paragraph:
"The power of the Congress to enact this law and to punish the
theft of automobiles in one State and the removing of them into
another State can not be questioned, in view of laws of similar
nature heretofore enacted by Congress and the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States touching same."
H.R.Rep. No. 312, at 3. This statement establishes that (1) the
objective of the statute was to proscribe the transportation of a
stolen automobile from one State to another, and (2) the House
Judiciary Committee was confident that this objective could be
accomplished under the Commerce Clause, as interpreted by this
Court. The Report's discussion of this Court's decisions justifies
the Committee's confidence in the constitutionality of the Act.
Indeed, the penultimate paragraph of the Report explains just how
far Congress can act under the Commerce Clause; [
Footnote 2/7] in the paragraph's closing sentence,
which the
Page 455 U. S. 667
Court quotes,
ante at 650, the Report states that even
"[l]arceny of goods from railroad cars being transported in
interstate commerce has . . . been declared a crime by act of
Congress." H.R.Rep. No. 312 at 4. But the Committee had a much more
limited objective in proposing the Dyer Act. In the closing
paragraph of the Report, it expressly linked its discussion of this
Court's Commerce Clause cases with the statutory objective:
"No good reason exists why Congress, invested with the power to
regulate commerce among the several States, should not provide that
such commerce should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen
property from one State to another."
Ibid.
The Committee's confidence in the constitutionality of the Act
was not shared by all Members of Congress. Representative Newton
described in detail the practice of automobile thieves of stealing
cars and driving them across state lines, where they could not be
pursued by the police of the first State.
See 58 Cong.Rec.
5474-5475 (1919). After summarizing the need for federal
legislation, [
Footnote 2/8] he
turned to the question of its constitutionality:
Page 455 U. S. 668
"But it has been seriously argued by Members of this House that
Congress has no power to pass such a law; that such legislation is
an invasion of the rights of the States. But if you will study the
laws upon kindred subjects heretofore enacted by Congress, and will
read the decisions of the courts sustaining such laws, I do not
believe that a doubt will remain in the mind of even the most
ardent States rights advocate as to the powers of Congress upon
this subject."
Id. at 5475. Representative Newton discussed a number
of court decisions, and repeatedly compared the federal laws
therein upheld with the bill Congress was considering:
"In the face of the decisions which I have just read, can there
be any question but what an automobile which is stolen in one State
and transported across a State line into another State for the
purpose of yielding a profit to the person transporting the same
constitutes 'interstate commerce?' . . ."
"
* * * *"
"Thus, it will be observed that no particular vehicle of
transportation is necessary in order to make the article
transported interstate commerce, nor is it necessary that the
article should be transported for any specific purpose. All that is
necessary for it to become interstate commerce is that it shall be
transported from one State to another, even though it be live stock
driven on foot."
"
* * * *"
"If the driving of diseased cattle from one State to another is
interstate commerce, as held in the decision just cited, and as
held by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Railroad
v. Hus\[e\]n (95 U.S. 465), then the driving of a
stolen automobile from one State to another certainly falls within
the meaning of that term."
"
* * * *
Page 455 U. S.
669
"
"If the transportation of a woman from one State to another, by
means of an automobile, for prostitution, constitutes interstate
commerce, then how can it be argued, with any show of color, that
the driving of a stolen automobile from one State to another for
profit is not interstate commerce?"
Id. at 5475-5476. Given these statements in the
legislative history and the absence of any indication that any
legislator intended the Dyer Act to proscribe more than the
transportation of stolen automobiles from one State into another,
it is manifest that Congress used the term "interstate commerce"
and referred to this Court's decisions construing the Commerce
Clause simply to articulate the source of its authority to
proscribe the interstate transportation of stolen automobiles. The
Court's suggestion that Congress incorporated into the statute the
constitutional definition of "interstate commerce" is quite
implausible.
C
The final leg of the Court's analysis of the legislative history
is the following colloquy between Representatives Anderson and
Dyer:
"Mr. ANDERSON. I will ask the gentleman whether the committee
meant the same thing in its definition of interstate commerce in
section 2 as it meant in section 4?"
"Mr. DYER. I think so. If the gentleman will point out wherein
it differs, I shall be glad."
"Mr. ANDERSON. In the definition under section 2, interstate
commerce means transportation from one State to another, while, if
you refer to section 4, you find there you have a vehicle or motor
car constituting interstate or foreign commerce, and you scarcely
have a sensible section."
"Mr. DYER. I will say to the gentleman that, if there is any
difference there, which I do not see, the matter
Page 455 U. S. 670
would be construed by the Supreme Court, which has passed many
times upon what is meant by interstate and foreign commerce. I
think it really is not necessary to put the definition in this
bill. It was done at the request of some of the members of the
committee. The Supreme Court has decided many times what is
interstate commerce. I do not think myself that any definition is
necessary."
Id. at 5472.
Since the Court places so much reliance upon Representative
Dyer's answer,
see ante at
455 U. S.
650-652, a careful parsing is necessary. Section 2(b) of
the bill provided that "[t]he term
interstate . . . commerce,'
as used in this Act, shall include transportation from one State .
. . to another State." 41 Stat. 325. Section 4 of the bill
proscribed the receipt, concealment, storage, bartering, sale, or
disposition of any stolen motor vehicle "moving as, or which is a
part of, or which constitutes interstate . . . commerce."
Ibid. Representative Anderson's confusion is
understandable: § 2 defined interstate commerce in terms of
interstate transportation; § 4, however, seemed to indicate that
the automobile itself constituted interstate commerce, apart from
the transportation of it. [Footnote
2/9] Representative Dyer obviously did not understand the
confusion, because he perceived no difference between the two
sections insofar as the meaning of "interstate commerce" was
concerned. He had no doubt that this Court knew what the term
meant, and that § 4 would be construed correctly; indeed, he saw no
need for the statutory definition of "interstate commerce." Even if
it could be said that Representative Dyer was willing to defer to
this Court for the definition of the interstate commerce element of
§ 4, that is not what Congress did. The Dyer Act, as proposed and
as enacted, included
Page 455 U. S. 671
the definition of "interstate commerce" as transportation from
one State to another. Moreover, § 4, which contained the confusing
reference to interstate commerce, is the precursor of § 2315, not
the section the Court interprets today. The precursor of § 2314 is
§ 3 of the Dyer Act, which has nothing to do with Representative
Anderson's confusion and Representative Dyer's answer.
Interestingly, another colloquy, this one between
Representatives Hastings and Saunders, also indicates the confusion
about the meaning of § 4 of the bill:
"Mr. HASTINGS. I want to direct the gentleman's attention to
section 4. Suppose an automobile is stolen, say, in the State of
Virginia at some one point and is transported to some other point
in the State of Virginia and sold to some one there who knows that
property to have been stolen, would that be a Federal offense under
section 4?"
"Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I think not. How would it be? Up to
that point, what has been done has not reached the dignity of a
Federal offense. The Federal offense begins when there is a
movement in interstate commerce."
"Mr. HASTINGS. Section 4 provides that anyone receiving stolen
property knowing it to have been stolen, and it does not require it
to have gone across State lines, as you will perceive if you read
section 4 closely."
"Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. The gentleman did not read the
language in line 10, which says:"
"Moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes
interstate or foreign commerce."
"And that answers the difficulty of the gentleman from
Oklahoma."
58 Cong.Rec. 5477 (1919). Immediately after this colloquy,
Representative Dyer asked for a vote, and the House passed the
bill. If we were construing § 2315, which is the successor to § 4
of the Dyer Act,
Page 455 U. S. 672
then this colloquy would seem to indicate that § 4 requires the
automobile to have crossed state lines, notwithstanding the
confusing reference to "interstate commerce" in that section and
Representative Dyer's answer to Representative Anderson's
observation. In any event, we are not construing § 2315, but §
2314, and the definition of "interstate commerce" included in the
Dyer Act, as well as the statute's legislative history, clearly
indicates that § 3, the precursor of § 2314, proscribed only the
transportation across state lines of stolen automobiles.
II
The National Stolen Property Act, enacted in 1934, merely
extended the Dyer Act to the transportation in interstate commerce
of other types of stolen property. [
Footnote 2/10] The Act was passed with little debate,
but its legislative history confirms the points made above. As they
did in 1919, the Committees and Members of Congress used the phrase
"transportation in interstate commerce of stolen property"
interchangeably with such phrases as "interstate transportation of
stolen property" or "transportation across state lines of stolen
property." The Senate Judiciary Committee Report described the Dyer
Act as "concerned [with] interstate transportation of stolen motor
vehicles." S.Rep. No. 538, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934). The House
Judiciary Committee Report stated that "[t]his bill is designed to
punish interstate transportation of stolen property, securities, or
money." H.R.Rep. No. 1462, 73d Cong,2d Sess., 2 (1934). It also
noted
Page 455 U. S. 673
that "[p]revious Congresses have considered bills providing
punishment for interstate shipment of stolen property."
Ibid. Senator Ashurst told the Senate:
"Gangsters who now convey stolen property, except vehicles,
across the State line, with that immemorial gesture of derision,
thumb their nose at the officers. This bill extends the provisions
of the [Dyer Act] to other stolen property described in the
bill."
78 Cong.Rec. 6981 (1934). Also like the legislative history of
the Dyer Act, the Reports in 1934 substantiated the
constitutionality of the enactment, this time by reference to the
decisions upholding the Dyer Act.
See S.Rep. No. 538,
supra, at 2; H.R.Rep. No. 1462,
supra, at 2.
The Reports made an additional point that merits consideration.
The Department of Justice, in a memorandum reprinted in the Senate
Report, explained the troubles that previous attempts at extending
the Dyer Act to other stolen property had faced:
"The explanation for the opposition to federalizing such crimes
was in the concern which had developed at that time over the
burdening of the Federal machinery for administering criminal
justice. It was for this reason also that the Senate failed to pass
a similar bill in 1930. The heavy burden placed on the Federal
Government by the Dyer Act, which concerned interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles, had then become
apparent."
S.Rep. No. 538,
supra, at 2. The Senate bill therefore
limited federal jurisdiction to cases involving stolen property
worth $1,000 or more. The House increased the limit to $5,000, with
this explanation:
"It is believed that it would place too great a burden on the
Department of Justice to ask it to undertake to apprehend and
prosecute every person violating the substantive provisions of such
a law without regard to the amount of property involved. The
minimum valuations
Page 455 U. S. 674
fixed in the bill required to give the Federal Government
jurisdiction are the figures asked and recommended by the Attorney
General."
H.R.Rep. No. 1462,
supra, at 2. The Senate acceded to
the increase. The point to be made is that Congress recognized that
federal law enforcement authorities had limited resources. This
recognition makes it all the more likely that Congress did not
intend in 1934 to extend its proscription beyond the interstate
transportation of stolen property.
III
Quoting from
United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.
S. 379,
329 U. S. 384,
the Court declares that,
"in [enacting] § 2314, Congress 'contemplated coming to the aid
of the states in detecting and punishing criminals whose offenses
are complete under state law, but who utilize the channels of
interstate commerce to make a successful getaway, and thus make the
state's detecting and punitive processes impotent.'"
Ante at
455 U. S. 654.
Ironically, this quote actually refutes the Court's position. The
Court assumes, as it must, that the state offense committed by
petitioner -- forging a check -- was committed in Pennsylvania,
rather than in Ohio, from which petitioner commenced his interstate
journey. This is not a case, therefore, in which the defendant's
offense was complete under state law before he crossed state lines
to make his getaway. Rather, this is a case in which the defendant
crossed state lines and then committed the underlying state
offense. [
Footnote 2/11] It is
even more ironic that, although the issue of the meaning of the
interstate commerce phrase of § 2314 was not before the Court in
Sheridan, the Court thrice referred to that element as the
"interstate transportation" of forged securities.
See 329
U.S. at
329 U. S. 384,
329 U. S. 385,
329 U. S. 387.
Remarkably, the Court today places so much significance upon the
statutory formulation of the interstate
Page 455 U. S. 675
commerce element of § 2314 even though, in referring to that
element, the Committees and Members of the 1919 and 1934
Congresses, as well this Court in
Sheridan, repeatedly
used the formulation that the Court rejects today as too
narrow.
IV
The petitioner's argument that he was prosecuted and convicted
under the wrong statute may generate little sympathy. [
Footnote 2/12] Our primary concern,
however, is not with the fate of this defendant. Rather, our
concern is to identify the scope of the Federal Government's
responsibility for law enforcement. That scope is a matter for
Congress to determine. In this case, it is clear to me that the
Court has allowed the prosecutor to encroach into an area of state
responsibility and to cross a line that Congress has drawn. I
therefore respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (explosives); 18 U.S.C. §
924(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (firearms); 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)
(1976 ed., Supp. IV) (kidnaping); 18 U.S.C. § 1231
(strikebreaking); 18 U.S.C. § 1301 (lotteries); 18 U.S.C. § 1465
(obscenity); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (sexual
exploitation of children); 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (stolen motor vehicles
and aircraft); 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (other stolen property); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2318 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (counterfeit phonograph records); 18
U.S.C. § 2421 (prostitution); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(b)(iii), 2512(1)
(electronic eavesdropping).
[
Footnote 2/2]
Section 2314 also requires proof that the defendant knew that
the transported checks were forged. This element is not at issue
here.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The instructions of the trial court required proof that the
check had moved from Ohio to Pennsylvania,
see ante at
455 U. S.
645-646, n. 6, but the Court's interpretation of the
statute would apply equally to a forged check picked up in the
destination State. For the Court, the test is whether there was
"movement" of the contraband "within the destination State."
Ante at
455 U. S. 648.
The Court of Appeals' position is unclear.
See 644 F.2d
274, 282, n. 1 (CA3 1981) (Garth, J., concurring and
dissenting).
[
Footnote 2/4]
Likewise, a transcontinental hitchhiker who stole a car in
Pittsburgh and abandoned it in Philadelphia would have violated the
Dyer Act.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Later, Senator Cummins further described the House bill:
"The practice is to steal an automobile close to a State line
and run it across the State line. The first section is intended to
punish anyone who does that thing, knowing the vehicle to have been
stolen. The further practice is, if possible, to dispose of the
vehicle to some other party, confederate or otherwise, when it gets
across the State line, and section 4 is for the purpose of
punishing a man who barters or sells or disposes of the property
with intent to deprive the owner of the possession thereof, or if
he conceals it knowing it to have been stolen. I think that would
probably embrace every case that could be reached."
58 Cong.Rec. 6434 (1919).
[
Footnote 2/6]
See, e.g., id. at 5472-5473 (Rep. Reavis);
id.
at 5473 (Rep. Igoe);
id. at 5474-5476 (Rep. Newton);
id. at 6433-6434 (Sen. Cummins).
[
Footnote 2/7]
"Congress has enacted various laws for the regulation of
interstate commerce which have uniformly been sustained by the
courts. Among them are those relating to the use of safety
appliances, hours of labor of employees, monthly reports of
accidents, arbitration of controversies between railroads and their
employees, the exclusion of impure goods and lottery tickets,
employers' liability, etc. Specific reference may be made to the
interstate commerce act, wherein interstate commerce railroads are
forbidden to form combinations or pools for the maintenance of
rates, and also the antitrust act of July 2, 1890, wherein every
contract combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States was declared a crime, and made punishable as such. Larceny
of goods from railroad cars being transported in interstate
commerce has also been declared a crime by act of Congress."
H.R.Rep. No. 312, at 4.
[
Footnote 2/8]
"That there is a crying need for relief from this rapidly
growing evil there can be no question. That the States have been
unable to effectively deal with the problem has been fully
demonstrated. I have no doubt but that 90 per cent of the cars that
are stolen and not recovered cross State lines before they are
disposed of. The use which the automobile thief is making of
interstate commerce takes him into a sphere which is beyond the
reach of State control, and into a field where he can operate with
security and where he will continue to do so until Congress asserts
its power by the passage of a bill such as the one now under
consideration."
58 Cong.Rec. 5475 (1919).
[
Footnote 2/9]
This is the section that Representative Dyer had just previously
described as providing for the punishment of "the receipt of the
stolen car by thieves in another State for the purpose of selling
and disposing of it."
Id. at 5472.
[
Footnote 2/10]
In the 1934 National Stolen Property Act, Congress adopted a
slightly different definition of "interstate commerce" than the one
included in the 1919 Dyer Act. Section 2(b) of the Dyer Act
provides that the term shall include transportation from one State
to another State, whereas § 2(a) of the 1934 enactment provides
that the terms shall mean transportation from one State to another
State. There is no reason to believe that one definition was
intended to be any broader than the other.
But see the
Court's curious discussion,
ante at
455 U. S.
650-652, n. 14.
[
Footnote 2/11]
The evidence does not indicate where petitioner traveled after
the forgeries.
[
Footnote 2/12]
Petitioner concedes that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 2315, the
successor to § 4 of the Dyer Act.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11.
Petitioner might also have violated other paragraphs of § 2314.
See 644 F.2d at 285 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Tr. of Oral Arg. 18.