Held: Respondent was not denied due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment by the prosecutor's use, at
respondent's state court trial which resulted in a conviction for
first-degree manslaughter, of his post-arrest silence for
impeachment purposes -- the record not indicating that respondent
had been given the warnings required by
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436,
during the period in which he remained silent immediately after his
arrest. In testifying in his own defense, respondent stated for the
first time that he acted in self-defense in stabbing the victim,
and that the stabbing was accidental. The prosecutor then
cross-examined him as to why he had failed to advance his
exculpatory explanation to the arresting officers. Absent the sort
of affirmative assurances embodied in the
Miranda warnings
-- which at least implicitly assure the defendant that his silence
will not be used against him -- a State does not violate due
process by permitting cross-examination as to post-arrest silence
when a defendant chooses to take the stand.
Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U. S. 610
(where
Miranda warnings were given), distinguished.
Certiorari granted; 658 F.2d 1126, reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
In the course of a fight in a nightclub parking lot, Ronnie
Buchanan pinned respondent Weir to the ground. Buchanan then jumped
to his feet and shouted that he had been stabbed; he ultimately
died from his stab wounds. Respondent immediately left the scene,
and did not report the incident to the police.
At his trial for intentional murder, respondent took the stand
in his own defense. He admitted stabbing Buchanan, but claimed that
he acted in self-defense, and that the stabbing was accidental.
This in-court statement was the first occasion on which respondent
offered an exculpatory version of the stabbing. The prosecutor
cross-examined him as to
Page 455 U. S. 604
why he had, when arrested, failed either to advance his
exculpatory explanation to the arresting officers or to disclose
the location of the knife he had used to stab Buchanan. Respondent
was ultimately found guilty by a jury of first-degree manslaughter.
The conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Kentucky.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky then granted respondent a writ of habeas corpus, and the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 658 F.2d 1126
(1981). The Court of Appeals concluded that respondent was denied
due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment when the
prosecutor used his post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes.
[
Footnote 1] Although it did
not appear from the record that the arresting officers had
immediately read respondent his
Miranda warnings,
[
Footnote 2] the court
concluded that a defendant cannot be impeached by use of his
post-arrest silence even if no
Miranda warnings had been
given. The court held that "it is inherently unfair to allow
cross-examination concerning post-arrest silence," 658 F.2d at
1130, and rejected the contention that our decision in
Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U. S. 610
(1976), applied only where the police had read
Miranda
warnings to a defendant. Because we think that the Court of Appeals
gave an overly broad reading to our decision in
Doyle v. Ohio,
supra, we reverse its judgment.
One year prior to our decision in
Doyle, we held, in
the exercise of our supervisory power over the federal courts, that
silence following the giving of
Miranda warnings was
ordinarily
Page 455 U. S. 605
so ambiguous as to have little probative value.
United
States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171
(1975). There we said:
"In light of the many alternative explanations for his pretrial
silence, we do not think it sufficiently probative of an
inconsistency with his in-court testimony to warrant admission of
evidence thereof."
Id. at
422 U. S.
180.
The principles which evolved on the basis of decisional law
dealing with appeals within the federal court system are not, of
course, necessarily based on any constitutional principle. Where
they are not, the States are free to follow or to disregard them so
long as the state procedure, as a whole, remains consistent with
due process of law.
See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.
S. 141,
414 U. S. 146
(1973). The year after our decision in
Hale, we were
called upon to decide an issue similar to that presented in
Hale in the context of a state criminal proceeding. While
recognizing the importance of cross-examination and of exposing
fabricated defenses, we held in
Doyle v. Ohio, supra,
that, because of the nature of
Miranda warnings, it would
be a violation of due process to allow comment on the silence which
the warnings may well have encouraged:
"[W]hile it is true that the
Miranda warnings contain
no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such
assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In
such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a
deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence
to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at
trial."
Id. at
426 U. S. 618
(footnote omitted).
The significant difference between the present case and
Doyle is that the record does not indicate that respondent
Weir received any
Miranda warnings during the period in
which he remained silent immediately after his arrest. The majority
of the Court of Appeals recognized the difference,
Page 455 U. S. 606
but sought to extend
Doyle to cover Weir's situation by
stating that "[w]e think an arrest, by itself, is governmental
action which implicitly induces a defendant to remain silent." 658
F.2d at 1131. We think that this broadening of
Doyle is
unsupported by the reasoning of that case, and contrary to our
post-
Doyle decisions.
In
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.
S. 231,
447 U. S. 239
(1980), a case dealing with pre-arrest silence, we said:
"Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached
by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which
that fact naturally would have been asserted. 3A J. Wigmore,
Evidence ยง 1042, p. 1056 (Chadbourn rev.1970). Each jurisdiction
may formulate its own rules of evidence to determine when prior
silence is so inconsistent with present statements that impeachment
by reference to such silence is probative."
In
Jenkins, as in other post-
Doyle cases, we
have consistently explained
Doyle as a case where the
government had induced silence by implicitly assuring the defendant
that his silence would not be used against him. In
Roberts v.
United States, 445 U. S. 552,
445 U. S. 561
(1980), we observed that the postconviction, presentencing silence
of the defendant did not resemble "post-arrest silence that may be
induced by the assurances contained in
Miranda warnings."
In
Jenkins, we noted that the failure to speak involved in
that case occurred before the defendant was taken into custody and
was given his
Miranda warnings, commenting that no
governmental action induced the defendant to remain silent before
his arrest. 447 U.S. at
447 U. S.
239-240. Finally, in
Anderson v. Charles,
447 U. S. 404,
447 U. S.
407-408 (1980), we explained that use of silence for
impeachment was fundamentally unfair in
Doyle because
"
Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to
remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence
will not be used against him. . . .
Doyle bars the use
against a criminal defendant of silence maintained after receipt of
governmental assurances. "
Page 455 U. S. 607
In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in
the
Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates
due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to
post-arrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand. A
State is entitled, in such situations, to leave to the judge and
jury, under its own rules of evidence, the resolution of the extent
to which post-arrest silence may be deemed to impeach a criminal
defendant's own testimony.
The motion of respondent for leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis is granted.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BRENNAN would set the case for oral argument.
JUSTICE MARSHALL dissents from the summary reversal of this
case.
[
Footnote 1]
During cross-examination, the prosecutor also questioned
respondent concerning his failure, prior to his arrest, to report
the incident to the police and offer his exculpatory story. Relying
on our decision in
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.
S. 231 (1980), the Court of Appeals correctly held that
there was no constitutional impropriety in the prosecutor's use of
respondent's pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes.
[
Footnote 2]
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966).