Section 310(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
lists three categories of plaintiffs who may challenge the
constitutionality of any provision of the Act in a federal district
court action in which the district court must certify all questions
of constitutionality to the court of appeals sitting en banc: (1)
the Federal Election Commission, (2) "the national committee of any
political party," and (3) "any individual eligible to vote in any
election for the office of President." Appellants, two trade
associations and three political action committees (PAC's), filed
an action in Federal District Court, challenging the validity of
the provisions of the Act limiting the extent to which such
associations and their PAC's may solicit funds for political
purposes, and sought expedited consideration of the action under §
310(a). The District Court denied such consideration on the ground
that appellants were not within any of the three categories listed
as eligible to invoke § 310(a)'s expedited procedures. The Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that § 310(a) is available
for use by plaintiffs whether they belong to an enumerated category
or not, and, on subsequent certification from the District Court,
upheld the challenged solicitation provisions.
Held: Only parties belonging to one of the three
categories listed in § 310(a) may invoke its expedited procedures,
and since appellants are not within any of those categories, they
may not invoke such procedures. The text of § 310(a) states plainly
enough which plaintiffs may invoke its special procedures. This
plain language controls the construction of § 310(a), absent "clear
evidence" of a "clearly expressed" contrary congressional intent,
and appellants have not met the burden of showing such "clear
evidence" of a contrary intent. The fact that Congress wanted a
broad class of questions to be speedily resolved does not imply
that it intended the courts to augment the enumeration of qualified
plaintiffs. Nor is there any merit to appellants' contention that
Congress specified the three enumerated classes of plaintiffs
simply to remove any doubts about their standing, but not to
exclude others by implication. Pp.
455 U. S.
580-585.
635 F.2d 621, reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 455 U. S. 578
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 310(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), 88 Stat. 1285, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1976 ed.,
Supp. IV), lists three categories of plaintiffs who may challenge
the constitutional validity of FECA in specially expedited suits:
(1) the Federal Election Commission (FEC), (2) "the national
committee of any political party," and (3) "any individual eligible
to vote in any election for the office of President." In this case,
we address a question we expressly reserved in
California
Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182,
453 U. S. 187,
n. 6 (1981): whether a party not belonging to one of the three
categories listed in § 437h(a) may nonetheless invoke its
procedures.
I
The appellants are two trade associations and three political
action committees (PAC's): the National Restaurant Association and
its associated PAC, the Restauranteurs Political Action Committee,
the National Lumber and Building Material Dealers Association and
its associated PAC, the Lumber Dealers Political Action Committee,
and the Bread Political Action Committee, the PAC associated with
the American Bakers Association. In order to challenge the validity
of 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(D), which has the effect of limiting the
extent to which trade associations and their PAC's may solicit
funds for political purposes, [
Footnote 1] the appellants filed an action
Page 455 U. S. 579
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, seeking expedited consideration of their suit under the
procedures set forth in § 437h. [
Footnote 2] The District Court denied certification under
§ 437h on the ground that the plaintiff trade associations and
PAC's do not belong to
Page 455 U. S. 580
any of the three categories of plaintiffs listed in § 437h(a) as
eligible to invoke its expedited procedures. On an interlocutory
appeal from this ruling, a panel of the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that § 437h(a) is available for use by plaintiffs whether
they belong to an enumerated category or not. 591 F.2d 29 (CA7
1979). On remand, the District Court, as required by § 437h, first
made findings of fact and then certified the case back to the Court
of Appeals sitting en banc for a determination on the
constitutional questions raised by the appellants. The en banc
court declined to overrule the earlier panel decision regarding the
reach of § 437h(a), and proceeded to the merits of the appellants'
claims, upholding the constitutionality of the challenged
provisions. 635 F.2d 621 (CA7 1980). The present appeal to this
Court followed, confronting us with the question whether § 437h(a)
should be construed to permit parties, such as the appellants, who
do not belong to one of its three specifically enumerated classes,
nonetheless to invoke its procedures.
II
Our analysis of this issue of statutory construction "must begin
with the language of the statute itself,"
Dawson Chemical Co.
v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176,
448 U. S. 187
(1980), and, "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to
the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive."
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U. S. 102,
447 U. S. 108
(1980). Moreover, when the statute to be construed creates, as §
437h does, a class of cases that command the immediate attention of
this Court and of the courts of appeals sitting en banc, displacing
existing caseloads and calling court of appeals judges away from
their normal duties for expedited en banc sittings, close
construction of statutory language takes on added importance. As we
have said:
"Jurisdictional statutes are to be construed 'with precision and
with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has expressed its
wishes;' and we are particularly
Page 455 U. S. 581
prone to accord 'strict construction of statutes authorizing
appeals' to this Court."
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.
S. 389,
411 U. S. 396
(1973) (citations omitted). In short, the plain language of §
437h(a) controls its construction, at least in the absence of
"clear evidence,"
United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.
S. 115,
445 U. S. 121
(1980), of a "clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary,"
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., supra, at
447 U. S.
108.
The text of § 437h(a) states plainly enough which plaintiffs may
invoke its special procedures: "The Commission, the national
committee of any political party, or any individual eligible to
vote in any election for the office of President." Thus, § 437h(a)
affords its unique system of expedited review to three carefully
chosen classes of persons who might meet the minimum standing
requirements of Art. III. The only artificial persons expressly
entitled to invoke § 437h(a) are the Federal Election Commission,
which is charged with enforcing the Act, and the national
committees of political parties, which play a central role in the
political process.
In the face of the obvious meaning of the language of § 437h(a),
the appellants urge what they concede to be an "expansive
construction" of the section. Reply Brief for Appellants 3. Indeed,
the construction they advocate could not be more expansive, for
they apparently argue that Congress intended the class of
permissible plaintiffs to be defined by the outermost limits of
Art. III. The appellants, however, fall far short of providing
"clear evidence" of a "clearly expressed legislative intention"
that the unique expedited procedures of § 437h be afforded to
parties other than those belonging to the three listed
categories.
In fact, the section's legislative history is too brief and
ambiguous to provide much solace to either side of the present
controversy. When Senator Buckley introduced the section during the
deliberations on the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, he limited his explanation to the following comments:
Page 455 U. S. 582
"[I]t is a modification that I am sure will prove acceptable to
the managers of the bill. It merely provides for the expeditious
review of the constitutional questions I have raised. I am sure we
will all agree that, if, in fact, there is a serious question as to
the constitutionality of this legislation, it is in the interest of
everyone to have the question determined by the Supreme Court at
the earliest possible time."
120 Cong.Rec. 10562 (1974). [
Footnote 3] In the House, Representative Frenzel echoed
this theme in responding to a question from another Member of the
House about the constitutionality of the Amendments:
"Any time we pass legislation in this field, we are causing
constitutional doubts to be raised. I have many myself. I think the
gentleman has pointed out a good one. We have done the best we
could to bring out a bill which we hope may pass the constitutional
test. But we do not doubt that some questions will be raised
quickly."
"I do call the attention of the gentleman to the fact that any
individual under this bill has a direct method to raise
these questions and to have those considered as quickly as possible
by the Supreme Court."
Id. at 35140 (emphasis added).
Page 455 U. S. 583
These brief remarks by two Members of Congress nearly exhaust
the legislative history of the section. The appellants nevertheless
suggest that these comments suffice to prove that, in passing §
437h, Congress focused solely on expediting the resolution of all
disputes over the constitutionality of FECA, and was unconcerned
with the identity of the challenging plaintiffs. In support of this
view, the appellants point out that, in the first sentence of §
437h(a), Congress authorized suits to challenge "any" provision of
the Act, while the second sentence requires the district courts to
certify "all" constitutional questions under the Act to the court
of appeals sitting en banc. According to the appellants, the fact
that Congress expressly extended § 437h to "all" constitutional
questions about "any" provision of the Act compels the inference
that Congress also intended that § 437h be afforded to any and all
plaintiffs, even those not expressly listed in the Act.
The obvious fact that Congress wanted a broad class of questions
to be speedily resolved, however, scarcely implies that Congress
intended the courts to augment Congress' enumeration of qualified
plaintiffs. Indeed, if it suggests anything, the structure of the
Act suggests that Congress knew how to specify that "all"
constitutional questions about "any" provision of the Act may be
raised, and therefore could as easily have directed that "any"
person might invoke the unique procedures of § 437h. But Congress
did not do so. Instead, it went to the trouble of specifying that
only two precisely defined types of artificial entities and one
class of natural persons could bring these actions.
Reaching out for some support, the appellants hypothesize that
Congress specified the three enumerated classes to remove any
doubts about their standing, but not to exclude others by
implication. According to the appellants, absent explicit
congressional authorization, the members of the three listed
classes might not meet the prudential standing requirements this
Court imposes.
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.
S. 490,
422 U. S.
498-501 (1975). This argument, however, puts
Page 455 U. S. 584
the appellants in the awkward position of simultaneously noting
that express congressional authorization is required to overcome
prudential standing limitations, while urging us to read an
implicit grant of standing into congressional silence. Of course,
had Congress intended the result the appellants desire, it could
easily have achieved it by expressly granting standing to the
limits of Art. III, and then listing as specific examples the three
classes now enumerated in § 437h(a). Instead, Congress gave no
affirmative indication that it meant to include in its grant any
parties beyond the three listed classes.
For these reasons, we cannot impute to Congress the intention to
confer standing on the broadest class imaginable. We do not assume
the maximum jurisdiction permitted by the Constitution, absent a
clearer mandate from Congress than here expressed. We therefore
hold that only parties meeting the express requirements of §
437h(a) may invoke its procedures. Because the appellants do not
meet these requirements, they may not invoke the expedited
procedures of § 437h.
The appellants complain that the practical result of this ruling
may be that some provisions of FECA will escape expedited review,
thereby defeating Congress' intent that the courts pass as quickly
as possible on the validity of FECA. Without a clearer indication
of congressional intent than provided by the extremely sketchy
legislative history of § 437h, however, we believe the best
evidence of what Congress wanted is found in the statute itself,
where Congress listed only three types of parties who may invoke
the expedited procedures of § 437h. Others, evidently, are remitted
to the usual remedies.
We note, moreover, that our decision today raises no threat that
an aggrieved party with standing will be unable to litigate
questions arising under FECA, since our holding affects only the
availability of the extraordinary procedures afforded by § 437h.
Section 437g, for example, permits either
Page 455 U. S. 585
the Commission or, under the proper circumstances, a private
person to bring a civil action to enforce the Act, and such suits
are themselves given expedited treatment under § 437g(a)(10), being
advanced on the calendar ahead of all other actions except those
given even higher priority by either § 437g or § 437h. Thus, any
challenge, constitutional or nonconstitutional, may be raised as a
defense in an enforcement action, and will be afforded expedited
review. [
Footnote 4]
Furthermore, plaintiffs meeting the usual standing requirements can
challenge provisions of the Act under the federal question
jurisdiction granted the federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976
ed., Supp. IV). [
Footnote
5]
In sum, the appellants have not met the burden of showing such
"clear expression" or "clear evidence" of congressional intent to
make the procedures of § 437h available to categories of plaintiffs
other than those listed in that section. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Title 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(D) permits an incorporated trade
association to solicit contributions to its (PAC) only from
"the stockholders and executive or administrative personnel of
the member corporations of such trade association and the families
of such stockholders or personnel to the extent that such
solicitation of such stockholders and personnel, and their
families, has been separately and specifically approved by the
member corporation involved, and such member corporation does not
approve any such solicitation by more than one such trade
association in any calendar year."
Other provisions of FECA permit a trade association to solicit
contributions to its PAC from its members, § 441b(b)(4)(C), and
from its own executive and administrative personnel and their
families, § 441b(b)(4)(A).
[
Footnote 2]
That section provides:
"(a) Actions, including declaratory judgments, for construction
of constitutional questions; eligible plaintiffs; certification of
such questions to courts of appeals sitting en banc"
"The Commission, the national committee of any political party,
or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office
of President may institute such actions in the appropriate district
court of the United States, including actions for declaratory
judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality
of any provision of this Act. The district court immediately shall
certify all questions of constitutionality of this Act to the
United States court of appeals for the circuit involved, which
shall hear the matter sitting en banc."
"(b) Appeal to Supreme Court; time for appeal"
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any decision on a
matter certified under subsection (a) of this section shall be
reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Such appeal shall be brought no later than 20 days after
the decision of the court of appeals."
"(c) Advancement on appellate docket and expedited disposition
of certified questions"
"It shall be the duty of the court of appeals and of the Supreme
Court of the United States to advance on the docket and to expedite
to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter
certified under subsection (a) of this section."
2 U.S.C. §§ 437h(a)-(c) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV).
The grant of standing to the three listed categories of
plaintiffs is similar to the grant Congress had adopted earlier in
26 U.S.C. § 9011(b) authorizing the "Commission, the national
committee of any political party, and individuals eligible to vote
for President" to bring suits to implement or construe the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§
9001-9013.
[
Footnote 3]
Perhaps because Senator Buckley's intent as expressed in the
legislative history remains uncertain, the appellants have
submitted to this Court affidavits from Senator Buckley and David
A. Keene, the Executive Assistant to the Senator who prepared the
original draft of § 437h, expressing the belief that the amendment
was not intended to exclude organizations from challenging the
constitutionality of the Act.
See Affidavit of James
Buckley (Nov. 11, 1977), reprinted at App. 110, 112; Affidavit of
David A. Keene (Oct. 21, 1977), reprinted at App. 106, 109.
We cannot give probative weight to these affidavits, however,
because "[s]uch statements
represent only the personal views of
th[is] legislato[r], since the statements were [made] after passage
of the Act.'" Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U. S. 102,
419 U. S. 132
(1974), quoting National Woodwork Manufacturers Assn. v.
NLRB, 386 U. S. 612,
386 U. S. 639,
n. 34 (1967). See also Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.
S. 725, 436 U. S. 736,
n. 10 (1978), in which we noted that "post hoc
observations by a single member of Congress carry little, if any,
weight."
[
Footnote 4]
The appellants suggest that an anomaly is thereby created,
unless parties not listed in § 437h(a) can invoke that section's
procedures, because nonconstitutional challenges raised as defenses
will be granted expedited service under 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(10)
(1976 ed., Supp. IV), while constitutional challenges brought by
plaintiffs not listed in § 437h(a) will be treated like any other
case on the docket. No evidence exists that Congress ever pondered
this subtlety, or, if it did, what it thought about it. Suffice it
to say that we do not consider the possibility that Congress may
have seen fit to expedite claims raised by defendants, but not
similar claims raised by some plaintiffs, to shed much light on
Congress' purpose in enumerating three specific classes of eligible
plaintiffs in § 437h(a).
[
Footnote 5]
We express no opinion, however, on the question whether the
appellants meet the standing requirements under § 1331.