A 1974 collective bargaining agreement between the United Mine
Workers of America and the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association
increased health benefits, payable out of a trust fund financed by
contributions from the operators, for widows of coal miners who
died prior to the effective date of the agreement and who were
receiving pensions when they died, but did not increase such
benefits for widows of miners who died prior to the effective date
and were still working at the time of death, even though they were
eligible for pensions. Respondents, widows of miners who died in
1967 and 1971, respectively, and were eligible for pensions but
were still working at the time of their deaths, brought a class
action in Federal District Court against the trustees of the fund,
alleging that the requirement that a miner be receiving a pension
at the time of his death in order to make his widow eligible for
the increased health benefits had no rational relationship to the
purposes of the trust fund, and therefore was illegal under § 302
of the Labor Management Relations Act. The District Court denied
relief. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 302(c)(5),
which requires jointly administered pension trusts to be maintained
"for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees . . . and their
families and dependents," means that eligibility rules fixed by a
collective bargaining agreement must meet a reasonableness
standard, and that, in this case, the trustees were unable to
produce an acceptable explanation for the discrimination between
widows of pensioners and widows of pension-eligible miners.
Held: Section 302(c)(5) does not authorize federal
courts to review for reasonableness the provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement, such as the provisions in question,
allocating health benefits among potential beneficiaries of an
employee benefit trust fund. Pp.
455 U. S.
570-576.
(a) Section 302(c)(5)'s language embodies no reasonableness
requirement. Its plain meaning is simply that employer
contributions to employee benefit trust funds must accrue to the
benefit of employees and their families and dependents, to the
exclusion of all others. P.
455 U. S.
570.
(b) This reading is amply supported by the legislative history,
which indicates that § 302(c)(5) was meant to protect employees
from the risk
Page 455 U. S. 563
that funds contributed by their employers for the benefit of the
employees and their families might be diverted to other union
purposes, or even to union leaders' private benefit. Pp.
455 U. S.
570-572.
(c) Such interpretation is also supported by § 302(c)(5)'s other
requirements prescribing the conditions that must be satisfied to
exempt employer contributions to pension funds from a criminal
sanction. P.
455 U. S.
572.
(d) Absent conflict with federal law, the trustees here breached
no fiduciary duties in administering the trust fund in question in
accordance with the 1974 collective bargaining agreement. Pp.
455 U. S.
573-574.
(e) When neither the collective bargaining process nor its end
product violates any command of Congress, a federal court has no
authority to modify the substantive terms of a collective
bargaining contract. Pp.
455 U. S.
574-576.
205 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 640 F.2d 416, reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a discrimination between two classes of
widows of coal miners who died prior to December 6, 1974 -- those
whose husbands were receiving pensions when they died and those
whose husbands were still working although they were eligible for
pensions. The 1974 collective bargaining agreement between the
United Mine Workers of America and the Bituminous Coal Operators'
Association, Inc., increased the health benefits for widows in the
former class, but
Page 455 U. S. 564
made no increase for those in the latter class. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that this discrimination was arbitrary, and therefore violated §
302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA).
[
Footnote 1] 205 U.S.App.D.C.
330, 640 F.2d 416 (1981). We granted certiorari to decide whether §
302(c)(5) authorizes federal courts to review for reasonableness
the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement allocating
health benefits among potential beneficiaries of an employee
benefit trust fund. 454 U.S. 814.
I
A description of the origin of the discrimination may explain
why the Court of Appeals considered it arbitrary. The
Page 455 U. S. 565
1950 collective bargaining agreement between the union and the
operators established a fund to provide pension, health, and other
benefits for certain miners and their dependents. That agreement
defined the operators' obligation to contribute to the fund, but
delegated the authority to define the amount of benefits and the
conditions of eligibility to the trustees of the fund. [
Footnote 2] In 1967, the trustees
adopted two resolutions governing benefits for widows. Under the
first, a widow of a retired miner who was receiving a pension at
the time of his death was entitled to a death benefit of $2,000
payable over a 2-year period, and a widow of a miner who was
eligible for a pension but who was still working at the time of his
death was entitled to a $5,000 benefit payable over a 5-year
period. [
Footnote 3] The second
resolution authorized hospital and medical care benefits for
unremarried widows of deceased miners while they were receiving the
widows' benefit
Page 455 U. S. 566
authorized by the first resolution. [
Footnote 4] The effect of these two resolutions was to
provide a greater health benefit for widows of working miners who
were eligible for pensions than for widows of miners who were
receiving pension benefits.
In 1974, because of their concerns about compliance with minimum
funding standards of the recently enacted Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
1001
et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), and about the
actuarial soundness of the 1950 fund, the union and the operators
agreed to restructure the industry's benefit program. They agreed
that the amount of benefits and the eligibility requirements, as
well as the level of contributions, should be specified in their
collective bargaining agreement. They also decided to replace the
single 1950 fund with four separate funds, two of which provided
pension benefits while two others, the "1950 Benefit Trust" and the
"1974 Benefit Trust," provided health and death benefits. The 1950
Benefit Trust, which is at issue in this case, extended lifetime
health coverage to certain widows of miners who died before
December 6, 1974, the effective date of the 1974 collective
bargaining agreement. [
Footnote
5]
Page 455 U. S. 567
During the 1974 negotiations, the union originally demanded that
all unremarried widows who were entitled to health benefits for
either two years or five years under the old plan be extended
lifetime health coverage. Both the amount and the uncertainty of
the cost of such coverage for these widows concerned the operators.
Relatively early in the negotiations, they nevertheless accepted
the demand as it related to widows of miners who would die after
the agreement became effective, but they objected to the requested
increase for widows of already deceased miners. The operators
estimated that the latter class consisted of between 25,000 and
50,000 widows, whereas the union's estimate was approximately
40,000. Of that total, about 10% were believed to be widows of
miners who had been working at the time of their death, even though
eligible for pensions, and thus already had been entitled to five
years of health benefits. In the final stages of the 1974
negotiations, after a strike had begun, the operators made a
package proposal to the union that excluded this smaller group of
perhaps 4,000 or 5,000 widows from any increased health benefits.
Besides making it possible to conclude an otherwise acceptable,
complex collective bargaining agreement and to avoid a prolonged
strike, the union received no separately identifiable
quid pro
quo for the rejection of this portion of its demands.
II
Respondents are widows of coal miners who died in 1967 and 1971,
respectively. Their husbands were over age 55, had been employed in
the industry for over 20 years, and had spent most of their careers
in the employ of contributing employers.
Page 455 U. S. 568
They were eligible for pensions, but were still working at the
time of their deaths. Under the 1950 plan, respondents were
entitled to $5,000 death benefits and health benefits for five
years. They received no additional benefits from the 1974
agreement. Had their husbands applied for the pensions for which
they were eligible, they now would be entitled to lifetime health
coverage.
On their own behalf and as representatives of a class of
similarly situated widows and dependents of deceased coal miners,
respondents brought this action against the trustees of the funds
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
[
Footnote 6] They alleged that
the requirement that a miner actually be receiving a pension for
which he was eligible at the time of his death in order to make his
survivors eligible for lifetime health benefits has no rational
relationship with the purposes of the trust funds, and therefore
was illegal under § 302 of the LMRA. They prayed that the
requirement be declared null and void, and that the trustees be
ordered to pay to them health benefits retrospectively and
prospectively.
After certifying the respondents' class, [
Footnote 7] and after indicating that the
plaintiffs had made a
prima facie showing of
arbitrariness, the court scheduled a hearing to give the
petitioners an opportunity to prove that the discrimination against
respondents was not arbitrary. At that hearing the District Court
received documents prepared during the 1974 collective
Page 455 U. S. 569
bargaining negotiations and heard the testimony of participants
in those negotiations. Based on that evidence, the District Court
found that
"the question of whether or not to provide plaintiffs the
benefits they now seek was the subject of explicit, informed and
intense bargaining."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a. The court rejected the argument that
the eligibility requirement was arbitrary and capricious, and held
that "the trustees are bound to adhere to the terms of the
agreement."
Ibid. The court concluded:
"Public policy dictates the limited role of courts in reviewing
collectively bargained agreements. The familiar history of the
anguished relations between the bargaining parties in this case
only underscores the delicacy of the balance set in each agreement.
Plaintiffs' relief, if indeed any is due, cannot come from the
courts."
Ibid.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on the
§ 302(c)(5) requirement that jointly administered pension trusts be
maintained "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of
[the contributing] employer, and their families and dependents,"
the court held that any rule denying benefits to employees on whose
behalf significant contributions had been made must be explained to
its satisfaction, particularly if benefits were authorized for
others who had worked a lesser period of time for contributing
employers. 205 U.S.App.D.C. at 335, 640 F.2d at 421. In this case,
the trustees were unable to produce an acceptable explanation for
the discrimination between widows of pensioners and widows of
pension-eligible miners. Specifically, the court held that it was
"not enough that the particular eligibility standards were adopted
simply because that enabled resolution of a collective bargaining
dispute."
Id. at 338, 640 F.2d at 424. Recognizing the
legitimacy of a concern about actuarial soundness of pension trust
funds, the court held that
"financial integrity must be secured by methods dividing
beneficiaries from nonbeneficiaries on lines reasonably
Page 455 U. S. 570
calculated to further the fund's purposes."
Id. at 337-338, 640 F.2d at 423-424.
Judge Robb, in dissent, agreed with the reasoning of the
District Court and added the observation that the discrimination
against widows of active miners was rational because those widows
had received a larger death benefit than widows of pensioners, and
because their needs may have been lesser than those of the families
of pensioners, since their husbands had continued to work after
they were eligible for pensions.
III
The Court of Appeals held that the requirement in § 302(c)(5)
that an employee benefit trust fund be maintained "for the sole and
exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families and
dependents" means that eligibility rules fixed by a collective
bargaining agreement must meet a reasonableness standard. The
statutory language hardly embodies this reasonableness requirement.
Its plain meaning is simply that employer contributions to employee
benefit trust funds must accrue to the benefit of employees and
their families and dependents, to the exclusion of all others.
Indeed, this has been this Court's consistent interpretation of §
302(c)(5).
Just last Term, the Court reiterated that
"the 'sole purpose' of § 302(c)(5) is to ensure that employee
benefit trust funds 'are legitimate trust funds, used actually for
the specified benefits to the employees of the employers who
contribute to them. . . .'"
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.
S. 322,
453 U. S. 331
(quoting 93 Cong.Rec. 4678 (1947), reprinted in 2 Legislative
History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 1305
(Leg.Hist. LMRA)).
See Arroyo v. United States,
359 U. S. 419,
359 U. S.
425-426. [
Footnote
8]
Accord, 429 U. S.
Schlecht,
Page 455 U. S. 571
429 U. S. 401,
429 U. S.
410-411;
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.,
361 U. S. 459,
361 U. S. 474
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This reading is amply supported by
the legislative history.
See, e.g., 93 Cong.Rec. 4877
(1947), 2 Leg.Hist. LMRA, at 1312; [
Footnote 9] 93 Cong.Rec. at 4752-4753, 2 Leg.Hist. LMRA,
at 1321-1322. [
Footnote 10]
The section was meant to protect employees
Page 455 U. S. 572
from the risk that funds contributed by their employers for the
benefit of the employees and their families might be diverted to
other union purposes or even to the private benefit of faithless
union leaders. Proponents of this section were concerned that
pension funds administered entirely by union leadership might serve
as "war chests" to support union programs or political factions, or
might become vehicles through which "racketeers" accepted bribes or
extorted money from employers.
Our interpretation of the purpose of the "sole and exclusive
benefit" requirement is reinforced by the other requirements of §
302(c)(5). Section 302(c)(5) is an exception in a criminal statute
that broadly prohibits employers from making direct or indirect
payments to unions or union officials. Each of the specific
conditions that must be satisfied to exempt employer contributions
to pension funds from the criminal sanction is consistent with the
nondiversion purpose. The fund must be established "for the sole
and exclusive benefit" of employees and their families and
dependents; contributions must be held in trust for that purpose,
and must be used exclusively for health, retirement, death,
disability, or unemployment benefits; the basis for paying benefits
must be specified in a written agreement; and the fund must be
jointly administered by representatives of management and labor.
[
Footnote 11] All the
conditions in the section fortify the basic requirement that
employer contributions be administered for the sole and exclusive
benefit of employees. None of the conditions places any restriction
on the allocation of the funds among the persons protected by §
302(c)(5).
Page 455 U. S. 573
The Court of Appeals did not attempt to ground its holding on
the text or legislative history of § 302(c)(5). Rather, the court
relied upon cases in which trustees of employee benefit trust
funds, not the collective bargaining agreement, fixed the
eligibility rules and benefit levels. The Court of Appeals has held
in those cases
"that the Trustees have 'full authority . . . with respect to
questions of coverage and eligibility,' and that the court's role
is limited to ascertaining whether the Trustees' broad discretion
has been abused by the adoption of arbitrary or capricious
standards."
Pete v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare &
Retirement Fund of 1950, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 9, 517 F.2d 1275,
1283 (1975) (en banc) (footnote omitted). Noting that
"[t]he institutional arrangements creating this Fund and
specifying the purposes to which it is to be devoted are cast
expressly in fiduciary form,"
the court stated that
"the Trustees, like all fiduciaries, are subject to judicial
correction in a proper case upon a showing that they have acted
arbitrarily or capriciously towards one of the persons to whom
their trust obligations run."
Kosty v. Lewis, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 346, 319 F.2d
744, 747 (1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964. Those cases,
however, provide no support for the Court of Appeals' holding in
this case. [
Footnote 12] The
petitioner trustees were not given "full authority" to determine
eligibility requirements and benefit levels, for these were fixed
by the 1974 collective bargaining agreement. By the terms of the
trust created by that agreement, the trustees are obligated to
enforce these
Page 455 U. S. 574
determinations unless modification is required to comply with
applicable federal law. [
Footnote 13] The common law of trusts does not alter this
obligation.
See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. at
453 U. S.
336-337; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 164 (1959).
Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Absent
conflict with federal law, then, the trustees breached no fiduciary
duties in administering the 1950 Benefit Trust in accordance with
the terms established in the 1974 collective bargaining
agreement.
Section 302(c)(5) plainly does not impose the Court of Appeals'
reasonableness requirement, and respondents do not offer any
alternative federal law to sustain the court's holding. There is no
general requirement that the complex schedule of the various
employee benefits must withstand judicial review under an undefined
standard of reasonableness. This is no less true when the potential
beneficiaries subject to discriminatory treatment are not members
of the bargaining unit; we previously have recognized that former
members and their families may suffer from discrimination in
collective bargaining agreements because the union need not
"affirmatively . . . represent [them] or . . . take into account
their interests in making bona fide economic decisions in
behalf
Page 455 U. S. 575
of those whom it does represent."
Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U. S. 157,
404 U. S. 181,
n. 20. [
Footnote 14]
Moreover, because finite contributions must be allocated among
potential beneficiaries, inevitable financial and actuarial
considerations sometimes will provide the only justification for an
eligibility condition that discriminates between different classes
of potential applicants for benefits. As long as such conditions do
not violate federal law or policy, they are entitled to the same
respect as any other provision in a collective bargaining
agreement.
The substantive terms of jointly administered employee benefit
plans must comply with the detailed and comprehensive standards of
the ERISA. The terms of any collective bargaining agreement must
comply with federal laws that prohibit discrimination on grounds of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; [
Footnote 15] that protect veterans;
[
Footnote 16] that regulate
certain industries; [
Footnote
17] and that preserve our competitive economy. [
Footnote 18] Obviously, an agreement must
also be substantively consistent with the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. 151
et seq. [
Footnote 19] Moreover, in the collective bargaining
Page 455 U. S. 576
process, the union must fairly represent the interests of all
employees in the unit. [
Footnote
20] But when neither the collective bargaining process nor its
end product violates any command of Congress, a federal court has
no authority to modify the substantive terms of a collective
bargaining contract. [
Footnote
21]
The record in this case discloses no violation of § 302(c)(5) or
of any other federal law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
therefore reversed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
That section provides in relevant part:
"The provisions of this section [forbidding transfers between
employer and representatives of employees] shall not be applicable
. . . (5) with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a
trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and
exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their
families and dependents (or of such employees, families, and
dependents jointly with the employees of other employers making
similar payments, and their families and dependents):
Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust for the
purpose of paying, either from principal or income or both, for the
benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or
hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees,
compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational
activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or
unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness
insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which
such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement
with the employer, and employees and employers are equally
represented in the administration of such fund, together with such
neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the
representatives of employees may agree upon . . . ; and (C) such
payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing
pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust
which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any
purpose other than paying such pension or annuities. . . ."
61 Stat. 157, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1976 ed., Supp.
IV).
[
Footnote 2]
The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, in creating
the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of
1950, provided in part:
"Subject to the stated purposes of this Fund, the Trustees shall
have full authority, within the terms and provisions of the
'Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947,' and other applicable law,
with respect to questions of coverage and eligibility, priorities
among classes of benefits, amounts of benefits, methods of
providing or arranging for provisions for benefits, investment of
trust funds, and all other related matters."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 7&.
[
Footnote 3]
Resolution No. 68, adopted on January 19, 1967, established
"a Widows and Survivors Benefit of five thousand dollars
($5,000.00) as a result of the death of miners who at the time of
death were regularly employed in a classified job in the bituminous
coal industry by coal operators signatory to the National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, as amended, other than
those exempted from said Agreement, and two thousand dollars
($2,000.00) in the event of the death of miners who at the time of
death were receiving Trust Fund pensions and not employed outside
the coal industry. . . ."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a. The $5,000 benefit was payable in 60
monthly installments, and the $2,000 benefit was payable in 22
monthly installments.
Id. at 85a.
[
Footnote 4]
Resolution No. 69, also adopted on January 19, 1967, provided in
part:
"The following persons shall be eligible for benefits herein
provided for hospital and medical care . . . :"
"
* * * * "
"5. Unremarried widows and unmarried dependent children under
twenty-two (2) years of age of deceased miners described in
Subparagraph B of this Paragraph I as long as they are the
recipients of Widows and Survivors Benefits provided in Paragraph
II of Resolution No. 68."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 90a.
[
Footnote 5]
Article II, E(3), of the 1950 Benefit Trust provides that
lifetime health benefits shall be provided to the survivors
of a miner who died . . . [p]rior to the effective date of this
Plan . . . at a time when he was receiving a retirement or
disability pension under the eligibility rules then in effect of
the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of
1950.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a.
"By the trustee's interpretation, this clause applies to
survivors of miners who died while collecting pensions and, as
well, to survivors of those who, though not actually receiving
retirement payments at death, had ceased work and applied for them.
This construction, however, excludes widows and dependents of those
miners who were eligible for pensions but who continued working and
later died before applying for health care benefits."
205 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 333, 640 F.2d 416, 419 (1981) (footnotes
omitted).
[
Footnote 6]
Federal district courts have jurisdiction to restrain violations
of 302. 29 U.S.C. § 186(e).
[
Footnote 7]
"The class represents all surviving spouses and dependents of
deceased miners who satisfied the age and service requirements for
pension benefits at the time of death and who"
"(1) were working in classified service in the coal industry at
the time of death and had not applied for a pension, or"
"(2) had applied for and were eligible to receive pension
benefits but were not receiving such benefits at the time of death
because of their return to classified service in the coal
industry."
449 F. Supp. 941, 942 (1978).
[
Footnote 8]
The Court in
Arroyo stated:
"Those members of Congress who supported [§ 302] were concerned
with corruption of collective bargaining through bribery of
employee representatives by employers, with extortion by employee
representatives, and with the possible abuse by union officers of
the power which they might achieve if welfare funds were left to
their sole control. Congressional attention was focussed
particularly upon the latter problem, because of the demands which
had then recently been made by a large international union for the
establishment of a welfare fund to be financed by employers'
contributions and administered exclusively by union officials.
See United States v. Ryan, 350 U. S.
299."
"Congress believed that, if welfare funds were established which
did not define with specificity the benefits payable thereunder, a
substantial danger existed that such funds might be employed to
perpetuate control of union officers, for political purposes, or
even for personal gain.
See 92 Cong.Rec. 4892-4894, 4899,
5181, 5345-5346; S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 52; 93
Cong.Rec. 4678, 4746-4747. To remove these dangers, specific
standards were established to assure that welfare funds would be
established only for purposes which Congress considered proper, and
expended only for the purposes for which they were established.
See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947, 61 Harv.L.Rev. 274, 290."
(Footnotes omitted.)
[
Footnote 9]
Senator Taft, the primary author of the LMRA, stated:
"Certainly, unless we impose some restrictions, we shall find
that the welfare fund will become merely a war chest for the
particular union, and that the employees for whose benefit it is
supposed to be established, for certain definite welfare purposes,
will have no legal rights, and will not receive the kind of
benefits to which they are entitled after such deductions from
their wages."
[
Footnote 10]
Senator Ball, one of the sponsors of the floor amendment that
became § 302, stated:
"All that is sought to be done by the amendment is to protect
the rights of employees. After all, on any reasonable basis,
payments by an employer to such a fund are, in effect, compensation
to his employees. All that is sought to be done in the amendment is
to see to it that the rights of employees in the fund are
protected. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"In other words, when the union has complete control of this
fund, when there is no detailed provision in the agreement creating
the fund respecting the benefits which are to go to employees, the
union and its leadership will always come first in the
administration of the fund, and the benefits to which the employees
supposedly are entitled will come second."
[
Footnote 11]
See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.
S. 322,
453 U. S.
328-329; H.R.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 66-67
(1947), 1 Leg.Hist. LMRA at 570-571.
[
Footnote 12]
In
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., supra, at
453 U. S. 330,
the Court held that, in enacting § 302(c)(5), "Congress intended to
impose on trustees traditional fiduciary duties." The Court did not
decide, nor do we decide today, whether federal courts, sitting as
courts of equity, are authorized to enforce those duties. It is, of
course, clear that compliance with the specific standards of §
302(c)(5) in the administration of welfare funds is enforceable in
federal district courts under § 302(e) of the LMRA.
See Arroyo
v. United States, 359 U. S. 419,
359 U. S.
426-427.
[
Footnote 13]
"The Trustees are authorized, upon approval by the Employers and
the Union, to make such changes in the Plans and Trusts hereunder
as they may deem to be necessary or appropriate."
"They are also authorized and directed, after adequate notice
and consultation with the Employers and Union, to make such changes
in the Plans and Trusts hereunder, including any retroactive
modifications or amendments, which shall be necessary:"
"(a) to conform the terms of each Plan and Trust to the
requirements of ERISA, or any other applicable federal law, and the
regulations issued thereunder;"
"
* * * *"
"(d) to comply with all applicable court or government decisions
or ruling."
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974, art. XX, §
(h)(5), App. to Pet. for Cert. 106a.
[
Footnote 14]
We also recognized that these persons are not without
protection:
"Under established contract principles, vested retirement rights
may not be altered without the pensioner's consent.
See
generally Note, 70 Col.L.Rev. 909, 916-920 (1970). The
retiree, moreover, would have a federal remedy under § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act for breach of contract if his
benefits were unilaterally changed.
See Smith v. Evening News
Assn., 371 U. S. 195,
371 U. S.
200-201 (1962);
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.,
361 U. S.
459,
361 U. S. 470 (1960)."
404 U.S. at
404 U. S. 181,
n. 20.
[
Footnote 15]
See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
424 U. S. 747
(Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U. S. 188
(Equal Pay Act).
[
Footnote 16]
See, e.g., Fishgold v. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair
Corp., 328 U. S. 275,
328 U. S.
285.
[
Footnote 17]
See, e.g., Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Nemitz,
404 U. S. 37.
[
Footnote 18]
See, e.g., Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.
S. 657.
[
Footnote 19]
See, e.g., NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.
S. 322;
Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U. S.
17.
[
Footnote 20]
See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.
S. 171,
386 U. S. 177;
Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892;
Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U. S. 330;
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.
S. 192.
See also Railroad Trainmen v. Howard,
343 U. S. 768.
[
Footnote 21]
See, e.g., Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers,
444 U. S. 212,
444 U. S.
218-219;
H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U. S.
99,
397 U. S.
105-108;
NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.
S. 477,
361 U. S. 488;
Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283,
358 U. S.
295-296;
NLRB v. American National Ins. Co.,
343 U. S. 395,
343 U. S.
404.