In 1970, the union then representing flight attendants employed
by respondent Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), brought a federal
court class action alleging that TWA practiced unlawful sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 by its policy of grounding all female flight attendants who
became mothers while their male counterparts who became fathers
were permitted to continue flying. Subsequently, individual members
of the class (petitioners in No. 78-1545) were appointed as class
representatives to replace the union, which was found to be an
inadequate representative. The District Court later denied TWA's
motion to exclude class members who had not filed charges with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the time
limit specified in Title VII, holding that, while such filing
requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite not subject to waiver,
any violation by TWA continued against all the class members until
TWA changed its challenged policy. The court also granted the
plaintiff class' motion for summary judgment on the issue of TWA's
liability for violating Title VII. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the grant of summary judgment and held that timely filing of EEOC
charges was a jurisdictional prerequisite, but declined to extend
the "continuing violation" theory so as to include in the plaintiff
class those terminated employees who failed to file timely EEOC
charges. However, the court stayed its mandate pending the filing
of petitions in this Court, which, in turn, deferred consideration
of the petitions pending completion of settlement proceedings in
the District Court. In such proceedings, the District Court
designated two subclasses: Subclass A, consisting of women who were
terminated on or after March 20, 1970, and those who were
discharged earlier but who had accepted reinstatement in ground
positions, and Subclass B, consisting of all other members of the
class, whose claims the Court of Appeals had found to be
jurisdictionally barred for failure to satisfy the timely filing
requirement. The flight attendants'
Page 455 U. S. 386
current union (petitioner in No. 80-951) was permitted to
intervene and object to the proposed settlement. On the basis of
the Court of Appeals' stay of its mandate in its jurisdictional
decision, the District Court rejected the union's challenge to its
jurisdiction over Subclass B. It also approved the settlement and
awarded restoration of retroactive seniority. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, rejecting the union's contention that, because of the
Court of Appeals' earlier opinion, the District Court lacked
jurisdiction to approve the settlement or to order retroactive
seniority with respect to Subclass B.
Held:
1. Filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not
a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a
requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. The structure of Title
VII, the congressional policy underlying it, and the reasoning of
this Court's prior cases all lead to this conclusion. Pp.
455 U. S.
392-398.
2. The District Court had authority to award retroactive
seniority to the members of Subclass B as well as Subclass A. Pp.
455 U. S.
398-401.
(a) The union's contention in No. 80-951 that there was no
finding of discrimination with respect to Subclass B, and thus no
predicate for relief under § 706(g) of Title VII is without merit.
The District Court found unlawful discrimination against the
plaintiff class as a whole, at a time when the class had not yet
been divided into the two subclasses, and the court's summary
judgment ran in favor of the entire class. Since the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the District Court had no jurisdiction
over claims by those who had not met the filing requirement, and
that those individuals should have been excluded from the class
prior to the grant of summary judgment, there was no jurisdictional
barrier to the District Court's finding of discrimination with
respect to the entire class. Pp.
455 U. S.
398-399.
(b) Equally meritless is the union's contention that retroactive
seniority contrary to the collective bargaining agreement should
not be awarded over the objection of a union that has not itself
been found guilty of discrimination. Class-based seniority relief
for identifiable victims of illegal discrimination is a form of
relief generally appropriate under § 706(g). And, as made clear in
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.
S. 324, once there has been a finding of discrimination
by the employer, an award of retroactive seniority is appropriate
even if there is no finding that the union has also illegally
discriminated. Pp.
455 U. S.
399-400.
No. 78-1545, 582 F.2d 1142, reversed; No. 80-951, 630 F.2d 1164,
affirmed.
Page 455 U. S. 387
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and
II of which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment in part, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST, J.,
joined,
post, p.
455 U. S. 401.
STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
cases.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The primary question in these cases is whether the statutory
time limit for filing charges under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et
seq. (1970 ed.) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit in
the District Court. Secondarily, we resolve a dispute as to whether
retroactive seniority was a proper remedy in these Title VII
cases.
Page 455 U. S. 388
I
In 1970, the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association
(ALSSA), then the collective bargaining agent of Trans World
Airlines (TWA) flight attendants, brought a class action alleging
that TWA practiced unlawful sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII by its policy of grounding all female flight cabin
attendants who became mothers, while their male counterparts who
became fathers were permitted to continue flying. After collective
bargaining eliminated the challenged practice prospectively, the
parties in the case reached a tentative settlement. The settlement,
which provided neither backpay nor retroactive seniority, was
approved by the District Court. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, however, found the union to be an inadequate
representative of the class because of the inherent conflict
between the interests of current and former employees. It remanded
the case with instructions that the District Court name individual
members of the class to replace ALSSA as the class representative.
[
Footnote 1]
Air Line
Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. American Airlines, Inc.,
490 F.2d 636 (1973).
Upon remand, petitioners in No. 71545 were appointed as class
representatives. TWA moved to amend its answer to assert that the
claims of plaintiffs and other class members were barred by Title
VII's "statute of limitations" because they had failed to file
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
within the statutory time
Page 455 U. S. 389
limit. 1 App. 89a. [
Footnote
2] Although the District Court granted the motion to amend, it
noted that the "delay in pleading the defense of limitations may
well ultimately constitute a waiver of the defense."
Id.
at 101a.
Subsequently, on October 15, 1976, the District Court denied
TWA's motion to exclude class members who had not filed timely
charges with the EEOC. In support of its motion, TWA argued that,
instead of an affirmative defense analogous to a statute of
limitations, timely filing with the EEOC is a jurisdictional
prerequisite not subject to waiver by any action of the defendants.
While the District Court agreed that the filing requirements of
Title VII are jurisdictional, it denied the motion on the basis
that any violation by the airline continued against all the class
members until the airline changed the challenged policy.
Id. at 131a-132a. On October 19, 1976, the District Court
granted the motion of the plaintiff class for summary judgment on
the issue of TWA's liability for violating Title VII.
Id.
at 133a-134a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of October 18, 1976,
granting summary judgment on liability, expressly holding that
"TWA's no motherhood policy . . . provides a clear example of sex
discrimination prohibited by § 2000e-2(a)."
In re Consolidated
Petrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1145
(1978). It declined, however,
"to extend the continuing violation theory, as did the district
court, so as to include in the plaintiff class those employees who
were permanently terminated more than 90 days before the filing of
EEOC charges."
Id. at 1149.
The Court of Appeals went on to hold that timely filing of EEOC
charges was a jurisdictional prerequisite. Because TWA could not
waive the timely filing requirement, the
Page 455 U. S. 390
Court of Appeals found that approximately 92% of the plaintiffs'
claims were jurisdictionally barred by the failure of those
plaintiffs to have filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC
within 90 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. The
Court of Appeals, however, stayed its mandate pending the filing of
petitions in this Court. Petitions for certiorari were filed by the
plaintiff class, No. 78-1545, and by TWA, No. 78-1549. This Court
granted motions to defer consideration of the petitions pending
completion of settlement proceedings in the District Court. 442
U.S. 916 (1979).
In connection with the settlement proceedings, the District
Court designated two subclasses. Subclass A, consisting of some 30
women, comprised those who were terminated on or after March 2,
1970, as well as those who were discharged earlier, but who had
accepted reinstatement in ground duty positions. Subclass B,
numbering some 400 women, covered all other members of the class
and consisted of those whose claims the Court of Appeals had found
to be jurisdictionally barred for failure to satisfy the timely
filing requirement. 2 App. 3.
The proposed settlement divided $3 million between the two
groups. It also provided each class member with full company and
union seniority from the date of termination. The agreement
specified that,
"in the event of the timely objection of any interested person,
it is agreed that the amount of seniority and credit for length of
service for the compensation period will be determined by the Court
in its discretion, pursuant to the provisions of Section 706(g),
and all other applicable provisions of law, without contest or
objection by TWA. [
Footnote
3]"
3 App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 80-951, p. 29a.
Page 455 U. S. 391
The Independent Federation of Flight Attendants (union), which
had replaced ALSSA as the collective bargaining agent for the
flight attendants, was permitted to intervene and to object to the
settlement. On the basis that the Court of Appeals had not issued
the mandate in its jurisdictional decision, the District Court
rejected the union's challenge to its jurisdiction over Subclass B.
Id. at 14a-15a. After holding three days of hearings, the
District Court approved the settlement and awarded competitive
seniority. It explicitly found that full restoration of retroactive
seniority would not have an unusual adverse impact upon currently
employed flight attendants in any way atypical of Title VII cases.
Id. at 18a-19a.
The union appealed. It argued that, because of the Court of
Appeals' earlier opinion, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
approve the settlement or to order retroactive seniority with
respect to Subclass B. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning
that
"the principles favoring settlement of class action lawsuits
remain the same regardless of whether the disputed legal issues
center on the jurisdiction of the court over the action."
Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 630 F.2d 1164, 1169 (1980). It further
explained that the question of jurisdiction as to Subclass B had
not been finally determined, because a challenge to its decision
was pending before this Court, and observed that the Courts of
Appeals were split on the issue. The Court of Appeals noted that
the District Court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims of Subclass A. It concluded:
"Where, as here, the jurisdictional question is not settled with
finality, parties should not be forced to litigate the issue of
jurisdiction if they can arrive at a settlement
Page 455 U. S. 392
that is otherwise appropriate for district court approval."
Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the award of seniority.
According to the court, the settlement served the public policy of
remedying past acts of sex discrimination and the consequences of
those past acts. Moreover, "[t]he right to have its objections
heard does not, of course, give the intervenor the right to block
any settlement to which it objects."
Ibid. [
Footnote 4]
The union petitioned for certiorari, No. 80-951. We granted its
petition together with the petitions in No. 71545 and No. 71549,
450 U.S. 979 (1981), but later removed the TWA case, No. 71549,
[
Footnote 5] from the argument
docket and limited the grant in No. 80-951. 451 U.S. 980
(1981).
II
The single question in No. 71545 is whether the timely filing of
an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a Title
VII suit in federal court, or whether the requirement is subject to
waiver and estoppel. In reaching its decision that the requirement
is jurisdictional, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
relied on its reading of the statutory language, the absence of any
indication to the contrary
Page 455 U. S. 393
in the legislative history, and references in several of our
cases to the 90-day filing requirement as "jurisdictional."
[
Footnote 6] Other Courts of
Appeals that have examined the same materials have reached the
opposite conclusion. [
Footnote
7]
We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the
EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court,
but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject
to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. [
Footnote 8] The structure of Title VII, the
congressional policy underlying it, and the reasoning of our cases
all lead to this conclusion.
The provision granting district courts jurisdiction under Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20005(e) and (f), does not limit jurisdiction to
those cases in which there has been a timely filing with the EEOC.
[
Footnote 9] It contains no
reference to the timely
Page 455 U. S. 394
filing requirement. The provision specifying the time for filing
charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely separate provision,
and it does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way
to the jurisdiction of the district courts. [
Footnote 10] The legislative history of the
filing provision is sparse, but Senator Humphrey did characterize
the time period for filing a claim as a "period of limitations,"
110 Cong.Rec. 12723 (1964), and Senator Case described its purpose
as preventing the pressing of "stale" claims,
id. at 7243,
the end served by a statute of limitations.
Although subsequent legislative history is not dispositive,
see Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.,
444 U. S. 572,
444 U. S. 596
(1980);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.
S. 677,
441 U. S. 686,
n. 7 (1979), the legislative history of the 1972 amendments also
indicates that Congress intended the filing period to operate as a
statute of limitations, instead of a jurisdictional requirement. In
the final Conference Committee section-by-section analysis of H.R.
1746, The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 118 Cong.Rec. 7166, 7167
(1972), the Committee not only termed the filing period a "time
limitation," but explained:
"This subsection as amended provides that charges be filed
within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Court
decisions under the present law have
Page 455 U. S. 395
shown an inclination to interpret this time limitation so as to
give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of the law; it is not
intended that such court decisions should be in any way
circumscribed by the extension of the time limitations in this
subsection. [
Footnote
11]"
This result is entirely consistent with prior case law. Although
our cases contain scattered references to the timely filing
requirement as jurisdictional, the legal character of the
requirement was not at issue in those cases, and as or more often,
in the same or other cases, we have referred to the provision as a
limitations statute. [
Footnote
12]
Page 455 U. S. 396
More weighty inferences however, are to be drawn from other
cases.
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.
S. 747 (1976), was a Title VII suit against an employer
and a union. The District Court denied relief for unnamed class
members on the ground that those individuals had not filed
administrative charges under the provisions of Title VII, and that
relief for them was thus not appropriate. The Court of Appeals did
not disturb this ruling, but we reversed, saying:
"The District Court stated two reasons for its denial of
seniority relief for the unnamed class members. The first was that
those individuals had not filed administrative charges under the
provision of Title VII with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and therefore class relief of this sort was not
appropriate. We rejected this justification for denial of
class-based relief in the context of backpay awards in
Albemarle Paper [Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S.
405 (1975),] and . . . reject it here. This
justification for denying class-based relief in Title VII suits has
been unanimously rejected by the courts of appeals, and Congress
ratified that construction by the 1972 amendments. . . ."
Id. at
424 U. S. 771
(footnote omitted).
Page 455 U. S. 397
If the timely filing requirement were to limit the jurisdiction
of the District Court to those claimants who have filed timely
charges with the EEOC, the District Courts in
Franks and
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.
S. 405 (1975), would have been without jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claims of those who had not filed, as well as
without jurisdiction to award them seniority. We did not so hold.
Furthermore, we noted that Congress had approved the Court of
Appeals cases that awarded relief to class members who had not
exhausted administrative remedies before the EEOC. It is evident
that, in doing so, Congress necessarily adopted the view that the
provision for filing charges with the EEOC should not be construed
to erect a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in the district
court.
In
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.
S. 522 (1972), we announced a guiding principle for
construing the provisions of Title VII. Declining to read literally
another filing provision of Title VII, we explained that a
technical reading would be "particularly inappropriate in a
statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers,
initiate the process."
Id. at
404 U. S. 527.
That principle must be applied here as well.
The reasoning of other cases assumes that the filing requirement
is not jurisdictional. In
Electrical Workers v. Robbins &
Myers, Inc., 429 U. S. 229
(1976), we rejected the argument that the timely filing requirement
should be tolled because the plaintiff had been pursuing a
grievance procedure set up in the collective bargaining agreement.
We did not reach this decision on the basis that the 180-day period
was jurisdictional. Instead, we considered the merits of a series
of arguments that grievance procedures should toll the requirement.
Such reasoning would have been gratuitous if the filing requirement
were a jurisdictional prerequisite. [
Footnote 13]
Page 455 U. S. 398
Similarly, we did not
sua sponte dismiss the action in
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807
(1980), on the basis that the District Court lacked jurisdiction
because of plaintiff's failure to comply with a related Title VII
time provision. Instead, we merely observed in a footnote that
"[p]etitioner did not assert respondent's failure to file the
action within 90 days as a defense."
Id. at
447 U. S. 811,
n. 9.
By holding compliance with the filing period to be not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a
requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so
requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a
whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing
requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.
We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals in No. 78-1545.
III
In No. 80-951, the union challenges on several grounds the
District Court's authority to award, over the union's objection,
retroactive seniority to the members of Subclass B. We have already
rejected the union's first contention, namely, that the District
Court had no jurisdiction to award relief to those who had not
complied with Title VII's filing requirement. The union also
contends that, in any event, there has been no finding of
discrimination with respect to Subclass B members, and that the
predicate for relief under § 706(g) is therefore missing. This
contention is also without merit.
The District Court unquestionably found an unlawful
discrimination against the plaintiff class, and the class at
that
Page 455 U. S. 399
time had not been subdivided into Subclasses A and B. Summary
judgment ran in favor of the entire class, including both those
members who had filed timely charges and those who had not. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment order as well as the
finding of a discriminatory employment practice. The court went on,
however, to hold that the District Court had no jurisdiction over
claims by those who had not met the filing requirement, and that
those individuals should have been excluded from the class prior to
the grant of summary judgment. But as we have now held, that ruling
is erroneous. The District Court did have jurisdiction over
nonfiling class members. Thus, there was no jurisdictional barrier
to its finding of discrimination with respect to the entire class.
With the reversal of the Court of Appeals judgment in No. 71545 and
our dismissal of No. 71549, which had challenged the affirmance of
the summary judgment order, the order that found classwide
discrimination remains intact, and is final. The award of
retroactive seniority to members of Subclass B as well as Subclass
A is not infirm for want of a finding of a discriminatory
employment practice.
Equally meritless is the union's contention that retroactive
seniority contrary to the collective bargaining agreement should
not be awarded over the objection of a union that has not itself
been found guilty of discrimination. In
Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 764,
we read the legislative history of Title VII as giving
"emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empowered to
fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may
require to effect restitution, making whole in so far as possible
the victims of . . . discrimination. . . ."
While recognizing that backpay was the only remedy specifically
mentioned in the provision, we reasoned that adequate relief might
be denied without a seniority remedy. We concluded that the
class-based seniority relief for identifiable victims
Page 455 U. S. 400
of illegal discrimination is a form of relief generally
appropriate under § 706(g).
In
Franks, the District Court had found both that the
employer had engaged in discrimination and that the discriminatory
practices were perpetuated in the collective bargaining agreements
with the unions. 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 751.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.
S. 324 (1977), however, makes it clear that, once there
has been a finding of discrimination by the employer, an award of
retroactive seniority is appropriate even if there is no finding
that the union has also illegally discriminated. In
Teamsters, the parties agreed to a decree which provided
that the District Court would decide "whether any discriminatees
should be awarded additional equitable relief such as retroactive
seniority."
Id. at
431 U. S. 331,
n. 4. Although we held that the union had not violated Title VII by
agreeing to and maintaining the seniority system, we nonetheless
directed the union to remain in the litigation as a defendant so
that full relief could be awarded the victims of the employer's
post-Act discrimination.
Id. at
431 U. S. 356,
n. 43. [
Footnote 14] Here,
as in
Teamsters, the settlement left to the District Court
the final decision as to retroactive seniority.
In resolving the seniority issue, the District Court gave the
union all the process that was due it under Title VII in our cases.
The union was allowed to intervene. The District Court heard its
objections, made appropriate findings, and determined that
retroactive seniority should be awarded. The Court of Appeals
agreed with that determination, and
Page 455 U. S. 401
we have eliminated from our consideration here the question
whether, on the facts of these cases, the Court of Appeals and the
District Court were in error in this respect.
Accordingly, the judgment in No. 78-1545 is reversed and the
judgment in No. 80-951 is affirmed.
So ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of
these cases.
* Together with No. 80-951,
Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., also on
certiorari to the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
The class was defined as all female flight cabin attendants who
were terminated from employment with TWA on or after July 2, 1965,
for reasons of pregnancy. The Court of Appeals assumed the class to
include only those who would have resumed flight duty after
becoming mothers but for TWA's policy.
In re Consolidated
Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142,
1147, and n. 9 (CA7 1978). The class thus included both former
employees and current employees, that is, both those who declined
and those who accepted ground positions.
[
Footnote 2]
When suit was filed, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d) (1970 ed.) required
charges to be filed within 90 days of the alleged unlawful
employment practice. In 1972, this provision was amended to extend
the time limit to 180 days, and is now codified as § 2000e(e).
[
Footnote 3]
Section 706(g) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e 5(g) provides:
"If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate. . . ."
[
Footnote 4]
The Court of Appeals relied on language in
Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747,
424 U. S. 779,
n. 41 (1976):
"[D]istrict courts should take as their starting point the
presumption in favor of rightful place seniority relief, and
proceed with further legal analysis from that point; and . . . such
relief may not be denied on the abstract basis of adverse impact
upon interests of other employees, but rather only on the basis of
unusual adverse impact arising from facts and circumstances that
would not be generally found in Title VII cases."
[
Footnote 5]
In No. 78-1549, TWA contends (a) that the Court of Appeals erred
in affirming summary judgment for plaintiffs on the issue of
liability, (b) that TWA should be required to grant only
prospective relief to plaintiffs, and (c) that the Court of Appeals
erred in defining the subclass of plaintiffs who had filed timely
charges with the EEOC. In view of our decision in No. 78-1545 and
No. 80-951, we now dismiss the petition in No. 78-1549 as
improvidently granted.
[
Footnote 6]
See Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,
429 U. S. 229,
429 U. S. 240
(1976);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.
S. 553,
431 U. S. 555,
n. 4 (1977);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36,
415 U. S. 47
(1974);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.
S. 792,
411 U. S. 798
(1973).
[
Footnote 7]
See Carlile v. South Routt School District Re 3-J, 652
F.2d 981 (CA10 1981);
Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau,
Inc., 640 F.2d 584 (CA5 1981);
Leake v. University of
Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255 (CA6 1979);
Hart v. J. T. Baker
Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 829 (CA3 1979);
Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 185 U.S.App.D.C. 322, 567 F.2d 429
(1976).
[
Footnote 8]
One of the questions on which we granted certiorari in No.
80-951 was whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
District Court's approval of the settlement of jurisdictionally
barred claims. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to follow
McArthur v.
Southern Airways, Inc., 569 F.2d 276 (CA5 1978) (en banc).
Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. TWA, 630 F.2d
1164, 1168-1169 (1980). In
McArthur, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed the approval of a settlement
agreement in a Title VII class action, holding that the District
Court lacked jurisdiction because no plaintiff had filed a timely
charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Because of our holding in
No. 78-1545 that timely filing with the EEOC is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite, this issue need not be resolved.
[
Footnote 9]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), for example, reads:
"Each United States district court and each United States court
of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter. Such an
action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in
which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been
committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records
relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in
the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have
worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the
respondent is not found within any such district, such an action
may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent
has his principal office. . . ."
[
Footnote 10]
Section 2000e-5(e), the amended version of the filing provision,
reads simply: "A charge under this section shall be filed within
one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred. . . ."
[
Footnote 11]
The Senate Labor Committee's section-by-section analysis of the
amendments explained that "[t]his subsection would permit . . . a
limitation period similar to that contained in the Labor-Management
Relations Act, as amended." S.Rep. No. 92-415, p. 37 (1971). We
have recognized that the National Labor Relations Act was "the
model for Title VII's remedial provisions,"
Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U. S. 324,
431 U. S. 366
(1977). Because the time requirement for filing an unfair labor
practice charge under the National Labor Relations Act operates as
a statute of limitations subject to recognized equitable doctrines,
and not as a restriction of the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board,
see NLRB v. Local 264, Laborers' Int'l
Union, 529 F.2d 778, 781-785 (CA8 1976);
Shumate v.
NLRB, 452 F.2d 717, 720 (CA4 1971); NLRB v. A. E. Nettleton
Co., 241 F.2d 130, 133 (CA2 1957);
NLRB v. Itasca Cotton Mfg.
Co., 179 F.2d 504, 506-507 (CA5 1950), the time limitations
under Title VII should be treated likewise.
Moreover, when Congress, in 1978, revised the filing requirement
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602,
29 U.S.C. § 621
et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), which was
modeled after Title VII,
see Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
Evans, 441 U. S. 750
(1979), the House Conference Report explicitly stated that
"the 'charge' requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite
to maintaining an action under the ADEA, and that therefore
equitable modification for failing to file within the time period
will be available to plaintiffs under this Act."
H.R. Conf Rep. No. 95950, p. 12.
[
Footnote 12]
As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit points out in its
opinion in
Coke, supra, at 588-589, references to the
filing requirement as a statute of limitations have come to
dominate in our opinions:
"The trend of the Supreme Court cases is also significant. In
the early cases, the Court in dicta referred to such time
provisions using the label 'jurisdictional prerequisite.'
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S.
792 . . . (1973);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U. S. 36 . . . (1974). In the
1976
Robbins & Myers decision, the jurisdictional
label was used once, but there were numerous references to 'tolling
the limitations period,' 429 U.S. at
429 U. S.
239, . . . and other labels obviously referring to a
statute of limitations, as opposed to subject matter jurisdiction.
See also United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U. S.
553 . . . (1977), in which both labels are used. From
and after late 1977, all nine justices have concurred in opinions
containing dicta using the limitations label to the exclusion of
the jurisdictional label.
Occidental Life Insurance Company v.
EEOC, 432 U. S. 355,
432 U. S.
371-[3]72 . . . (1977);
United Air Lines, Inc. v.
McDonald, 432 U. S. 385,
432 U. S.
391-[3]92 . . . (1977);
Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U. S. 807,
447 U. S.
818-823 . . . (1980),
Delaware State College
v. Ricks, [449] U.S. [250] . . . (1980)."
[
Footnote 13]
In
Robbins & Myers, we also held that the expanded
180-day "limitations period," enacted by the 1972 amendments, was
retroactive. 429 U.S. at
429 U. S. 244.
This holding presupposes that the requirement is not
jurisdictional. Moreover, in reaching this conclusion, we quoted
from
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.
S. 304,
325 U. S. 316
(1945):
"[C]ertainly it cannot be said that lifting the bar of a statute
of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of
time is,
per se, an offense against the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Several Courts of Appeals have read
Robbins & Myers
as implicitly approving equitable tolling.
Coke v. General
Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d at 588;
Hart v. J. T.
Baker Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d at 833;
Smith v. American
President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 108-109 (CA2 1978).
[
Footnote 14]
In noting that the union in
Teamsters properly remained
a defendant in the litigation, we cited to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19(a). The union here was not joined under Rule 19 when
individuals replaced the union as class representatives, but
intervened later.
Cf. EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers,
Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1095 (CA6 1974) (Joinder under Rule 19(a)
provides union with full opportunity to participate in litigation
and formulation of proposed relief, although, as practical matter,
union does not play role in litigation until court finds violation
of Title VII).
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
REHNQUIST join, concurring in No. 78-545 and concurring in the
judgment in No. 80-951.
The above cases arise out of the same protracted controversy,
and the Court disposes of them in a single opinion. The only
question in No. 78-1545 is whether the timely filing of an EEOC
charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a Title VII
suit. I agree that timely filing is not jurisdictional, and is
subject to waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, I join Parts I and II
of the Court's opinion.
I join only the judgment in No. 80-951. My concern with the
Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a timely
charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a prerequisite to
disturbing rights under a bona fide seniority system protected by §
703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). [
Footnote 2/1] This was made
Page 455 U. S. 402
clear in
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.
S. 553,
431 U. S. 559
(1977), a case not discussed in the Court's opinion. [
Footnote 2/2] I nevertheless concur in the
remand of No. 80-951, in which a settlement agreement was approved
awarding retroactive competitive status seniority under the
standard of
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
424 U. S. 747
(1976). This case has been in litigation since 1970, and, in view
of its complexity, it is difficult to be certain as to "what
happened and when." I believe, however, that one can conclude that
the requirements of
Evans were met.
As noted in the Court's opinion,
ante at
455 U. S.
398-399, the District Court's order finding classwide
discrimination is now final. The District Court also entered an
order finding that timely charges had been filed for all class
members, and that order is similarly final. The timely charge order
was entered on October 15, 1976, three days before the entry of the
order finding classwide discrimination. These orders were
consolidated on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Although the October 18th order, finding discrimination,
was affirmed, the Court of Appeals vacated the other order, holding
that the members of Subclass B had failed to meet the
jurisdictional requirements of Title VII because they had not filed
timely claims. No District Court order was ever actually vacated,
because, on the motion of the parties, the Court of Appeals stayed
its mandate, and the parties then reached a settlement. Today, the
Court reverses that portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment that
would have vacated the October 15th order. As a result, both the
October 15th and October 18th orders, finding timely charges and
classwide discrimination, are now final.
Page 455 U. S. 403
I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court affirming the
award of retroactive competitive status seniority under the
standard of
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. [
Footnote 2/3]
[
Footnote 2/1]
In
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.
S. 747 (1976), timely charges of discrimination had been
filed. Relief was awarded on the theory that current employees were
merely being placed in the position they would have enjoyed,
relative to the victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. In
contrast, when the victims of discrimination have slept on their
rights, it will often be unfair to award them full retroactive
seniority at the expense of employees who may have accrued their
present seniority in good faith. When timely charges have not been
filed, a district court should consider these equities in
determining whether to award competitive status seniority, and the
presence of a settlement between the employer and the plaintiffs
should not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any other
rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII actions, in part,
by bargaining away the rights of current employees.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court refers to
United Air Lines v. Evans twice,
see ante at
455 U. S. 393,
n. 6, and at
455 U. S. 396,
n. 12; both references are to terms used by the
Evans
Court in describing the timely filing requirement.
[
Footnote 2/3]
I am not entirely content with this formalistic resolution of
the "timely filing" issue. But, after almost 12 years of
litigation, neither the parties nor the courts have addressed
specifically whether the failure to file timely charges should
affect the balance of the equities in awarding competitive status
seniority. Rather than prolong this disruptive litigation, it may
well be in the best interest of all of the parties to approve the
settlement -- as the Court's judgment does today.