An application for a stay, pending appeal, of the District
Court's judgment -- which declared that a New Jersey statute
creating new election districts for United States Representatives
in response to the 1980 census was unconstitutional because of
population variances among the districts, and which enjoined any
primary or general congressional elections under the statute -- is
granted. There is a reasonable probability that four Justices of
this Court will consider the issue of the proper interpretation of
the controlling standard of
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U. S. 526,
concerning permissible population variances to be sufficiently
meritorious to note probable jurisdiction, and there is a fair
prospect of reversal of the District Court's judgment. Moreover,
applicants will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted,
and apportionment plans created by the legislature are to be
preferred to judicially constructed plans.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, Circuit Justice.
Applicants, the Speaker of the New Jersey Assembly, the
President of the New Jersey Senate, and eight Members of the United
States House of Representatives from New Jersey, have applied to me
for a stay pending this Court's review on appeal of the judgment of
a three-judge District Court for the District of New Jersey entered
March 3, 1982.
Daggett v. Kimmelman, 535 F.
Supp. 978. The judgment declared unconstitutional 1982 N.J.
Laws, ch. 1, which creates districts for the election of the United
States Representatives from New Jersey, and enjoined the defendant
state officers from conducting primary or general congressional
elections under the terms of that statute.
On the basis of the 1980 decennial census, the number of United
States Representatives to which New Jersey is entitled has been
decreased from 15 to 14. Consequently, the
Page 455 U. S. 1304
New Jersey Legislature was required to apportion 14
congressional districts. Chapter 1 is the product of the state
legislature's effort to meet that requirement. The District Court
found that, in drafting ch. 1, the legislature was concerned not
only with drawing districts of equal population as an
"aspirational" goal, but also with recognizing such factors as the
preservation of the cores of preexisting districts, the
preservation of municipal boundary lines, and the preservation of
the districts of incumbent Democratic Congressmen. Chapter 1
creates 14 congressional districts with an overall absolute range
of deviation of 3,674 people and an overall relative range of
deviation of 0.6984% from the "ideal" map of 14 districts of
526,059 persons each. There were, however, several other proposals
brought before the legislature that yielded total deviations of
less than 0.6984%. The opinion for the majority of the District
Court says of these:
"For example, the Roeck plan contained a total deviation of
.3250%, and only .2960% after it was amended. The DiFrancesco plan
. . . had a total deviation of .1253%. The Hardwick plan . . .
contained a total deviation of .4515%. The Bennett plan . . . and
the Kavanaugh plan . . . contain total deviations of .1369% and
.0293%, respectively."
535 F. Supp. at 982.
All three judges of the District Court agreed that the
constitutionality of 1982 N.J. Laws, ch. 1, was to be determined
under the standard announced in
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U. S. 526
(1969), and its progeny,
e.g., White v. Weiser,
412 U. S. 783
(1973). But the judges divided 2 to 1 on what that standard is. The
majority read
Kirkpatrick as holding that, even if 0.6984%
was to be regarded as a
de minimis variance,
"P.L.1982, c. 1, can withstand constitutional attack only if the
population variances 'are unavoidable despite a good faith effort
to achieve absolute equality. . . .'
Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S.
at
394 U. S. 531. . . . It is
clear that the .6984% population deviation of P.L.1982, c. 1, is
not unavoidable.
Page 455 U. S. 1305
The legislature had the option of choosing from several other
plans with a lower total deviation than .6984%."
535 F. Supp. at 982. The dissenting judge, on the other hand,
read
Kirkpatrick to suggest:
"[V]ariances may be justified which do not achieve statistically
significant dilutions of the relative representation of voters in
larger districts when compared with that of voters in smaller
districts. . . . [
Kirkpatrick is to be read to announce] a
prohibition against toleration of
de minimis dilutions of
relative representation, rather than as a prohibition against
toleration of
de minimis population variances which have
no statistically relevant effect on relative representation. A
plus-minus deviation of 0.6984% falls within the latter
category."
535 F. Supp. at 982.
The appeal would thus appear to present the important question
whether
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler requires adoption of the
plan that achieves the most precise mathematical exactitude, or
whether
Kirkpatrick left some latitude for the New Jersey
Legislature to recognize the considerations taken into account by
it as a basis for choosing among several plans, each with arguably
"statistically insignificant" variances from the constitutional
ideal of absolute precision.
The principles that control my determination as Circuit Justice
of this in chambers application were stated in
Rostker v.
Goldberg, 448 U. S. 1306
(1980) (BRENNAN, J., in chambers):
"Relief from a single Justice is appropriate only in those
extraordinary cases where the applicant is able to rebut the
presumption that the decisions below -- both on the merits and on
the proper interim disposition of the case -- are correct. In a
case like the present one, this can be accomplished only if a
four-part showing is made. First, it must be established that there
is a 'reasonable
Page 455 U. S. 1306
probability' that four Justices will consider the issue
sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari or to note probable
jurisdiction. Second, the applicant must persuade [the Circuit
Justice] that there is a fair prospect that a majority of the Court
will conclude that the decision below was erroneous. While related
to the first inquiry, this question may involve somewhat different
considerations, especially in cases presented on direct appeal.
Third, there must be a demonstration that irreparable harm is
likely to result from the denial of a stay. And fourth, in a close
case, it may be appropriate to 'balance the equities' -- to explore
the relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the
interests of the public at large."
Id. at
448 U. S.
1308 (citations omitted).
The importance of a definitive answer from this Court as to the
proper interpretation of the
Kirkpatrick standard is
self-evident: doubtless, all 50 States would be assisted by that
answer in any review of the apportionment of congressional seats in
consequence of the 1980 census. My task is not to adjudicate this
application on my own view of the merits of that question, but
rather to determine whether there is a "reasonable probability"
that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious
to note probable jurisdiction of this appeal, and, if so, whether
there is a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will conclude
that the decision below was erroneous. Neither event can be
predicted with anything approaching certainty, but nonetheless it
does seem to me that there is a reasonable probability that
jurisdiction of the appeal will be noted, and that there is a fair
prospect of reversal.
As to the third
Rostker requirement, I conclude that
applicants would plainly suffer irreparable harm were the stay not
granted. Under the District Court order, the legislature must
either adopt an alternative redistricting plan before March 22 next
or face the prospect that the District Court will implement its own
redistricting plan. With respect to
Page 455 U. S. 1307
the balance of the equities, this Court has repeatedly
emphasized that legislative apportionment plans created by the
legislature are to be preferred to judicially constructed
plans.
Accordingly, I am today entering an order granting the
application for a stay pending the filing of a jurisdictional
statement and, if probable jurisdiction is noted, final disposition
of the appeal.