After respondent employee had been discharged by petitioner
employer for alleged dishonest acts, respondent requested his union
to file a grievance contesting the discharge. The collective
bargaining agreement provided a grievance and arbitration procedure
for the resolution of covered disputes. Respondent was represented
by the union at an arbitration hearing which resulted in a decision
upholding the discharge. Seventeen months later, respondent filed
suit in Federal District Court against the union and petitioner
under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, alleging that
the union had breached its duty of fair representation and that
petitioner discharged him not for the stated reasons, which it knew
to be false, but to replace full-time employees with part-time
employees. The court. granted summary judgment for the defendants
on the ground that the action was barred by New York's 90-day
statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court
should have applied New York's 6-year limitations period for breach
of contract actions.
Held: Given the choices present here, and the
undesirability of the results of the grievance and arbitral process
being suspended in limbo for long periods, the District Court
properly chose the 90-day period for the bringing of an action to
vacate an arbitration award.
Cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 424 U. S. 554. Pp.
451 U. S.
60-64.
(a) The timeliness of a § 301 suit is to be determined, as a
matter of federal law, by reference to the appropriate state
statute of limitations, and the determination of which limitations
period is the most appropriate depends upon the nature of the
federal claim and the federal policies involved.
Auto Workers
v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696. Pp.
451 U. S.
60-61.
(b) Although not styled as one to vacate the arbitration award,
respondent's suit, if successful, would have that direct effect. He
raised the same claim that was raised before the arbitrators --
that he was discharged in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. He sought the same relief -- reinstatement with full
backpay. While his underlying claim against his employer was based
on the collective
Page 451 U. S. 57
bargaining agreement, the indispensable predicate for the §
301(a) action was not a showing under traditional contract law that
the discharge was a breach of the agreement, but instead that the
union breached its duty of fair representation. Since the
arbitrators' conclusion was, under the collective bargaining
agreement, "binding on all parties," respondent was required to
show that the union's duty to represent him fairly at the
arbitration had been breached before he was entitled to reach the
merits of his contract claim. Thus, the suit is more analogous to
an action to vacate an arbitration award than to a straight
contract action. Pp.
451 U. S.
61-62.
(c) An employee's unfair representation claim against his union,
even though his employer may ultimately be called upon to respond
in damages if he is successful, is more a creature of "labor law"
as it has developed since the enactment of § 301 than it is of
general contract law. And one of the leading federal policies in
this area is the relatively rapid disposition of labor disputes.
The system of industrial self-government, with its heavy emphasis
on grievance, arbitration, and the "law of the shop," could easily
become unworkable if a decision which has given "meaning and
content" to the terms of an agreement, and even affected subsequent
modifications of the agreement, could suddenly be called into
question as much as six years later. Pp.
451 U. S.
63-64.
624 F.2d 394, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL,
JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
451 U. S. 64.
STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p.
451 U. S. 65.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part,
post, p.
451 U. S.
71.
Page 451 U. S. 58
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are called upon in this case to determine which state statute
of limitations period should be borrowed and applied to an
employee's action against his employer under § 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947. 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a),
and
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.
S. 554 (1976).
I
Petitioner United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), employed
respondent Mitchell (respondent) as a car washer at its facility on
Staten Island, N.Y. On January 13, 1977, respondent was discharged
for dishonest acts, including falsifying his timecards and claiming
payment for hours which he did not work. Respondent denied the
charges against him and requested his union, Department Store and
Wholesale Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 177
(the Union), to file a grievance on his behalf contesting the
discharge. UPS and the Union were parties to a collective
bargaining agreement which provided a grievance and arbitration
procedure for the resolution of disputes covered by the agreement.
App. 57-67. Pursuant to the agreement respondent's grievance was
submitted to a panel of the Atlantic Area Parcel Grievance
Committee, composed of three union and three company
representatives (the Joint Panel).
Cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., supra, at
424 U. S. 557,
n. 2. The Joint Panel conducted a hearing, at which respondent was
represented by the Union, and on February 16, 1977, it announced
its decision that the discharge be upheld. App. 103-104. Under the
collective bargaining agreement, this decision was "binding on all
parties."
Id. at 66;
see id. at 103.
Seventeen months later, on July 20, 1978, respondent filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern
Page 451 U. S. 59
District of New York against the Union and UPS under § 301(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
See
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., supra. He alleged that
the Union had breached its duty of fair representation, and that
UPS discharged him not for the stated reasons, which it knew to be
false, but to achieve savings by replacing full-time employees with
part-time employees. App. 7-13. Both UPS and the Union moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by New
York's 90-day statute of limitations for actions to vacate
arbitration awards. Section 7511(a) of the N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law
(McKinney 1963) provides that " [a]n application to vacate or
modify an [arbitration] award may be made by a party within ninety
days after its delivery to him."
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS and
the Union, ruling that respondent's action was properly
characterized as one to vacate the arbitration award entered
against him. The court reasoned:
"The relief sought was expressly denied in an arbitration award
issued as a result of a full-scale arbitration proceeding. The
effect of any grant of the relief sought . . . would be to vacate
the determination of the arbitrators."
App. 129. Respondent appealed and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed. 624 F.2d 394 (1980). That court held that
the District Court should have applied New York's 6-year
limitations period for actions alleging breach of contract,
N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 213 (2) (McKinney 1972). It reasoned that
respondent's action was analogous to a breach of contract action
because the issues were whether the collective bargaining agreement
had been breached and whether the Union contributed to that breach
by failure to discharge its duty of fair representation. The court
further reasoned that a 6-year limitations period
"provides for relatively rapid disposition of labor disputes
without undermining an employee's ability to vindicate his rights
through § 301 actions."
624 F.2d at 397-398.
Page 451 U. S. 60
We granted UPS' petition for certiorari. 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
[
Footnote 1]
II
Congress has not enacted a statute of limitations governing
actions brought pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA. As this Court
pointed out in
Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U. S. 696,
383 U. S.
704-705 (1966), "the timeliness of a § 301 suit . . . is
to be determined, as a matter of federal law, by reference to the
appropriate state statute of limitations." [
Footnote 2] Our present task is to determine which
limitations period is "the most appropriate one provided by state
law."
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U. S. 454,
421 U. S. 462
(1975). This depends upon an examination of the nature of the
federal
Page 451 U. S. 61
claim and the federal policies involved.
See Hoosier
Cardinal, supra, at
383 U. S.
706-707.
Although respondent did not style his suit as one to vacate the
award of the Joint Panel, if he is successful, the suit will have
that direct effect. Respondent raises in his § 301 action the same
claim that was raised before the Joint Panel -- that he was
discharged in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. He
seeks the same relief he sought before the Joint Panel --
reinstatement with full backpay. In sum, "it is clear that [he] was
dissatisfied with, and simply seeks to upset, the arbitrator's
decision that the company did not wrongfully discharge him."
Liotta v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903, 905-906
(CA3 1980),
cert. pending, No. 80-890. [
Footnote 3]
The Court of Appeals purported to rely on this Court's decision
in
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., but that decision
strongly supports borrowing the limitations period for actions to
vacate arbitration awards. As
Hines makes clear, an
employee may go behind a final and binding award under a collective
bargaining agreement and seek relief against his employer and union
only when he demonstrates that his union's breach of its duty
"seriously undermine[d] the integrity of the arbitral process." 424
U.S. at
424 U. S. 567.
Hines rejected the suggestion that "erroneous arbitration
decisions must stand" in the face of the union's breach of its
duty,
id. at
424 U. S. 571,
suggesting that the suits it sanctioned are aptly characterized as
ones to vacate such arbitration decisions. Indeed, the present
Page 451 U. S. 62
writer, though in dissent on the merits in
Hines,
characterized the action as one to "vacate an . . . arbitration
award."
Id. at
424 U. S. 575.
See also Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.
S. 335,
375 U. S. 336
(1964) (issue characterized as whether to enjoin implementation of
decision of joint panel).
It is true that respondent's underlying claim against his
employer is based on the collective bargaining agreement, a
contract. It is not enough, however, for an employee such as
respondent to prove that he was discharged in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement.
"To prevail against either the company or the Union, petitioners
must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the
contract, but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of
duty by the Union. . . . The grievance processes cannot be expected
to be error-free."
Hines, 424 U.S. at
424 U. S.
570-571. Thus, respondent's characterization of his
action against the employer as one for "breach of contract" ignores
the significance of the fact that it was brought in the District
Court pursuant to § 301(a) of the LMRA, and that the indispensable
predicate for such an action is not a showing under traditional
contract law that the discharge was a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement, but instead a demonstration that the Union
breached its duty of fair representation. Since the conclusion of
the Joint Panel was, under the collective bargaining agreement,
"binding on all parties," respondent was required in some way to
show that the Union's duty to represent him fairly at the
arbitration had been breached before he was entitled to reach the
merits of his contract claim. This, in our view, makes the suit
more analogous to an action to vacate an arbitration award than to
a straight contract action. [
Footnote 4]
Page 451 U. S. 63
We think that the unfair representation claim made by an
employee against his union, even though his employer may ultimately
be called upon to respond in damages for it if he is successful, is
more a creature of "labor law" as it has developed since the
enactment of § 301 than it is of general contract law. We said in
Hoosier Cardinal that one of the leading federal policies
in this area is the "relatively rapid disposition of labor
disputes." 383 U.S. at
383 U. S. 707.
Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (6-month period under NLRA). This
policy was one of the reasons the Court in
Hoosier
Cardinal chose the generally shorter period for actions based
on an oral contract, rather than that for actions upon a written
contract, 383 U.S. at
383 U. S. 707,
and similar analysis supports our adoption of the shorter period
for actions to vacate an arbitration award in this case. [
Footnote 5]
It is important to bear in mind the observations made in the
Steelworkers Trilogy that
"the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement
is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government. .
. . The processing . . . machinery is actually a vehicle by which
meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining
agreement."
Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U. S. 574,
363 U. S. 581
(1960). Although the present case involves a fairly mundane
Page 451 U. S. 64
and discrete wrongful discharge complaint, the grievance and
arbitration procedure often processes disputes involving
interpretation of critical terms in the collective bargaining
agreement affecting the entire relationship between company and
union.
See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, supra (seniority
rights of all employees). This system, with its heavy emphasis on
grievance, arbitration, and the "law of the shop," could easily
become unworkable if a decision which has given "meaning and
content" to the terms of an agreement, and even affected subsequent
modifications of the agreement, could suddenly be called into
question as much as six years later.
Obviously, if New York had adopted a specific 6-year statute of
limitations for employee challenges to awards of a joint panel or
similar body, we would be bound to apply that statute under the
reasoning of
Hoosier Cardinal. But in cases such as this,
where generally state limitations periods were enacted prior to the
enactment of § 301 by Congress in 1947, we are necessarily
committed by prior decisional law to choosing among statutes of
limitations none of which fit hand in glove with an action under §
301(a) of the LMRA. Given the choices present here, and the
undesirability of the results of the grievance and arbitral process
being suspended in limbo for long periods, we think the District
Court was correct when it chose the 90-day period imposed by New
York for the bringing of an action to vacate an arbitration
award.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
A direct conflict in the Circuits developed when the Third
Circuit, confronted with the present question, borrowed the 3-month
period contained in Pennsylvania's arbitration statute, reversing a
District Court decision borrowing the State's 6-year period for
actions upon a contract.
Liotta v. National Forge Co., 629
F.2d 903 (1980),
cert. pending, No. 80-890.
[
Footnote 2]
Amicus the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations has filed a brief arguing that, in cases
such as the present, courts should apply the 6-month limitations
period found in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 160(b). The AFL-CIO distinguishes the above-quoted
language from
Hoosier Cardinal on the ground that
Hoosier Cardinal involved a § 301 action by a union
against an employer, while actions brought by employees against
both their union and employer pursuant to our decisions in
Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171
(1967), and
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
424 U. S. 554
(1976), are hybrid § 301 breach-of-duty actions, the union's duty
being implied from the NLRA. We decline to consider this argument,
since it was not raised by either of the parties here or below.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520,
441 U. S. 532,
n. 13 (1979);
Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.
S. 361,
364 U. S. 370
(1960). Our grant of certiorari was to consider which state
limitations period should be borrowed, not whether such borrowing
was appropriate.
See Pet. for Cert. i. The parties have
considered the question as being limited to which state limitations
period to borrow.
See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 8; Brief
for Respondent 11. Since respondent filed his complaint beyond the
6-month period, the same result would obtain in this case were we
to adopt the AFL-CIO's position.
[
Footnote 3]
The Court of Appeals declined to borrow the limitations period
for actions to vacate an arbitration award, in part, because of its
view that discharged employees could not institute such actions
under New York law,
see In re Soto, 7
N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855 (1960). 624 F.2d 394, 398 (1980).
The fact that an employee could not bring a direct suit to vacate
an arbitration award, however, does not mean that his § 301 claim,
which, if successful, would have the same effect, is not "closely
analogous" to such an action.
See Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454,
421 U. S. 464
(1975).
[
Footnote 4]
Respondent suggests
Hines actions might also be
characterized as actions upon a statute, personal injury actions,
or malpractice actions, all governed by a 3-year limitations period
in New York, N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law §§ 214(2), 214(5), 214(6) (McKinney
1972). All of these characterizations suffer from the same flaw as
the effort to characterize the action as one for breach of
contract: they overlook the fact that an arbitration award stands
between the employee and any relief which may be awarded against
the company.
[
Footnote 5]
New York is typical in providing a relatively short limitations
period for actions to vacate arbitration awards. Of 42 States with
specific limitations periods for such actions, 28 have a period of
90 days, 9 have shorter periods, 2 longer, and 3 States have
periods based on the term of court.
See App. to Pet. for
Cert. A18-A19. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 12, provides
a limitations period of three months.
The particular choice made in
Hoosier Cardinal to
borrow the limitations period for oral contracts is not binding in
this case, not only because the issue in
Hoosier Cardinal
was between a 6-year period for oral contracts and a 20-year period
for written contracts, but also because the claim in
Hoosier
Cardinal was not one to overturn an arbitration award.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion because I am persuaded that the Court
has made the correct choice between the two state law alternatives
presented by the parties. As the Court observes, the applicability
of § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b),
was never pressed by
Page 451 U. S. 65
either party, and was not considered by the Court of Appeals.
Although I find much that is persuasive in JUSTICE STEWART's
analysis, resolution of the § 10(b) question properly should await
the development of a full adversarial record.
JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in the judgment.
The Court believes itself obligated by
Auto Workers v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, to
determine the applicable statute of limitations in this case "as a
matter of federal law, by reference to the appropriate state
statute of limitations." [
Footnote
2/1] I do not believe, however, that we are so constrained by
Hoosier. Instead of deciding which of two almost equally
relevant state limitations periods applies to the respondent
employee's claims, I would impose the limitations period of § 10(b)
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
A
Hoosier involved a straightforward breach of contract
damages suit brought by a union against an employer under § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). As Congress had not
provided a limitations period for § 301 suits, the Court concluded
that a state statute of limitations should apply. But the Court was
careful to note that it was not deciding the appropriate time
limits for all suits brought under § 301:
"The present suit is essentially an action for damages caused by
an alleged breach of an employer's obligation embodied in a
collective bargaining agreement. Such an action closely resembles
an action for breach of contract cognizable at common law. Whether
other § 301 suits different from the present one might call for the
application of other rules on timeliness, we are not required
Page 451 U. S. 66
to decide, and we indicate no view whatsoever on that
question."
383 U.S. at
383 U. S. 705,
n. 7. The Court also observed, in response to the claim that
reliance on varying state limitations statutes was contrary to the
national interest in uniformity in industrial relations, that the
kind of contract dispute it had before it did not implicate
"those consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly
designed to promote --
the formation of the . . . agreement and
the private settlement of disputes under it."
Id. at
383 U. S. 702
(emphasis added).
The case before us is quite unlike the one in
Hoosier.
It is a hybrid "§ 301 and breach of duty sui[t],"
Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U. S. 171,
386 U. S. 197,
n. 18, brought by an employee against both his employer and his
union in order to set aside a "final and binding" determination of
a grievance, arrived at through the collectively bargained method
of resolving the grievance. It is, therefore, a direct challenge to
"the private settlement of disputes under [the collective
bargaining agreement]."
Moreover, unlike
Hoosier, where the employee's
complaint was rooted solely in § 301 of the LMRA, the respondent
employee here has two claims, each with its own discrete
jurisdictional base. The contract claim against the employer is
based on § 301, but the duty of fair representation is derived from
the NLRA. [
Footnote 2/2] Yet the
two claims are inextricably interdependent.
Page 451 U. S. 67
"To prevail against either the company or the Union, . . .
[employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was
contrary to the contract, but must also carry the burden of
demonstrating breach of duty by the Union."
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.
S. 554,
424 U. S.
570-571. Accordingly, a plaintiff must prevail upon his
unfair representation claim before he may even litigate the merits
of his § 301 claim against the employer.
Thus, the suit in this case, unlike the one in
Hoosier,
cannot be likened to "an action for breach of contract cognizable
at common law." 383 U.S. at
383 U. S. 705,
n. 7. Instead, it is an amalgam of § 301, which has no limitations
period, and the NLRA. And, of course, the latter contains a
limitations provision. Although § 10(b) of the NLRA was designed to
limit the initiation of unfair labor practice claims [
Footnote 2/3] in order
Page 451 U. S. 68
to safeguard the stability of collective bargaining agreements,
the policy behind it applies with equal force in this context.
B
Congress enacted § 10(b) of the NLRA to protect continuing
collective bargaining systems from delayed attack. The 6-month bar
of § 10(b) [
Footnote 2/4] is
designed to strengthen and defend the "stability of bargaining
relationships."
Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.
S. 411,
362 U. S. 425.
The time limitation reflects
Page 451 U. S. 69
the balance drawn by Congress, "the expositor of the national
interest,"
id. at
362 U. S. 429, between the interests of employees in
redressing grievances and "vindicati[ng] [their] statutory rights,"
ibid., and the "interest in
industrial peace, which it
is the overall purpose of the Act to secure.'" Id. at
362 U. S. 428
(quoting NLRB v. Childs Co., 195 F.2d 617, 621-622 (CA2)
(L. Hand, concurring)). [Footnote
2/5]
Of course, one aspect of the respondent employee's claim in this
case is predicated on § 301 of the LMRA; if the plaintiff can
establish his claim for breach of the duty of fair representation,
he may then pursue his § 301 breach of contract claim. But here,
unlike
Hoosier, the latter action, like the breach of duty
claim, is a challenge to a result reached in the contractual
grievance resolution system. Accordingly, the policy of promoting
stability in collective bargaining underlying the time bar of §
10(b) is applicable to this aspect of the respondent employee's
case as well.
In any event, the two elements of respondent employee's hybrid
action cannot be disentangled: the duty of fair representation is
"part and parcel of [the] § 301 [claim]."
Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 186.
When the 6-month period of § 10(b) has passed, the employee should
no longer be able to challenge the alleged breach of duty by his
union, [
Footnote 2/6] and as this
is a precondition for maintaining the contract action, he should
not be able to challenge the employer's action either.
Finally, even if it were appropriate to view the respondent
employee's suit in this case as founded solely on § 301, the
Page 451 U. S. 70
Court is not obliged to apply a state statute of limitations. As
already noted,
Hoosier contemplated that "other § 301
suits different from the present one might call for application of
other rules of timeliness." 383 U.S. at
383 U. S. 705,
n. 7. And the Court has indicated, in a more general context, that
state limitations periods will not be applied when their employment
would be inconsistent with national policy:
"[T]he Court has not mechanically applied a state statute of
limitations simply because a limitations period is absent from the
federal statute. State legislatures do not devise their limitations
periods with national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the
federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not
frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national
policies. . . . State limitations periods will not be borrowed if
their application would be inconsistent with the underlying
policies of the federal statute."
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.
S. 355,
432 U. S.
367.
In § 10(b) of the NLRA, Congress established a limitations
period attuned to what it viewed as the proper balance between the
national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality
of private settlements and an employee's interest in setting aside
what he views as an unjust settlement under the collective
bargaining system. That is precisely the balance at issue in this
case. The employee's interest in setting aside the "final and
binding" determination of a grievance through the method
established by the collective bargaining agreement unquestionably
implicates
"those consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly
designed to promote -- the formation of the . . . agreement and the
private settlement of disputes under it."
Hoosier, 383 U.S. at
383 U. S. 702.
Accordingly, "[t]he need for uniformity" among procedures followed
for similar claims,
ibid., [
Footnote 2/7] as well as the clear congressional
indication
Page 451 U. S. 71
of the proper balance between the interests at stake, counsels
the adoption of § 10(b) of the NLRA as the appropriate limitations
period for lawsuits such as this.
C
Because the respondent employee commenced his suit beyond the
6-month bar of § 10(b) of the NLRA, I agree that the judgment of
the Court of Appeals must be reversed.
[
Footnote 2/1]
But see ante at
451 U. S. 60, n.
2.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court has recognized on numerous occasions that "[t]he duty
of fair representation is . . . implicit in the National Labor
Relations Act."
See, e.g., Electrical Workers v. Foust,
442 U. S. 42,
442 U. S. 46, n.
8. The Court first recognized the statutory duty of fair
representation in
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.
Co., 323 U. S. 192, a
case arising under the Railway Labor Act, but in a series of
decisions beginning with
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U. S. 330, the
Court concluded that the duty of fair representation applies
equally to the NLRA. The Court explained the derivation of the
principle in
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
424 U. S. 554,
424 U. S.
563-564:
"Necessarily, '[a] wide range of reasonableness must be allowed
a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it
represents. . . .'
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S.
330,
345 U. S. 338 (1953). The
union's broad authority in negotiating and administering effective
agreements is 'undoubted,'
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S.
335,
375 U. S. 342 (1964), but it
is not without limits. Because"
"[t]he collective bargaining system, as encouraged by Congress
and administered by the NLRB, of necessity subordinates the
interests of an individual employee to the collective interests of
all employees in a bargaining unit,"
"
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171,
386 U. S.
182 (1967), the controlling statutes have long been
interpreted as imposing upon the bargaining agent a responsibility
equal in scope to its authority, 'the responsibility and duty of
fair representation.'
Humphrey v. Moore, supra, at
375 U. S. 342. The union, as
the statutory representative of the employees, is 'subject always
to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of
its discretion.'
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra, at
345 U. S. 338."
That this duty of fair representation under the NLRA may be
judicially enforced was made clear in
Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U. S. 171.
[
Footnote 2/3]
This Court has not decided whether all breaches of the duty of
fair representation necessarily constitute unfair labor practices
under §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the NLRA. In
Miranda Fuel
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, the Board ruled that all violations of
the duty of fair representation are unfair labor practices either
under § 8(b)(2) or under § 8(b)(1)(A).In
Vaca v. Sipes,
supra, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether
Miranda Fuel was correctly decided, but simply "assume[d]
for present purposes" that the Board had been correct. 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 186.
The three concurring Justices in
Vaca v. Sipes, however,
stated that "a complaint by an employee that the union has breached
its duty of fair representation . . . is a charge of unfair labor
practice."
Id. at
386 U. S. 198. And a majority of the Courts of Appeals
have concluded that breach of the fair representation duty is an
unfair labor practice.
See Newport News Shipbuilding Co. v.
NLRB, 631 F.2d 263 (CA4);
Abilene Sheet Metal, Inc. v.
NLRB, 619 F.2d 332, 347 (CA5);
NLRB v. American Postal
Workers Union, 618 F.2d 1249, 1254-1255 (CA8);
Kesner v.
NLRB, 532 F.2d 1169, 1173-1174 (CA7);
Kling v. NLRB,
503 F.2d 1044 (CA9);
Truck Drivers v. NLRB, 126
U.S.App.D.C. 360, 379 F.2d 137;
cf. Denver Stereotypers v.
NLRB, 623 F.2d 134, 136 (CA10).
But see NLRB v. Miranda
Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 175-178 (CA2) (Judge Medina took the
position that the Board had incorrectly held violation of the duty
of fair representation to be an unfair labor practice; Judge
Lumbard, concurring, did not reach that question; Judge Friendly
dissented). Even if there are some breaches of the representation
duty that are not unfair labor practices under the NLRA, § 10(b)
is, I believe, the proper source for determining when claims of
breach of duty must be raised. For that limitations period is a
clear indication of Congress' judgment of when claims of a very
similar or identical character must be brought.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Concededly, the terms of § 10(b) are directed to the
administrative procedures provided by Congress to resolve unfair
labor practices. But the fact that Congress did not provide a
limitations period for a judicially enforceable action later found
implied in the NLRA is not comparable to a congressional failure to
establish a time limitation for an action it expressly creates by
statute.
Cf. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC,
432 U. S. 355,
432 U. S. 367.
In any case, it cannot reasonably be assumed here that
congressional silence reflects an intent to apply state statutes of
limitation for an action based in part on rights and obligations
traceable to the NLRA.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The charge by the employees in
Machinists was against
the formation of a collective bargaining agreement. Here the
complaint is with the agreement's administration. But § 8(d) of the
NLRA defines the collective bargaining required by the Act to
include grievance procedures as a part of the continuing collective
bargaining process.
See NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,
385 U. S. 432,
385 U. S. 436;
29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
[
Footnote 2/6]
The Court held in
Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.
S. 411,
362 U. S. 422,
that
"a finding of violation which is inescapably grounded on events
predating the limitations period is directly at odds with the
purposes of the § 10(b) [time limit]."
[
Footnote 2/7]
The need for speedy and final resolution of labor disputes,
preferably without recourse to the courts -- identified by the
Court today in support of its preference for the shorter of the
possible state limitations periods,
ante at
451 U. S. 63,
451 U. S. 64 --
also supports adoption of the relatively short period of §
10(b).
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In this action, the plaintiff employee seeks a judicial remedy
against his former employer for wrongful discharge, and against his
union for breach of the duty of fair representation. The District
Court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants because
of the employee's failure to file suit within what that court
viewed as the appropriate period of limitations. The Court of
Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment as to both claims,
and remanded for further proceedings. The employer alone sought
further review in this Court. Therefore, at this stage of the
litigation, the only question properly presented for our
consideration is whether the Court of Appeals chose the most
appropriate New York statute of limitations to govern the
employee's claim against his former employer for wrongful
discharge. [
Footnote 3/1] Although
I agree, for the most part, with the
Page 451 U. S. 72
Court's resolution of that question, I fear that its failure
expressly to limit its reasoning to the narrow question presented
in this case may suggest that today's decision also resolves the
question whether the same statute of limitations governs the
employee's claim against the union for breach of the duty of fair
representation. That interpretation, although understandable in
light of the broad language of the Court's opinion, would be
inconsistent with the procedural posture of this case, and, in
addition, would be conceptually unsound.
I concur in the Court's conclusion that it is appropriate, for
purposes of federal labor law, to characterize the employee's suit
against his employer as an action to set aside an arbitration
award. In the arbitration proceeding that took place prior to this
litigation, the employer prevailed on the precise claim respondent
raises against it in this judicial proceeding -- that the discharge
violated the collective bargaining agreement. If the employee now
were to prevail against the employer on this claim, the necessary
effect of the resulting court order would be to undo the
arbitration award.
See ante at
451 U. S. 61.
Accordingly, in upholding the employer's position, the Court
properly emphasizes the importance of the finality and certainty of
arbitration in the collective bargaining context, and properly
treats the adverse arbitration decision as a substantial obstacle
to the employee's pursuit of judicial relief against his
employer.
The employee's claim against his union for breach of the duty of
fair representation, however, is of a far different character.
Although this claim is closely related to the claim
Page 451 U. S. 73
against the employer, the two claims are nonetheless
conceptually distinct. [
Footnote
3/2] The claim against the union may not, in my judgment, be
characterized as an action to vacate an arbitration award. The
arbitration proceeding did not, and indeed, could not, [
Footnote 3/3] resolve the employee's claim
against the union. Although the union was a party to the
arbitration, it acted only as the employee's representative; the
Joint Panel did not address or resolve any dispute between the
employee and the union. Therefore, with respect to the employee's
action against the union, the finality and certainty of arbitration
are not threatened by the prospect that the employee might prevail
on his judicial claim. Because no arbitrator has decided the
primary issue presented by this claim, no arbitration award need be
undone, even if the employee ultimately prevails. [
Footnote 3/4]
Page 451 U. S. 74
The employee's claim against his union is properly characterized
not as an action to vacate an arbitration award, but rather as a
malpractice claim. There is no conceptual reason why that claim may
not survive even if the employer is able to rely on the arbitration
award as a conclusive determination of its obligations under the
collective bargaining agreement. [
Footnote 3/5] Thus, by analogy, a lawyer who negligently
allows the statute of limitations to run on his client's valid
claim may be liable to his client even though the original
defendant no longer has any exposure.
Cf. Smart v. Ellis
Trucking Co., 580 F.2d 215, 218-219 (CA6 1978),
cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 958.
In this case, I agree with the Court that the statute of
limitations applicable to respondent's claim against his former
employer is the 90-day statute governing actions to vacate or
Page 451 U. S. 75
modify arbitration awards in New York. [
Footnote 3/6] It surely does not follow, however, that
that statute is applicable to the claim against the union for
breach of its duty of fair representation. [
Footnote 3/7] Because the union did not seek review of
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, it is not appropriate to
decide what period of limitations should be applied to the
employee's claim against it. It is, however, noteworthy that
JUSTICE STEWART's proposal that we strain to conclude that Congress
intended that § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 160(b), [
Footnote 3/8] be
applied to causes of action that this
Page 451 U. S. 76
Court had not yet divined when § 10(b) was enacted, [
Footnote 3/9]
cf. Watt v. Alaska,
post, p.
451 U. S. 276
(STEWART, J., dissenting), rests on a rationale that might apply to
a § 301 claim against the union, but which is wholly inapplicable
to the claim against the employer, because the employer is not
accused of any unfair labor practice.
In sum, I concur in the Court's judgment insofar as it pertains
to the employee's action against his employer.
[
Footnote 3/1]
The union did not petition for review of the Court of Appeals'
decision, and the employer has not taken a position with respect to
which statute of limitations governs the employee's claim against
the union. Indeed, the employer has vigorously denied that this
question is presented in this case:
"[T]he only question raised in the petition for certiorari is
the statute of limitations applicable to Mitchell's claim against
his employer, UPS.
See Liotta v. National Forge Co., 629
F.2d 903 (3d Cir 1980)."
"
* * * *"
"The fact that Mitchell may have a claim against the Union does
not affect the determination of which statute of limitations
governs his claim against his employer.
See Liotta v. National
Forge Co., supra, 629 F.2d at 905."
Reply Brief for Petitioner 3, 4.
See also id. at
5-6.
[
Footnote 3/2]
The claims are closely related because, to prevail against the
employer, the employee must establish that the union breached its
duty of fair representation and that the employer breached the
collective bargaining agreement; similarly, to prevail against the
union, the employee must prove that the union breached its duty of
fair representation and, if he wishes to recover loss of employment
damages for which the union is responsible, that the employer
breached the agreement.
See 451 U.S.
56fn3/4|>n. 4,
infra. Cf. Czosek v.
O'Mara, 397 U. S. 25,
397 U. S. 28-29.
However, despite this close relationship, the two claims are not
inseparable. Indeed, although the employee in this case chose to
sue both the employer and the union, he was not required to do so;
he was free to institute suit against either one as the sole
defendant.
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.
S. 171,
386 U. S.
186-187.
[
Footnote 3/3]
By its very nature, the employee's claim that the union breached
its duty of fair representation cannot be resolved in an
arbitration proceeding because it arises out of the conduct of that
proceeding itself.
[
Footnote 3/4]
While an arbitration decision favorable to the employer -- for
example, that the discharge did not breach the collective
bargaining agreement -- would be of substantial significance in an
employee's suit against his union, it would not necessarily be
dispositive. The determination whether the employer breached the
agreement may be highly relevant to the amount of damages caused by
the union's alleged breach of duty, but it is not necessarily
controlling with respect to the threshold question whether there
was any breach of duty by the union at all. For example, if, solely
for reasons of racial bias, a union processes a discharged
employee's grievance in bad faith, the union breaches its duty of
fair representation.
Cf. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R. Co., 323 U. S. 192. The
fact that the underlying discharge may not have violated the
collective bargaining agreement does not necessarily absolve the
union of liability for its breach, although it may limit the size
of the employee's recovery against the union. Thus, while a court
considering an employee's claim against a union will evaluate the
validity of the employer's underlying conduct, that evaluation is
not central to the resolution of the duty of fair representation
claim.
[
Footnote 3/5]
In
Liotta v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903 (CA3
1980),
cert. pending, No. 80-890, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the Pennsylvania statute of limitations governing
actions to vacate arbitration awards should apply to an employee's
§ 301 action against his employer for wrongful discharge. However,
in
Liotta, the employee had filed suit only against his
employer, and not against his union. The Court of Appeals suggested
that this fact was of some significance in determining which
statute of limitations to apply:
"[T]he fact that Liotta alleges that the arbitration award is
invalid due to the Union's breach of its duty of fair
representation does not change the limitations period, because the
suit here is against the Company, and not the Union. Thus, it is
clear that Liotta was dissatisfied with, and simply seeks to upset,
the arbitrator's decision that the Company did not wrongfully
discharge him."
629 F.2d at 90906.
[
Footnote 3/6]
N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 7511(a) (McKinney 1963), quoted
ante
at
451 U. S. 59. I
do not address any question concerning the possible tolling of that
period, because no such issue is presented in this case.
[
Footnote 3/7]
Under the rationale of
Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp., 383 U. S. 696,
383 U. S.
704-705, arguably the proper statute of limitations to
apply to such a claim would be N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 214(6) (McKinney
1972), which governs claims for nonmedical malpractice. Because the
question of the appropriate statute of limitations to apply to the
employee's claim against his union is not properly presented in
this case, I express no definite opinion on the point. I note,
however, that the Court dismisses the suggestion that this action
may be characterized as a malpractice action with the observation
that this characterization "overlook[s] the fact that an
arbitration award stands between the employee and any relief which
may be awarded against
the company."
Ante at
451 U. S. 63, n.
4 (emphasis supplied). Because no arbitration award stands between
the employee and any relief which may be awarded against the union,
this observation is inapplicable to the claim against the
union.
[
Footnote 3/8]
Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
"Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the [National Labor
Relations] Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board
for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served
upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect,
and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a member
thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein
fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said complaint:
Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any
unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the
filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy
thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, unless
the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge
by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the
six-month period shall be computed from the day of his discharge.
Any such complaint may be amended by the member, agent, or agency
conducting the hearing or the Board in its discretion at any time
prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so
complained of shall have the right to file an answer to the
original or amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise
and give testimony at the place and time fixed in the complaint. In
the discretion of the member, agent, or agency conducting the
hearing or the Board, any other person may be allowed to intervene
in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any such
proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance
with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the
United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district
courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the
United States pursuant to section 2072 of title 28."
29 U.S.C. § 160(b). The plain language of this statute indicates
that it is directed solely to the administrative procedure
established by Congress in the National Labor Relations Act for the
resolution of unfair labor practice charges arising under, and
processed in accordance with, that Act. Nothing in the statutory
language suggests that Congress intended that this 6-month
limitations period be applied in any other context.
[
Footnote 3/9]
The National Labor Relations Act was enacted in 1935. 49 Stat.
449. Although § 10(b) was a part of the Act at that time, in its
original form, it did not contain a period of limitations. 49 Stat.
453-454. The 6-month limitations period upon which JUSTICE STEWART
relies was added to § 10(b) in 1947. 61 Stat. 146. Six years later,
the Court decided the first in a series of cases recognizing that
the National Labor Relations Act imposes a duty of fair
representation upon unions.
See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U. S. 330. In
1967, in
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, the
Court clearly held that this duty may be judicially enforced.
See generally Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
424 U. S. 554,
424 U. S.
563-567.