Petitioner, a former automobile dealer, brought suit against
respondent automobile manufacturer in Federal District Court,
alleging that respondent's "sales incentive" programs over a
certain period violated the price discrimination prohibition of §
2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.
Under its programs, respondent paid a bonus to its dealers if they
exceeded their quotas -- set by respondent for each dealer -- of
cars to be sold at retail or purchased from respondent. Petitioner
alleged that respondent set petitioner's quotas higher than those
of its competitors; that to the extent it failed to meet its
quotas, and to the extent its competitors met their lower quotas,
petitioner received fewer bonuses; and that the net effect was that
it paid more for its automobiles than did its competitors.
Petitioner contended that the amount of the price discrimination --
the amount of the price difference multiplied by the number of
petitioner's purchases -- was $81,248, and that, when petitioner
went out of business, the going concern value of the business
ranged between $50,000 and $170,000. Respondent maintained that the
sales incentive programs were nondiscriminatory, and that they did
not injure petitioner or adversely affect competition. The jury
returned a verdict awarding petitioner $111,247.48 in damages,
which the District Court trebled. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that it was unnecessary to consider whether a violation of
§ 2(a) had been proved, since petitioner had failed to introduce
substantial evidence of injury attributable to the programs, much
less substantial evidence of the amount of such injury, as was
required in order to recover treble damages under § 4 of the
Clayton Act.
Held:
1. Petitioner's contention that, once it has proved a price
discrimination in violation of § 2(a), it is entitled at a minimum
to so-called "automatic damages" in the amount of the price
discrimination is without merit. Section 2(a), a prophylactic
statute which is violated merely upon a showing that "the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition,"
does not require, for purposes of
Page 451 U. S. 558
injunctive actions, that the discrimination must in fact have
harmed competition.
Corn Products Co. v. FTC, 324 U.
S. 726;
FTC v. Morton Salt Co.. 334 U. S.
37. However under § 4 of the Clayton Act, which is
essentially a remedial statute providing treble damages to any
person "who
shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," a plaintiff
must make some showing of actual injury attributable to something
the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. Thus, it must prove
more than a violation of § 2(a), since such proof establishes only
that injury
may result.
Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477. Pp.
451 U. S.
561-563.
2. The rule excusing antitrust plaintiffs from an unduly
rigorous standard of proving antitrust injury,
see, e.g.,
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.
S. 100, will not be applied here to determine whether
petitioner, though not entitled to "automatic damages," has
produced enough evidence of actual injury to sustain recovery.
While it is a close question whether petitioner's evidence would be
sufficient to support a jury award even under such rule, a more
fundamental difficulty is that the cases relied upon by petitioner
all depend, in greater or lesser part, on the inequity of a
wrongdoer's defeating the recovery of damages against him by
insisting upon a rigorous standard of proof. In this case, it
cannot be said with assurance that respondent is a "wrongdoer,"
since the Court of Appeals went directly to the issue of damages
after bypassing the question whether respondent, in fact, violated
§ 2(a). The proper course is to remand the case so that the Court
of Appeals may pass upon respondent's contention that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of such violation. If the
court determines that respondent did violate the Act, it should
then consider the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence of injury.
Pp.
451 U. S.
563-568.
607 F.2d 1133, vacated and remanded.
REHNQUIST, .J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL,
J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined,
post, p.
451 U. S.
569.
Page 451 U. S. 559
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is the appropriate measure
of damages in a suit brought under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. [
Footnote 1]
Petitioner, for several decades a Chrysler-Plymouth dealer in
Birmingham, Ala., went out of business in 1974. It subsequently
brought suit against respondent in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama, alleging that, from January,
1970, to May, 1974, respondent's various "sales incentive" programs
violated § 2(a). Under one type of program, respondent assigned to
each participating dealer a sales objective and paid to the dealer
a bonus on each car sold in excess of that objective. Under another
type of program, respondent required each dealer to purchase from
it a certain quota of automobiles before it would pay a bonus on
the sale of automobiles sold at retail. The amount of the
Page 451 U. S. 560
bonus depended on the number of retail sales (or wholesale
purchases) made in excess of the dealer's objective, and could
amount to several hundred dollars. Respondent set petitioner's
objectives higher than those of its competitors, requiring it to
sell (or purchase) more automobiles to obtain a bonus than its
competitors. To the extent petitioner failed to meet those
objectives, and to the extent its competitors met their lower
objectives, petitioner received fewer bonuses. The net effect of
all this, according to petitioner, was that it paid more money for
its automobiles than did its competitors. It contended that the
amount of the price discrimination -- the amount of the price
difference multiplied by the number of petitioner's purchases --
was $81,248. It also claimed that the going-concern value of the
business as of May, 1974, ranged between $50,000 and $170,000.
Respondent maintained that the sales incentive programs were
nondiscriminatory, and that they did not injure petitioner or
adversely affect competition. The District Court denied
respondent's motion for a directed verdict. The jury returned a
verdict against respondent and awarded petitioner $111,247.48 in
damages, which the District Court trebled.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed with
instructions to dismiss the complaint. 607 F.2d 1133 (1979). It
found that, in order to recover treble damages under § 4 of the
Clayton Act, a plaintiff must prove (1) a violation of the
antitrust laws, (2) cognizable injury attributable to the
violation, and (3) at least the approximate amount of damage. It
found it unnecessary to consider whether petitioner proved that
respondent's incentive programs violated § 2(a) because, in its
view, petitioner had "failed to introduce substantial evidence of
injury attributable to the programs, much less substantial evidence
of the amount of such injury."
Id. at 1135. Rejecting
petitioner's theory of "automatic damages," under which mere proof
of discrimination establishes the fact and amount of injury, the
court held that injury must be proved by more than mere
"[c]onclusory statements
Page 451 U. S. 561
by the plaintiff, without evidentiary support."
Id. at
1136-1137. The court concluded that the District Court erred in
refusing respondent's motion for a directed verdict and in denying
its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We granted
certiorari, 449 U.S. 819 (1980), to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
I
Petitioner first contends, that once it has proved a price
discrimination in violation of § 2(a), it is entitled at a minimum
to so-called "automatic damages" in the amount of the price
discrimination. Petitioner concedes that, in order to recover
damages, it must establish cognizable injury attributable to an
antitrust violation and some approximation of damage. Brief for
Petitioner 9. It insists, however, that the jury should be
permitted to infer the requisite injury and damage from a showing
of a substantial price discrimination. Petitioner notes that this
Court has consistently permitted such injury to be inferred in
injunctive actions brought to enforce § 2(a),
e.g., FTC v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37
(1948), and argues that private suits for damages under § 4 should
be treated no differently. We disagree. [
Footnote 2]
By its terms, § 2(a) is a prophylactic statute which is violated
merely upon a showing that "the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition."
Page 451 U. S. 562
(Emphasis supplied.) As our cases have recognized, the statute
does not "require that the discriminations must, in fact, have
harmed competition."
Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC,
324 U. S. 726,
324 U. S. 742
(1945);
FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra, at
334 U. S. 46
("the statute does not require the Commission to find that injury
has actually resulted"). Section 4 of the Clayton Act, in contrast,
is essentially a remedial statute. It provides treble damages to
"[a]ny person who
shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. . .
." (Emphasis supplied.) To recover treble damages, then, a
plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury attributable to
something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.
Perkins
v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642,
395 U. S. 648
(1969) (plaintiff "must, of course, be able to show a causal
connection between the price discrimination in violation of the Act
and the injury suffered"). It must prove more than a violation of §
2(a), since such proof establishes only that injury
may
result.
Our decision here is virtually governed by our reasoning in
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.
S. 477 (1977). There we rejected the contention that the
mere violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers
which
may substantially lessen competition, gives rise to
a damages claim under § 4. We explained that,
"to recover damages [under § 4], respondents must prove more
than that the petitioner violated § 7, since such proof establishes
only that injury may result."
Id. at
429 U. S. 486.
Likewise in this case, proof of a violation does not mean that a
disfavored purchaser has been actually "injured" within the meaning
of § 4.
The legislative history buttresses this view. Both the Patman
bill, H.R. 8442, § 2(d), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), as
introduced in the House, and the Robinson bill, S. 3154, § 2(d),
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935), as introduced in the Senate, provided
that a plaintiff's damages for a violation of § 2(a) shall be
presumed to be the amount of the price discrimination. The
provision, however, encountered such
Page 451 U. S. 563
strong opposition in both Houses that the House Committee
eliminated it from its bill, H.R.Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong.,2d
Sess., 16 (1936), and the Senate Committee modified the provision
to authorize presumptive damages in the amount of the
discrimination only when plaintiff shows the "fact of damage."
S.Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1936). The Conference
Committee eliminated even that compromise, and § 2(a) was passed in
its present form. Congress thus has rejected the very concept which
petitioner seeks to have the Court judicially legislate.
Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.
S. 186,
419 U. S.
199-201 (1974). [
Footnote 3]
II
Petitioner next contends that, even though it may not be
entitled to "automatic damages" upon a showing of a violation of §
2(a), it produced enough evidence of actual injury to survive a
motion for a directed verdict. That evidence consisted primarily of
the testimony of petitioner's owner, Mr. Payne, and an expert
witness, a professor of economics. Payne testified that the price
discrimination was one of the causes of the dealership's going out
of business. In support of that contention, he testified that his
salesmen told him that the dealership lost sales to its
competitors, and that its market share of retail Chrysler-Plymouth
sales in the Birmingham area was 24% in 1970, 27 in 1971, 23% in
1972, and 25% in 1973. Payne contended that it was proper to infer
that the 4% drop in 1972 was a result of the incentive
programs.
Page 451 U. S. 564
He also testified that the discrimination caused him to "force"
business so that he could meet his assigned quotas. That is, his
desire to make a sale induced him to "overallow" on trade-ins, thus
reducing his profits on his used car operation. App. 51-52. Payne
adduced evidence showing that his average gross profit on used car
sales was below that of his competitors, though that same evidence
revealed that his average gross profit on new sales was higher.
Id. at 269.
Neither Payne nor petitioner's expert witness offered
documentary evidence as to the effect of the discrimination on
retail prices. Although Payne asserted that his salesmen and
customers told him that the dealership was being undersold,
id. at 35-37, 92, 95, he admitted he did not know if his
competitors did in fact pass on their lower costs to their
customers.
Id. at 44, 57. Petitioner's expert witness took
a somewhat different position. He believed that the discrimination
would ultimately cause retail prices to be held at an artificially
high level, since petitioner's competitors would not reduce their
retail prices as much as they would have done if petitioner
received an equal bonus from respondent.
Id. at 103, 135.
He also testified that petitioner was harmed by the discrimination
even if the favored purchasers did not lower their retail prices,
since petitioner, in that case, would make less money per car.
[
Footnote 4]
Id. at
139.
Page 451 U. S. 565
Even construed most favorably to petitioner, the evidence of
injury is weak. Petitioner nevertheless asks us to consider the
sufficiency of its evidence in light of our traditional rule
excusing antitrust plaintiffs from an unduly rigorous standard of
proving antitrust injury. In
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100,
395 U. S.
123-124 (1969), for example, the Court discussed at some
length the fixing of damages in a case involving market exclusion.
We accepted the proposition that damages could be awarded on the
basis of plaintiff's estimate of sales it could have made absent
the violation:
"[D]amage issues in these cases are rarely susceptible of the
kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in
other contexts. The Court has repeatedly held that, in the absence
of more precise proof, the factfinder may"
"conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference from the
proof of defendants' wrongful acts and their tendency to injure
plaintiffs' business, and from the evidence of the decline in
prices, profits and values, not shown to be attributable to other
causes,
Page 451 U. S. 566
that defendants' wrongful acts had caused damage to the
plaintiffs."
"
Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., supra, at
327 U. S.
264.
See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U. S. 359,
273 U. S.
377-379 (1927);
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555,
282 U. S.
561-566 (1931)."
Ibid.
In
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.
S. 251 (1946), relied on in
Zenith, film
distributors had conspired to deny the plaintiff theater access to
first-run films. The jury awarded damages based on a comparison of
plaintiff's actual profits with the contemporaneous profits of a
competing theater with access to first-run films. Plaintiff had
also adduced evidence comparing his actual profits during the
conspiracy with his profits when he had been able to obtain
first-runs. The lower court thought the evidence too imprecise to
support the award, but we reversed because the evidence was
sufficient to support a "just and reasonable inference" of damage.
We explained:
"[A]ny other rule would enable the wrongdoer to profit by his
wrongdoing at the expense of his victim. It would be an inducement
to make wrongdoing so effective and complete in every case as to
preclude any recovery by rendering the measure of damages
uncertain. Failure to apply it would mean that the more grievous
the wrong done, the less likelihood there would be of a
recovery."
327 U.S. at
327 U. S.
264-265.
Our willingness to accept a degree of uncertainty in these cases
rests, in part, on the difficulty of ascertaining business damages
as compared, for example, to damages resulting from a personal
injury or from condemnation of a parcel of land. The vagaries of
the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of what plaintiff's
situation would have been in the absence of the defendant's
antitrust violation. But our willingness also rests on the
principle articulated in cases such as
Bigelow, that it
does not "
come with very good grace'" for
Page 451 U. S.
567
the wrongdoer to insist upon specific and certain proof of
the injury which it has itself inflicted. Hetzel v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co., 169 U. S. 26,
169 U. S. 39 (1898)
(quoting United States Trust Co. v. O'Brien, 143 N.Y. 284,
289, 38 N.E. 266, 267 (1894)). Accord, Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.
S. 555, 282 U. S. 563
(1931) ("Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude
the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would
be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all
relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer
from making any amend for his acts"); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.
S. 359, 273 U. S. 379
(1927).
Applying the foregoing principles to this case is not without
difficulty. In the first place, it is a close question whether
petitioner's evidence would be sufficient to support a jury award
even under our relaxed damages rules. In those cases where we have
found sufficient evidence to permit a jury to infer antitrust
injury and approximate the amount of damages, the evidence was more
substantial than the evidence presented here. In
Zenith,
for example, plaintiff compared its sales in Canada, where it was
subject to a violation, with its sales in the United States, where
it was not. And in
Bigelow, plaintiff adduced evidence not
only comparing its profits with a competitor not subject to the
violation, but also comparing its profits during the time of the
violation with the period immediately preceding the violation.
[
Footnote 5]
Page 451 U. S. 568
But a more fundamental difficulty confronts us in this case. The
cases relied upon by petitioner all depend in greater or lesser
part on the inequity of a wrongdoer's defeating the recovery of
damages against him by insisting upon a rigorous standard of proof.
In this case, however, we cannot say with assurance that respondent
is a "wrongdoer." Because the court below bypassed the issue of
liability and went directly to the issue of damages, we simply do
not have the benefit of its views as to whether respondent, in
fact, violated § 2(a). Absent such a finding, we decline to apply
to this case the lenient damages rules of our previous cases. Had
the court below found a violation, we could more confidently
consider the adequacy of petitioner's evidence.
Accordingly, we think the proper course is to remand the case so
that the Court of Appeals may pass upon respondent's contention
that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support a
finding of violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. We do not
ordinarily address for the first time in this Court an issue which
the Court of Appeals has not addressed, and we think this would be
a poor case in which to depart from that practice. If the court
determines on remand that respondent did violate the Act, the court
should then consider the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence of
injury in light of the cases discussed above. We, of course,
intimate no views as to how that issue should be decided. We
emphasize that, even if there has been a violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act, petitioner is not excused from its burden of
proving antitrust injury and damages. It is simply that, once a
violation has been established, that burden is to some extent
lightened.
Page 451 U. S. 569
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), provides in
pertinent part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the
United States . . . and where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefits of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them. . . ."
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15,
provides:
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States in the district in which
the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-fold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."
[
Footnote 2]
The automatic damages theory has split the lower courts. The
leading case approving the theory is
Fowler Manufacturing Co.
v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (CA9 1969),
cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1012 (1970).
See also Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v.
Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (CA8) (involving §§ 2 (d) and 2(e)
of the Act),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945);
Grace
v. E. J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170 (CA7 1976) (involving § 2(c)
of the Act). The leading case rejecting the theory is
Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457
(CA2),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
Accord,
Edward J. Sweeney Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105
(CA3 1980);
McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 1332 (SD Ala.1972),
affirmance order, 486 F.2d
1400 (CA5 1973);
Kidd v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d
497 (CA6 1961).
[
Footnote 3]
Relying on
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co.,
330 U. S. 743,
330 U. S. 757
(1947), petitioner argues that this Court has previously accepted
the automatic damages theory. In that case, the Court stated that,
if petitioner can show an illegal price discrimination under the
Act, "it would establish its right to recover three times the
discriminatory difference without proving more than the illegality
of the prices."
Ibid. But that statement is merely dictum,
since the only issue before the Court was whether a violation of §
2(a) could be used as an affirmative defense to void a
contract.
[
Footnote 4]
Respondent suggests that petitioner's inability to show that his
favored competitors lowered their retail sales price should defeat
recovery. That argument assumes that evidence of a lower retail
price is the
sine qua non of antitrust injury, that the
disfavored purchaser is simply not "injured" unless the favored
purchaser has lowered his price. If the favored purchaser has
lowered his retail price, for example, the disfavored purchaser
will lose sales to the extent it does not match that lower price.
Similarly, if the disfavored purchaser matches the lower price, it
will lose profits. Because petitioner has not shown that the
favored purchasers have lowered their retail price, petitioner is
arguably foreclosed from showing that it lost either sales or
profits. Justice Cardozo seemingly adopted this position in
ICC
v. United States, 289 U. S. 385,
289 U. S.
390-391 (1933), a case involving rate discrimination
under the Interstate Commerce Act:
"If, by reason of the discrimination, the preferred producers
have been able to divert business that would otherwise have gone to
the disfavored shipper, damage has resulted to the extent of the
diverted profits. If the effect of the discrimination has been to
force the shipper to sell at a lowered price . . . damage has
resulted to the extent of the reduction. But none of these
consequences is a necessary inference from discrimination without
more."
Petitioner argues that is an overly narrow view of antitrust
injury. To the extent a disfavored purchaser must pay more for its
goods than its competitors, it is less able to compete. It has
fewer funds available with which to advertise, make capital
expenditures, and the like. Although the inability of petitioner to
show that the favored retailers lowered their retail price makes
petitioner's argument particularly weak, we find it unnecessary to
decide in this case whether such failure, as a matter of law,
demonstrates no competitive injury.
[
Footnote 5]
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U. S. 555
(1931), is similarly distinguishable. In upholding a jury verdict
against respondents for a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, the
Court observed:
"It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of
damage, but there was none as to the fact of damage; and there is a
clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to
establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and
the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the
amount. The rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages
applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to
those damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong and
only uncertain in respect of their amount. . . ."
Id. at
282 U. S.
562.
"If the damage is certain, the fact that its extent is uncertain
does not prevent a recovery."
Id. at
282 U. S. 566.
In this case, by contrast, the issue is not so much the amount of
damages as whether petitioner has, in fact, been injured by an
antitrust violation.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and
JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting in part.
I concur in
451 U. S. but
simply would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner
"failed to introduce substantial evidence of injury attributable
to [respondent's program], much less substantial evidence of the
amount of such injury."
607 F.2d 1133, 1135. In
451 U. S. the
Court today reviews the evidence, vacates the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, and remands the case for a resifting of the evidence
and determination of whether respondent violated the Clayton Act as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. The Court identifies no error
of fact or law in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but vacates
that judgment only because the Court finds it "unclear" whether
there is sufficient evidence. I find no basis for this Court
undertaking to second-guess the Court of Appeals as to the
sufficiency of evidence.
Even if there were some satisfactory reason for us to review the
evidence in this relatively uncomplicated case, I think the Court
of Appeals was plainly correct in finding petitioner's evidence
insufficient to show a competitive injury of the kind that the
antitrust laws were enacted to prevent.
See Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477,
429 U. S.
488-489 (1977). Section 2(a) is a prophylactic statute
that makes unlawful price discrimination that "may . . . lessen
competition." Thus, a court cannot infer from the fact of a
violation that defendant's behavior has caused plaintiff any
injury. A plaintiff must show, to recover damages for violation of
§ 2(a), that unlawful discrimination in price allowed a favored
competitor to draw sales or profits
Page 451 U. S. 570
from him the unfavored competitor.
See Enterprise
Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 458 (CA2),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). Petitioner's evidence,
which the Court concedes to be "weak,"
ante at
451 U. S. 565,
amounts to nothing more than a showing that its market share
declined temporarily 4% in 1972. Petitioner presented no
substantial evidence that respondent's incentive program caused its
market share to shrink. Indeed, over the 4-year period of the
challenged programs, its market share increased 1%. Rather,
petitioner relied on its president's conclusory testimony, which
consisted in major part of hearsay statements from petitioner's
automobile salesmen. Hypothetical analysis of the "predicted
effects" of respondent's program by an economics professor also was
relied upon by petitioner to prove the actual cause of injury. One
hardly would expect this Court to reject a Court of Appeals
judgment that evidence as flimsy as this was insufficient to go to
the jury.
My concern with the Court's opinion, however, goes beyond its
reviewing the evidence. I have understood that, in a
Robinson-Patman Act case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
the fact of antitrust injury by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.
S. 642,
395 U. S. 648
(1969). Only when this fact has been proved may a court properly be
lenient in the evidence it requires to prove the amount of damages.
See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U. S. 555,
282 U. S. 562
(1931). It is not at all apparent that the Court adequately
recognizes this distinction.
It seems to me that today's remand measurably increases the
uncertainty inherent in the generalities of the Robinson-Patman
Act. Accordingly, I dissent.