This case involves a custody dispute between the mother
(petitioner) and father (respondent) of a minor child. A Florida
state court awarded custody to petitioner. In a subsequently filed
action, a Georgia state court awarded custody to respondent, and
the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner then filed a
petition for certiorari in this Court, raising the question whether
Art. IV, § 1, of the Federal Constitution required Georgia to give
full faith and credit to the Florida decree, and certiorari was
granted.
Held: Where the record discloses that petitioner failed
to raise her federal claim in the Georgia courts and that the
Georgia Supreme Court failed to rule on a federal issue, this Court
is without jurisdiction to decide that issue, and accordingly the
writ of certiorari is dismissed. Pp.
451 U. S.
494-502.
Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 245 Ga. 650,
266 S.E.2d
463.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and
STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which BRENNAN, J., joined,
post, p.
451 U. S. 502.
MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part,
post,
p.
451 U. S.
502.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a custody dispute between the mother and
father of a minor child. Their dispute has reached this
Page 451 U. S. 494
Court because the state courts of Florida and Georgia have
reached conflicting results in assigning custody of the child.
On March 8, 1979, petitioner, the mother, filed an action in
Florida state court seeking custody of her son. On April 18, 1979,
the Florida court entered a judgment granting her custody. On March
23, 1979, respondent, the father, filed an action in Georgia state
court also seeking custody. On June 21, 1979, he was awarded
custody by the Georgia court. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed
that decision. 245 Ga. 650,
266 S.E.2d
463.
The mother then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this
Court, raising just one question:
"Does Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution, demand
that Georgia . . . give full faith and credit to a Florida decree
rendered immediately prior to Georgia's acceptance of unqualified
jurisdiction?"
Petitioner alleged that she had properly raised this federal
question in the Georgia courts. Respondent filed a brief in
opposition to the petition for certiorari in which he argued that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause must give way to the "best
interests" of the child in a child custody proceeding. [
Footnote 1] At no point in his brief in
opposition did respondent dispute petitioner's contention that the
federal issue had been properly raised below, nor did respondent
contend that there was some other jurisdictional bar that would
prevent this Court from reaching the question raised in the
petition.
Under our Rule 19.1, we no longer require, and in fact disfavor,
the filing of the lower court record prior to action by this Court
on a petition for certiorari. We are, therefore, largely dependent
upon the assertions made by the parties as to what that record will
demonstrate concerning the manner in which a federal question was
raised below. Because petitioner forthrightly asserted that the
federal question had
Page 451 U. S. 495
been raised and this assertion was not disputed by respondent,
we assumed that there would be no jurisdictional problem in
reaching the issue raised by the petition, and we granted
certiorari. [
Footnote 2] 44
U.S. 819. It has become clear however, that the federal question
was not raised below, and that we are without jurisdiction in this
case. We must therefore dismiss without reaching the merits.
Because this case comes to this Court from a state court, the
relevant jurisdictional statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1257. As applied to
the circumstances of this case, that statute requires that, in the
state courts, petitioner have "specially set up or claimed under
the Constitution . . . of . . . the United States" that right which
she now seeks to have this Court enforce. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (3).
Similarly, our Rule 21.1(h) requires the petitioner to
"specify the stage in the proceedings, both in the court of the
first instance and in the appellate court, at which the federal
questions sought to be reviewed were raised; the method or manner
of raising them and the way in which they were passed upon by the
court."
Our examination of the record convinces us that petitioner
failed properly to raise or preserve a claim under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution in the Georgia
courts.
We note first that nowhere in the opinion of the Georgia Supreme
Court is any federal question mentioned, let alone expressly passed
upon. Nor is any federal issue mentioned by the dissenting opinion
in that court. This Court has frequently stated that, when
"the highest state court has failed to pass upon a federal
question, it will be assumed that the omission was due to want of
proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party
in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary."
Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576,
Page 451 U. S. 496
394 U. S. 582
(1969);
see also Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S.
40, 417 U. S. 50, n.
11 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.
S. 284,
410 U. S. 290,
n. 3 (1973);
Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.
S. 203,
326 U. S.
206-207 (1945). Petitioner argues that the record of
this case rebuts this assumption because it demonstrates that she
did raise the federal question. Therefore, in her view, the State
Supreme Court must be understood as having implicitly rejected her
federal claim.
Although petitioner did use the phrase "full faith and credit"
at several points in the proceedings below, nowhere did she cite to
the Federal Constitution or to any cases relying on the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution. In her amended
motion to dismiss in the Georgia trial court, petitioner added the
following contention:
"Plaintiff herein continues to act contrary to the order of the
Superior Court of Berrine County, entered September 22, 1977, and
also is acting in violation of the April 18, 1979, order of the
circuit court of Alachua County, Florida . . . which order should
be accorded full faith and credit by this court, as it was made
pursuant to relevant Florida law, as stated above."
Also, in petitioner's enumeration of errors to the Georgia
Supreme Court, she stated that
"the [c]ourt erred in failing to find a Florida decree of April
18 1979, a valid order in a prior pending action, give such full
faith and credit, enforce it by ordering Plaintiff to comply with
it in all respects, and dismiss this action. [
Footnote 3]"
It is a long-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court to
reexamine the final judgment of a state court can arise only if the
record as a whole shows either expressly or by clear implication
that the federal claim was adequately presented
Page 451 U. S. 497
in the state system.
New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63,
278 U. S. 67
(1928);
Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U.
S. 648,
166 U. S. 655
(1897). Petitioner argues that, since the Georgia Constitution has
no full faith and credit clause, there can be no doubt that the
above references in the record were to the Federal Constitution,
and therefore that her federal claim was properly presented.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. We are unpersuaded. In fact, we
find it far more likely that petitioner was referring to state
law.
The Georgia Supreme Court understood this case to concern
primarily the requirements of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act: "This case calls for an interpretation of certain
provisions of Georgia's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,
Code Ann. § 74-501,
et seq." That Act has been adopted by
both Georgia and Florida. Section 74-514 of that Act, as codified
by Georgia, states:
"The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial
or modification decree of a court of another state which had
assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in
accordance with this Chapter, or which was made under factual
circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Chapter,
so long as this decree has not been modified in accordance with
jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this
Chapter."
Ga.Code § 74-514 (1979). Interpreting the meaning of this
section is obviously a matter of Georgia state law, but a litigant
could plausibly refer to it as a statutory full faith and credit
requirement. The record supports the view that it was so understood
in this case, by both the courts and the parties.
At the trial court hearing, petitioner discussed the Florida
decree, but did not invoke the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Federal Constitution. Rather, petitioner argued that, in failing to
make the Georgia court aware of the previous decree, respondent had
violated the terms of the Uniform
Page 451 U. S. 498
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act:
"[W]hile all this was going on in Florida, [respondent] turned
right around and filed an action here, never informed the [c]ourt
here that he had done it; never made any of the disclosures that
he's supposed to make under Georgia law [the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act], and never made any response to that
whatsoever."
Tr. 8. The appellate briefs of the parties to the Georgia
Supreme Court similarly argued the application of the Act to the
facts of this case. As noted above, the State Supreme Court
apparently did not believe that any federal issue was presented.
Finally, petitioner did not claim in her petition for rehearing
before the Georgia Supreme Court that the court's failure to reach
the federal claim, which petitioner now contends was raised before
that court, was error. She did, however, argue that the failure of
the Georgia courts to dismiss the action was error under the Act.
[
Footnote 4]
We cannot conclude on this record that petitioner raised the
federal claim that she now presents to this Court at any point in
the state court proceedings. Thus, we confront in this case the
same problem that arose in
Cardinale v. Louisiana,
394 U. S. 437,
394 U. S. 438
(1969):
"Although certiorari was granted to consider this question, . .
. the sole federal question
Page 451 U. S. 499
argued here has never been raised, preserved, or passed upon in
the state courts below."
Citing a long history of cases, we stated there that "[t]he
Court has consistently refused to decide federal constitutional
issues raised here for the first time on review of state court
decisions."
Ibid. We have had several occasions to repeat
this rule since then,
Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.
S. 351,
410 U. S. 352
(1973);
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.
S. 786,
408 U. S. 799
(1972);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.
S. 645,
405 U. S. 658,
n. 10 (1972);
Hill v. California, 401 U.
S. 797 (1971);
University of California Regents v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265,
438 U. S. 283
(1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.), and we see no reason to deviate
from it now.
It is appropriate to emphasize again,
see Cardinale v.
Louisiana, supra, at
394 U. S. 439,
that there are powerful policy considerations underlying the
statutory requirement and our own rule that the federal challenge
to a state statute or other official act be presented first to the
state courts. These considerations strongly indicate that we should
apply this general principle with sufficient rigor to make
reasonably certain that we entertain cases from state courts only
where the record clearly shows that the federal issue has been
properly raised below.
In the first place, although the States are sovereign entities,
they are bound, along with their officials, including their judges,
by the Constitution and the federal statutory law. Principles of
comity in our federal system require that the state courts be
afforded the opportunity to perform their duty, which includes
responding to attacks on state authority based on the federal law,
or, if the litigation is wholly private, construing and applying
the applicable federal requirements. As the Court has elsewhere
observed, this principal of comity requires
"a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the
Page 451 U. S. 500
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways."
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37,
401 U. S. 44
(1971).
The principal of comity that stands behind the "properly raised
federal question" doctrine is similar to the principle that stands
behind the "exhaustion of state remedies" doctrine applicable to
federal habeas corpus review of the constitutional claims of state
prisoners. We have described the latter doctrine as one based on
"federal-state comity,"
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.
S. 270,
404 U. S. 275
(1971), and have described its function as reflecting
""an accommodation of our federal system designed to give the
State the initial
opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged
violations of its prisoners' federal rights." We have consistently
adhered to this federal policy, for "it would be unseemly in our
dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a
state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts
to correct a constitutional violation.""
Ibid. (citations omitted).
There are also very practical reasons for insisting that federal
issues be presented first in the state court system. The
requirement affords the parties the opportunity to develop the
record necessary for adjudicating the issue. It permits the state
courts to exercise their authority, which federal courts, including
this one, do not have, at least to the same extent, to construe
state statutes so as to avoid or obviate federal constitutional
challenges such as vagueness and overbreadth. The rule also insures
that, if there are independent and adequate state grounds that
would pretermit the federal issue, they will be identified and
acted upon in an authoritative manner. Finally, if the parties to
state court litigation are required to present their federal claims
in the state tribunals
Page 451 U. S. 501
in the first instance, those issues will be adjudicated in the
state courts where necessary to dispose of the case. In most
instances, such a judgment will be supported by an opinion that may
well obviate any reason for our giving plenary consideration to the
case. In terms of our own workload, this is a very substantial
matter.
For all of these reasons, we, as well as litigants seeking to
bring cases here from the state courts, should take care to comply
with the jurisdictional statute and our rules. Although it would
avoid uncertainty and the expenditure of much time and effort if
litigants identified in the state courts precisely the provisions
of the Federal Constitution or the federal statute on which they
rely, we have not insisted on such inflexible specificity. The
inevitable result is that, at times, there have been differences of
opinion as to whether the state courts have been afforded a fair
opportunity to address the federal question that is sought to be
presented here. [
Footnote 5] At
the minimum, however, there should be no doubt from the record that
a claim under a
federal statute or the
Federal
Constitution was presented in the state courts, and that those
courts were apprised of the nature or substance of the federal
claim at the time and in the manner required by the state law.
Otherwise, we cannot be sufficiently sure, when the state court
whose judgment is being reviewed has not addressed the federal
question that is later presented here, that the issue was actually
presented and silently resolved by the state court against the
petitioner or the appellant in this Court.
Because petitioner failed to raise her federal claim in the
state proceedings and the Georgia Supreme Court failed to rule on a
federal issue, we conclude that we are without
Page 451 U. S. 502
jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the writ is dismissed
for want of jurisdiction.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Respondent also argued that the Georgia court properly assumed
jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. This
is purely a question of state law not properly subject to review in
this Court.
[
Footnote 2]
Because -- as will be discussed
infra -- the federal
issue was not addressed by the Georgia Supreme Court, it may have
been better practice on our part to call for the record before
acting on the petition for certiorari.
[
Footnote 3]
In petitioner's brief to the Georgia Supreme Court, she devoted
one sentence to this issue:
"In such circumstances, Appellant asserts, the decree entered in
Florida should have been recognized as a final order subject to
full faith and credit."
Brief for Respondent 3. This lower court brief is not a part of
the record, but even if it were, it would not suffice to establish
that petitioner's claim was based on the Federal Constitution.
[
Footnote 4]
Even if, as a matter of federal law, petitioner had properly
raised her federal question, we might still confront here an
independent state procedural ground barring our consideration of
the federal issue. Rule 45 of the Rules of the Georgia Supreme
Court states: "Any enumerated error which is not supported by
argument or citation of authority shall be deemed abandoned."
Ga.Code § 24-4545 (Supp. 1980). The Georgia court has held that
failure to include citations of authority to support enumerated
errors will bar review of those errors in the State Supreme Court.
Watts v. Mitchell, 227 Ga. 247,
179 S.E.2d
774 (1971). The Georgia Supreme Court failed to discuss or even
mention petitioner's full faith and credit claim. Petitioner has
not demonstrated that the failure of the Georgia Supreme Court to
reach the federal issue was not grounded on an application of this
rule. Since we conclude that the federal claim was not properly
presented, we need not reach any conclusion about application of
this state court rule.
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.
S. 261 (1981);
Vachon v. New Hampshire,
414 U. S. 478
(1974);
Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.
S. 454 (1960);
Bryant v. Zimmerman,
278 U. S. 63
(1928).
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring.
I agree that the writ should be dismissed because petitioner did
not raise her federal constitutional challenge in the Georgia
courts. I join the Court's opinion with the understanding, however,
that the broad statements in it are not to be taken as departing
from the rule, reaffirmed just this Term, that the Court has
jurisdiction to review plain error unchallenged in the state court
when necessary to prevent fundamental unfairness.
Wood v.
Georgia, 450 U. S. 261,
450 U. S. 265,
n. 5 (1981).
See also Vachon v. New Hampshire,
414 U. S. 478
(1974) (finding plain error in an appeal from a state court).
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting in part.
I share the Court's concerns for comity and for careful
pleadings. Nonetheless, I do not believe that either of these
concerns justifies the Court's apparent conclusion that a
petitioner who fails to cite the exact location of a federal
constitutional provision has neglected to raise a claim on that
ground.
The Court attempts to reason that the petitioner neglected to
raise any claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution. As the Court acknowledges, however, petitioner "did
use the phrase
full faith and credit' at several points in the
proceedings below." Ante at 451 U. S. 496.
Indeed, she asserted in her amended complaint that the decision of
the Florida court "should be accorded full faith and credit" by the
Georgia court, and reiterated this claim in her enumeration of
errors to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Court tries to translate
these words as references not to the identical language in the
Federal Constitution, but instead to a
Page 451 U. S. 503
provision of Georgia law which fails to mention any of the three
words, "full," "faith," or "credit."
See Ga.Code § 74-514
(1979), Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The Georgia
provision governs allocation of jurisdiction under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, which both Georgia and Florida have
enacted as their own law. I fail to see how the interests of
improved pleadings or comity are served by the Court's strained
refusal to ascribe to petitioner's words their plain meaning.
It remains true that the Georgia Supreme Court neglected to pass
on the import of the federal Full Faith and Credit Clause for this
case. I would remand for such state review on that issue, rather
than dismiss the writ and leave the decision below in place.