The Kenai National Moose Range was created in 1941 as a national
wildlife refuge by withdrawing acreage from public lands in Alaska.
Commercially significant quantities of oil underlie the Range, and
the Secretary of the Interior issued oil and gas leases for the
Range, beginning in the 1950's. The Secretary has distributed
revenues from these leases according to the formula provided in §
35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, whereby 90% of the revenues
are paid to Alaska and 10 to the United States Treasury. In 1964, §
401(a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act was amended so as
to add the word "minerals" to the list of refuge resources, the
revenues from which were to be distributed according to the formula
provided in § 401(c) of that Act, whereby 25% of the revenues are
paid to counties in which the wildlife refuge lies, and the
remaining funds are used by the Department of the Interior for
public purposes. The Department's Solicitor then made a
determination, in which the Comptroller General concurred, that the
amended § 401(a) superseded § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, with the result that the formula under § 401(c) was to be
applied to oil and gas lease revenues from wildlife refuges.
Petitioner Kenai Peninsula Borough, the "county" within which Moose
Range lies, thereafter brought suit in Federal District Court,
seeking a declaration that the amended § 401(a) governed the
distribution of oil and gas revenues from the Range. Alaska also
filed suit in the same court, seeking a declaration that § 35 still
governed such distribution, and the suits were consolidated. The
District Court granted summary judgment for Alaska, and the Court
of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Revenues generated by oil and gas leases on
federal wildlife refuges consisting of reserved public lands, as
here, must be distributed according to the formula provided in § 35
of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Absent any expression of
congressional intention to repeal
Page 451 U. S. 260
§ 35 by implication, the term "minerals" in § 401(a) of the
Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act applies only to minerals on
land acquired for wildlife refuges. Pp.
451 U. S.
265-273.
612 F.2d 1210, affirmed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
451 U. S. 273.
STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and
MARSHALL, J., joined,
post, p.
451 U. S.
276.
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The narrow issue presented by these cases is which of two
federal statutes provides the formula for distribution of revenues
received from oil and gas leases on national wildlife refuges
reserved from public lands.
I
The Kenai National Moose Range was created in 1941 by the
withdrawal of nearly two million acres from public lands on the
Kenai Peninsula in Alaska.
See Exec.Order No. 8979, 3 CFR
1043 (1938-1943 Comp.).
See also Public Land Order No.
3400, 29 Fed.Reg. 7094-7095 (1964) (adjusting the boundaries). The
Kenai Moose Range, as its name suggests, provides a refuge and
breeding ground for moose. The Fish and Wildlife Service in the
Department of the Interior administers it as part of the national
wildlife refuge system.
Page 451 U. S. 261
Commercially significant quantities of oil underlie the Kenai
Moose Range. [
Footnote 1]
Pursuant to authority under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30
U.S.C. § 181
et seq., the Secretary of the Interior issued
oil and gas leases for the Kenai Moose Range, beginning in the
mid-1950's.
See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S.
1 (1965). The United States has received substantial
revenues from these leases. [
Footnote 2] From first receipt in 1954, the Secretary has
distributed these revenues according to the formula provided in §
35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 450, as amended, 30
U.S.C. § 191. This formula prescribes that 90% of the revenues be
paid to the State of Alaska and 10% to the United States Treasury.
[
Footnote 3]
Page 451 U. S. 262
In 1975, the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service inquired
of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior whether revenues
from oil and gas leases in wildlife refuges created by withdrawal
of public lands should be distributed according to § 401(c) of the
Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, 49 Stat. 383, as amended, 16
U.S.C. § 715s(c), rather than under the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920. The Director's inquiry was prompted by the 1964 amendments to
§ 401(a), which added the word "minerals" to a list of refuge
resources, the revenues from which were to be distributed according
to the statutory formula. [
Footnote
4] Pub.L. 88-523, 78 Stat. 701. According to this formula, 25%
of the revenues are paid to counties wherein the refuge lies, and
remaining funds are used by the Department of the Interior for
public purposes. [
Footnote
5]
Page 451 U. S. 263
The Solicitor ruled that the 1964 amendment governed,
superseding § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. App. to Pet.
for Cert. in No. 79-1890, p. 26a. The Comptroller General concurred
in the view of the Solicitor. 55 Comp.Gen. 117 (1975). Upon request
for reconsideration by the State of Alaska in 1976, the Comptroller
General affirmed his initial decision.
See Op.Comp.Gen. in
File: B-118678, June 11, 1976, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert.
in No. 79--1890, p. 42a.
The Kenai Peninsula Borough then brought suit against the
Secretary of the Interior in the United States District Court for
the District of Alaska, seeking a declaration that the amended §
401(a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act governed the
distribution of oil and gas revenues from the Kenai Moose Range.
Kenai Borough is the "county" within which the Moose Range lies. If
§ 401(a) governs, it will receive 25% of the revenues, and the
State none. The State of Alaska then filed suit in the same court
against the Secretary and various federal officials, seeking a
declaration that § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act still governed
distribution of these same oil and gas revenues. If that provision
applies, the State will continue to receive 90% of the funds and,
so far as federal law is concerned, Kenai Borough none. The
District Court consolidated the lawsuits. [
Footnote 6]
The District Court granted summary judgment for the State of
Alaska.
436 F.
Supp. 288 (1977). Upon examination
Page 451 U. S. 264
of the apparently conflicting statutes, the court held that the
term "minerals" in the amended Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act
referred only to oil and gas found on land acquired for wildlife
refuges.
Id. at 292. Distribution of oil and gas revenues
from leases on public land reserved for wildlife refuges, it held,
continues to be determined by § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920. [
Footnote 7]
Ibid. The court viewed the legislative history of the 1964
amendments as demonstrating that Congress was concerned primarily
with the difficulties of acquiring land for refuges, and that
Congress expected no increase in revenues from the Kenai Moose
Range to result from the amendments.
Id. at 291-292.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 612 F.2d
1210 (1980). That court found the legislative history largely
ambiguous.
Id. at 1213. It refused to find that the
addition of the word "minerals" to the amended Wildlife Refuge
Revenue Sharing Act had repealed by implication the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920 without a clear showing that this was the intent of
Congress.
SeeMorton v. Mancari, 417 U.
S. 535,
417 U. S.
549-551 (1974). The court further approved the District
Court's holding because it gave effect to each statute. 612 F.2d at
1214-1215.
We granted certiorari.
Sub nom. Andrus v. Alaska, 449
U.S. 818 (1980), [
Footnote 8]
We now affirm.
Page 451 U. S. 265
II
The Secretary and the Kenai Borough rely primarily on the "plain
language" of § 401(a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act.
They contend that it provides without ambiguity that mineral
resources from all national wildlife refuges be distributed
according to the formula described in § 401(a) of the Act. As
currently phrased, § 401(a) provides:
"[A]ll revenues received by the Secretary of the Interior from
the sale or other disposition of animals, salmonoid carcassas
[
sic], timber, hay, grass, or other products of the soil,
minerals, shells, sand, or gravel, [or] from other privileges . . .
shall be . . . reserved in a separate fund for disposition as
hereafter prescribed."
16 U.S.C. § 715s(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The provision defines
the wildlife refuge system to include lands "acquired or reserved"
for conservation and protection of certain fish and wildlife. No
restriction is placed upon the common meaning of "minerals." Given
this clarity, it is argued, resort to the legislative history is
unnecessary or improper.
We agree with the Secretary that "[t]he starting point in every
case involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
Page 451 U. S. 266
723,
421 U. S. 756
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring).
See Rubin v. United
States, 449 U. S. 424
(1981). But ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a
single statute need not end the inquiry.
Train v. Colorado
Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S.
1,
426 U. S. 10
(1976);
United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.,
310 U. S. 534,
310 U. S.
543-544 (1940). This is because the plain meaning rule
is "rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not
preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists."
Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U. S.
41,
278 U. S. 48
(1928) (Holmes, J.). [
Footnote
9] The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation
may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common
meaning to have their literal effect.
E.g., Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457,
143 U. S. 459
(1892);
United States v. Ryan, 284 U.
S. 167,
284 U. S. 175
(1931).
Sole reliance on the "plain language" of § 401(a) would assume
the answer to the question at issue. These cases involve two
statutes, each of which, by its literal terms, applies to the facts
before us. Restatement of the terms of § 401(a) cannot answer which
statute Congress intended to control. Recognizing this, the
Secretary invokes the maxim of construction that the more recent of
two irreconcilably conflicting statutes governs. 2A C. Sands,
Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.02 (4th
ed.1973). Without depreciating this general rule, we decline to
read the statutes as being in irreconcilable conflict without
seeking to ascertain the actual intent of Congress. Our examination
of the
Page 451 U. S. 267
legislative history is guided by another maxim: "
repeals by
implication are not favored,'" Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
at 417 U. S. 549,
quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.
S. 497, 296 U. S. 503
(1936). "The intention of the legislature to repeal must be `clear
and manifest.'" United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.
S. 188, 308 U. S. 198
(1939), quoting Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.
S. 596, 106 U. S. 602
(1883). We must read the statutes to give effect to each if we can
do so while preserving their sense and purpose. Mancari,
supra, at 417 U. S. 551;
see Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.
S. 389, 308 U. S. 394
(1940).
III
Congress gave extensive consideration to the purpose and
probable effect of the 1964 amendments to the Wildlife Refuge
Revenue Sharing Act. Pub.L. 88-523, 78 Stat. 701. Nonetheless, and
we think it significant, there is no explanation in the legislative
history for the addition of the single word "minerals" to the list
of refuge resources subject to the Act.
See H.R.Rep. No.
1753, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (hereinafter 1964 H.R.Rep.);
S.Rep. No. 1096, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (hereinafter 1964
S.Rep.); 110 Cong.Rec.19882-19883 (1964) (remarks of Rep.
Ostertag). Our study of the few legislative materials pertinent to
the insertion of "minerals" persuades us that Congress intended to
work no change in the preexisting formula for distribution of
mineral revenues from federal wildlife refuges.
A
Prior to 1964, § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 governed
distribution of revenues from mineral leases on wildlife refuges
withdrawn from public lands. This conclusion cannot be seriously
questioned. First, from the time the first mineral revenues were
generated on such lands until well after 1964, the Secretary
invariably distributed the revenues as provided in the Mineral
Leasing Act. Second, the Comptroller General long ago ruled that
the only other arguably
Page 451 U. S. 268
applicable statute, the then unamended Wildlife Refuge Revenue
Sharing Act, Act of June 1, 1935, ch. 261, 49 Stat. 383
(hereinafter 1935 Refuge Act),
see n 4,
supra, did not govern the disposal of
revenues from mineral leases on wildlife refuges. 21 Comp.Gen. 873
(1942).
See also Comp.Gen., B-105133, Oct. 10, 1951, App.
82. [
Footnote 10]
Third, our opinion in
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S.
1 (1965), strongly suggests that the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 governed the distribution of revenues from reserved refuge
lands prior to 1964. That case involved the authority of the
Secretary to issue oil leases on the Kenai Moose Range after the
lands had been withdrawn from the public domain by
Page 451 U. S. 269
Executive Order. In holding that the Executive Order did not
deprive the Secretary of this power, this Court held that the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 conferred the necessary statutory
authorization on the Secretary to grant the leases. "The Act
excluded from its application certain designated lands, but did not
exclude land within wildlife refuge areas."
Id. at
380 U. S. 4
(footnote omitted). [
Footnote
11] Because § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act prescribes the
distribution formula for revenues received from all leases issued
"under the provisions of this chapter," we think it an inescapable
deduction from
Tallman that, prior to 1964, the Act
continued to provide the formula for disposition of revenues
generated by leases on public lands after the lands were withdrawn
for wildlife refuges.
Neither the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 nor the 1935 Refuge Act
authorized the Secretary to issue leases for mineral extraction
from refuges created from acquired lands. 40 Op.Atty.Gen. 9 (1941)
(Attorney General Jackson); 21 Comp.Gen. 873 (1942). Congress
responded by passing the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands,
Act of Aug. 7, 1947, ch. 513, 61 Stat. 913, 30 U.S.C. § 351
et
seq. See n 10,
supra. In addition to conferring authority on the
Secretary to issue leases for specified minerals, including oil and
gas, it provided that revenues from the leases be "distributed in
the same manner as prescribed for other receipts from the lands
affected by the lease." 30 U.S.C. § 355. As applied to wildlife
refuges created from acquired lands, this provision requires that
mineral revenues be distributed according to the formula in the
1935 Refuge Act.
Page 451 U. S. 270
Thus, when Congress amended the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing
Act in 1964, the disposition of oil and gas revenues was reasonably
clear. Such revenues from reserved refuge lands were distributed
according to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Revenues from
acquired refuge lands were distributed according to the formula in
the 1935 Refuge Act, not by its own terms, but by operation of the
1947 Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands.
B
The question presented by these cases is whether Congress
intended to alter this program of revenue distribution when it
amended the 1935 Refuge Act in 1964. The impetus for proposals
leading to the passage of the amendments was the difficulty the
Department had experienced in acquiring new refuge lands.
See 1964 S.Rep. 5; 1964 H.R.Rep. 2. Localities resisted
having land removed from local tax roles. The purpose of the
amendments was to "provide a more equitable formula for payments to
counties as compensation for loss of taxable properties that have
been acquired by the Federal wildlife refuge system." 1964 S.Rep.
2.
See 1964 H.R.Rep. 2-3. Public Law 88-523 met this
problem by changing the formula for distribution of revenues from
refuges consisting of acquired lands. § 401(c)(1), 78 Stat. 701.
The new formula provided that counties within which acquired refuge
lands lay could receive, at their option, a payment based on the
adjusted cost of the lands, rather than on revenues produced.
[
Footnote 12] Congress
intended the Department to pay more to counties under the new law
than it had under the old.
There is no explanation in the legislative history of Pub.L.
88-523 for the insertion of "minerals" in the list of resources
Page 451 U. S. 271
subject to the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act. Such silence
is suggestive, because Congress was concerned that the Department
have sufficient funds to make the increased payments mandated by
the amendments. [
Footnote
13]
See 1964 S.Rep. 12 (statement of Secretary Udall);
1964 H.R.Rep. 11. Congress might be expected to have mentioned a
change wrought through the amendments which would increase refuge
revenues by amounts exceeding total existing refuge revenues.
[
Footnote 14]
During deliberations on the amendments, the Fish and Wildlife
Service presented to Senate and House Committees tables showing
present payments to counties containing refuges, and payments
estimated under the proposed amendments. 1964 S.Rep. 13; 1964
H.R.Rep. 3. The relevant table shows no change in the expected
payments to the Borough of Kenai Peninsula. This table assumed that
oil and gas revenues were governed by the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920 both before and after the amendments. [
Footnote 15]
Page 451 U. S. 272
The inference seems inescapable that Congress in 1964 did not
intend by the insertion of "minerals" in § 401(a) of the Wildlife
Refuge Revenue Sharing Act to subject revenues from oil leases on
reserved refuge lands to its distribution formula. The more
reasonable explanation for the intended effect of including
"minerals" is provided by the Department of the Interior. The
insertion of "minerals" appears first in 1962 in proposed bills
supported by the Department as substitutes for other bills then
pending before the House and Senate to increase payments to
counties. S. 2138, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 13176, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). In its report to the Committees, the
Department offered no particular explanation for this new term, but
the Secretary here concedes that this change was included within
the proposal's descriptive category of "various perfecting . . .
provisions."
See Letter from Frank P. Briggs, Assistant
Secretary of the Interior, June 20, 1962, in S.Rep. No.1919, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1962); H.R.Rep. No. 2499, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess., 4 (1962).
The insertion of "minerals" in § 401(a) could both leave the
mineral revenues from reserved lands subject to the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920 and "perfect" § 401(a) by incorporating prior changes.
The 1947 Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands subjected mineral
revenues from lands acquired for wildlife refuges to the
distribution formula in the 1935 Refuge Act. We hold that Congress
inserted "minerals" in the amended § 401(a) to recognize the effect
of the 1947 Act and to make clear that the amended distribution
formula applied to mineral revenues from acquired lands. This
conclusion draws support from the evident fact that Congress was
concerned almost exclusively with problems related to acquired
refuge lands in adopting the 1964 amendments.
Finally, the Department of the Interior interpreted the
amendments when passed, and for 10 years thereafter, as not
altering the distribution formula. The Department's
contemporaneous
Page 451 U. S. 273
construction carries persuasive weight.
Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. at
380 U. S. 16.
Such attention to contemporaneous construction is particularly
appropriate in these cases, because the Department first proposed
the amendment.
See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.
S. 103,
436 U. S. 120
(1978). The Department's current interpretation, being in conflict
with its initial position, is entitled to considerably less
deference.
See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U. S. 125,
429 U. S. 143
(1976). In these cases, we find it wholly unpersuasive.
IV
In summary, we hold that revenues generated by oil and gas
leases on federal wildlife refuges consisting of reserved public
lands must be distributed according to the formula provided in § 35
of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Finding no "clearly expressed
congressional intention" to repeal this provision by implication,
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at
417 U. S. 551,
we conclude that the term "minerals" in § 401(a) of the Wildlife
Refuge Revenue Sharing Act applies only to minerals on acquired
refuge lands. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 79-1904,
Kenai Peninsula Borough v.
Alaska et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
Today, the Kenai Moose Range is the only national wildlife
refuge created from public lands where oil is being pumped.
See Brief for Federal Petitioners 4, n. 4. Substantial
quantities of oil, however, are thought to underlie other reserved
refuge lands in Alaska.
[
Footnote 2]
Between 1966 and 1976, Kenai Range generated more than $57
million in oil lease revenues. App. 64. In 1964, Kenai Range
generated more than $3.8 million in revenues from oil and gas
leases. In that same year, refuges on reserved public land in the
contiguous 48 States generated $3,143 in oil and gas revenues. App.
to Brief for Federal Petitioners 1a-2a. In interpreting Congress'
directions for distribution of oil revenues from reserved refuge
lands, it should be remembered that, historically, Kenai alone has
generated such revenues.
[
Footnote 3]
In pertinent part, the current § 35, as set forth in 30 U.S.C. §
191, provides:
"All money received from sales, bonuses, royalties, and rentals
of the public lands under the provisions of this chapter . . .
shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States; . . . of
those from Alaska . . . 90 per centum thereof shall be paid to the
State of Alaska for disposition by the legislature. . . ."
States other than Alaska receive only 50% of public land mineral
revenues under the Act.
Ibid.
By its terms, the Mineral Leasing Act applies to specified
minerals, including oil and gas, on all lands owned by the United
States, except those lands excluded by the Act. 30 U.S.C. § 181.
See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1,
380 U. S. 4, and
n. 3 (1965).
[
Footnote 4]
Prior to 1964, § 401 governed distribution of revenues from
"the sale or other disposition of surplus wildlife, or of
timber, hay, grass, or other spontaneous products of the soil,
shell, sand, or gravel, and from other privileges on refuges."
Act of June 15, 1935, ch. 261, 49 Stat. 378, 383. The current
version of § 401(a) is given in the text,
infra at
451 U. S.
265.
[
Footnote 5]
Section 401(c) currently provides:
"(1) The Secretary shall pay out the fund, for each fiscal year
. . . to each county in which is situated any fee area whichever of
the following amounts is greater:"
"(A) An amount equal to the product of 75 cents multiplied by
the total acreage of that portion of the fee area which is located
within such county."
"(B) An amount equal to three-fourths of 1 per centum of the
fair market value, as determined by the Secretary, of that portion
of the fee area . . . which is located within such county."
"(C) An amount equal to 25 per centum of the net receipts
collected by the Secretary in connection with operation of and
management of such fee area during the fiscal year. . . . "
"(2) At the end of each fiscal year the Secretary shall pay out
of the fund for such fiscal year to each county in which any
reserve area is situated, an amount equal to 25 per centum of the
net receipts collected by the Secretary in connection with the
operation and management of such area during such fiscal year. . .
."
16 U.S.C. § 715s(c) (1976 ed., Supp . III) . Section 401(b)
allows the Secretary to pay any expenses related to revenue
production or distribution from this fund. Section 401(e) provides
that funds remaining after expenses and the States are paid are
transferred to the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, established
for the laudable purpose of purchasing migratory bird refuges.
[
Footnote 6]
Since this litigation commenced in 1976, 9% of oil and gas
revenues from the Kenai Range has been paid into an escrow account
that now contains more than $23 million. Brief for Federal
Petitioners 4, n. 4. In addition to declaratory relief, Kenai
Borough sought an accounting of revenues paid to the State since
1964 under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 but allegedly due the
Borough, and recovery of such payments. The State sought a
resumption of accustomed payments under the Mineral Leasing
Act.
[
Footnote 7]
In general,
"acquired lands are those granted or sold to the United States
by a State or citizen, and public domain lands were usually never
in state or private ownership."
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S.
63,
384 U. S. 65, n.
2 (1966). The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 applies only to public
lands.
Id. at
384 U. S.
65.
[
Footnote 8]
In 1978, Congress rejected new amendments to § 401(a) that would
have defined minerals as "including, but not limited to, crude
petroleum and natural gas." H.R. 8394, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
The House Report recommending this bill stated that the language
was added to "insure" that, after the effective date, oil and gas
revenues from Kenai would be distributed according to the formula
in § 401(c). H.R.Rep. No. 95-1197, p. 8 (1978). The Report
disclaims any intention to affect the outcome of these cases, then
pending in the Court of Appeals.
Ibid. The Senate then
rejected even this amendment, Members stating that it would be
inappropriate to make any judgment about the proper allocation of
these resources while these cases were still in the courts. 124
Cong.Rec. 31436-31440 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Culver and Sen.
Gravel).
The sole issue that has been before the courts during this five
years of litigation is the intent of Congress in adding the single
term "minerals" to the statute in 1964. Congress declined to
clarify its intent in 1978. Accordingly, we are left to resolve by
judicial construction what should be addressed as a question of
legislative policy judgment: the appropriate distribution among
federal, state, and local governments of natural resource
revenues.
[
Footnote 9]
"Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal
sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of
interpreting the meaning of any writing, be it a statute, a
contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of
a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of
the dictionary, but to remember that statutes always have some
purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (CA2) (L. Hand,
J.),
aff'd, 326 U. S. 326 U.S.
404 (1945)
[
Footnote 10]
The Secretary speculates that Congress in 1964 probably assumed
that oil and gas revenues from refuges on reserved lands were
governed by the 1935 Refuge Act. The basis for this argument is
language in the 1935 Refuge Act, continued today, that the Act
governed the disposition of "shell, sand, or gravel, and from other
privileges on refuges."
See n 4,
supra. It sometimes was contended that
"other privileges" included oil and gas leases.
See
Memorandum of July 6, 1951, Chief Counsel of the Fish and Wildlife
Service, App. 87.
As noted, the Comptroller General rejected this contention in
1942 and 1951. For the reasons elaborated in the text, we believe
that it was understood by Congress that the 1935 Refuge Act did not
govern the leasing of minerals; indeed, even the 1946 opinion of
the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior that the provision
authorized oil leases on acquired refuge lands, App. 68, is
contradicted by Congress' passage of the Mineral Leasing Act for
Acquired Lands, Act of Aug. 7, 1947, ch. 513, 61 Stat. 913, 30
U.S.C. § 351
et seq., which subsequently conferred this
very authority on the Department.
See also 40 Op.Atty.Gen.
9 (1941).
The dissent also speculates -- inconsistently, we think -- that
Congress embraced this often discredited interpretation of the 1935
Refuge Act,
post at
451 U. S.
279-280, n. 3. The dissent criticizes the Court for
concluding that Congress' insertion of "minerals" in § 401(a) did
not change preexisting law.
Post at
451 U. S.
278-279. The dissent then explains that Congress added
"minerals" in 1964 not to change the law, but to reaffirm that the
1935 Refuge Act already governed disposition of oil revenues from
reserved refuge lands.
Post at
451 U. S.
279-280, n. 3. In other words, the dissent contradicts
itself and joins us in positing that the addition of "minerals" was
never intended to work a substantive change, but disagrees merely
about what the law provided prior to the 1964 amendments.
[
Footnote 11]
The Secretary argues that
Tallman's construction of the
Mineral Leasing Act should not now be binding, because the Court
did not need to construe the Act. This is incorrect. The Court was
required to determine that the Secretary had statutory authority to
issue oil leases on refuges withdrawn from public lands, before it
could reach the question whether the Executive Orders withdrawing
the refuge lands limited that authority. The Court examined the
language of § 1 of the Act and found that it gave the Secretary the
requisite authority.
See 380 U.S. at
380 U. S. 4, n.
3.
[
Footnote 12]
The 1964 payment formula was liberalized further in 1978. Pub.L.
9469, § 1(a)(3), 92 Stat. 1319.
See n 5,
supra, (quoting present law) .
[
Footnote 13]
The silence of Congress may provide a treacherous guide to its
intent.
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S.
4,
316 U. S. 11
(1942). Here, however, it is almost inconceivable that Congress
knowingly would have changed substantially a longstanding formula
for distribution of substantial funds without a word of comment. In
1978, Congress inserted "salmonoid carcass[e]s" into the list of
resources governed by § 401(a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue
Sharing Act. Pub.L. 95-469, § 1(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1319. Even for this
comparatively trivial addition, Congress explicitly stated,
"[s]almonoid carcasses have been included to allow for the sale of
salmon used in hatchery operations." H.R.Rep. No. 95-1197, p. 8
(1978) .
[
Footnote 14]
In 1963, net receipts from the national wildlife system totaled
$2,350,000. 1964 H.R.Rep. 11. In 1964, revenues from oil and gas
leases in the Kenai Moose Range exceeded $3,800,000. App. to Brief
for Federal Petitioners 2a.
[
Footnote 15]
The table indicated that 1963 payments to the Kenai Peninsula
Borough under the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, amended or
unamended, totaled $1,768. 1964 H.R.Rep. 3. This figure cannot
include 25% of the revenues from oil and gas leases.
See
n 14,
supra.
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
My colleagues periodically criticize the way the Court manages
its docket. Most frequently, such criticism takes the form of a
dissent from the denial of certiorari.
See, e.g., Brown
Transport Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.
S. 1014 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Although I consider the
practice of dissenting from denials of certiorari
counterproductive,
see Singleton v. Commissioner,
439 U. S. 940,
942-946 (opinion of STEVENS, J.), in the context of the present
cases it may be appropriate to suggest that the Court may misuse
its scarce resources not only by occasionally denying certiorari in
cases deserving plenary consideration, but also by granting
certiorari
Page 451 U. S. 274
without adequate justification. [
Footnote 2/1] As long as the Court creates unnecessary
work for itself in this manner, its expressions of concern about
the overburdened federal judiciary will ring with a hollow
echo.
In these cases, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
should have been permitted to provide the final answer to the
unique question of statutory construction presented by the
petitions for certiorari. The decision of the Court of Appeals did
not conflict with any other judicial decision, and there is no
reason to anticipate that a comparable issue will arise in another
Circuit in the foreseeable future. [
Footnote 2/2] I fully agree with the majority's
explanation of why the Court of Appeals correctly read these
ambiguous statutes, but even if I were persuaded that JUSTICE
STEWART had the better of the argument, I still would feel that the
public interest would have been better served by allowing this
litigation to terminate in the Court of Appeals.
The question of how to divide the revenues from oil and gas
leases on public lands in the Kenai Peninsula is clearly a matter
for Congress to decide. If Congress is displeased with the
decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, it may promptly
reverse them by revising the relevant statutes. If that is its
view, it no doubt would have acted more promptly if we had simply
denied certiorari. [
Footnote 2/3]
On the other
Page 451 U. S. 275
hand, if we have correctly perceived the intent of the
legislature, nothing has been gained by protracting this
litigation. Admittedly, a significant amount of money was at stake,
see ante at
451 U. S. 263,
n. 6, but the offsetting costs associated with holding the funds in
escrow pending our review, as well as the costs associated with the
expenditure of this Court's material and human resources, are also
significant.
The federal judicial system is undergoing profound changes.
Among the most significant is the increase in the importance of our
courts of appeals. Today they are, in truth, the courts of last
resort for almost all federal litigation. Like other courts of last
resort -- including this one -- they occasionally render decisions
that will not withstand the test of time. No judicial system is
perfect, and no appellate structure can entirely eliminate judicial
error. Most certainly, this Court does not sit primarily to correct
what we perceive to be mistakes committed by other tribunals.
Although our work is often accorded special respect because of its
finality, [
Footnote 2/4] we possess
no judicial monopoly on either finality or respect. The quality of
the work done by the courts of appeals merits the esteem of the
entire Nation, but, unfortunately, is not nearly as well or as
widely recognized as it should be. Indeed, I believe that, if we
accorded those dedicated appellate judges the deference that their
work merits, we would be better able to resist the temptation to
grant certiorari for no reason other than a tentative prediction
that our review of a case may produce an answer different from
theirs. In my opinion, that is not a sufficient reason for granting
certiorari. [
Footnote 2/5]
Page 451 U. S. 276
Because no other reason for reviewing this case is apparent, a
simple denial of certiorari would have been an appropriate and
efficient disposition.
My disagreement in these cases with the Court's management of
its docket does not, of course, prevent me from joining JUSTICE
POWELL's opinion for the Court on the merits.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Of course, these two problems are not wholly independent of one
another. In light of the ever-increasing number of petitions for
certiorari and the severe practical constraints on our ability
freely to grant certiorari, it is certainly safe to assume that,
whenever we grant certiorari in a case not deserving plenary
review, we increase the likelihood that certiorari will be denied
in other, more deserving, cases.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Neither of the petitions for certiorari filed in these cases
suggested that the Court of Appeals' decision conflicted with any
other judicial decision. In addition, the Solicitor General, in the
petition filed on behalf of the federal parties, observed that the
question of statutory construction presented here was unlikely to
arise in the foreseeable future in another Circuit.
See
Pet. for Cert. in No. 79-1890, p. 18.
[
Footnote 2/3]
In fact, Congress declined to clarify its intention with respect
to the distribution of the Kenai oil and gas leasing revenues in
part because of the concerns of some of its Members that such
legislative action would be inappropriate while these cases were
still pending in the federal courts.
See ante at
451 U. S.
264-265, n. 8;
post at
451 U. S. 285,
n. 10.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Indeed, as Justice Jackson once noted, "[w]e are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we
are final."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.
S. 443,
344 U. S. 540
(concurring in result).
[
Footnote 2/5]
The possibility that a lower court may have incorrectly decided
a federal question is, of course, a relevant factor when this Court
decides whether to exercise its discretionary certiorari
jurisdiction. However, as Rule 17.1 of the Rules of this Court
makes plain, our certiorari jurisdiction is designed to serve
purposes broader than the correction of error in particular
cases:
"A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons that will be considered."
"(a) When a federal court of appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with the decision of another federal court of appeals on
the same matter; or has decided a federal question in a way in
conflict with a state court of last resort; or has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so
far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an
exercise of this Court's power of supervision."
"(b) When a state court of last resort has decided a federal
question in a way in conflict with the decision of another state
court of last resort or of a federal court of appeals."
"(c) When a state court or a federal court of appeals has
decided an important question of federal law which has not been,
but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided a federal
question in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of this
Court."
By its own terms, Rule 17.1 "neither control[s] nor fully
measur[es]" the extent of our discretion to grant or to deny
certiorari. Nonetheless, it is surely significant that none of the
factors identified in the Rule can fairly be said to be present in
these cases.
JUSTICE STEWART, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
MARSHALL join, dissenting.
Today the Court strains to conclude that Congress did not mean
what it said, and judicially repeals a reasonable [
Footnote 3/1]
Page 451 U. S. 277
and specific legislative provision because the provision
announced a change in the law the Court divines to have been
unintended.
A
The Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, as amended in 1964,
expressly provides that "all revenues received by the Secretary of
the Interior from the sale or other disposition of . . . minerals .
. ." within federal wildlife refuges administered by the Fish and
Wildlife Service shall be "reserved in a separate fund for
disposition as hereafter prescribed." 16 U.S.C. § 715s(a) (1976
ed., Supp. III). At the end of each fiscal year, a portion of these
revenues is to be distributed to the counties in which the refuges
are located. In the case of "any reserve area," expressly defined
as "land withdrawn from the public domain" for wildlife refuge
purposes, § 715s(g)(3), the allocation to the county is 25% of net
receipts. § 715s(c)(2). Alternative formulas are specified for
refuges created out of "fee areas." § 715s(c)(1). Net receipts
remaining after the payments to counties "shall be transferred to
the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund for use in the acquisition of
suitable areas for migratory bird refuges." § 715s(e). The statute
draws no distinction between mineral revenues and receipts from
other natural resources or between revenues from "acquired" lands
and those from "reserved" lands. The statutory scheme is therefore
clear: receipts from mineral leases, like all other revenues
generated from wildlife refuges, whether the refuge is comprised of
reserved or acquired lands, are to be apportioned between the
Page 451 U. S. 278
counties and the federal Migratory Bird Conservation Fund. No
receipts are to go to the State itself.
The Court argues that the addition of the word "minerals" to the
Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act must be read to apply only to
acquired refuge lands, and not to reserved refuge lands. But there
is no support, in law or legislative history, for exempting mineral
revenues from refuges consisting of reserved public lands from the
distribution formula of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act.
The District Court concluded that "there is nothing in 16 U.S.C. §
715s which would support a restrictive construction of the word
minerals,'" and that "a literal approach of statutory
construction would dictate an expansive definition including both
reserved and acquired lands." 436 F.
Supp. 288, 291. Similarly, the Court of Appeals found that,
"under the plain meaning of minerals and of the other provisions of
§ 715s, its language fairly brings the Kenai Moose Range oil and
gas revenues within it scope." 612 F.2d 1210, 1213. It was a
mistake for either court to proceed further.
The addition of the word "minerals" to the Wildlife Refuge
Revenue Sharing Act in 1964 would be meaningless if it reached only
leases of acquired lands. And, "[i]n construing a statute, we are
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used."
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.
S. 330,
442 U. S. 339.
Section 6 of the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C.
§ 355, already provided that mineral leases of acquired lands
"shall be distributed in the same manner as prescribed for other
receipts from the lands affected by the lease." Accordingly, any
allocation scheme established for wildlife refuges encompassing
acquired lands would automatically apply to mineral revenues, as
well as those from the resources specified in the Refuge Act. As
there was no ambiguity on that point, there was no useful purpose
for Congress to declare once again how mineral revenues from
acquired lands within wildlife refuges would be allocated.
[
Footnote 3/2]
Page 451 U. S. 279
The suggestion, therefore, that the 1964 amendment reached only
acquired lands presumes that the design of Congress in adding the
word minerals was to accomplish precisely nothing.
B
The Court concludes that the statute does not mean what it says
because the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act of 1964 is in
conflict with the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, [
Footnote 3/3]
Page 451 U. S. 280
and because "repeals by implication are not favored."
Ante at
451 U. S. 267.
But that canon of construction has no force in this context. The
challenged section in the 1964 Act, far from "repealing" the 1920
Act, merely established a limited and specific exception to one of
the provisions in the earlier law. When the text of a new statute,
dealing with a discrete subject, is unambiguous, it should be given
effect even if it alters a previous law that dealt with the same
general subject.
The maxim that "repeals by implication are disfavored" has force
when the argument is made that a general statute, wholly occupying
a field, eviscerates an earlier and more specific enactment of
limited coverage, but without an indication of congressional intent
to do so. In such a case, it may be reasonable to presume that
Congress had not anticipated
Page 451 U. S. 281
that its broad pronouncement would have serious implications in
a peripheral, or even quite different, area, and that had it
recognized that a specific earlier law would be rendered
meaningless by a new enactment, it would have expressly indicated
its intent to repeal or amend.
Thus, in
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.
S. 535, the Court refused to find a repeal where the
words of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, if taken
literally, would have worked a repeal of an Indian preference
policy consistently recognized by Congress for almost 40 years. The
Court's description of
Mancari as "a prototypical case
where an adjudication of repeal by implication is not appropriate,"
id. at
417 U. S. 550,
is instructive:
"The preference is a longstanding, important component of the
Government's Indian program. The antidiscrimination provision,
aimed at alleviating minority discrimination in employment,
obviously is designed to deal with an entirely different and,
indeed, opposite problem."
Ibid.; see also Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U.
S. 550. The contrast with these cases is obvious. The
provision in the more recent enactment deals specifically with the
same subject -- distribution of revenue from leases on federal
lands -- that had been the object of an earlier, and more general,
[
Footnote 3/4] statute. [
Footnote 3/5] In any case, there is more
than enough evidence
Page 451 U. S. 282
to indicate that Congress was aware of what it was doing when
the word "minerals" was added to the Wildlife Refuge Revenue
Sharing Act.
The legislative history of the 1964 amendments to 16 U.S.C. §
715s (1976 ed., Supp. III) discloses that Congress had before it
numerous bills from which to choose to compensate counties in which
wildlife refuges were located, some of which omitted any reference
to "minerals," S. 2138, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 2678,
2770, 2927, 3201, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. 12144, 12143,
11535, 11525, 10714 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. 1720, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); and some that included such reference,
H.R. 2393, 1004, 1127, 9030, 5996, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963);
H.R. 11008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); S. 179, 1363, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963); S. 2498, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). Presumably
when Congress adopted a bill containing the term, it was aware of
the difference. Moreover, the 1964 amendment was not a "technical"
amendment, nor was it a last-minute addition from the floor.
See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.
S. 114,
442 U. S. 120.
The suggestion that the word "minerals" be added to 16 U.S.C. §
715s (1976 ed., Supp. III) was raised in June, 1962, when the
Interior Department submitted a substitute bill for those pending
in the House and Senate. Report of the Department of the Interior
dated June 20, 1962, in S.Rep. No.1919, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 13,
15 (1962); Report of the Department of the Interior of June 22,
1962, in Authorize Increased Payments to Counties for Wildlife
Refuges: Hearings on H.R. 10714, H.R. 11525, H.R. 11535, H.R.
12143, and H.R. 12144 before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 7, 9 (1962).
Page 451 U. S. 283
The amendment was not highlighted, but it is unlikely that it
escaped notice. [
Footnote 3/6]
Later the same year, the relevant Committees of both the House and
the Senate adopted the language. S.Rep. No.1919,
supra, at
19; H.R.Rep. No. 2499, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1962), and the text
was before Congress for the following two years.
It is therefore very difficult to conclude that the addition was
inadvertent or unnoticed. [
Footnote
3/7] But, in any case, nothing in the legislative history
demonstrates congressional intent different from that reflected in
the words of the statute.
"'The most that can be said for the legislative history is that
it is, on the whole, inconclusive. Certainly it contains nothing
that requires the court to reject the construction which the
statutory
Page 451 U. S. 284
language clearly requires.'"
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.
S. 422,
350 U. S.
433.
The Court today is bothered because the literal meaning of a
statute altered prevailing law. [
Footnote 3/8] But usually the very point of new
legislation is to alter prevailing law.
"Every act is made either for the purpose of making a change in
the law or for the purpose of better declaring the law, and its
operation is not to be impeded by the mere fact that it is
inconsistent with some previous enactment."
T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory
and Constitutional Law 104 (2d ed. 1874). Congress does not have
the affirmative obligation to explain to this Court why it deems a
particular enactment wise or necessary, or to demonstrate that it
is aware of the consequences of its action. [
Footnote 3/9]
See Harrison v. PPG Industries,
Inc., 446 U. S. 578,
446 U. S. 592.
And "[i]t
Page 451 U. S. 285
is not a function of this Court to presume that
Congress was
unaware of what it accomplished.'" Albernaz v. United
States, 450 U. S. 333,
450 U. S. 342
(quoting United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,
449 U. S. 166,
449 U. S.
179).
Rather than join the Court in its speculative efforts to deal
with the doctrine of implied repeal, I would rest decision of these
cases upon an established rule of statutory construction:
leges
posteriores, priores contrarias abrogant. Sedgwick describes
this rule with approval as follows:
"'If two inconsistent acts be passed at different times, the
last,' said the Master of the Rolls, 'is to be obeyed, and if
obedience cannot be observed without derogating from the first, it
is the first which must give way.'"
Sedgwick,
supra, at 104.
See District of Columbia
v. Hutton, 143 U. S. 18,
143 U. S. 26-27;
Henderson's
Tobacco, 11 Wall. 652,
78 U. S. 657;
United States v.
Tynen, 11 Wall. 88,
78 U. S. 92.
Observance of this rule also allows the Court to respect the most
basic of all canons of statutory construction: that statutes mean
what they plainly say. [
Footnote
3/10] As Chief Justice Marshall said more than a century and a
half ago:
"[T]he intention of the legislature is to be collected from the
words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there
is no room for construction. The case must
Page 451 U. S. 286
be a strong one indeed which would justify a court in departing
from the plain meaning of words . . . in search of an intention
which the words themselves did not suggest."
United States v.
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76,
18 U. S.
95-96.
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 3/1]
There is nothing unreasonable, or even unusual, about a system
of revenue sharing that returns a portion to the locality most
immediately affected, rather than to the State at large. The
payment of 25% of the revenues to the county in which the refuge is
situated compensates the county for tax revenue lost because of the
public status of the lands and for any local services made
necessary because of the refuge, and the payment of 75% to the
special fund provided for in 16 U.S.C. § 715s (1976 ed., Supp. III)
satisfies the need to provide a source of revenue for refuge
management and maintenance.
[
Footnote 3/2]
But see 451
U.S. 259fn3/3|>n. 3,
infra.
[
Footnote 3/3]
While it is clear there is a conflict, it is not at all clear
that the conflict is even relevant to these cases. The Court
assumes that the 1964 amendment, if given its plain meaning,
changed the allocation of oil and gas lease revenues to affected
counties. Although, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, "the
legislative history of the 1964 amendments to 16 U.S.C. § 715s
sheds no direct light on the issue here," 612 F.2d 1210, 1213, it
is arguable that, before 1964, oil and gas lease receipts generated
from lands in federal wildlife refuges were subject to § 401 of the
Wildlife Refuge Act of 1935, ch. 261, 49 Stat. 383, and not to the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, despite the vigorous contentions of
today's Court.
See ante at
451 U. S.
267-268.
Section 401 of the 1935 Act established a distribution scheme
for refuge revenues "from the sale or other disposition" of natural
resources and receipts "from other privileges." Although oil and
gas leases are not mentioned, the provision was intended to give
the administering agency broad authority to make
"disposition of surplus . . . products on these reservations or
refuges upon such terms and conditions as [it] shall determine to
be for the best interests of the Government."
H.R.Rep. No. 886, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1934). In 1946, the
Interior Department ruled that oil and gas leases could be granted
on wildlife refuge lands under the 1935 Act. Op.Solic.Interior
Dept. M. 34516 (Aug. 5, 1946). Under the 1964 amendments to the
Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, 25% of oil and gas lease
revenues are apportioned to the affected counties embracing
reserved refuge lands. Accordingly, Congress may have intended that
the addition of the word "minerals" in 16 U.S.C. § 715s (1976 ed.,
Supp. III) was merely a "perfecting provision," S.Rep. No.1919,
87th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1962); H.R.Rep. No. 2499, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess., 4 (1962), and not an amendment of existing law at all.
Indeed, Interior Department spokesmen in the 1962, 1963, and
1964 congressional hearings described the existing law for receipts
collected from both reserved public lands and acquired lands as
generally subject to § 401 of the 1935 Act.
See S.Rep.
No.1919,
supra, at 2, 13; H.R.Rep. No. 2499,
supra, at 4; H.R.Rep. No. 1753, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 14
(1964); S.Rep. No. 1096, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1964). The
Secretary of the Interior stated that,
"
[u]nder existing law, enacted in 1935, the counties in
which our refuges are located receive 25 percent of the net revenue
from operations on national wildlife refuges, such as
oil
production, grazing, timber harvest, and the like."
More Equitable Payments To Counties Having Wildlife Refuges:
Hearings on S. 179, S. 1363, S. 1720, and S. 2498 before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1964) (emphasis
added); Participation By Counties In Refuge Receipts: Hearings on
H.R. 1127, H.R. 2393, H.R. 5596, H.R. 9030 and H.R. 11008 before
the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., 34 (1964) (emphasis added).
But it is not important to decide today what the true rule for
apportionment of mineral resources from refuge lands was before
1964. And, contrary to the Court's assertion, I do not do so here,
and "explai[n] that Congress added
minerals' . . . to reaffirm"
that the 1935 Act already controlled the disposition of oil
revenues from reserved refuge lands. Ante at 451 U. S. 268,
n. 10. In 1964, Congress did not have to resolve the question of
what the law had been before; its concern was properly with the
future. Ideally, it could have prefaced § 715s with the language
"notwithstanding any other provision of law." But it did not.
Instead, it introduced an entirely unambiguous prospective rule
with the phrase: "Beginning with the next full fiscal year and for
each fiscal year thereafter. . . ." At least for me, it needed to
do no more.
[
Footnote 3/4]
While the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 covers in general terms
the distribution of revenue from federal lands, the later Wildlife
Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, as amended in 1964, embraced new
provisions that apply with particularity to wildlife refuges,
without distinction between those reserved or acquired. To that
extent, the later Act must constitute a repeal of the former.
"[T]he narrowly drawn, specific . . . provision . . . must prevail
over the broader . . . provision. . . ."
Radzanower v. Touche
Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148,
426 U. S.
158.
[
Footnote 3/5]
These cases do not involve an apparent limitation on an
important and pervasive statute, such as the Sherman Act.
See,
e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.
S. 188. In such a case, as in
Mancari, implied
repeals are not found, because it would be unreasonable to assume
Congress would alter fundamental policy without an unambiguous
expression of its intent to do so. But it is equally unreasonable
to expect Congress to specify, or indeed even to consider, the
effect of a new statutory provision on all earlier provisions
affecting the same subject that may be swept away by the enactment,
particularly if the old provisions are unclear.
See
451
U.S. 259fn3/3|>n. 3,
supra.
[
Footnote 3/6]
The Court makes much of the fact that a statistical table
comparing revenues actually received by counties with those
estimated to result from the amendment showed no change in the
amounts from the Kenai Range, and if the amendment meant what a
plain reading of it indicates, an increase should have been
reflected.
Ante at
451 U. S. 271.
That straw of evidence scarcely compels the conclusion that the
amendment does not mean what it says. It would hardly be surprising
if the legislators overlooked a single disparity in a single entry
in a lengthy exhibit. And it is noteworthy that the table the Court
refers to appeared in the 1964 Reports only, while the addition of
the word "minerals" to § 715s was proposed in 1962, when the
comparable statistical table did not include any indication of the
anticipated payments to counties from public land areas under the
proposed amendment.
See S.Rep. No.1919, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess., 11, nn. 1 and 2 (1962).
[
Footnote 3/7]
That Congress explained the addition of "[s]almonoid carcasses,"
see ante at
451 U. S. 271,
n. 13, hardly supports the inference that Congress would also have
explained the addition of the word "minerals." By the Court's
strained logic, premised on the notion that " [t]he silence of
Congress may provide a treacherous guide to its intent,"
ibid., Congress is put on notice that any time it explains
one provision of a statute, no matter how trivial, it does so at
its peril. For if it fails similarly to explain all provisions, no
matter how important, a court would be free to strike those
unexplained provisions as unintended. That, in my view, leads to
far more "treacherous" results than those feared by today's
Court.
[
Footnote 3/8]
This is not a case where the plain meaning of statutory language
would lead to an absurd or futile result,
see, e.g., Armstrong
Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.
S. 315, or to an unreasonable result at variance with
the policy of the legislation as a whole.
See, e.g., United
States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.
S. 534.
See also Shapiro v. United States,
335 U. S. 1,
335 U. S. 31.
[
Footnote 3/9]
The Court relies on the fact that the Department of the Interior
ignored the 1964 amendment for a decade with respect to oil and gas
revenues from the Kenai Range.
Ante at
451 U. S.
272-273. But administrative errors are not
self-validating.
See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.
S. 103,
436 U. S.
117-119;
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,
434 U. S. 275,
434 U. S.
287-288, n. 5;
Dion v. United States,
381 U. S. 68,
381 U. S. 78.
Unauthorized payments from the federal Treasury are not immune from
correction, and the United States can retrieve money mistakenly
dispersed by its officials.
United States v. Wurts,
303 U. S. 414,
303 U. S.
415-416;
Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. United
States, 164 U. S. 190,
164 U. S. 212.
In any case, there is no indication that the administrative
practice until 1975 was the result of considered evaluation of the
1964 amendments. Instead, it appears that it was the inertial
continuation of earlier practice. A much more reliable indication
of the administrative construction of the 1964 amendment is the
"detailed and comprehensive" reevaluation by the Department in
1975, confirmed by the Comptroller General.
Andrus v. Sierra
Club, 442 U. S. 347,
442 U. S. 358.
See also NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.
S. 335,
434 U. S.
351.
[
Footnote 3/10]
Of course, if I am wrong, and Congress did not intend that oil
revenues from reserved refuge lands be distributed according to the
scheme of the 1964 Act, Congress is always free to revise the
statute. It would be far more appropriate, given the constitutional
allocation of lawmaking power to Congress, and not to the courts,
if this Court were to respect the plain meaning of the statute, and
leave it to Congress to make any changes it thinks necessary. The
Court's readiness to rewrite legislation contributes, I am afraid,
to undue congressional willingness to leave it to the courts to do
its redrafting. Indeed, the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works, when confronted with the dispute involved in these
cases, chose to
"tak[e] no position as to whether disposition of mineral
revenues should be made pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act or the
Refuge Revenue Sharing Act."
S.Rep. No. 95-1174, pp. 4, 8 (1978).
See also ante at
451 U. S.
264-265, n. 8.