Petitioner, who is of Mexican descent, was tried in Federal
District Court for his participation in a plan by which Mexican
aliens were smuggled into the country. Another participant in the
plan, one Bowling, was apparently a Caucasian with whose daughter
petitioner had been living. Prior to his trial, petitioner
requested that the judge, in his
voir dire examination of
prospective jurors, ask a question as to possible prejudice toward
Mexicans. The judge refused to ask such question, but did ask
questions concerning possible prejudice against aliens. Petitioner
was subsequently convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
rejecting petitioner's challenge of the trial judge's refusal to
question the jurors about possible racial or ethnic bias.
Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp.
451 U. S.
188-194;
451 U. S.
194-195.
617 F.2d 1349, affirmed.
JUSTICE WHITE, joined by JUSTICE STEWART, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and
JUSTICE POWELL, concluded that there was no reversible error in the
voir dire afforded petitioner. Pp.
451 U. S.
188-194.
(a) Because the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in
the first instance with the trial judge, and because he must rely
largely on his immediate perceptions, federal judges have been
accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the
voir dire. "Special circumstances" under which the
Constitution requires questioning prospective jurors about racial
or ethnic bias exist only when racial issues are inextricably bound
up with the conduct of the trial and there are substantial
indications of the likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice
affecting the jurors in the particular case.
See Ristaino v.
Ross, 424 U. S. 589;
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524.
Under this Court's supervisory power over the federal courts,
failure to honor a defendant's request to inquire into racial or
ethnic prejudice, where such an inquiry is not constitutionally
mandated, is reversible error only where the circumstances of the
case indicate a "reasonable possibility" that such prejudice might
influence the jury. Federal trial courts must make such an inquiry
when requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime and where
the defendant and the victim are members of different
Page 451 U. S. 183
racial or ethnic groups.
See Ristaino, supra; Aldridge v.
United States, 283 U. S. 308. Pp.
451 U. S.
188-192.
(b) In this case, there were no "special circumstances" of
constitutional dimension requiring an inquiry as to racial or
ethnic bias, since the issues in the trial did not involve
allegations of racial or ethnic prejudice. And the circumstances of
the case did not reveal a violent criminal act with a victim of a
different racial or ethnic group from that of the defendant. Nor
did the external circumstances of the case indicate a "reasonable
possibility" that racial or ethnic prejudice would influence the
jury's evaluation of the evidence. Pp.
451 U. S.
192-194.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in
the result, concluded that the decision as to inquiry on
voir
dire as to racial or ethnic prejudice rested primarily with
the trial court, subject to case-by-case review by the appellate
courts, even in the case of "violent crimes" where the defendant
and victim were members of different racial or ethnic groups. Pp.
451 U. S.
194-195.
WHITE, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which STEWART, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined.
REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which
BURGER, C.J. joined,
post, p.
451 U. S. 194.
STEVENS, J., filed dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
451 U. S.
195.
JUSTICE WHITE announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
an opinion, in which JUSTICE STEWART, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE
POWELL joined.
The question here is whether it was reversible error for a
federal trial court in a criminal case to reject the defendant's
request that the court's
voir dire of prospective jurors
inquire further into the possibility of racial or ethnic prejudice
against the defendant.
Page 451 U. S. 184
I
Petitioner is of Mexican descent. In February, 1979, he was
tried before a jury in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California for his alleged participation in a
plan by which three Mexican aliens were illegally brought into the
country. [
Footnote 1]
The Government's evidence at trial described the following
events. On the night of December 10, 1978, three aliens were led
across the Mexican-American border and taken to a car, previously
left for them on the American side. They drove to Imperial Beach,
Cal., a town about eight miles inside the border. Early in the
morning of December 11, they reached the home of Virginia Hendricks
Bowling, where they were admitted into the garage of the house by
petitioner. Bowling was an American citizen, apparently Caucasian,
living in Imperial Beach with her 19-year-old daughter. Petitioner
had been living with Bowling's daughter in her mother's house since
July, 1978.
Later in the morning, petitioner hid the three aliens and their
guide in the trunk of a green Oldsmobile. Bowling drove the
Oldsmobile north, through the San Clemente checkpoint, while
petitioner followed in a grey Ford. After passing through the
checkpoint, Bowling and petitioner exchanged cars. Petitioner
proceeded to Los Angeles in the Oldsmobile and Bowling returned to
Imperial Beach in the Ford. In Los Angeles, petitioner went to an
apartment, which agents of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service had had under surveillance for several weeks because they
suspected that it was a drop site for illegal aliens. Upon
Page 451 U. S. 185
arrival, the aliens were let out of the trunk and told to go
into the apartment by petitioner. Shortly thereafter, petitioner
was arrested when he left the apartment with one of the aliens.
At trial, the INS agents, Bowling, the three illegal aliens, and
David Falcon-Zavala, another named principal in the smuggling
arrangement who was arrested with petitioner, testified for the
Government. Petitioner did not testify; his defense was principally
to challenge the credibility of the Government witnesses. The jury
convicted him of all the charges, and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed. 617 F.2d 1349 (1980) .
Prior to trial, petitioner's counsel formally requested that he
be allowed personally to
voir dire the prospective members
of the jury. At the same time, he filed a list of 26 questions that
he requested the trial judge to ask if the court denied his first
motion. Among the questions submitted was one directed toward
possible prejudice toward Mexicans:
"Would you consider the race or Mexican descent of Humberto
Rosales-Lopez in your evaluation of this case? How would it affect
you?"
As permitted by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and pursuant to the practice in the Southern District of
California, the trial judge conducted the
voir dire
himself. He asked about half of the questions submitted by
petitioner. [
Footnote 2]
Although he did not ask any question directed specifically to
possible racial or ethnic prejudice, he did ask a question directed
to attitudes toward the substantive charges
Page 451 U. S. 186
involved: "Do any of you have any feelings about the alien
problem at all?" He subsequently rephrased this: "Do any of you
have any particular feelings one way or the other about aliens, or
could you sit as a fair and impartial juror if you are called upon
to do so?" App. 17-18. [
Footnote
3] The judge began the
voir dire with the following
general statement to the panel:
"In order that this defendant shall have a fair and impartial
jury to try the charges against him, it is necessary that we
address certain questions to the panel to make sure that there are
no underlying prejudices, there are no underlying reasons why you
can't sit as a fair and impartial juror if chosen to do so in this
case."
Id. at 14. He ended his general questioning with the
following:
"Does any reason occur to anyone of you why you could not sit in
this case as a fair and impartial juror, any reason
whatsoever?"
Id. at 21.
Following the
voir dire, defense counsel restated his
request with respect to six of the submitted questions, including
the one directed toward racial or ethnic prejudice. [
Footnote 4] He argued at sidebar that, under
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.
S. 308 (1931), a federal court "must explore all racial
antagonism against my client because he happens to be of Mexican
descent." App. 25. The judge declined to ask any further
Page 451 U. S. 187
questions of the jury panel. Peremptory challenges were then
exercised, and the jury was sworn.
Petitioner appealed, unsuccessfully challenging the refusal of
the trial judge to question the jurors about possible racial or
ethnic bias. [
Footnote 5] The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that there is
"[a] longstanding rule of criminal justice in the federal courts
. . . that questions regarding possible racial prejudice should be
put to the venire in prosecutions of minority defendants, at least
where 'special circumstances' indicate that the defendant's race
may be a factor in the trial."
617 F.2d at 1354. The court noted that "[t]he extent of the
federal rule is unclear."
Ibid. It concluded, however,
that this case did not contain such "special circumstances."
The Courts of Appeals have adopted conflicting rules as to when
the failure to ask such questions will constitute reversible error.
Some Circuits have adopted a
per se rule, requiring
reversal whenever the trial judge fails to ask a question on racial
or ethnic prejudice requested by a defendant who is a member of a
minority group.
See United States v. Bowles, 574 F.2d 970
(CA8 1978);
United States v. Robinson, 485 F.2d 1157 (CA3
1973);
United States v. Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (CA6 1971);
United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110 (CA4 1970);
Frasier v. United States, 267 F.2d 62 (CA1 1959). Other
Circuits, including the Ninth, have rejected such a
per se
rule, holding that a trial judge is required to pose such a
question only where there is some indication
Page 451 U. S. 188
that the particular case is likely to have racial overtones or
involve racial prejudice.
See United States v. Polk, 550
F.2d 1265 (CA10 1977);
United States v. Perez-Martinez,
525 F.2d 365 (CA9 1975). In light of this diversity of views, we
granted certiorari. 449 U.S. 819.
II
Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the
criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury will be honored. Without an adequate
voir dire, the
trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will
not be able impartially to follow the court's instructions and
evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.
See Connors v.
United States, 158 U. S. 408,
158 U. S. 413
(1895). Similarly, lack of adequate
voir dire impairs the
defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges where provided
by statute or rule, as it is in the federal courts. [
Footnote 6]
Despite its importance, the adequacy of
voir dire is
not easily subject to appellate review. The trial judge's function
at this point in the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later
on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and
credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor
evidence and of responses to questions.
See Ristaino v.
Ross, 424 U. S. 589,
424 U. S. 595
(1976), quoting
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.
S. 723,
373 U. S. 733
(1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). In neither instance can an
appellate court easily second-guess the conclusions of the
decisionmaker who heard and observed the witnesses.
Page 451 U. S. 189
Because the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the
first instance with the trial judge, and because he must rely
largely on his immediate perceptions, federal judges have been
accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the
voir dire. In
Aldridge v. United States,
283 U. S. 308
(1931), the Court recognized the broad role of the trial court:
"[T]he questions to the prospective jurors were put by the court,
and the court had a broad discretion as to the questions to be
asked."
Id. at
283 U. S. 310.
See also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.
S. 524,
409 U. S. 528
(1973) (recognizing "the traditionally broad discretion accorded to
the trial judge in conducting
voir dire. . . .").
Furthermore, Rule 24(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
provides that the trial court may decide to conduct the
voir
dire itself or may allow the parties to conduct it. If the
court conducts it, the parties may "supplement the examination by
such further inquiry as [the court] deems proper"; alternatively,
the court may limit participation to the submission of additional
questions, which the court must ask only "as it deems proper."
There are, however, constitutional requirements with respect to
questioning prospective jurors about racial or ethnic bias. The
"special circumstances" under which the Constitution requires a
question on racial prejudice were described in
Ristaino v.
Ross, supra, by contrasting the facts of that case with those
in
Ham v. South Carolina, supra, in which we held it
reversible error for a state court to fail to ask such a
question.
Ham involved a black defendant charged with a drug
offense. His defense was that the law enforcement officers had
"framed" him in retaliation for his active, and widely known,
participation in civil rights activities. The critical factor
present in
Ham, but not present in
Ristaino, was
that racial issues were "inextricably bound up with the conduct of
the trial," and the consequent need, under all the circumstances,
specifically to inquire into possible racial prejudice in order to
assure an impartial jury.
Ristaino, supra, at
424 U. S.
596,
Page 451 U. S. 190
424 U. S. 597.
Although
Ristaino involved an alleged criminal
confrontation between a black assailant and a white victim, that
fact pattern alone did not create a need of "constitutional
dimensions" to question the jury concerning racial prejudice. 424
U.S. at
424 U. S. 596,
424 U. S. 597.
There is no constitutional presumption of juror bias for or against
members of any particular racial or ethnic groups. As
Ristaino demonstrates, there is no
per se
constitutional rule in such circumstances requiring inquiry as to
racial prejudice.
Id. at
424 U. S. 596,
n. 8. Only when there are more substantial indications of the
likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice affecting the jurors in a
particular case does the trial court's denial of a defendant's
request to examine the jurors' ability to deal impartially with
this subject amount to an unconstitutional abuse of discretion.
Absent such circumstances, the Constitution leaves it to the
trial court, and the judicial system within which that court
operates, to determine the need for such questions. In the federal
court system, we have indicated that, under our supervisory
authority over the federal courts, we would require that questions
directed to the discovery of racial prejudice be asked in certain
circumstances in which such an inquiry is not constitutionally
mandated.
Ristaino, supra, at
424 U. S. 597,
n. 9.
Determination of an appropriate nonconstitutional standard for
the federal courts does not depend upon a comparison of the
concrete costs and benefits that its application is likely to
entail. These are likely to be slight: some delay in the trial
versus the occasional discovery of an unqualified juror who would
not otherwise be discovered. There is, however, a more significant
conflict at issue here -- one involving the appearance of justice
in the federal courts. On the one hand, requiring an inquiry in
every case is likely to create the impression "that justice in a
court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin [or] the
accident of birth."
Ristaino, supra, at
424 U. S. 596,
n. 8. Trial judges are understandably hesitant to introduce such a
suggestion into their courtrooms.
Page 451 U. S. 191
See Aldridge, supra, at
283 U. S. 310;
Ristaino, supra, at
424 U. S. 591.
Balanced against this, however, is the criminal defendant's
perception that avoiding the inquiry does not eliminate the
problem, and that his trial is not the place in which to elevate
appearance over reality.
We first confronted this conflict in
Aldridge, supra,
and what we said there remains true today:
"The argument is advanced on behalf of the Government that it
would be detrimental to the administration of the law in the courts
of the United States to allow questions to jurors as to racial or
religious prejudices. We think that it would be far more injurious
to permit it to be thought that persons entertaining a
disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that
inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were
barred. No surer way could be devised to bring the process of
justice into disrepute."
283 U.S. at
283 U. S.
314-315.
In our judgment, it is usually best to allow the defendant to
resolve this conflict by making the determination of whether or not
he would prefer to have the inquiry into racial or ethnic prejudice
pursued. [
Footnote 7] Failure
to honor his request, however, will be reversible error only where
the circumstances of the case indicate that there is a reasonable
possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced
the jury.
In
Ristaino, the Court indicated that, under the
circumstances of that case, a federal trial court would have been
required to "propound appropriate questions designed to identify
racial prejudice if requested by the defendant." 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 597,
n. 9. In
Ristaino, the Court also made clear that the
result reached in
Aldridge was based on this Court's
Page 451 U. S. 192
supervisory power over the federal courts. 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 598
n. 10. In
Aldridge, which
Ristaino embraced, the
Court held that it was reversible error for a federal trial court
to fail to inquire into racial prejudice in a case involving a
black defendant accused of murdering a white policeman. The
circumstances of both cases indicated that there was a "reasonable
possibility" that racial prejudice would influence the jury.
Aldridge and
Ristaino, together, fairly imply
that federal trial courts must make such an inquiry when requested
by a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant
and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups.
This supervisory rule is based upon and consistent with the
"reasonable possibility standard" articulated above. It remains an
unfortunate fact in our society that violent crimes perpetrated
against members of other racial or ethnic groups often raise such a
possibility. There may be other circumstances that suggest the need
for such an inquiry, but the decision as to whether the total
circumstances suggest a reasonable possibility that racial or
ethnic prejudice will affect the jury remains primarily with the
trial court, subject to case-by-case review by the appellate
courts.
III
Evaluated against these standards, there was no reversible error
in the
voir dire afforded petitioner. At no point has
petitioner argued that the matters at issue in his trial involved
allegations of racial or ethnic prejudice: neither the Government's
case nor his defense involved any such allegations. There were,
then, no "special circumstances" of constitutional dimension in
this case. Neither did the circumstances of the case reveal a
violent criminal act with a victim of a different racial or ethnic
group. In fact, petitioner was accused of a victimless crime:
aiding members of his own ethnic group to gain illegal entry into
the United States. Petitioner, therefore, falls within that
category of cases in which the trial court must determine if the
external circumstances
Page 451 U. S. 193
of the case indicate a reasonable possibility that racial or
ethnic prejudice will influence the jury's evaluation of the
evidence. For two reasons, we do not believe that such a reasonable
possibility has been demonstrated in this case.
First, the trial court reasonably determined that a juror's
prejudice toward aliens might affect his or her ability to serve
impartially in this case. The court, therefore, questioned the
prospective jurors as to their attitudes toward aliens. There can
be no doubt that the jurors would have understood a question about
aliens to at least include Mexican aliens. The trial court excused
two jurors for cause, based on their responses to this question.
Removing these jurors eliminated, we believe, any reasonable
possibility that the remaining jurors would be influenced by an
undisclosed racial prejudice toward Mexicans that would have been
disclosed by further questioning. [
Footnote 8]
Second, petitioner contends that "any latent racial antagonism"
of the jurors toward Mexicans was likely to be exacerbated by
Bowling's testimony concerning the relationship between petitioner
and her daughter. Petitioner, however, failed to make this argument
to the trial court in support of his requested question. Even if he
had, however, it would not create a reasonable possibility that the
jury's determination would be influenced by racial prejudice.
Bowling's testimony as to petitioner's role in the particular
smuggling operation involved in this trial was substantially
corroborated by the other witnesses presented by the Government,
including Falcon-Zavala and the three illegal aliens. Under the
circumstances of this case, the racial or ethnic differences
between
Page 451 U. S. 194
the defendant and a key Government witness did not create a
situation meeting the standard set out above. The judge was not,
therefore, required to inquire further than he did.
Under these circumstances, we cannot hold that there was a
reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice would affect
the jury. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying petitioner's request, and the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Petitioner was charged with one count of conspiracy to conceal,
harbor and shield, and illegally transport aliens, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371 and 8 U.S.C. § 1324; three counts of aiding and
abetting the illegal transportation of aliens, in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and three counts of
concealing, harboring, and shielding aliens, in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3).
[
Footnote 2]
The trial court asked the panel as a group questions concerning
the following: knowledge of the participants in the trial; outside
knowledge of the case; physical impairments that would interfere
with their responsibilities as jurors; legal training; possible
disagreement with the principle that a criminal defendant is
presumed to be innocent. Each juror was asked to state some basic
facts about himself or herself, including name, occupation, and
spouse's occupation.
[
Footnote 3]
Two jurors were excused because of their responses to this
question.
[
Footnote 4]
The other five questions were:
1. "Have you ever employed or have friends that have employed
illegal aliens?"
2. "Have you ever worked for the federal Government? If so, as
what? How long?"
3. "Have you ever been the victim of a crime?"
4. "Have you ever sat as a juror in a civil or criminal case?
What was the nature of the case and the verdict?"
5. "Are you able to speak Spanish? If so, how well? Would you be
willing to accept the interpreter's translation?"
[
Footnote 5]
On appeal, petitioner also challenged the failure of the trial
court to provide him a free copy of the transcript of a suppression
hearing, the sentencing procedure applied to him, the denial of an
evidentiary hearing on possible prosecutorial vindictiveness, the
trial court's refusal to give an instruction on a lesser included
offense, the propriety of imposing consecutive sentences, and the
constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. The Court of Appeals rejected
all of these contentions.
[
Footnote 6]
In
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202
(1965), we noted the connection between
voir dire and the
exercise of peremptory challenges: "The
voir dire in
American trials tends to be extensive and probing, operating as a
predicate for the exercise of peremptories. . . . "
Id. at
380 U. S.
218-219. We also noted there that, although there is no
federal constitutional requirement that peremptory challenges be
permitted, the challenge is widely used in federal and state courts
pursuant to statute or rule, and is deemed to be an important
aspect of trial by jury.
Id. at
380 U. S.
219.
[
Footnote 7]
Of course, the judge need not defer to a defendant's request
where there is no rational possibility of racial prejudice. But
since the courts are seeking to assure the appearance and reality
of a fair trial, if the defendant claims a meaningful ethnic
difference between himself and the victim, his
voir dire
request should ordinarily be satisfied.
[
Footnote 8]
We also note that the trial court asked generally whether there
were any grounds which might occur to the jurors as to why they
could not sit as "fair and impartial" jurors. Coupled with the
question concerning aliens, there is little reason to believe that
a juror who did not answer this general question would have
answered affirmatively a question directed narrowly at racial
prejudice.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring
in the result.
I agree with the result reached by the plurality today, and with
most of its reasoning. I cannot, however, embrace the language
contained in the last paragraph of Part II of the opinion which may
be perceived as creating a
per se rule requiring reversal
of any criminal conviction involving a "violent crime" between
members of different racial or ethnic groups if the district court
refused to
voir dire on the issue of racial prejudice. I
do not disagree
in toto with that paragraph, but fear that
its use of the term "violent crime" and the term "different racial
or ethnic groups" is apt to spawn new litigation over the meaning
of these terms and whether the trial court properly assessed the
possibility of racial or ethnic prejudice infecting the selection
of the jury. It is undoubtedly true that such prejudice may occur
in the case of a defendant accused of a violent crime where the
defendant and victim are members of different racial or ethnic
groups, and it is also undoubtedly true that there are
circumstances other than these which may suggest to the trial judge
the need for an inquiry into the possibility of prejudice. But
knowing the contentiousness of our profession, the suggestion that
a precise definition of "violent crime" or "different racial or
ethnic groups" will ever be arrived at
Page 451 U. S. 195
leaves me unwilling to lay down the flat rule which seems to be
proposed in the last paragraph of Part II. I would think that in
the case of "violent crimes" where the defendant and victims are
members of "different racial or ethnic groups," the decision as to
inquiry on
voir dire as to racial or ethnic prejudice
"remains primarily with the trial court, subject to case-by-case
review by the appellate courts."
See ante at
451 U. S. 192.
In my view, it is inappropriate for us to decide that there is
always a "reasonable possibility" of prejudice solely because the
crime is "violent." I would also not rule out the possibility of a
finding of harmless error, but that may well be embraced in
footnote 7 to the plurality's opinion.
As can be seen, my differences with the plurality are not great,
but we are beseeched on so many appeals to reverse a judgment for
procedural reasons which cannot fairly have been said to play a
part in the factfinding process that I would leave somewhat more to
the trial court's discretion than does the plurality, the decision
as to whether or not questions on such as racial or ethnic
prejudice should be asked on
voir dire. We cannot, in the
nature of things, always lay down "bright-line" rules, but we
should try to avoid definitions that do not define or clarify, and
hence invite litigation. It seems to me quite conceivable that a
thoroughly competent and fair-minded district court judge could
conclude that the asking of such questions, or the devotion of a
substantial amount of time to the inquiry, could well exacerbate
whatever prejudice might exist, without substantially aiding in
exposing it.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, dissenting.
The question in this case is whether, in the conduct of the
voir dire examination of prospective jurors in criminal
prosecutions in the federal courts, the trial judge must, upon
request, ask at least one question concerning possible
prejudice
Page 451 U. S. 196
against the minority group to which the defendant belongs.
Settled law provides a simple answer to this question. [
Footnote 2/1]
The plurality's new answer to that question contains two parts:
it holds that
"federal trial courts must make such an inquiry when requested
by a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant
and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic
groups."
Ante at
451 U. S. 192.
Because no such "special circumstances" are present in this case,
the plurality affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Ante at
451 U. S.
192-194. Heretofore, federal law has required that a
racial or ethnic prejudice inquiry be made when requested by the
defendant, regardless of the presence or absence of special
circumstances indicating that there is a reasonable possibility
that prejudice will influence the jury. In this case, because the
general questions asked by the learned trial judge were inadequate,
I respectfully dissent.
An impartial tribunal is an indispensable element of a fair
criminal trial.
See In re Murchison, 349 U.
S. 133,
349 U. S. 136;
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717,
366 U. S. 722.
[
Footnote 2/2] Before any citizen
may be permitted to sit in judgment on his peers, some inquiry into
his potential bias is essential. Such bias can arise from two
principal sources: a special reaction to the facts of the
particular case, or a special prejudice against the individual
defendant that is unrelated to the particular case. Much as we wish
it were otherwise, we should acknowledge the fact that there are
many potential jurors who harbor strong prejudices against all
members of certain racial, religious, or
Page 451 U. S. 197
ethnic groups for no reason other than hostility to the group as
a whole. [
Footnote 2/3] Even when
there are no "special circumstances" connected with an alleged
criminal transaction indicating an unusual risk of racial or other
group bias, a member of the Nazi Party should not be allowed to sit
in judgment on a Jewish defendant.
In 1931, in
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.
S. 308, this Court addressed the problem of protecting
criminal defendants in the federal courts from the possibility of
racial or ethnic bias among prospective jurors. That case was not
argued or decided in a vacuum. Rather, it followed a long line of
state court decisions requiring that prospective jurors be
questioned about such potential prejudices.
Aldridge
itself involved the special circumstances that the crime at issue
was murder, and that the defendant was black and the victim was a
white police officer, but neither the reasoning in Chief Justice
Hughes' opinion for the Court nor the reasoning in the state court
opinions from which he quoted at length relied on such special
circumstances. The character of the
Aldridge holding is
best explained by a quotation of both the text and the appended
footnotes discussing the leading cases from Florida, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Texas, and South Carolina:
"The propriety of such an inquiry has been generally recognized.
In
Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370; 8 So. 837,
Page 451 U. S. 198
the counsel for the accused sought to have the jurors asked on
their
voir dire:"
"Could you give the defendant, who is a negro, as fair and as
impartial a trial as you could a white man, and give him the same
advantage and protection as you would a white man upon the same
evidence?"
"The Supreme Court of Florida held that the refusal of the court
to allow the question was error, and reversed the conviction.[1] In
Hill v. State, 112 Miss. 260; 72 So. 1003, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi held that it was fatal error to refuse to
permit a negro on trial for murder to put to prospective jurors on
their
voir dire the following question:"
"Have you got any prejudice against the negro, as a negro, that
would induce you to return a verdict on less or slighter evidence
than you would return a verdict of guilty against a white man under
the same circumstances?"
"The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the conviction of
a negro because of the refusal of the trial judge to permit a juror
to be asked if 'he believed he could, as a juror, do equal and
impartial justice between the State and a colored man.'
State
v. McAfee, 64 N.C. 339.[2]
See also Fendrick v.
State, 39 Tex.Cr. 147; 45 S.W. 589;
State v. Sanders,
103 S.C. 216; 88 S.E. 10."
"---"
"[1] In the
Pinder case,
supra, the court
said: 'Though the question is not, in express terms, provided for
in the statute above cited' (McClellan's Digest, § 10, p. 446)"
"yet it was a pertinent, and, as we think, proper question, to
test fully the existence of bias or prejudice in the minds of the
jurors. It sought to elicit a fact that was of the most vital
import to the defendant, and a fact, too, that, if existent, was
locked up entirely within the breasts of the jurors to whom the
question was propounded; a knowledge of the existence of which
could only be acquired by interrogating the juror himself. The
answer to it, if in the affirmative, could have worked no harm to
the juror or to anyone else, but would have done credit to the
humanity and intelligence of the juror, and would have
satisfactorily exhibited to the court and to the defendant his
entire competency,
Page 451 U. S. 199
so far as the element of bias or prejudice was involved. But, if
the answer to it from the jurors had been in the negative, then we
have no hesitancy in saying that it would have shown them to be
wholly unfit and incompetent to sit upon the trial of a man of the
negro race, whose right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury is
as fully guaranteed to him under our constitution and laws as to
the whitest man in Christendom. And such incompetency asserts
itself with superadded force in such a case as this where the life
or death of the defendant was the issue to tip the scale in the
jury's hands for adjustment."
"[2] In that case, the court said (at p. 340):"
"It is essential to the purity of trial by jury that every juror
shall be free from bias. If his mind has been poisoned by prejudice
of any kind, whether resulting from reason or passion, he is unfit
to sit on a jury. Here, his Honor refused to allow a proper
question to be put to the juror in order to test his
qualifications. Suppose the question had been allowed, and the
juror had answered that the state of his feelings toward the
colored race was such that he could not show equal and impartial
justice between the State and the prisoner, especially in charges
of this character, it is at once seen that he would have been
grossly unfit to sit in the jury box."
283 U.S. at
283 U. S.
311-313, and nn. 1, 2.
To avoid the risk that the opinion might be construed as
applicable only to prejudice against members of the black race,
Chief Justice Hughes added the following paragraph:
"The right to examine jurors on the
voir dire as to the
existence of a disqualifying state of mind has been upheld with
respect to other races than the black race, and in relation to
religious and other prejudices of a serious character.
Potter
v. State, 86 Tex.Cr. 380, 384; 216 S.W. 886;
People v.
Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 349;
Watson v. Whitney, 23 Cal.
375, 379;
People v. Car Soy, 57 Cal. 102;
Horst v.
Silverman, 20 Wash. 233, 234; 55 Pac. 52. In
People v.
Reyes, supra, Mexicans were charged with assault with intent
to commit murder, and conviction was reversed because of the
refusal to allow questions to determine whether a prospective juror
was a member of
Page 451 U. S. 200
the Know Nothing party, and whether he had taken any oath or
obligation which resulted in prejudice, or whether, independent of
such an oath, he entertained a prejudice, which would prevent him
from giving the accused a fair trial.[3]"
"---"
"[3] The court in that case said (at p. 349):"
"As the juror best knows the condition of his own mind, no
satisfactory conclusion can be arrived at without resort to
himself. Applying this test then, how is it possible to ascertain
whether he is prejudiced or not unless questions similar to the
foregoing are propounded to him? . . ."
" Prejudice, being a state of mind more frequently founded in
passion than in reason, may exist with or without cause, and to ask
a person whether he is prejudiced or not against a party, and (if
the answer is affirmative), whether that prejudice is of such a
character as would lead him to deny the party a fair trial, is not
only the simplest method of ascertaining the state of his mind, but
is, probably, the only sure method of fathoming his thoughts and
feelings. If the person called had not taken an obligation which
would prejudice him against foreigners in such a manner as to
imperil their rights in a court of law, he could say so, and the
question and answer would be harmless. If, upon the other hand, he
had taken oaths and was under obligations which influenced his mind
and feelings in such a manner as to deny to a foreigner an
impartial trial, he is grossly unfit to sit as a juror, and such
facts should be known."
283 U.S. at
283 U. S.
313-314, and n. 3.
Then, toward the end of the
Aldridge opinion, Chief
Justice Hughes again made it clear that the Court's holding was not
limited to a risk of racial prejudice arising from the special
circumstances of a particular case:
"The argument is advanced on behalf of the Government that it
would be detrimental to the administration of the law in the courts
of the United States to allow questions to jurors as to racial or
religious prejudices. We think that it would be far more injurious
to permit it to be thought that persons entertaining a
disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors, and
that
Page 451 U. S. 201
inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were
barred. No surer way could be devised to bring the processes of
justice into disrepute."
Id. at
283 U. S.
314-315.
In light of Chief Justice Hughes' reasoning, it is not
surprising that the overwhelming majority of Federal Circuit Judges
who have confronted the question presented in this case have
interpreted
Aldridge as establishing a firm rule entitling
a minority defendant to some inquiry of prospective jurors on
voir dire about possible racial or ethnic prejudice
unrelated to the specific facts of the case. [
Footnote 2/4] I so read
Aldridge in 1973,
[
Footnote 2/5] and I think the
message of the case is equally clear in 1981. [
Footnote 2/6] The state court decisions on which
Chief Justice
Page 451 U. S. 202
Hughes relied in
Aldridge did not rest upon the
presence of special circumstances indicating an unusual likelihood
that racial or other prejudice would infect the jury venire.
[
Footnote 2/7] Therefore, although
such special circumstances were present in
Aldridge, that
decision has a broader significance. I can "perceive no reason why
Aldridge should be applied more restrictively than the
precedent on which it rests."
United States v. Gore, 435
F.2d 1110, 1112, (CA4 1970). Accordingly, unlike the plurality, I
would join the majority of Federal Circuit Judges and decline to
limit
Aldridge to cases involving crimes of interracial
violence.
In this case, I agree with the plurality's view that the
voir dire was adequate to determine whether any special
circumstances might give rise to juror prejudice. The trial judge
did inquire about prejudice related to the smuggling of aliens into
California, and I agree that the possibility of prejudice resulting
from the relationship between the defendant and the witness
Bowling's daughter was a matter that the trial judge could best
evaluate. However, the
voir dire was inadequate as a
matter of law, because it wholly ignored the risk that potential
jurors in the Southern District of California might be prejudiced
against the defendant simply because he is a person of Mexican
descent. Because the defendant's lawyer perceived a risk of such
irrational prejudice in that
Page 451 U. S. 203
District, his request for a specific question concerning it
should have been granted. [
Footnote
2/8]
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"For more than four decades, it has been the rule in federal
courts that a trial court
must inquire as to possible
racial bias of the veniremen when the defendant is a member of a
racial minority.
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U. S.
308 . . . (1931)."
United States v. Powers, 482 F.2d 941, 944 (CA8 1973)
(emphasis in original),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923.
[
Footnote 2/2]
A criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury arises from
both the Sixth Amendment and principles of due process.
See
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589,
424 U. S. 595,
n. 6.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The fact that such prejudice may not be a pervasive influence in
the particular community from which the jury is drawn, or even in
society at large, does not make this concern any less serious. As
Chief Justice Hughes explained in
Aldridge v. United
States, 283 U. S. 308,
283 U. S.
314:
"But the question is not . . . as to the dominant sentiment of
the community and the general absence of any disqualifying
prejudice, but as to the bias of the particular jurors who are to
try the accused. If in fact, sharing the general sentiment, they
were found to be impartial, no harm would be done in permitting the
question; but if any one of them was shown to entertain a prejudice
which would preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross
injustice would be perpetrated in allowing him to sit."
[
Footnote 2/4]
See Frasier v. United States, 267 F.2d 62, 66 (CA1
1959);
King v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 138, 139,
362 F.2d 968, 969 (1966);
United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d
1110, 1111-1113 (CA4 1970);
United States v. Carter, 440
F.2d 1132, 1134-1135 (CA6 1971);
United States v.
Bamberger, 456 F.2d 1119, 1129 (CA3 1972),
cert. denied
sub nom. Crapps v. United States, 406 U.S. 969;
United
States v. Robinson, 466 F.2d 780, 781-782 (CA7 1972);
United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 1310, 1310-1311 (CA7
1973);
United States v. Powers, 482 F.2d 941, 944 (CA8
1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923;
United States v.
Robinson, 485 F.2d 1157, 1158-1160 (CA3 1973);
United
States v. Johnson, 527 F.2d 1104, 1106-1107 (CA4 1975);
United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1042-1043 (CA8
1978);
United States v. Bowles, 574 F.2d 970, 971-973 (CA8
1978);
United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 736-737
(CA3 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934.
Cf. Kuzniak v.
Taylor Supply Co., 471 F.2d 702, 703 (CA6 1972);
United
States v. Grant, 494 F.2d 120, 122-123, and n. 6 (CA2 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849;
United States v. Bear
Runner, 502 F.2d 908, 911-913 (CA8 1974).
[
Footnote 2/5]
See United States v. Booker, supra.
[
Footnote 2/6]
Nothing in
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.
S. 589, is inconsistent with this interpretation of
Aldridge. Ristaino defined the circumstances
under which a state trial court is constitutionally required to
inquire into racial prejudice on
voir dire. The Court in
Ristaino expressly noted that it would require, under its
supervisory power, that federal trial courts inquire into racial
prejudice in cases in which such inquiry was not constitutionally
required. 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 597,
n. 9. The Court also noted that
Aldridge was based on the
supervisory power, not on the Federal Constitution. 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 598,
n. 10.
See United States v. Williams, supra; United States v.
Bowles, supra.
[
Footnote 2/7]
The Fourth Circuit, in
United States v. Gore, supra,
examined the state court decisions cited in
Aldridge and
found that some involved crimes with no racial overtones
whatsoever.
See 435 F.2d at 1111-1112. Chief Justice
Hughes' discussion of these decisions in
Aldridge
indicates that that case established
"a broad rule that, in any criminal case, an accused has a right
to inquire whether racial prejudice precludes any juror from
reaching a fair and impartial verdict."
435 F.2d at 1111.
See also King v. United States,
supra, at 139, 362 F.2d at 969.
[
Footnote 2/8]
It is, of course, clear that the trial judge's duty to give such
an instruction was not dependent on the phrasing of the particular
questions submitted by defense counsel.
See Aldridge, 283
U.S. at
283 U. S. 311.
It is equally clear that, although trial judges have broad
discretion to formulate
voir dire questions, the general
question whether there was any reason "why you could not sit in
this case as a fair and impartial juror,"
see ante at
451 U. S. 186,
is not an adequate substitute for a specific inquiry; if it were,
trial judges might be well advised simply to ask that question, and
nothing else.
See, e.g., United States v. Carter, supra,
at 1134-1135;
United States v. Robinson, supra, at
782.