Under § 6202(g)(1)(D) of the Social Security Act, "mother's
insurance benefits" are available only to one who, among other
qualifications, "has filed application." An implementing regulation
provides that only written applications satisfy this requirement. A
Social Security Administration (SSA) field representative
erroneously told respondent that she was not entitled to such
benefits. And contrary to instructions in SSA's Claims Manual, an
internal handbook, he failed to recommend to respondent that she
file a written application; nor did he advise her of the advantages
of doing so. After subsequently learning that she was eligible for
benefits, respondent filed a written application and sought
retroactive benefits that she would have received if she had been
properly advised by the field representative. Her claim for such
retroactive benefits was denied in administrative proceedings, but
the District Court found for her in her subsequent lawsuit. The
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The SSA field representative's erroneous
statement and neglect of the Claims Manual did not estop the
Secretary of Health and Human Services from denying retroactive
benefits to respondent for the period in which she was eligible for
benefits but had not filed a written application. The field
representative's conduct was less than "affirmative misconduct,"
and does not justify abnegation of "the duty of all courts to
observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public
treasury."
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill,
332 U. S. 380,
380 U. S. 385.
Although the field representative failed to follow the Claims
Manual, the Manual has no legal force, and does not bind the SSA.
Nor is estoppel justified on the basis of any distinction between
respondent's "substantive eligibility" and her failure to satisfy a
"procedural requirement." A court is no more authorized to overlook
the valid regulation requiring that applications be in writing than
it is to overlook any other valid requirement for the receipt of
benefits.
Certiorari granted; 619 F.2d 942, reversed.
Page 450 U. S. 786
PER CURIAM.
On June 12, 1974, respondent met for about 15 minutes with Don
Connelly, a field representative of the Social Security
Administration (SSA), and orally inquired of him whether she was
eligible for "mother's insurance benefits" under § 202(g) of the
Social Security Act (Act), 64 Stat. 485, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
402(g). Connelly erroneously told her that she was not, and she
left the SSA office without having filed a written application. By
the Act's terms, such benefits are available only to one who, among
other qualifications, "has filed application." 42 U.S.C. §
402(g)(1)(D). By a regulation promulgated pursuant to the Act, only
written applications satisfy the "filed application" requirement.
20 CFR § 404.01 (1974). [
Footnote
1] The SSA's Claims Manual, an internal Administration
handbook, instructs field representatives to advise applicants of
the advantages of filing written applications and to recommend to
applicants who are uncertain about their eligibility that they file
written applications. Connelly, however, did not recommend to
respondent that she file a written application; nor did he advise
her of the advantages of doing so. The question is whether
Connelly's erroneous statement and neglect of the Claims Manual
estop petitioner, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, from
denying retroactive benefits to respondent for a period in which
she was eligible for benefits but had not filed a written
application.
Respondent eventually filed a written application after learning
in May, 1975, that in fact she was eligible. She then began
receiving benefits. Pursuant to § 202(j)(1) of the Act, [
Footnote 2] she also received
retroactive benefits for the preceding
Page 450 U. S. 787
12 months, which was the maximum retroactive benefit allowed by
the Act. Respondent contended, however, that she should receive
retroactive benefits for the 12 months preceding her June, 1974,
interview with Connelly. An Administrative Law Judge rejected this
claim, concluding that Connelly's erroneous statement and neglect
of the Claims Manual did not estop petitioner from determining
respondent's eligibility for benefits only as of the date of
respondent's written application. The Social Security Appeals
Council affirmed.
Respondent then brought this lawsuit in the District Court for
the District of Vermont, [
Footnote
3] which held that the written application requirement was
"unreasonably restrictive" as applied to the facts of this case. A
divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed. 610 F.2d 942 (1980). It agreed with petitioner as an
initial matter that the regulation requiring a written application
is valid, and that the Claims Manual has no legally binding effect.
But it considered the written application requirement a mere
"procedural requirement" of lesser import than the fact that
respondent, in June, 1974, had been "substantively eligible" for
the benefits.
Id. at 948. In such circumstances, the
majority held,
"misinformation provided by a Government official, combined with
a showing of misconduct (even if it does not rise to the level of a
violation of a legally binding rule), should be sufficient to
require estoppel."
Ibid. In summarizing its holding, the majority stated
that the Government may be estopped
"where (a) a procedural, not a substantive, requirement is
involved and (b) an internal procedural manual or guide or some
other source of objective
Page 450 U. S. 788
standards of conduct exists and supports an inference of
misconduct by a Government employee."
Id. at 949.
Judge Friendly dissented. He argued that the majority's
conclusion is irreconcilable with decisions of this Court,
e.g., Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill,
332 U. S. 380
(1947);
Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.
S. 308 (1961);
INS v. Hibi, 414 U. S.
5 (1973) (per curiam), and with decisions of other
Courts of Appeals,
Leimbach v. Califano, 596 F.2d 300 (CA8
1979);
Cheers v. Secretary of HEW, 610 F.2d 463 (CA7
1979).
We agree with the dissent. This Court has never decided what
type of conduct by a Government employee will estop the Government
from insisting upon compliance with valid regulations governing the
distribution of welfare benefits. In two cases involving denial of
citizenship, the Court has declined to decide whether even
"affirmative misconduct" would estop the Government from denying
citizenship, for in neither case was "affirmative misconduct"
involved.
INS v. Hibi, supra., at
414 U. S. 8-9;
Montana v. Kennedy, supra at
366 U. S.
314-315. The Court has recognized, however, "the duty of
all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress for
charging the public treasury."
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v.
Merrill, supra at
332 U. S. 385.
Lower federal courts have recognized that duty also, and
consistently have relied on
Merrill in refusing to estop
the Government where an eligible applicant has lost Social Security
benefits because of possibly erroneous replies to oral inquiries.
See Leimbach v. Califano, supra at 304-305;
Cheers v.
Secretary of HEW, supra at 468-469;
Goldberg v.
Weinberger, 546 F.2d 477, 481 (CA2 1976),
cert
denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1!377);
Simon v. Califano, 593
F.2d 121, 123 (CA9, 1979);
Parker v. Finch, 327 F.
Supp. 193, 195 (ND Ga. 1971);
Flamm v.
Ribicoff, 203 F.
Supp. 507, 510 (SDNY 1961). This is another in that line of
cases, [
Footnote 4] for we
Page 450 U. S. 789
are convinced hat Connelly's conduct -- which the majority
conceded to be less than "affirmative misconduct," 619 F.2d at 948
-- does not justify the abnegation of that duty.
Connelly erred in telling respondent that she was ineligible for
the benefit she sought. It may be that Connelly erred because he
was unfamiliar with a recent amendment which afforded benefits to
respondent.
Id. at 947. Or it may be that respondent gave
Connelly too little information for him to know that he was in
error.
Id. at 955 (Friendly, J., dissenting). But, at
worst, Connelly's conduct did not cause respondent to take action
cf. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, supra, or
fail to take action,
cf. Montana v. Kennedy, supra, that
respondent could not correct at any time.
Similarly, there is no doubt that Connelly failed to follow the
Claims Manual in neglecting to recommend that respondent file a
written application and in neglecting to advise her of the
advantages of a written application. But the Claims Manual is not a
regulation. It has no legal force, and it does not bind the SSA.
Rather, it is a 13-volume handbook for internal use by thousands of
SSA employees, including the hundreds of employees who receive
untold numbers of oral inquiries like respondent's each year. If
Connelly's minor breach of such a manual suffices to estop
petitioner, then the Government is put
"at risk that every alleged failure
Page 450 U. S. 790
by an agent to follow instructions to the last detail in one of
a thousand cases will deprive it of the benefit of the written
application requirement which experience has taught to be essential
to the honest and effective administration of the Social Security
Laws."
619 F.2d. at 956 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
See United
States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741,
440 U. S.
755-756 (1979). [
Footnote 5]
Finally, the majority's distinction between respondent's
"substantiv[e] eligib[ility]" and her failure to satisfy a
"procedural requirement" does not justify estopping petitioner in
this case. Congress expressly provided in the Act that only one who
"has filed application" for benefits may receive them, and it
delegated to petitioner the task of providing by regulation the
requisite manner of application. A court is no more authorized to
overlook the valid regulation requiring that applications be in
writing than it is to overlook any other valid requirement for the
receipt of benefits.
In sum. Connelly's errors "fal[l] far short" of conduct which
would raise a serious question whether petitioner is estopped from
insisting upon compliance with the valid regulation.
Montana v.
Kennedy, supra, at
366 U. S. 314.
Accordingly, we grant the motion of respondent for leave to proceed
in
Page 450 U. S. 791
forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari and
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
This regulation has been recodified, and now appears at 20 CFR
§§ 404.602-404.614 (1980).
[
Footnote 2]
This section provides, in pertinent part:
"An individual who would have been entitled to a benefit under
subsectio[n] . . .(g) . . . of this section for any month after
August 1950 had he filed application therefor prior to the end of
such month shall be entitled to such benefit for such month if he
files application therefor prior to the end of the twelfth month
immediately succeeding such month. . . ."
42 U. S.C. § 402(j)(1).
[
Footnote 3]
Judicial review of final decisions by the Secretary is
authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
[
Footnote 4]
JUSTICE MARSHALL cites several cases in which federal courts
have applied estoppel against the Government.
Post at
450 U. S. 791.
In some of the cases, the Government had entered into written
agreements which supported the claim of estoppel.
E.g., United
States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 990 (CA9 1973);
Walsonavich v. United States, 335 F.2d 96, 100-101 (CA3
1964). In others, estoppel did not threaten the public fisc as
estoppel does here.
E.g., Semaan v. Mumford, 118
U.S.App.D.C. 282, 284, and n. 6, 335 F.2d 704, 706, and n. 6
(1964). In another, a bank claiming estoppel had erred in certain
applications because it had to file before the Government would
provide it with necessary information.
United States v. Fox
Lake State Bank, 366 F.2d 962 (CA7 1966). We need not consider
the correctness of these cases. We do think that they are easily
distinguishable from the type of situation presented in this case
and the line of cases we rely upon above.
[
Footnote 5]
The contention was made in
Caceres that a violation of
an internal IRS regulation concerning electronic eavesdropping
should result in exclusion from trial of the evidence obtained by
such eavesdropping. In rejecting this contention, we noted that
such a
per se rule
"would take away from the Executive Department the primary
responsibility for fashioning the appropriate remedy for the
violation of its regulations. But since the content, and indeed the
existence, of the regulations would remain within the Executive's
sole authority, the result might well be fewer and less protective
regulations. In the long run, it is far better to have rules like
those contained in the IRS Manual, and to tolerate occasional
erroneous administration of the kind displayed by this record, than
either to have no rules except those mandated by statute or to have
them framed in a mere precatory form."
440 U.S. at
440 U. S.
755-756.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.
A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by
this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable,
the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in
error. Because this is not such a case, I dissent from the
majority's summary reversal of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, and would instead grant the petition and set the case for
plenary consideration.
The issue here is important not only in economic terms to
respondent Hansen, but in constitutional terms as well. The
question of when the Government may be equitably estopped has
divided the distinguished panel of the Court of Appeals in this
case, has received inconsistent treatment from other Courts of
Appeals, and has been the subject of considerable ferment.
See,
e.g., Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS,
532 F.2d 301 (CA2
1976); United States v Lazy FC Ranch,
481 F.2d 985 (CA9
1973); United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, 366 F.2d 962 (CA7
1966);
Walsonavich v. United States, 335 F.2d 96 (CA3
1964);
Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 938 (CA5 1962);
Semaan v. Mumford, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 282, 335 F.2d 704
(1964);
Eichelberer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
88 F.2d 874 (CA5 1937).
See generally K. Davis,
Administrative Law of the Seventies § 17.01 (1976); Note, Equitable
Estoppel of the Government, 79 Colum.L.Rev. 551 (1979). Indeed, the
majority today recognizes that
"[t]his Court has never decided what type of conduct by a
Government employee will estop the Government from insisting upon
compliance with valid regulations governing the distribution of
welfare benefits."
Ante at
450 U. S. 788.
The majority goes on to suggest that estoppel may be justified in
some circumstances. Yet rather than address the issue in a
comprehensive
Page 450 U. S. 792
fashion, the Court simply concludes that this is not such a
case. [
Footnote 2/1] The apparent
message of today's decision -- that we will know an estoppel when
we see one -- provides inadequate guidance to the lower courts in
an area of the law that, contrary to the majority's view, is far
from settled.
Indeed, the majority's attempt to distinguish conflicting
decisions of other courts itself demonstrates the impropriety of
today's summary disposition. The majority declines to "consider the
correctness of these cases," and instead simply notes that they are
distinguishable on their facts from the present case.
Ante
at
450 U. S. 789,
n. 4. Yet the majority fails to explain why or how these purported
factual distinctions affect the legal question of when the
Government may be equitably estopped. Thus, the lower courts are
left guessing whether the factual differences cited by the majority
are of any real consequence. For example, the majority
distinguishes
Semaan v. Mumford, supra, on the ground that
"estoppel did not threaten the public fisc."
Ante at
450 U. S. 789,
n. 4. Even accepting this characterization as correct, [
Footnote 2/2] I am unable to discern from
the majority's opinion why the rules governing estoppel should
differ depending on whether the party asserting
Page 450 U. S. 793
an estoppel seeks monetary benefits from the Government instead
of some other form of Government action or inaction. Similarly, the
majority distinguishes
United States v. Fox Lake State Bank,
supra, on the ground it involved a claim of estoppel by "a
bank [that] had erred in certain applications because it had to
file before the Government would provide it with necessary
information."
Ante at
450 U. S. 789,
n. 4. I trust that the majority does not intend to suggest that a
claim of estoppel is more likely to prevail when raised by a bank,
rather than by a person eligible for Social Security benefits, but
I do not believe that the majority's other basis for distinguishing
that case -- that the Government failed to provide the information
necessary to file correct applications -- is substantively
different from the Government's failure in this case to supply
respondent with correct information when she sought to apply for
benefits. The third distinction offered by the majority -- one that
apparently differentiates between written statements by the
Government and oral ones -- might be relevant to the proof of the
Government's conduct in some cases. However, estoppel against the
Government has not been restricted in the past to written
misrepresentations,
see, e.g., Simmons v. United States,
supra, and today's decision leaves unclear whether or when
such a limitation will apply in the future. Thus, I believe that
the majority, in its haste to reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, has simply added confusion to an already unsettled area by
hinting, but not deciding, that various factual nuances may be
dispositive of estoppel claims against the Government.
Moreover, in summarily reversing the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, the majority glosses over the sorts of situations -- such
as that presented by this case -- that have increasingly led courts
to conclude that, in some cases, hard and fast rules against
estoppel of the Government are neither fair nor constitutionally
required. The majority characterizes Connelly's conduct in this
case as little more than an innocent mistake, based possibly on his
unfamiliarity with a "recent
Page 450 U. S. 794
amendment" rendering respondent eligible for benefits, or
possibly, the majority speculates, on respondent's failure to give
Connelly sufficient "information . . . to know that he was in
error."
Ante at
450 U. S. 789.
The majority further concludes that this error was essentially
harmless, because, in the majority's view, it "did not cause
respondent to . . . fail to take action . . . that respondent could
not correct at any time."
Ibid.
While these characterizations certainly facilitate the summary
disposition the majority seeks, they do not fit this case. The
"recent amendment" had been in effect for a year and a half when
respondent was incorrectly informed that she was not eligible.
Moreover, it is quite clear that respondent provided Connelly with
sufficient information on which to make a correct judgment, had he
been so inclined. [
Footnote 2/3]
Finally, to conclude that Connelly's incorrect assessment of
respondent's eligibility did not cause her to act to her detriment
in a manner that she "could not correct at any time" is to blink in
the face of the obvious. Connelly, and not respondent, had the
legal duty to meet with Social Security applicants and advise them
concerning their eligibility for benefits. While not necessarily
free of error, such preliminary advice is inevitably accorded great
weight by applicants who -- like respondent -- are totally
uneducated in the intricacies of the Social Security
Page 450 U. S. 795
laws. Hence, the majority's effort to cast respondent as the
architect of her own predicament is wholly unpersuasive. Instead,
the fault for respondent's failure to file a timely application for
benefits that she was entitled to must rest squarely with the
Government, first because its agent incorrectly advised her that
she was ineligible for benefits, and second because the same agent
breached his duty to encourage to file a written application
regardless of his views on her eligibility.
In my view, when this sort of governmental misconduct directly
causes an individual's failure to comply with a purely procedural
requirement established by the agency, it may be sufficient to
estop the Government from denying that individual benefits that she
is substantively entitled to receive. Indeed, in an analogous
situation, we concluded that, before an agency "may extinguish the
entitlement of . . . otherwise eligible beneficiaries, it must
comply, at a minimum, with its own internal procedures."
Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199,
415 U. S. 235
(1974). At the very least, the question deserves more than the
casual treatment it receives from the majority today.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Ironically, the central case relied on by the majority today,
INS v. Hibi, 414 U. S. 5 (1973),
was also a per curiam decision rendered without the benefit of
briefing and oral argument. Moreover, in that case, the applicant
applied for the sought-after benefit -- naturalization -- 20 years
after his substantive eligibility had expired, and the claim of
estoppel arose solely from an alleged general failure of the
Government to adequately inform noncitizens who served with the
Armed Services of the United States during World War II of their
possible eligibility for naturalization. Here, in contrast,
respondent was eligible for the benefits at the time of her
interview with Connelly, and the claim of estoppel here arises from
Connelly's specific failure to answer correctly her questions
concerning eligibility and to encourage her to file an
application.
[
Footnote 2/2]
In
Semaan, the benefit ultimately sought by the party
claiming estoppel was reinstatement in the job from which he was
discharged. Thus, I believe that the majority errs in claiming that
the estoppel "did not threaten the public fisc."
Ante at
450 U. S. 789,
n.4.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The apparent basis for the majority's speculation that
respondent may not have informed Connelly of all the relevant facts
is Judge Friendly's assertion, in dissent, that Connelly did not
know that respondent's husband had died. This view is wholly
implausible. Respondent asked Connelly whether she was eligible for
mother's insurance benefits. These benefits are
only
available to persons whose spouses have died, 42 U.S.C. § 402(g), a
fact that must have been known to Connelly. It is clear from the
record that Connelly assumed that respondent's husband had died,
and instead focused his questions on respondent's marital status at
the time of her husband's death, in the mistaken belief that she
would be ineligible if she was divorced at that time. Thus,
respondent testified before the Administrative Law Judge that
Connelly "said I was not [eligible] because I was divorced
at
the time of my husband's death." App. to Brief in Opposition
2a. (Emphasis added.)