Held: Louisiana violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by
prosecuting petitioner a second time for first-degree murder after
the judge at the first trial granted petitioner's motion for new
trial on the ground that the evidence was legally insufficient to
support the jury's guilty verdict. This case is controlled by
Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (decided
before the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction
after the second trial), which held that "the Double Jeopardy
Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found
the evidence legally insufficient" to support the guilty verdict.
Id. at
437 U. S. 18.
Burks is not to be read as holding that double jeopardy
protections are violated only when the prosecution has adduced no
evidence at all of the crime or an element thereof. The record does
not support the State's contention that the trial judge granted a
new trial only because, as a "13th juror," he entertained personal
doubts about the verdict and would have decided it differently from
the other 12 jurors. The record shows instead that he granted the
new trial because the State had failed to prove its case as a
matter of law. Pp.
450 U. S.
425.
373 So.
2d 1294, reversed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether Louisiana violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause, as we expounded it in
Burks v. United
States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978),
by prosecuting petitioner a second time after the trial judge at
the first trial granted petitioner's
Page 450 U. S. 41
motion for new trial on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty.
I
Petitioner Tracy Lee Hudson was tried in Louisiana state court
for first-degree murder, and the jury found him guilty. Petitioner
then moved for a new trial, which, under Louisiana law, was
petitioner's only means of challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence against him. [
Footnote
1] The trial judge granted the motion, stating:
"I heard the same evidence the jury did[;] I'm convinced that
there was no evidence, certainly not evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, to sustain the verdict of the homicide committed by this
defendant of this particular victim."
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the State's application
Page 450 U. S. 42
for a writ of certiorari.
State v.
Hudson, 344 So. 2d
1 (1977).
At petitioner's second trial, the State presented an eyewitness
whose testimony it had not presented at the first trial. The second
jury also found petitioner guilty. The Louisiana Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction.
State v. Hudson, 361 So.
2d 858 (1978).
Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus in a Louisiana
state court, contending that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the
State from trying him the second time. Petitioner relied on our
decision in
Burks [
Footnote 2] that "the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a
second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence
legally insufficient" to support the guilty verdict. 437 U.S. at
437 U. S. 18.
[
Footnote 3] The trial court
denied a writ, and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed.
373 So.
2d 1294 (1979). The Supreme Court read
Burks to bar a
second trial only if the court reviewing the evidence -- whether an
appellate court or a trial court -- determines that there was no
evidence to support the verdict. Because it believed that the trial
judge at petitioner's first trial had granted petitioner's motion
for new trial on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to
support the verdict, although some evidence, the Louisiana Supreme
Court concluded that petitioner's second trial was not precluded by
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
We granted a writ of certiorari, 445 U.S. 960 (1980), and we now
reverse.
II
We considered in
Burks the question
"whether an accused may be subjected to a second trial when
conviction in a prior trial was reversed by an appellate court
solely for lack of sufficient
Page 450 U. S. 43
evidence to sustain the jury's verdict."
437 U.S. at
437 U. S. 2. We
held that a reversal "due to a failure of proof at trial," where
the State received a "fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it
could assemble," bars retrial on the same charge.
Id. at
437 U. S. 16. We
also held that it makes "no difference that the
reviewing
court, rather than the trial court, determined the evidence to be
insufficient,"
id. at
437 U. S. 11
(emphasis in original), or that "a defendant has sought a new trial
as one of his remedies, or even as the sole remedy."
Id.
at
437 U. S. 17.
Our decision in
Burks controls this case, for it is
clear that petitioner moved for a new trial on the ground that the
evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict and that
the trial judge granted petitioner's motion on that ground. In the
hearing on the motion, petitioner's counsel argued to the trial
judge that "the verdict of the jury is contrary to the law and the
evidence." After reviewing the evidence put to the jurors, the
trial judge agreed with petitioner "that there was no evidence,
certainly not evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, to sustain the
verdict"; and he commented:
"[H]ow they concluded that this defendant committed the act from
that evidence when no weapon was produced, no proof of anyone who
saw a blow struck, is beyond the Court's comprehension."
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that the trial judge
granted the new trial on the ground that the evidence was legally
insufficient. The Supreme Court described the trial judge's
decision in these words:
"[T]he trial judge herein ordered a new trial pursuant to
LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 851(1) solely for lack of
sufficient
evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. . . ."
373 So. 2d at 1298 (emphasis in original). This is precisely the
circumstance in which
Burks precludes retrials. 437 U.S.
at
437 U. S. 18.
See Greene v. Massey, 437 U. S. 19,
437 U. S. 226
(1978);
id. at
437 U. S. 27
(POWELL, J., concurring). Nothing in
Burks suggests, as
the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to believe, that double jeopardy
protections are violated only when the prosecution has adduced no
evidence at all of the crime or an element thereof.
Page 450 U. S. 44
The State contends that
Burks does not control this
case. As the State reads the record, the trial judge granted a new
trial only because he entertained personal doubts about the
verdict. According to the State, the trial judge decided that he,
as a "13th juror," would not have found petitioner guilty, and he
therefore granted a new trial even though the evidence was not
insufficient as a matter of law to support the verdict. [
Footnote 4] The State therefore reasons
that
Burks does not preclude a new trial in such a case,
for the new trial was not granted "due to a failure of proof at
trial." 437 U.S. at
437 U. S. 16.
This is not such a case, as the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme
Court and the statements of the trial judge make clear. The trial
judge granted the new trial because the State had failed to prove
its case as a matter of law, not merely because he, as a "13th
juror," would have decided it differently from the other 12 jurors.
[
Footnote 5] Accordingly, there
are no significant
Page 450 U. S. 45
facts which distinguish this case from
Burks, [
Footnote 6] and the Double Jeopardy
Clause barred the State from prosecuting petitioner a second
time.
III
The judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court is reversed. It is
so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Louisiana's Code of Criminal Procedure does not authorize trial
judges to enter judgments of acquittal in jury trials. La.Code
Crim.Proc.Ann., Art. 778 (West Supp. 1980);
State v.
Henderson, 362 So.
2d 1358, 1367 (La.1978). Accordingly, a criminal defendant's
only means of challenging the sufficiency of evidence presented
against him to a jury is a motion for new trial under La.Code
Crim.Proc.Ann., Art. 851 (West 1967 and Supp. 1980), which provides
in pertinent part:
"The Court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial
whenever:"
"(1) The verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence;"
"(2) The court's ruling on a written motion, or an objection
made during the proceedings, shows prejudicial error;"
"(3) New and material evidence that, notwithstanding the
exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not
discovered before or during the trial, is available, and if the
evidence had been introduced at the trial it would probably have
changed the verdict or judgment of guilty;"
"(4) The defendant has discovered, since the verdict or judgment
of guilty, a prejudicial error or defect in the proceedings that,
notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the
defendant, was not discovered before the verdict or judgment;
or"
"(5) The court is of the opinion that the ends of justice would
be served by the granting of a new trial, although the defendant
may not be entitled to a new trial as a matter of strict legal
right."
We think it clear that the trial judge in this case acted under
paragraph (1) in granting a new trial.
See infra at
450 U. S.
43.
[
Footnote 2]
We decided
Burks before the Louisiana Supreme Court
entered its judgment affirming petitioner's conviction.
[
Footnote 3]
Burks involved a federal prosecution, but the Court
held in
Greene v. Massey, 437 U. S.
19,
437 U. S. 24
(1978), that the double jeopardy principle in
Burks fully
applies to the States.
See Benton v. Maryland,
395 U. S. 784
(1969);
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U. S. 28
(1978).
[
Footnote 4]
The State's contention here adopts the reasoning of Justice
Tate's concurring opinion in the Louisiana Supreme Court. Justice
Tate wrote:
"[The trial judge] did not grant a new trial for a reason that
he did not think the state had produced
sufficient
evidence to prove guilt, but rather because he himself (to satisfy
his doubts, not the jury's, which had concluded otherwise)
had personal doubts that the evidence was sufficient to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Commendably and conscientiously, he
therefore ordered a new trial. . . . "
"The present is not an instance where the state did not prove
its case at the first trial, so that granting a new trial gave the
state a
second chance to produce enough evidence to
convict the accused. If so, as the majority notes, retrial offends
constitutional double jeopardy."
373 So. 2d at 1298 (emphasis in original).
[
Footnote 5]
Whether a state trial judge in a jury trial may assess evidence
as a "13th juror" is a question of state law.
Compare People v.
Noga, 196 Colo. 478, 480,
586 P.2d 1002,
1003 (1978);
State v. Bowle, 318 So. 2d 407, 408 (Fla.App.
1975),
with Veitch v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d
722, 730-731, 152 Cal. Rptr. 822, 827 (1979);
People v.
Ramos, 33 App.Div.2d 344, 347, 308 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197-198
(1970). Justice Tate's concurring opinion for the Louisiana Supreme
Court suggests that Louisiana law allows trial judges to act as
"13th jurors." We do not decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
would have barred Louisiana from retrying petitioner if the trial
judge had granted a new trial in that capacity, for that is not the
case before us. We note, however, that
Burks precludes
retrial where the State has failed as a matter of law to prove its
case despite a fair opportunity to do so.
Supra at
450 U. S. 43. By
definition, a new trial ordered by a trial judge acting as a "13th
juror" is not such a case. Thus, nothing in
Burks
precludes retrial in such a case.
[
Footnote 6]
The Louisiana Supreme Court did not find it significant that the
trial judge, rather than an appellate court, held the State's
evidence to be insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict:
"While the case at bar involves the granting of a motion for new
trial by the trial court for insufficient evidence, rather than
review at the appellate level, we deem the same principles are
applicable to both."
373 So. 2d at 1297. The State does not contest this
conclusion.