Petitioners, who were involved in an agreement to import
marihuana and then to distribute it domestically, were convicted on
separate counts of conspiracy to import marihuana, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 963, and conspiracy to distribute marihuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. These statutes are parts of different
subchapters of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970. Petitioners received consecutive sentences on each
count, the length of each of their combined sentences exceeding the
maximum which could have been imposed either for a conviction of
conspiracy to import or for a conviction of conspiracy to
distribute. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and
sentences.
Held:
1. Congress intended to permit the imposition of consecutive
sentences for violations of §§ 846 and 963 even though such
violations arose from a single agreement or conspiracy having dual
objectives. Pp.
450 U. S.
336-343.
(a) In determining whether Congress intended to authorize
cumulative punishments, the applicable rule, announced in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.
S. 299,
284 U. S. 304,
is that
"where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not."
The statutory provisions involved here specify different ends as
the proscribed object of the conspiracy -- "distribution" and
"importation" -- and clearly satisfy the
Blockburger test.
Each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not,
and thus §§ 846 and 963 proscribe separate statutory offenses the
violations of which can result in the imposition of consecutive
sentences.
Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S.
49 distinguished. Pp.
450 U. S.
337-340.
(b) While the
Blockburger test is not controlling where
there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent, if
anything is to be assumed from the legislative history's silence on
the question whether consecutive sentences can be imposed for a
conspiracy to import and distribute drugs, it is that Congress was
aware of the
Blockburger rule,
Page 450 U. S. 334
and legislated with it in mind. And the rule of lenity has no
application in this case, since there is no statutory ambiguity.
Pp.
450 U. S.
340-343.
2. The imposition of consecutive sentences for petitioners'
violations of §§ 846 and 963 does not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In determining whether punishments
imposed after a conviction are unconstitutionally multiple, the
dispositive question is whether Congress intended to authorize
separate punishments for the crimes. Where Congress intended, as it
did here, to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such
sentences does not violate the Constitution. Pp.
450 U. S.
343-344.
612 F.2d 906, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, ad POWELL, JJ., joined.
STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
MARSHALL and STEVENS, JJ., joined,
post, p.
450 U. S.
344.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to import marihuana
(Count I), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, and conspiracy to
distribute marihuana (Count II), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
Petitioners received consecutive sentences on each count. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc, affirmed petitioners' convictions and sentences.
United
States v. Rodriguez, 612 F.2d 906 (1980). We granted
certiorari to consider whether Congress intended consecutive
sentences to be imposed for the violation of these two conspiracy
statutes, and, if so, whether such cumulative punishment violates
the Double Jeopardy
Page 450 U. S. 335
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
449 U.S. 818 (1980).
The facts forming the basis of petitioners' convictions are set
forth in the panel opinion of the Court of Appeals,
United
States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234 (1978), and need not be
repeated in detail here. For our purposes, we need only relate that
the petitioners were involved in an agreement, the objectives of
which were to import marihuana and then to distribute it
domestically. Petitioners were charged and convicted under two
separate statutory provisions, and received consecutive sentences.
The length of each of their combined sentences exceeded the maximum
5-year sentence which could have been imposed either for a
conviction of conspiracy to import or for a conviction of
conspiracy to distribute.
The statutes involved in this case are part of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1236, 21
U.S.C. § 801
et seq. Section 846 is in Subchapter I of the
Act, and provides:
"Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense
defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or
both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the
offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or
conspiracy."
This provision proscribes conspiracy to commit any offense
defined in Subchapter I, including conspiracy to distribute
marihuana, which is specifically prohibited in 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1). Section 846 authorizes imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment or a fine that does not exceed the penalty specified
for the object offense.
Section 963, which is part of Subchapter II of the Act, contains
a provision identical to § 846 and proscribes conspiracy to commit
any offense defined in Subchapter II, including conspiracy to
import marihuana, which is specifically prohibited by 21 U.S.C. §
960(a)(1). As in § 846, § 963
Page 450 U. S. 336
authorizes a sentence of imprisonment or a fine that does not
exceed the penalties specified for the object offense. Thus, a
conspiratorial agreement which envisages both the importation and
distribution of marihuana violates both statutory provisions, each
of which authorizes a separate punishment.
Petitioners do not dispute that their conspiracy to import and
distribute marihuana violated both § 846 and § 963. Rather,
petitioners contend it is not clear whether Congress intended to
authorize multiple punishment for violation of these two statutes
in a case involving only a single agreement or conspiracy, even
though that isolated agreement had dual objectives. Petitioners
argue that, because Congress has not spoken with the clarity
required for this Court to find an "unambiguous intent to impose
multiple punishment," we should invoke the rule of lenity and hold
that the statutory ambiguity on this issue prevents the imposition
of multiple punishment. Petitioners further contend that, even if
cumulative punishment was authorized by Congress, such punishment
is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In resolving petitioners' initial contention that Congress did
not intend to authorize multiple punishment for violations of §§
846 and 963, our starting point must be the language of the
statutes. Absent a "clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."
Consumers Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U. S. 102,
447 U. S. 108
(1980). Here, we confront separate offenses with separate penalty
provisions that are contained in distinct Subchapters of the Act.
The provisions are unambiguous on their face, and each authorizes
punishment for a violation of its terms. Petitioners contend,
however, that the question presented is not whether the statutes
are facially ambiguous, but whether consecutive sentences may be
imposed when convictions under those statutes arise from
participation in a single conspiracy
Page 450 U. S. 337
with multiple objectives -- a question raised, rather than
resolved, by the existence of both provisions.
The answer to petitioners' contention is found, we believe, in
application of the rule announced by this Court in
Blockburger
v. United States, 284 U. S. 299
(1932), and most recently applied last Term in
Whalen v. United
States, 445 U. S. 684
(1980). In
Whalen, the Court explained that the "rule of
statutory construction" stated in
Blockburger is to be
used "to determine whether Congress has, in a given situation,
provided that two statutory offenses may be punished cumulatively."
445 U.S. at
445 U. S. 691.
The Court then referenced the following test set forth in
Blockburger:
"The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or
only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which
the other does not."
Blockburger v. United States, supra at
284 U. S. 304.
Our decision in
Whalen was not the first time this Court
has looked to the
Blockburger rule to determine whether
Congress intended that two statutory offenses be punished
cumulatively. We previously stated in
Brown v. Ohio,
432 U. S. 161,
432 U. S. 166
(1977), although our analysis there was, of necessity, based on a
claim of double jeopardy, since the case came to us from a state
court, that
"[t]he established test for determining whether two offenses are
sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative
punishment was stated in
Blockburger v. United States. . .
."
Similarly, in
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.
S. 770,
420 U. S. 785,
n. 17 (1975), we explained:
"The test articulated in
Blockburger v. United States,
284 U. S.
299 (1932), serves a generally similar function of
identifying congressional intent to impose separate sanctions for
multiple offenses arising in the course of a single act or
transaction. In determining whether separate
Page 450 U. S. 338
punishment might be imposed,
Blockburger requires that
courts examine the offenses to ascertain 'whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not.'
Id. at
284 U. S. 304. As
Blockburger and other decisions applying its principle
reveal, . . . the Court's application of the test focuses on the
statutory elements of the offense. If each requires proof of a fact
that the other does not, the
Blockburger test is
satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof
offered to establish the crimes."
In
Gore v. United States, 357 U.
S. 386 (1958), the Court rejected the opportunity to
abandon
Blockburger as the test to apply in determining
whether Congress intended to impose multiple punishment for a
single act which violates several statutory provisions. In
reaffirming
Blockburger, the Court explained:
"The fact that an offender violates by a single transaction
several regulatory controls devised by Congress as means for
dealing with a social evil as deleterious as it is difficult to
combat does not make the several different regulatory controls
single and identic."
357 U.S. at
357 U. S.
389.
Finally, in
American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U. S. 781
(1946), defendants who had been convicted of conspiracy in
restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act (15
U.S.C. § 1), and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of § 2 (15
U.S.C. § 2), sought review of their convictions, contending that
separate sentences for these offenses were impermissible because
there was "but one conspiracy, namely, a conspiracy to fix prices."
328 U.S. at
328 U. S. 788.
In rejecting this claim, the Court noted the presence of separate
statutory offenses and then, relying on
Blockburger,
upheld the sentences on the ground that
"§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act require proof of conspiracies
which are reciprocally distinguishable from and independent of
each
Page 450 U. S. 339
other although the objects of the conspiracies may partially
overlap."
328 U.S. at
328 U. S.
788.
The statutory provisions at issue here clearly satisfy the rule
announced in
Blockburger, and petitioners do not seriously
contend otherwise. Sections 846 and 963 specify different ends as
the proscribed object of the conspiracy -- distribution, as opposed
to importation -- and it is beyond peradventure that "each
provision requires proof of a fact [that] the other does not."
Thus, application of the
Blockburger rule to determine
whether Congress has provided that these two statutory offenses be
punished cumulatively results in the unequivocal determination that
§§ 846 and 963, like §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, which were at
issue in
American Tobacco, proscribe separate statutory
offenses the violations of which can result in the imposition of
consecutive sentences.
Our conclusion in this regard is not inconsistent with our
earlier decision in
Braverman v. United States,
317 U. S. 49
(1942), on which petitioners rely so heavily. Petitioners argue
that
Blockburger cannot be used for divining legislative
intent when the statutes at issue are conspiracy statutes. Quoting
Braverman, they argue that whether the objective of a
single agreement is to commit one or many crimes, it is in either
case the agreement which constitutes the conspiracy which the
statute punishes.
"The one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements, and
hence several conspiracies, because it envisages the violation of
several statutes, rather than one."
317 U.S. at
317 U. S. 53.
Braverman, however, does not support petitioners'
position. Unlike the instant case or this Court's later decision in
American Tobacco, the conspiratorial agreement in
Braverman, although it had many objectives, violated but a
single statute. The
Braverman Court specifically
noted:
"Since the single continuing agreement, which is the conspiracy
here, thus embraces its criminal objects, it
Page 450 U. S. 340
differs from successive acts which violate a single penal
statute and
from a single act which violates two statutes.
See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S.
299,
284 U. S. 301-[30]4;
Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1,
273 U. S. 11-12. The single
agreement is the prohibited conspiracy, and however diverse its
objects, it violates but a single statute, § 37 of the Criminal
Code. For such a violation, only the single penalty prescribed by
the statute can be imposed."
317 U.S. at
317 U. S. 54
(emphasis added). Later, in
American Tobacco, the Court
distinguished
Braverman:
"In contrast to the single conspiracy described in
[
Braverman] in separate counts, all charged under the
general conspiracy statute, . . . we have here separate statutory
offenses, one a conspiracy in restraint of trade that may stop
short of monopoly and the other a conspiracy to monopolize that may
not be content with restraint short of monopoly. One is made
criminal by § 1 and the other by § 2 of the Sherman Act."
328 U.S. at
328 U. S. 788.
See also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.
S. 640,
328 U. S.
642-643 (1946).
The
Blockburger test is a "rule of statutory
construction," and, because it serves as a mean of discerning
congressional purpose, the rule should not be controlling where,
for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative
intent. Nothing, however, in the legislative history which has been
brought to our attention discloses an intent contrary to the
presumption which should be accorded to these statutes after
application of the
Blockburger test. In fact, the
legislative history is silent on the question of whether
consecutive sentences can be imposed for conspiracy to import and
distribute drugs. Petitioners read this silence as an "ambiguity"
over whether Congress intended to authorize
Page 450 U. S. 341
multiple punishment. [
Footnote
1] Petitioners, however, read much into nothing. Congress
cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of statutory
construction which may arise. But, as we have previously noted,
Congress is "predominantly a lawyer's body."
Callanan v. United
States, 364 U. S. 587,
364 U. S. 594
(1961), and it is appropriate for us "to assume that our elected
representatives . . . know the law."
Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,
441 U. S.
696-697 (1979). As a result, if anything is to be
assumed from the congressional
Page 450 U. S. 342
silence on this point, it is that Congress was aware of the
Blockburger rule and legislated with it in mind. It is not
a function of this Court to presume that "Congress was unaware of
what it accomplished. . . ."
United States Railroad Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166,
449 U. S. 179
(1980). [
Footnote 2]
Finally, petitioners contend that, because the legislative
history is "ambiguous" on the question of multiple punishment, we
should apply the rule of lenity so as not to allow consecutive
sentences in this situation. Last Term. in
Bifulco v. United
States, 447 U. S. 381
(1980), we recognized that the rule of lenity is a principle of
statutory construction which applies not only to interpretations of
the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the
penalties they impose. Quoting
Ladner v. United States,
358 U. S. 169,
358 U. S. 178
(1958), we stated:
"'This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret
a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it
places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on
no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.'"
447 U.S. at
447 U. S. 387.
We emphasized that the "touchstone" of the rule of lenity "is
statutory ambiguity." And we stated: "Where Congress has manifested
its intention, we may not manufacture ambiguity in order to defeat
that intent."
Ibid. Lenity thus serves only as an aid for
resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. The rule
comes into operation
"at the end of the process of construing what Congress has
expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of
being lenient to wrongdoers."
Callanan v. United States, supra, at
364 U. S.
596.
Page 450 U. S. 343
In light of these principles, the rule of lenity simply has no
application in this case; we are not confronted with any statutory
ambiguity. To the contrary, we are presented with statutory
provisions which are unambiguous on their face and a legislative
history which gives us no reason to pause over the manner in which
these provisions should be interpreted.
The conclusion we reach today regarding the intent of Congress
is reinforced by the fact that the two conspiracy statutes are
directed to separate evils presented by drug trafficking.
"Importation" and "distribution" of marihuana impose diverse
societal harms, and, as the Court of Appeals observed, Congress
has, in effect, determined that a conspiracy to import drugs and to
distribute them is twice as serious as a conspiracy to do either
object singly. 612 F.2d at 918. This result is not surprising, for,
as we observed many years ago, the history of the narcotics
legislation in this country
"reveals the determination of Congress to turn the screw of the
criminal machinery -- detection, prosecution and punishment --
tighter and tighter."
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. at
357 U. S.
390.
Having found that Congress intended to permit the imposition of
consecutive sentences for violations of § 846 and § 963, we are
brought to petitioners' argument that, notwithstanding this fact,
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution precludes the imposition of such punishment.
While the Clause itself simply states that no person shall "be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb," the decisional law in the area is a veritable Sargasso Sea
which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial
navigator. We have previously stated that the Double Jeopardy
Clause
"protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the
offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense."
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.
S. 711,
395 U. S. 717
(1969) (footnotes omitted).
Page 450 U. S. 344
Last Term, in
Whalen v. United States, this Court
stated that
"the question whether punishments imposed by a court after a
defendant's conviction upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally
multiple cannot be resolved without determining what punishments
the Legislative Branch has authorized."
445 U.S. at
445 U. S. 688;
id. at
445 U. S. 696
(WHITE, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment);
ibid. (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). In
determining the permissibility of the imposition of cumulative
punishment for the crime of rape and the crime of unintentional
killing in the course of rape, the Court recognized that the
"dispositive question" was whether Congress intended to authorize
separate punishments for the two crimes.
Id. at
445 U. S. 689.
This is so because the "power to define criminal offenses and to
prescribe punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty of
them, resides wholly with the Congress."
Ibid. As we
previously noted in
Brown v. Ohio,
"[w]here consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal
trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to
assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative
authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same
offense."
432 U.S. at
432 U. S. 165.
Thus, the question of what punishments are constitutionally
permissible is not different from the question of what punishments
the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress
intended, as it did here, to impose multiple punishments,
imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.
[
Footnote 3]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Both petitioners and the Government concede that the legislative
history is silent with regard to whether Congress intended to
impose multiple punishment for a single conspiracy which violates
both § 846 and § 963.
See Brief for Petitioners 18-19 and
Brief for United States 25. In support of their argument that this
silence equals "ambiguity," petitioners set forth an alternative
explanation for the existence of the two separate conspiracy
statutes. Petitioners contend that these different statutes were
enacted because two different Committees in the House of
Representatives had jurisdiction over the different Subchapters of
the Act. The legislation was initially referred to the House
Committee on Ways and Means, and, following hearings, that
Committee decided to consider only the provisions relating to
imports and exports of narcotic drugs, transferring the remaining
provisions -- relating to domestic regulation and control -- to the
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Petitioners argue that
this background supports a conclusion that the dual structure of
the Act was a result of congressional concern with committee
jurisdiction, and not an intent by Congress to authorize multiple
punishment. The Government persuasively responds to this
speculation by noting that Congress was unquestionably aware of the
existence of the separate conspiracy provisions, inasmuch as the
enacted legislation evidences a great deal of coordination between
the two House Committees. For example, Subchapter II of the Act
incorporates the basic standards of Subchapter I, and makes
numerous express references to the provisions of that Subchapter.
The Subchapters also have parallel penalty structures imposing
similar penalties on similar crimes, and these penalties represent
a change from both the administration's proposal and prior law.
Moreover, Congressman Boggs, the sponsor of the bill, stated when
introducing a floor amendment to Title III (Subchapter II of the
Act) that
"section 1013 [now 21 U.S.C. § 963] -- relating to attempts and
conspiracies -- . . . will take effect at the same time as the
comparable provisions of title II [Subchapter I of the Act
encompassing,
inter alia, § 846]."
116 Cong.Rec. 33665 (1970).
[
Footnote 2]
The petitioners also argue that, in numerous instances, the
Government has charged a single conspiracy to import and distribute
marihuana in one count. The inconsistency in the Government's
behavior supports a finding of an absence of clear congressional
intent with regard to the appropriatness of multiple punishment.
The Government responds to this argument by noting that, in 1977,
the Justice Department. advised all United States Attorneys that
conspiracy to import and distribute should be charged as separate
counts. We find that neither argument sheds light on the intent of
Congress in this regard.
[
Footnote 3]
Petitioners' contention that a single conspiracy which violates
both § 846 and § 963 constitutes the "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes is wrong. We noted in
Brown v. Ohio that
the established test for determining whether two offenses are the
"same offense" is the rule set forth in
Blockburger -- the
same rule on which we relied in determining congressional intent.
As has been previously discussed, conspiracy to import marihuana in
violation of § 963 and conspiracy to distribute marihuana in
violation of § 846 clearly meet the
Blockburger standard.
It is well settled that a single transaction can give rise to
distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
See, e.g., Harris v. United
States, 359 U. S. 19
(1959);
Gore v. United States, 357 U.
S. 386 (1958). This is true even though the "single
transaction" is an agreement or conspiracy.
American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781
(1946).
JUSTICE STEWART, with whom JUSTICE MARSALL and JUSTICE STEVENS
join, concurring in the judgment.
In
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.
S. 684,
445 U. S. 688,
the Court said that
"the question whether punishments imposed by a
Page 450 U. S. 345
court after a defendant's conviction upon criminal charges are
unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining
what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized."
But that is a far cry from what the Court says today:
"[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally
permissible is not different from the question of what punishments
the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress
intended, as it did here, to impose multiple punishments,
imposition of such sentences does not violate the
Constitution."
Ante at
450 U. S. 344.
These statements are supported by neither precedent nor reasoning,
and are unnecessary to reach the Court's conclusion.
No matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not
constitutionally provide for cumulative punishments unless each
statutory offense required proof of a fact that the other did not,
under the criterion of
Blockburger v. United States,
284 U. S. 299.
Since Congress has created two offenses here, and since each
requires proof of a fact that the other does not, I concur in the
judgment.