Held: In proceedings by respondent nursing homes and
nursing home association wherein regulations relating to Medicaid
reimbursements to be paid by participating States to nursing homes
were held invalid, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
State of Florida had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from
liability in federal court for retroactive monetary relief to
respondents. The State's general waiver of sovereign immunity for
petitioner Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, under
a statute providing that the Department is a body corporate with
the capacity to sue and be sued, does not constitute a waiver by
the State of its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court. Nor is the Department's agreement, upon participating in the
Medicaid program, to obey federal law in administering the program
sufficient to waive the protection of the Eleventh Amendment.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651.
Certiorari granted; 616 F.2d 1355, reversed.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services and its Secretary, seek review of a decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordering them to make
payments to various nursing homes. These payments represent the
amount that Florida was found to have underpaid these nursing homes
in the course of its Medicaid reimbursements from July 1, 1976, to
October 18, 1977. Because we conclude that the court below
misapplied the prevailing standard for finding a waiver of the
State's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, we grant a writ of
certiorari and reverse.
Page 450 U. S. 148
I
In 1972, Congress amended the Medicaid Program to provide that
every "skilled nursing facility and intermediate care facility"
must be reimbursed by participating States on a "cost related
basis." 86 Stat. 1426, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(E). This amendment
was to take effect on July 1, 1976,
ibid., and had the
effect of altering some reimbursement arrangements based on "flat
rates" established by the States. Regulations implementing this
change were not promulgated by the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) until 1976. As a result, the regulations provided
that HEW would not enforce the new "cost related" reimbursement
requirement until January 1, 1978. 45 CFR § 250.30(a)(3)(iv)
(1976). [
Footnote 1]
In March, 1977, respondents, an association of Florida nursing
homes and various individual nursing homes in southern Florida,
brought suit in federal court against the Secretary of HEW and
petitioners. They argued that the delay in enforcement created by
the implementing regulations was inconsistent with the statutory
directive that cost-related reimbursements begin on July 1, 1976.
In addition to prospective relief, they sought retroactive relief
in the form of payments by the State of the difference between the
reimbursement they had received since July 1, 1976, and the amounts
they would have received under a cost-related system. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held the
regulations invalid, relying on its previous decision in
Golden
Isles Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Califano, 442 F.
Supp. 201 (1977),
aff'd, 616 F.2d 1355 (CA5),
cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. Golden Isles
Convalescent
Page 450 U. S. 149
Center, Inc., 449 U.S. 872 (1980). These two cases were
consolidated for consideration of the availability of retroactive
relief, and the District Court held that such relief was barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the ruling that the regulations were invalid, but
reversed the District Court's determination that retroactive relief
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 616 F.2d 1355 (1980).
[
Footnote 2] The court
acknowledged that retroactive monetary relief against a State in
federal court is forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment "if not
consented to by the state."
Id. at 1362. It found the
requisite consent, however, based on two acts of the State. First,
Florida law provides that the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services is a "body corporate" with the capacity to
"sue and be sued," Fla.Stat. § 402.34 (1979). 616 F.2d at 1363. In
addition to this general waiver of sovereign immunity, the court
found a specific waiver of the Eleventh Amendment's immunity from
suit in federal court in an agreement under the Medicaid Program in
which the Department agreed to
"recognize and abide by all State and Federal Laws, Regulations,
and Guidelines applicable to participation in and administration
of, the Title XIX Medicaid Program."
Ibid.
"By contracting with appellants to be bound by all federal laws
applicable to the Medicaid program, the state has expressly waived
its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consented to suit in federal
court regarding any action by providers alleging a breach of these
laws."
Ibid.
II
The analysis in this case is controlled by our decision in
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651
(1974). There we applied
Page 450 U. S. 150
the Eleventh Amendment to retroactive grants of welfare benefits
and discussed the proper standard for a waiver of this immunity by
a State. On the latter issue, we stated that
"we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express
language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.'"
Id. at
415 U. S. 673,
quoting
Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.
S. 151,
213 U. S. 171
(1909). We added that the
"mere fact that a State participates in a program through which
the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the
State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish
consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal
courts."
415 U.S. at
415 U. S.
673.
The holding below, finding a waiver in this case, cannot be
reconciled with the principles set out in
Edelman. As the
Court of Appeals recognized, the State's general waiver of
sovereign immunity for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services "does not constitute a waiver by the state of its
constitutional immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in
federal court." 616 F.2d at 1363.
See Smith v. Reeves,
178 U. S. 436,
178 U. S. 441
(1900). And the fact that the Department agreed explicitly to obey
federal law in administering the program can hardly be deemed an
express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. This agreement
merely stated a customary condition for any participation in a
federal program by the State, and
Edelman already
established that neither such participation, in itself, nor a
concomitant agreement to obey federal law is sufficient to waive
the protection of the Eleventh Amendment. [
Footnote 3] 415 U.S. at
415 U. S.
673-674.
We therefore reverse the decision below.
It is so ordered.
Page 450 U. S. 151
JUSTICE MARSHALL dissents, and would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals substantially for the reasons stated in his
dissent in
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.
S. 651,
415 U. S. 688
(1974)
JUSTICE BLACKMUN also dissents, and would affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals substantially for the reasons stated in
JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissent in
Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U. S. 651,
415 U. S. 688
(1974).
[
Footnote 1]
In a commentary accompanying the new regulations, the Secretary
noted that no States would be able to accumulate needed data in
time to meet the statutory deadline of July 1, 1976. For this
reason, cost-related reimbursement was not required under the
regulations until January 1, 1978, but the States were "encouraged
to meet each requirement of the regulations as soon as
possible."
41 Fed.Reg. 27305 (1976).
[
Footnote 2]
The
Golden Isles case and this case remained
consolidated on appeal. The decision below, however, produced two
separate petitions for certiorari. The first,
Taylor v. Golden
Isles Convalescent Center, Inc., cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872
(1980), involved jurisdictional and venue issues. The present
petition relates only to the availability of retroactive
relief.
[
Footnote 3]
Petitioners argue that, under Florida law, a waiver of immunity
can only be accomplished by a state statute.
See
Fla.Const., Art. 10, § 13. No such waiver is present here.
In addition, it is worth noting that, in October, 1976, Congress
repealed a provision requiring States participating in Medicaid to
waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity. Pub.L. 94-552, 90 Stat.
2540. This repeal was made retroactive to January 1, 1976.
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is in square conflict with
this Court's holding in
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.
S. 651. Apparently recognizing this fact, respondents
urge the Court to grant certiorari and hear argument on the
question whether
Edelman should be overruled. [
Footnote 2/1] I find this question less
easily answered than do my Brothers, all of whom were Members of
the Court when
Edelman was decided. Each has voted today
consistently with his vote in
Edelman itself.
The arguments in favor of overruling
Edelman are
appealing, particularly because I share the opinion of JUSTICE
BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN that
Edelman was incorrectly decided. [
Footnote 2/2] I have previously relied
Page 450 U. S. 152
on rather slender grounds for distinguihing
Edelman,
[
Footnote 2/3] when wiser judges
might have forthrightly urged rejection of the precedent. [
Footnote 2/4] And I joined the Court's
decision to overrule
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.
S. 167, insofar as it concerned the financial
responsibility of municipal corporations.
See Monell v. New
York City Dept. of Social Servces, 436 U.
S. 658,
436 U. S. 714
(STEVENS, J., concurring in part). Moreover, the reflections of
some former Members of the Court on the doctrine of
stare
decisis suggest that they would not have hesitated to overrule
a decision that stands as an impediment to providing an adequate
remedy for citizens injured by their government. [
Footnote 2/5] Nevertheless, I find greater force in
the countervailing arguments.
First, I would note that
Edelman did not announce a
rule of law fundamentally at odds with our current understanding of
the scope of constitutionally protected civil right, [
Footnote 2/6]
Page 450 U. S. 153
nor did it rest upon a discredited interpretation of the
relevant historical documents. [
Footnote 2/7] Rather, the rule of the
Edelman
case is of only limited significance, and has been a part of our
law for only a few years. Its limiting effect on the jurisdiction
of federal courts is not so restrictive that Congress may not
mitigate its impact by unambiguously conditioning state
participation in federal programs on a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment defense. The
Edelman rule represents an
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that had previously been
endorsed by some of our finest circuit Judges; [
Footnote 2/8] it therefore cannot be characterized
as unreasonable or egregiously incorrect. [
Footnote 2/9]
Of even greater importance, however, is my concern about the
potential damage to the legal system that may be caused by frequent
or sudden reversals of direction that may appear to have been
occasioned by nothing more significant than a change in the
identity of this Court's personnel. [
Footnote 2/10] Granting that a zigzag is sometimes the
best course, [
Footnote 2/11] I am
firmly convinced that we have a profound obligation to give
recently decided cases the strongest presumption of validity.
That
Page 450 U. S. 154
presumpion is supported by much more than the desire to foster
an appearance of certainty and impartiality in the administration
of justice, or the interest in facilitating the labors of judges.
[
Footnote 2/12] The presumption
is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law
affords the individual. Citizens must have confidence that the
rules on which they rely in ordering their affairs -- particularly
when they are prepared to take issue with those in power in doing
so -- are rules of law, and not merely the opinions of a small
group of men who temporarily occupy high office. [
Footnote 2/13] It is the unpopular or beleaguered
individual -- not the man in power -- who has the greatest stake in
the integrity of the law. [
Footnote
2/14]
Page 450 U. S. 155
For me, the adverse consequences of adhering to an arguably
erroneous precedent in this case are far less serious than the
consequences of further unravelling the doctrine of
stare
decisis. I therefore join the Court's disposition.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Respondents initially argued that the Court of Appeals' decision
was distinguishable from
Edelman, and that certiorari
therefore should be denied. However, after the Solicitor General,
on behalf of the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
recommended that the Court grant certiorari and summarily reverse
the lower court's decision, respondents requested that the Court
instead grant certiorari and consider overruling
Edelman.
See Supplemental Brief for Respondent Nursing Homes
4-13.
[
Footnote 2/2]
In 1972, I sat as a member of a three-judge District Court that
rejected essentially the same Eleventh Amendment argument that the
Court accepted in
Edelman. See Mother and Childrens
Rights Organization v. Sterrett, No. 70 F. 138 (ND Ind., Apr.
14, 1972),
summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 809; cited in
Edelman, 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 670,
n. 13. I am therefore quite certain that I would have joined
JUSTICE MASHALL's dissent if I had been a Member of the Court when
Edelman was decided.
[
Footnote 2/3]
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.
S. 445,
427 U. S.
458-460 (STEVENS, J., concurring) .
[
Footnote 2/4]
In his 1949 Cardozo lecture, Justice Douglas stated:
"The idea that any body of law, particularly public law, should
appear to stay put, and not be in flux, is an interesting
phenomenon that Frank has explored in Law and the Modern Mind. He
points out how it is -- in law and in other fields too -- that men
continue to chant of the immutability of a rule in order to"
"cover up the transformation, to deny the reality of change, to
conceal the truth of adaptation behind a verbal disguise of fixity
and universality."
"But the more blunt, open, and direct course is truer to
democratic traditions. It reflects the candor of Cardozo. The
principle of full disclosure has as much place in government as it
does in the marketplace. A judiciary that discloses what it is
doing and why it does it will breed understanding. And confidence
based on understanding is more enduring than confidence based on
awe."
W. Douglas, Stare Decisis 30-31 (1949) (footnote omitted).
[
Footnote 2/5]
See W. Douglas,
supra; A. Goldberg, Equal
Justice: The Warren Era of the Supreme Court 67-97 (1971).
[
Footnote 2/6]
Cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483,
347 U. S.
489-495,
overruling Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U. S. 537.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Cf. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64,
304 U. S. 71-73,
overruling 41 U. S. Tyson,
16 Pet. 1.
[
Footnote 2/8]
The opinion in
Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 228
(CA2 1972), which adopted the interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment subsequently approved by this Court in
Edelman,
was written by Judge McGowan (sitting by designation), and was
joined by Chief Judge Friendly and Judge Timbers.
See 415
U.S. at
415 U. S.
664-665,
415 U. S. 666,
n. 11.
[
Footnote 2/9]
The principal justifications for refusing to apply the doctrine
of
stare decisis in
Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Social Services, 436 U. S. 658;
see id. at
426 U. S.
695-701, are therefore not available in this case.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Scholars have suggested that the identity of the Court's
personnel was a factor underlying the decision in
National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833,
426 U. S.
853-855, to overrule
Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U. S. 183.
See, e.g., J. Nowak, J. Young, & R. Rotunda,
Constitutional Law 159-163 (1978).
[
Footnote 2/11]
See, e.g., West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624,
overruling
Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
310 U. S. 586.
[
Footnote 2/12]
These concerns are not, however, insubstantial:
"[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking
point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and
one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure
foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before
him."
B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921).
[
Footnote 2/13]
This, of course, is not a novel suggestion. As the first Justice
White noted in his dissent in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429,
157 U. S.
652:
"The fundamental conception of a judicial body is that of one
hedged about by precedents which are binding on the court without
regard to the personality of its members. Break down this belief in
judicial continuity, and let it be felt that, on great
constitutional questions, this court is to depart from the settled
conclusions of its predecessors, and to determine them all
according to the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill its
bench, and our Constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of
value, and become a most dangerous instrument to the rights and
liberties of the people."
[
Footnote 2/14]
THE CHIEF JUSTICE recently reminded us of this fact by quoting a
statement ascribed to Sir Thomas More:
"This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast --
Man's laws, not God's -- and if you cut them down . . . d'you
really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow
then? . . . Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own
safety's sake."
See TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153,
437 U. S. 195,
quoting R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, Act I, p. 147 (Three Plays,
Heinemann ed.1967).
JUSTICE BRENNAN dissenting.
I dissent, and would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. This suit is brought by Florida citizens against Florida
officials. In that circumstance, I am of the view, expressed in
dissent in
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.
S. 651,
415 U. S. 687
(1974), that Florida "may not invoke the Eleventh Amendment, since
that Amendment bars only federal court suits against States by
citizen of other States."