Shortly after a police officer observed a speeding automobile,
he heard a police radio dispatch which reported that a theft of
motor vehicle parts, including chrome lug nuts, had occurred in the
area, and which described two suspects. A few minutes later, he
again spotted the speeding automobile and followed it into a
service station for the purpose of issuing a traffic citation. As
he approached the car, respondent and his companion stepped out of
it, and during an ensuing conversation with the car's occupants,
the officer observed chrome lug nuts and lug wrenches in plain view
in the car. Recognizing that the car's occupants met the
description of the suspects, the officer arrested them and seized
the lug nuts and wrenches. Before respondent's trial on charges of
stealing motor vehicle parts, the trial court granted his motion to
suppress the seized items, and the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed.
Held: The circumstances in this case provided probable
cause for the officer's seizure of the incriminating items without
a warrant.
Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132;
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S.
42.
Certiorari granted; 199 Colo. 281,
607 P.2d
987, vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
In the early morning of October 15, 1979, an officer of the
Colorado Springs Police Department observed a blue 1967
Page 449 U. S. 2
Pontiac GTO automobile moving along a road at a speed above the
legal limit. Before the officer could pursue the vehicle, it
disappeared from his sight. Shortly thereafter, the officer heard a
police radio dispatch reporting that a theft of motor vehicle parts
had occurred in the area he was patrolling in his car. The radio
dispatch announced that a number of chrome lug nuts were among the
items stolen, and provided a description of two suspects. A few
minutes after hearing the report, the officer spotted the same
automobile he had seen earlier, still speeding. He saw the car
enter a service station, and followed it there for the purpose of
issuing a traffic citation to its driver.
As the officer approached the car, both of its occupants,
including the respondent, stepped out of it. A conversation between
the officer and the respondent ensued, just outside the closed
front door of the automobile. At this time, the officer observed
chrome lug nuts in an open glove compartment located between the
vehicle's front bucket seats, as well as two lug wrenches on the
floorboard of the back seat. These items were in plain view,
illuminated by the lights of the service station. Recognizing that
the respondent and his companion met the description of those
suspected of stealing motor vehicle parts, the officer immediately
arrested both of them. He then seized the lug nuts and
wrenches.
Before the date scheduled for his trial on charges of stealing
motor vehicle parts, the respondent moved to suppress the items
that the arresting officer had seized. The trial court granted the
motion, and its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Colorado. [
Footnote 1] The
State subsequently filed a petition for certiorari in this
Court.
The provisions of the Fourth Amendment are enforceable against
the States through the Fourteenth, and it is axiomatic that
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se
unreasonable
Page 449 U. S. 3
under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347,
389 U. S. 357
(1967). One of these exceptions, recognized at least since
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 (1925), exists when an automobile or other
vehicle is stopped and the police have probable cause to believe it
contains evidence of a crime.
See Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U. S. 753,
442 U. S. 760
(1979).
Carroll upheld the legality of a search that was
conducted immediately after a vehicle was stopped. Since
Carroll, warrantless searches have been found permissible
even when a car was searched after being seized and moved to a
police station.
Texas v. White, 423 U. S.
67 (1975);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S.
42 (1970). In each of these latter cases, the search was
constitutionally permissible because an immediate, on-the-scene
search would have been permissible.
Texas v. White, supra
at
423 U. S. 68;
Chambers v. Maroney, supra at
399 U. S.
52.
At issue in the present case is a seizure that occurred on the
scene shortly after a speeding car was stopped. Thus, if there was
probable cause "that the contents of the automobile offend against
the law,"
Carroll, supra at
267 U. S. 159,
the warrantless seizure was permissible. [
Footnote 2]
Probable cause in this case is self-evident. Indeed, the Supreme
Court of Colorado acknowledged that there was probable cause, but
mistakenly concluded that a warrant was required to open the car
door and seize the items within.
The officer could not stop the vehicle the first time he
Page 449 U. S. 4
detected it speeding, but he accosted it at his next
opportunity, when it entered the service station. His subsequent
approach to the side of the automobile in order to issue a traffic
citation to its driver was entirely legitimate. [
Footnote 3] Standing by the front door of the
car, the officer happened to see items matching the description of
some of those recently stolen in the vicinity, and observed that
the occupants of the car met the description of those suspected of
the crime. These circumstances provided not only probable cause to
arrest, but also, under
Carroll and
Chambers,
probable cause to seize the incriminating items without a warrant.
[
Footnote 4]
The petition for certiorari and the respondent's motion for
leave to proceed
in forma pauperis are granted, the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is vacated, and the case
is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
199 Colo. 281,
607 P.2d
987 (1980).
[
Footnote 2]
Another factor that contributes to the justification for the
absence of a warrant in such a situation is that "the circumstances
that furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for
particular articles are most often unforeseeable."
Chambers, 399 U.S. at
399 U. S. 50-51.
See also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.
S. 583,
417 U. S. 595
(1974). This factor applies with particular force in this case. As
the reason for the stop was wholly unconnected with the reason for
the subsequent seizure, it would be especially unreasonable to
require a detour to a magistrate before the unanticipated evidence
could be lawfully seized.
[
Footnote 3]
There can be no question that the stopping of a vehicle and the
detention of its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U. S. 648,
440 U. S. 653
(1979);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.
S. 543,
428 U. S.
556-558 (1976);
United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873,
422 U. S. 878
(1975).
[
Footnote 4]
The respondent does not dispute that the items seized were
illuminated by the lights of the service station, or that they were
in the plain view of the officer as he spoke to him beside the
front door of the car. There was no evidence whatsoever that the
officer's presence to issue a traffic citation was a pretext to
confirm any other previous suspicion about the occupants.