In No. 77-1546, respondents, who had been among those subpoenaed
to appear before a federal grand jury in Florida investigating a
possible conspiracy to cause a riot, brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia against
petitioners (the then United States Attorney and Assistant United
States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida, and a Federal
Bureau of Investigation agent) and a Department of Justice
attorney, individually and in their official capacities, alleging a
conspiracy to deprive respondents of various statutory and
constitutional rights, and seeking damages and a declaratory
judgment. Petitioners, each of whom resided in Florida, were served
by certified mail, and the Department of Justice attorney, who
resided in the District of Columbia, was served personally.
Respondents relied on § 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962
(Act), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which provides in part that
"[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official
capacity or under color of legal authority . . . may, except as
otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in
which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of
action arose . . . or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property
is involved in the action,"
and that delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer in
such an action may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial
limits of the district in which the action is brought. The District
Court dismissed the action, ruling that venue was improper and that
the court lacked
in personam jurisdiction over
petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 2
permits damages actions against federal officials to be brought in
any district in which any one defendant resides, and that, since
the Department of Justice attorney was a resident of the District
of Columbia, venue there was proper. In No. 78-303, respondents,
whose mail between the United States and the Soviet Union had
allegedly been opened by the Central Intelligence
Page 444 U. S. 528
Agency, brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island against petitioners (the then Director and
Deputy Director of the CIA) and others, in their individual and
official capacities, alleging that interference with respondents'
mail violated their constitutional rights and seeking damages as
well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Petitioners and the
other defendants were served outside of Rhode Island by certified
mail. The District Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue,
and insufficiency of process, but certified the questions involved
for an immediate appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's order as to petitioners, who were CIA officials when the
complaint was filed, but reversed as to those defendants who had
left their Government positions at the time of filing, holding that
§ 2 applied to damages actions against federal officials in their
individual capacities and provided the mechanism for obtaining
personal jurisdiction over them, and that accordingly venue was
proper in Rhode Island because one of the respondents resided
there.
Held: Section 2 of the Act does not apply to actions
for money damages brought against federal officials in their
individual capacities. Pp.
444 U. S. 533-545.
(a) Section 2's language "is an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity
or under color of legal authority" can reasonably be read as
describing the character of the defendant at the time of suit, and,
so read, limits a covered "civil action" to one against a federal
official who is at that time acting, or failing to act, in an
official or apparently official way. Such a "civil action" is that
referred to in § 1 of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which gives
district courts jurisdiction of
"any action in the nature of.mandamus to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a
duty owed to the plaintiff."
Pp.
444 U. S.
535-536.
(b) The Act's legislative history clearly indicates that
Congress intended nothing more than to provide nationwide venue for
the convenience of individual plaintiffs in actions that are
nominally against an individual officer but are in reality against
the Government. A suit for money damages which must be paid out of
the pocket of the private individual who happens to be -- or
formerly was -- employed by the Government plainly is not one
"essentially against the United States," and thus is not
encompassed by the venue provisions of § 2. Pp.
444 U. S.
536-543.
(c) If § 2 were construed to govern damages actions against
federal officers individually, suits could be brought against those
officers while in Government service -- and could be pressed even
after the officer has
Page 444 U. S. 529
left service -- in any one of the 95 federal districts covering
the 50 states and other areas within federal jurisdiction. This
would place federal officers, solely by reason of their Government
service, in a very different posture in personal damages suits from
that of all other persons, since, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),
damages suits against private persons must be brought in the
district where all the defendants reside or in which the claim
arose. Such was not the intent of Congress. Pp.
444 U. S.
544-545.
No. 77-1546, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 170, 569 F.2d 1, and No. 78-303,
577 F.2d 147, reversed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined,
post p
444 U. S. 545.
WHITE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
cases. MARSHALL, J., took no part in the decision of the case.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in these cases to decide whether the venue
provisions contained in § 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), apply to actions
Page 444 U. S. 530
for money damages brought against federal officials in their
individual capacities. 439 U.S. 1113 (1979).
I
No. 77-1546
Stafford et al. v. Briggs et al.
In 1972, petitioner William Stafford was United States Attorney
and petitioner Stuart Carrouth was an Assistant United States
Attorney for the Northern District of Florida. Guy Goodwin was an
attorney in the Department of Justice. [
Footnote 1] Together, they conducted grand jury
proceedings in Florida, inquiring into the possibility that various
individuals had conspired and engaged in interstate travel with
intent to cause a riot. Respondents were among those subpoenaed to
appear. At the request of respondents' counsel, the District Judge
responsible for the proceedings called Goodwin to the stand and
asked him to state, under oath, whether any of the witnesses
represented by respondents' counsel was an agent or informant of
the Government. Goodwin replied that none was.
Respondents later brought this suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia against Goodwin,
Stafford, Carrouth, and petitioner Claude Meadow, an agent for the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Each was sued individually and in
his official capacity. Respondents alleged that Goodwin had
testified falsely in furtherance of a conspiracy among petitioners
and Goodwin to deprive respondents of various statutory and
constitutional rights. Each respondent sought a declaratory
judgment, $50,000 in compensatory damages, and $100,000 in punitive
damages. Petitioners, each of whom resided in Florida, were served
by certified mail; Goodwin, whose residence was in the District of
Columbia, was served personally.
Page 444 U. S. 531
Respondents relied on § 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,
which, as amended and codified in Title 28 of the United States
Code, provides:
"§ 1391. Venue generally"
"
* * * *"
"(e) A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his
official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency
of the United States, or the United States, may, except as
otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in
which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of
action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is
situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is
involved in the action. Additional persons may be joined as parties
to any such action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and with such other venue requirements as would be
applicable if the United States or one of its officers, employees,
or agencies were not a party."
"The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as
provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the
delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or agency as
required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the
territorial limits of the district in which the action is
brought."
Petitioners requested transfer of the action to the Northern
District of Florida, or, alternatively, dismissal for improper
venue and insufficiency of process. The District Court denied the
motion to transfer but granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that
venue was improper and that the court lacked
in personam
jurisdiction over the petitioners. [
Footnote 2]
Page 444 U. S. 532
Respondents appealed the District Court's order dismissing the
case against petitioners, and the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)
permits damages actions against federal officials to be brought in
any district in which any one defendant resides.
Briggs v.
Goodwin, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 170, 569 F.2d 1 (1977). Because
Goodwin was a resident of the District of Columbia, venue there was
proper. The court also held that there was no constitutional
infirmity in the statute as applied. It refused to apply the
"minimum contacts" analysis of
International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U. S. 310
(1945), and held that, in a case such as this, there is no
constitutional requirement that defendants have any contacts with
the place in which a particular federal court sits before they may
be sued in that court.
No. 78-303
Colby et al. v. Driver et al.
From 1953 to 1973 at the International Airport in New York, the
Central Intelligence Agency opened and made photographic copies of
certain mail traveling between the United States and the Soviet
Union. [
Footnote 3]
Petitioner Vernon Walters was appointed Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence in 1972; petitioner William Colby was
appointed Director of Central Intelligence in 1973. Both
petitioners were in office in 1975 when respondents, acting on
behalf of themselves and others whose mail had allegedly been
opened by the CIA, brought suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Rhode Island. Respondents alleged that the
interference with their mail to and from the
Page 444 U. S. 533
Soviet Union violated their constitutional rights. Their suit,
brought against both present and former federal officials in their
individual and official capacities, requested declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief, including $20,000 for each letter
opened and punitive damages of $100,000 for each member of the
plaintiff class.
Petitioners and the other defendants were served outside of
Rhode Island by certified mail. All the defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue,
and insufficiency of process, claiming that no defendant resided in
or had substantial contacts with Rhode Island and that the
complaint failed to allege that any activity had occurred there.
The District Court denied these motions but certified the questions
involved for an immediate appeal.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the order of
the District Court as to petitioners, who were CIA officials when
the complaint was filed, but it reversed as to those defendants who
had left their Government positions at the time of filing.
Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1978). [
Footnote 4] The court held that § 1391(e) applied
to damages actions against federal officials in their individual
capacities and provided the mechanism for obtaining personal
jurisdiction over them. Venue was proper in Rhode Island because
one of the respondents resided there. The court also rejected
petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of the statute,
ruling that minimum contacts analysis was not relevant in this
situation.
II
Soon after the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73,
this Court held that Congress had not granted the federal
Page 444 U. S. 534
trial courts generally the power to issue writs of mandamus.
McIntire v.
Wood, 7 Cranch 504 (1813). The federal courts in
the District of Columbia, which derived power to issue the writ
from the common law of the State af Maryland, were the sole
exception.
Kendall v. United States ex
rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524 (1838).
To avoid this jurisdictional obstacle, litigants seeking
mandamus-type relief outside of the District of Columbia often
brought suits for injunctive or declaratory relief instead. But in
most cases, a superior federal officer was an indispensable party.
See, e.g., Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.
S. 490 (1947). Because of the legal fiction that
officers of such rank resided only where they were stationed --
usually the District of Columbia -- effective service could be
obtained only there. And with the restrictive venue provisions then
in effect, joinder of such an official required that the action be
brought in the District of Columbia.
See 28 U.S. C §
1391(b) (1946 ed., Supp. II), amended in Pub.L. 89-714, 80 Stat.
1111 (1966). The net result was that persons in distant parts of
the country claiming injury by reason of the acts or omissions of a
federal officer or agency were faced with significant expense and
inconvenience in bringing suits for enforcement of claimed
rights.
In response to this problem, Congress enacted the Mandamus and
Venue Act of 1962. Section 1 of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, provides
that actions in the nature of mandamus can be brought in any
district court of the United States. [
Footnote 5] Section 2 of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e),
provides a similarly expanded choice of venue, and authorizes
service by certified mail on federal officers or agencies located
outside the district in which such a suit is filed.
Page 444 U. S. 535
The 1962 legislation thus makes it more convenient for aggrieved
persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus. Respondents
argue, however, that much more was intended. They contend that, by
using the general language "civil action," Congress intended to
include in the expanded venue provision not only mandamus-type
actions but all civil actions, including those seeking money
damages from federal officers as individuals.
The language of § 1391(e) does refer to "a civil action."
Recitation of that fact, however, but begins our inquiry, as this
Court noted over a century ago when faced with a similar problem of
statutory interpretation:
"The general words used in the clause . . . , taken by
themselves and literally construed without regard to the object in
view, would seem to sanction the claim of the plaintiff. But this
mode of expounding a statute has never been adopted by any
enlightened tribunal -- because it is evident that, in many cases,
it would defeat the object which the Legislature intended to
accomplish. And it is well settled that, in interpreting a statute,
the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which
general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the
whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law. . .
."
Brown v.
Duchesne, 19 How. 183,
60 U. S. 194
(1857).
Looking first to "the whole statute," two things are apparent:
(1) § 1 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 is explicitly limited
to
"action[s] in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a
duty owed to the plaintiff."
28 U.S.C. § 1361. (2) The "civil action" referred to in § 2 of
the Act is one
"in which a defendant
is an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity
or under color of legal authority. . . ."
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (emphasis added). The highlighted
language,
Page 444 U. S. 536
cast by Congress in the present tense, can reasonably be read as
describing the character of the defendant at the time of the suit.
So read, it limits a covered "civil action" to one against a
federal official or agency who is at that time acting -- or failing
to act -- in an official or apparently official way. [
Footnote 6] Such "civil actions" are those
referred to in § 1 of the Act,
i.e., "action[s] in the
nature of mandamus."
Our analysis does not stop with the language of the statute; we
must also look to "the objects and policy of the law."
Brown v.
Duchesne, 19 How. at
60 U. S. 194.
In order to "give [the Act] such a construction as will carry into
execution the will of the Legislature . . . according to its true
intent and meaning,"
ibid., we turn to the legislative
history.
Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.
S. 487,
401 U. S. 490,
n. 4 (1971).
See also United States v. Culbert,
435 U. S. 371,
435 U. S. 374,
n. 4 (1978);
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research
Group, 426 U. S. 1,
426 U. S. 9-10
(1976).
III
H.R. 10089, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), was a precursor of the
bill which eventually became the 1962 Act. Congressman Budge, the
author of H.R. 10089, explained its purpose:
"As it is now, there is no opportunity for a judicial review of
the action of any decision that is made by a Federal officer in
charge out there [in the field], no matter how arbitrary or
capricious, because it is too expensive to come back here [to
Washington, D.C.] to litigate it."
Hearings on H.R. 10089 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (May 26 and
June 2, 1960). [
Footnote 7]
Page 444 U. S. 537
As often happens, the dialogue between witnesses, Members, and
Committee Counsel reveals considerable initial confusion as to the
extent of the problem and the proposed solution. Of course, the
very purpose of hearing witnesses is to expose problems, probe for
solutions, and reach a consensus. At one point, Congressman Poff,
in an obvious effort to clarify the responses, asked the Department
of Justice witness, Donald MacGuineas:
"Mr. POFF. Wouldn't you say the author's objective is to give a
citizen who has a legitimate complaint against his Government the
right to sue his Government at the place where the wrong was
committed?"
"Mr. MacGUINEAS. The difficulty, if I may say so, Congressman,
with your statement, is you speak of the right to sue his
Government. Now that proposition, in itself, raises very difficult
and complicated legal questions which I touched upon at my
appearance last week."
"You must first decide whether a particular suit is actually a
suit against the man in his official capacity or whether it i[s] a
suit against the Government officer in his individual capacity. If
it is the latter, it is not in any sense a suit against the
Government."
Id. at 54. Committee Counsel later asked the Department
of Justice witness:
"Suppose, in order to take care of a body of law which seems to
say that, when a government official does something wrong, he is
acting in his individual capacity, we added the following language
-- 'acting in his official capacity or under color of legal
authority'?"
Id. at 61. Mr. MacGuineas' response, which must now be
recognized as prophetic, was that such language might later be
misinterpreted as covering a damages action against a person
holding Government office. This, he said, would raise "serious
policy questions" by allowing a Government official to be sued in
the
Page 444 U. S. 538
plaintiff's home district while a private defendant in the same
kind of action could be sued only in the district of his residence.
The Chairman, Mr. Forrester, and the ranking senior Committee
Member, Mr. Poff, both stated that they shared the same concern.
Id. at 62-63.
Judge Albert Maris, then Chairman of the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, testified that such an "injustice" to the Government
officer could be avoided only by requiring a damages suit to be
brought in the district of his residence or where the cause of
action arose. "That," said Judge Maris, "is the normal procedure in
the law. That is what ordinarily happens in the ordinary law suit."
Id. at 86. Congressman Dowdy, one of the four Members
present, then said:
"Speaking to the point you were talking about, I don't
understand that we have in consideration suits for money damages.
That would be maybe where a person is being sued as an
individual."
Id. at 87. When Judge Maris stated his view that cases
involving money damages would not be involved, Mr. Dowdy agreed:
"They would not be covered by this [proposed legislation]."
Ibid.
Finally, near the conclusion of the hearing, the bill's author,
Mr. Budge, stated:
"We always get off into these slander type actions, which is not
what I am seeking at all. When Mr. MacGuineas stated here this
morning that he was not sure of the purpose of the legislation, I
think that is perhaps true, because
I have no intention of
bringing [within this bill]
tort actions against
individual government employees. All I am seeking to do is to
have the review of their official actions take place in the United
States District Court where the determination was made."
Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
Following the hearings, the Subcommittee redrafted H.R. 10089.
The revised version, H.R. 12622, 86th Cong., 2d
Page 444 U. S. 539
Sess. (1960), among other things, added the language "or under
color of legal authority" to the phrase "acting in his official
capacity." Far from being intended as the master key which would
unlock the door to nationwide venue for money damages actions
brought against an official as an individual, this language was
specifically intended only to alleviate the hardships caused by a
relatively narrow but nagging problem, as the Committee Report made
clear:
"By including the officer or employee, both in his official
capacity and acting under color of legal authority, the committee
intends to make the proposed section 1391(e) applicable not only to
those cases where an action may be brought against an officer or
employee in his official capacity. It intends to include also those
cases where the action is nominally brought against the officer in
his individual capacity even though he was acting within the
apparent scope of his authority, and not as a private citizen.
Such actions are also in essence against the United States, but
are brought against the officer or employee as an individual only
to circumvent what remains of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The considerations of policy which demand that an
action against an official may be brought locally, rather than in
the District of Columbia, require similar venue provisions where
the action is based upon the fiction that the officer is acting as
an individual. There is no intention, however, to alter the venue
requirements of Federal law insofar as suits resulting from the
official's private actions are concerned."
H.R.Rep. No.1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1960) (emphasis
added) .
The Committee's statement of the legislation's purpose also
sheds considerable light on the congressional intent:
"The purpose of this bill is to make it possible to bring
actions against Government officials and agencies in U.S. district
courts outside the District of Columbia, which,
Page 444 U. S. 540
because of certain existing limitations on jurisdiction and
venue, may now be brought only in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia."
Id. at 1 (emphasis added) . In context, this clearly
confines the intended thrust of § 1391(e) to mandamus-type actions.
See supra at
444 U. S.
533-534. The Report continues:
"Section 2 [1391(e)] is the venue section of the bill. Its
purpose is similar to that of section 1. It is designed to permit
an action
which is essentially against the United States
to be brought locally, rather than requiring that it be brought in
the District of Columbia simply because Washington is the official
residence of the officer or agency sued."
H.R.Rep. No.1936,
supra at 2 (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 8]
Although H R. 12622 passed the House in 1960, the Senate
adjourned without acting on it.
See H R. Rep. No. 536,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1961). The same bill was reintroduced in
the next Congress as H.R.1960, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The
Committee Report was republished as H.R.Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961), and the bill was referred to the Senate.
The Senate Judiciary Committee also solicited comments on the
bill from the Department of Justice. The Department suggested,
inter alia, that it would be prudent to effect the
Page 444 U. S. 541
venue reform by amending the Administrative Procedure Act so
that "suits for money judgments against officers" would be
"unquestionably eliminate[d]."
See Letter from Deputy
Attorney General White to Senator Eastland (Feb. 28, 1962),
reprinted in S.Rep. No.1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1962).
Although the Senate Committee in its Report commented on other
suggestions proffered by the Justice Department, in this instance,
it made no response at all. [
Footnote 9] Respondents and the Courts of Appeals rely on
this failure to respond as indicating an intention that the venue
provisions were to apply to actions for money damages brought
against a federal official in his individual capacity.
We are not persuaded by this negative inference. Several
passages affirmatively state the limited nature of the bill: the
Senate Committee's statement of the bill's purpose is exactly the
same as that found in the House Report.
Compare S.Rep.
No.1992,
supra at 2,
with H.R.Rep. No. 536,
supra, at 1. The Committee also states that "[t]he bill,
as amended, is intended to facilitate review by the Federal courts
of
administrative actions," S.Rep. No.1992,
supra, at 2 (emphasis added), which does not afford a
basis for reading the language of the statute to include money
damages actions against individuals. And the following comment as
to the bill's venue provisions appears in the Report:
"The committee is of the view that the current state of the law
respecting venue in actions against Government officials is
contrary to the sound and equitable administration of justice.
Frequently, the administrative determinations involved are made not
in Washington
Page 444 U. S. 542
but in the field. In either event, these are actions
which
are in essence against the United States. The Government
official is defended by the Department of Justice whether the
action is brought in the District of Columbia or in any other
district. U.S. attorneys are present in every judicial district.
Requiring the Government to defend Government officials and
agencies in places other than Washington would not appear to be a
burdensome imposition."
S. Rep No.1992,
supra, at 3 (emphasis added). Here
again is confirmation that there was no thought to expand the venue
provisions except as to actions "in essence against the United
States," since the Government is not "required" to defend personal
actions in which a Government employee is a defendant.
What emerges is that the bill's author, the Committees, and the
Congress intended nothing more than to provide nationwide venue for
the convenience of individual plaintiffs in actions which are
nominally against an individual officer but are in reality against
the Government. A suit for money damages which must be paid out of
the pocket of the private individual who happens to be -- or
formerly was -- employed by the Federal Government plainly is not
one "essentially against the United States," and thus is not
encompassed by the venue provisions of § 1391(e). [
Footnote 10]
This is not the first time an overbroad interpretation of §
1391(e) has been rejected by this Court. In
Schlanger v.
Seamans, 401 U. S. 487
(1971), the question was whether, in a habeas corpus
proceeding,
"any custodian, or one in the chain of command, as well as the
person detained, must be
Page 444 U. S. 543
in the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court."
Id. at
401 U. S. 489.
While recognizing that habeas corpus is "a civil action," we noted
that reference to § 1391(e) did not provide the answer. In the
opinion for the Court, Mr Justice' Douglas stated:
"Although, by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), . . . Congress has provided
for nationwide service of process in a 'civil action in which each
defendant is an officer or employee of the United States,' the
legislative history of that section is barren of any indication
that Congress extended habeas corpus jurisdiction.
That section
was enacted to broaden the venue of civil actions which could
previously have been brought only in the District of Columbia.
See H.R.Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1; S.Rep.
No.1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 2."
401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 490,
n 4. (Emphasis added.)
As we have noted, the "civil actions which could previously have
been brought only in the District of Columbia" were suits for
mandamus, not actions for money damages.
See supra at
444 U. S.
533-534. The clear purport of our statement in
Schlanger is that Congress did not intend the phrase
"civil action" to be given the sweeping definition argued for it in
that case, and that the Court was required to turn to the
legislative history to determine which "civil actions" § 1391(e)
governed.
IV
The conclusion derived from the legislative history that §
1391(e) does not cover the type of suits here at issue is
buttressed by consideration of the consequences of the broad
interpretation urged upon us by respondents. The conditions and
venue provisions under which officers of the United States may be
sued, while in office or after leaving office, have serious
implications for defendants, as well as for those seeking relief.
An officer of the Government, while so employed, may have numerous
mandamus-type suits naming him or her as a party.
Page 444 U. S. 544
Without doubt, under § 1391(e), venue lies in every one of the
95 federal districts, and suits may be pending in a dozen or
several dozen at any one time. Even though the burden of defending
multiple suits while in office may be onerous, the United States
Attorney in each of the districts and the Department of Justice
carry that burden. In a mandamus suit, only rarely would the
officer himself be obliged to travel to the district in which the
case was heard; if so obliged, the travel would be at Government
expense. When an official leaves office, his personal involvement
in a mandamus suit effectively ends, and his successor carries on.
No personal cost or inconvenience is incurred, either while in
office or later. It was with this understanding that Congress
sought to ameliorate the inconvenience and expense to private
plaintiffs seeking relief from the action or inaction of their
Government. H.R.Rep. No. 536, at 3; S.Rep. No.1992, at 3.
Suits for money damages for which an individual officeholder may
be found personally liable are quite different. If § 1391(e) were
construed to govern actions for money damages against federal
officers individually, suits could be brought against these federal
officers while in Government service -- and could be pressed even
after the official has left federal service -- in any one of the 95
federal districts covering the 50 states and other areas within
federal jurisdiction. This would place federal officers, solely by
reason of their Government service, in a very different posture in
personal damages suits from that of all other persons, since, under
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), suits against private persons for money
damages must be brought "in the judicial district where all
defendants reside, or in which the claim arose." [
Footnote 11]
Page 444 U. S. 545
There is, however, no indication that a Congress concerned with
"the sound and equitable administration of justice," H.R.Rep. No.
536, at 3; S.Rep. No.1992, at 3, intended to impose on those
serving their Government the burden of defending personal damages
actions in a variety of distant districts after leaving office.
Absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a sweeping
effect, we will not infer such a purpose, nor will we interpret a
statute to effect that result.
"We think these laws ought to be construed in the spirit in
which they were made -- that is, as founded in justice -- and
should not be strained by technical constructions to reach cases
which Congress evidently could not have contemplated without
departing from the principle upon which they were legislating and
going far beyond the object they intended to accomplish."
Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. at
60 U. S.
197.
The judgments of the Courts of Appeals in No. 77-1546 and No.
78-303 are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision
of these cases.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the decision of these
cases.
* Together with No. 78-303,
Colby, Director, Central
Intelligence Agency, et al. v. Driver et al., on certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
[
Footnote 1]
Goodwin is not a party in the case before this Court.
[
Footnote 2]
Goodwin joined petitioners in making the transfer request. He
also moved for dismissal on grounds of prosecutorial immunity. This
motion was denied.
See Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F.
Supp. 1228 (DC 1974),
aff'd, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 179, 569
F.2d 10 (1977),
cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978).
[
Footnote 3]
See Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report,
S.Rep. No. 94-755, Book 3, pp. 559-677 (1976).
[
Footnote 4]
The court concluded that, because 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) was
drafted in the present tense, Congress did not mean it to apply to
former officials. Although respondents sought certiorari on this
question, we declined review. 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
[
Footnote 5]
"§ 1361. Action to compel an officer of the United States to
perform his duty"
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed
to the plaintiff."
[
Footnote 6]
Congress' use of the language "under color of legal authority"
is explained in the House Committee Report as an effort to
circumvent the sovereign immunity doctrine.
See infra at
444 U. S.
538-539.
[
Footnote 7]
A certified copy of these unpublished hearings has been lodged
with the Clerk of this Court.
[
Footnote 8]
Respondents' argument that § 1391(e) should apply to personal
damages actions is based on an isolated passage in the Committee
Report:
"The venue problem also arises in an action against a Government
official seeking damages from him for actions which are claimed to
be without legal authority but which were taken by the official in
the course of performing his duty."
H.R.Rep. No.1936, at 3. In the face of the consistently
expressed intent of the Committee to include only actions
essentially against the Government, we decline to treat this one
cryptic sentence as dispositive of the legislative intent.
See
Blackburn v. Goodwin, 608 F.2d 919 (CA2 1979).
[
Footnote 9]
The only arguable reference is a passage taken verbatim from the
House Report which mentions that the venue problem also arises in
suits against officials for damages for acts taken in the course of
performing official duties.
See S.Rep. No.1992, at 3.
Inasmuch as this passage, like much of the Senate Report is but a
recitation of language used earlier in the House Report,
see n 8,
supra, it obviously was not drafted in response to the
Justice Department's letter.
[
Footnote 10]
In deciding whether an action is in reality one against the
Government, the identity of the named parties defendant is not
controlling; the dispositive inquiry is "who will pay the
judgment?"
See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682
(1949). Here, it is against individuals, and not against the
Government, that a money judgment is sought.
[
Footnote 11]
Under this provision the case against petitioner Stafford could
have been brought only in the Northern District of Florida where
the alleged claim arose. As to petitioner Colby, the proper venue
would have been the Eastern District of New York where the alleged
claim arose, or perhaps the Eastern District of Virginia, where
some acts may have occurred at the headquarters of the CIA.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.
The Court today holds that, in a suit against a federal officer
for allegedly wrongful actions under color of legal authority, the
venue provisions of § 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28
U.S.C. § 1391(e), are applicable only if the officer is simply a
nominal defendant, and the plaintiff's real grievance is against
the Government. I disagree. It is my view that § 1391(e) means what
it says, and that it thus
Page 444 U. S. 546
applies as well to a suit for damages against a federal officer
for his own wrongdoing.
I
When Congress enacted § 1391(e) in 1962, this Court had
recognized two types of suits against federal officers acting under
color of legal authority. [
Footnote
2/1]
See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp.,
337 U. S. 682. The
first of these two types of suits was based on a legal fiction
designed to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This
fiction enabled an aggrieved party to obtain equitable relief in a
case nominally directed against a federal officer if the officer
had acted either unconstitutionally or in excess of his statutory
authority. The theory underlying the fiction was that the relief
sought was against the officer in his individual capacity, rather
than against the Government.
Id. at
337 U. S.
689-690. But since any sovereign can act only through
its agents, the reality was that the relief sought was in fact
against the Government itself. The second type of suit, by
contrast, was a direct action against the federal officer in his
individual capacity for actions taken under color of legal
authority.
Id. at
337 U. S. 687. Such a suit typically sought to assess
personal monetary liability against the officer.
The issue here is whether the venue and service of process
provisions of § 1391(e) were intended to apply to both of these
kinds of suits. Section 1391(e) provides in relevant part:
"A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official
capacity or under color of legal authority . . may, except as
otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in
which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of
action arose, or
Page 444 U. S. 547
(3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4)
the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the
action. . . ."
"The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as
provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the
delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer . . . as
required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the
territorial limits of the district in which the action is
brought."
Since either of the two types of suits described above is
properly characterized as "[a] civil action in which a defendant is
an officer or employee of the United States . . . acting . . .
under color of legal authority," it is quite clear that they both
fall within the plain meaning of § 1391(e). [
Footnote 2/2] Thus, by its own terms, § 1391(e)
unambiguously extends to the second type of suit against a federal
officer, that is, one in which, as here, money damages are sought
directly from the federal officer himself.
II
Relying on legislative history and policy considerations, the
Court turns its back on the words of the statute and holds that it
does not cover a suit against a federal officer for money damages.
The legislative history, according to the Court, indicates that the
general purpose of Congress in enacting the Mandamus and Venue Act
of 1962 (Act) was to remove then-existing
Page 444 U. S. 548
jurisdictional and venue obstacles to suits against federal
officers for mandamus-type relief outside the District of Columbia.
The legislative history further indicates, in the Court's view,
that the specific, and
exclusive, concern of Congress in
adding to § 1391(e) the phrase at issue here, "acting . . . under
color of legal authority," was to ensure that the provision would
govern suits against federal officers for equitable relief. Thus
the Court concludes that the proper construction of the phrase
"acting . . . under color of legal authority" is coextensive with
the sole concern to which it was purportedly addressed. This
construction is said to find further support in the policies
underlying the Act. [
Footnote
2/3]
The Court thus purports to rely on the familiar rule that,
"'in interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a
particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take
in connection with it the whole statute . . . and the objects and
policy of the law.'"
Ante at
444 U. S. 535,
quoting
Brown v.
Duchesne, 19 How. 183,
60 U. S. 194.
See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.
S. 193,
443 U. S.
201-202. This reliance is misplaced, however, since
neither the legislative history nor public policy is inconsistent
with the plain meaning of § 1391(e).
A
The forerunner of the Act was introduced as H.R. 10089, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). That bill provided:
"A civil action in which each defendant is an officer of the
United States
in his official capacity, a person acting
under him, or an agency of the United States, may be brought in any
judicial district where a plaintiff in the action resides."
(Emphasis added.)
Page 444 U. S. 549
Following hearings and the submission of written comments on
H.R. 10089 to a House Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, a new bill was introduced that parallels closely the
current language of the Act. The new bill, H.R. 12622, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960), contained two sections: the first vested all
district courts with jurisdiction to hear suits seeking
mandamus-type relief; [
Footnote
2/4] the second broadened the venue alternatives for a suit
against a federal officer "acting in his official capacity
or
under color of legal authority." (Emphasis added.) This bill
passed the House in 1960, but the Senate adjourned without acting
on it. The same bill was then reintroduced in the next Congress,
H.R.1960, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), and, with only minor
amendments, was enacted by both the House and the Senate.
The question here is why Congress expanded the ambit of the
second section of the Act, now § 1391(e), to include not only a
suit against a federal officer "acting in his official capacity,"
but also a suit against a federal officer "acting . . . under color
of legal authority." The Court says that the legislative history
reveals that the phrase "acting . . . under color of legal
authority" was added to § 1391(e) for the sole purpose of including
within its coverage suits against federal officers for equitable
relief. This view is said to find support in the positions
announced by members of the House Subcommittee during the hearings
on H.R. 10089, and in the Committee Reports that accompanied the
subsequent versions of the bill.
I would have to agree that a principal purpose of adding the
phrase "acting . . . under color of legal authority" to § 1391(e)
was to ensure that the venue provisions would apply to suits
against federal officers for equitable relief. At the
Subcommittee
Page 444 U. S. 550
Hearings on H.R. 10089, the proponent of the bill,
Representative Budge, explained the basic problem to which it was
addressed -- that, in light of then existing venue and
jurisdictional obstacles,
"there is no opportunity for a judicial review of the action of
any decision that is made by a Federal officer in charge out there
[in the field], no matter how arbitrary or capricious, because it
is too expensive to come back here [to Washington, D.C.] to
litigate it."
Hearings on H.R. 10089 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (1960).
The record of the testimony at the Subcommittee hearings,
however, reveals substantial confusion both as to the scope of the
problem and the manner in which it ought to be resolved. During the
hearings, a representative of the Justice Department observed that,
since the bill, as drafted, applied only to a suit against a
federal officer "in his official capacity," there would remain
unresolved the venue and jurisdictional problems in the context of
a suit for equitable relief brought against a federal officer in
his individual capacity to sidestep the problem of sovereign
immunity.
Id. at 32-33. In response, the Subcommittee's
counsel proposed the addition of the language at issue here:
"Suppose in order to take care of a body of law which seems to
say that, when a government official does something wrong, he is
acting in his individual capacity, we added the following language
-- 'acting in his official capacity
or under color of legal
authority.'"
Id. at 61 (emphasis added). That phrase was then
incorporated in the redrafted bill, H.R. 12622, as well as
subsequent bills. The Committee Reports accompanying those bills
confirm that Congress intended § 1391(e) to govern suits against
federal officers for equitable relief.
Although a principal purpose of adding the phrase "acting . . .
under color of legal authority" to § 1391(e) thus undoubtedly was
to ensure that the venue provision would apply to suits against
federal officers for equitable relief, it is not at all clear
Page 444 U. S. 551
from the legislative history that Congress sought only to
include such suits within the broadened ambit of the provision.
Whatever may have been the intent of the Subcommittee members who
conducted the hearings on the original bill, the Committee Reports
accompanying subsequent bills -- all of which included the phrase
"acting . . . under color of legal authority" -- indicated an
intent to reach suits against federal officers not only for
equitable relief, but also for money damages. In describing the
scope of the problem addressed by the Act, the Committee Reports
indicated that
"[t]he venue problem also arises in an action against a
Government official
seeking damages from him for actions
which are claimed to be without legal authority but which were
taken by the official in the course of performing his duty."
H.R.Rep. No.1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1960); H.R.Rep. No.
536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1961); S.Rep. No.1992, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess., 3 (1961) (emphasis added).
B
It is also significant that at least one of these Committee
Reports, that of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was issued after
the then Deputy Attorney General had recommended that the venue
reform be tied in directly to the Administrative Procedure Act.
Letter from Deputy Attorney General White to Senator Eastland (Feb.
28, 1962), reprinted in S.Rep. No.1992,
supra at 6.
"This," he observed, "[would] unquestionably eliminat[e] suits for
money judgments against officers."
Ibid. Although the
Committee acted upon other suggestions in that letter, it took no
steps whatsoever to narrow the ambit of § 1391(e) to exclude suits
for money damages. Rather, as stated above, the Committee Report
indicated that the venue problem to which the bill was addressed
applied to such suits.
C
It is also instructive that, shortly after the Act was signed
into law, then Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach circulated a
memorandum to all United States Attorneys to assist
Page 444 U. S. 552
them in defending suits brought under the newly enacted
legislation. In that memorandum, he noted:
"The venue provision [§ 1391(e)] is applicable to suits against
Government officials and agencies for injunctions and damages as
well as suits for mandatory relief. . . . As an example, suits for
damages for alleged libel or slander by Government officials (which
the Department defends on the ground that statements made by a
Government official within the scope of his authority are
absolutely privileged . . . ) fall within the venue provision of
this statute."
It is thus clear that the Justice Department regarded § 1391(e)
as applicable to suits against federal officers for money damages
for actions taken under color of legal authority.
The significance of this memorandum is twofold. First, it
represents a contemporaneous interpretation of § 1391(e) that is
wholly at odds with that adopted by the Court. Second, it indicates
that the Justice Department has long assumed a special
responsibility for representing federal officers sued for money
damages for actions taken under color of legal authority. This
longstanding responsibility is carried forth in current
regulations.
See 28 CFR § 50.15, 50.16 (1979).
The fact that the Justice Department, in most circumstances,
will provide such representation substantially undercuts the
Court's policy argument that to construe § 1391(e) to govern suits
for money damages would undermine the "sound and equitable
administration of justice,"
see H.R.Rep. No. 536,
supra. at 3; S.Rep. No.1992,
supra, at 3, by
"plac[ing] federal officers solely by reason of their Government
service, in a very different posture in personal damages suits from
that of all other persons, since, under 28 U. S.C. § 1391(b), suits
against private persons for money damages must be brought 'in the
judicial district where all the defendants reside or in which the
claim arose.'"
Ante at
444 U. S. 544.
The Court's argument overlooks the fact that, since the
Government
Page 444 U. S. 553
is willing to provide representation in a suit against a federal
officer for money damages, the federal officer is relieved of the
greatest burden involved in defending himself.
III
The petitioners also argue that principles of due process
militate against construing § 1391(e) to govern suits against
federal officers for money damages. This argument turns on the fact
that § 1391(e) provides not only for expanded venue, but also for
nationwide service of process. It is the petitioners' position that
a serious due process problem arises when the provisions of §
1391(e) are taken to mean what they say, so as to permit a federal
district court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a federal
officer who lacks sufficient "minimum contacts" with the State or
district in which the federal court sits. [
Footnote 2/5]
The petitioners concede that previous cases in this area have
involved the Fourteenth Amendment requirement that a state court
may acquire personal jurisdiction only if there exist "minimum
contacts" between the defendant and the forum State. Reasoning by
analogy, however, the petitioners
Page 444 U. S. 554
argue that traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
similarly limit the exercise of congressional power to provide for
nationwide
in personam jurisdiction.
The short answer to this argument is that due process requires
only certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the
sovereign that has created the court.
See Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U. S. 186;
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.
S. 310. The issue is not whether it is unfair to require
a defendant to assume the burden of litigating in an inconvenient
forum, but rather whether the court of a particular sovereign has
power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a named defendant. The
cases before us involve suits against residents of the United
States in the courts of the United States. No due process problem
exists.
This is not to say that a federal officer in a suit for money
damages is without recourse in the event he is sued in an
inconvenient place. A federal district court is vested with broad
authority
"[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, [to] . . . transfer any civil action to any other
district . . . where it might have been brought."
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). It is not unreasonable to expect that
district courts would look sympathetically upon a motion for a
change of venue in any case where a federal officer could show that
he would be substantially prejudiced if the suit were not
transferred to a more convenient forum.
For the reasons stated, I think that § 1391(e) means exactly
what it says, and that its provisions present no constitutional
problem whatever. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgments in both
of these cases.
[
Footnote 2/1]
For purposes of brevity, I hereafter refer to "suits against
federal officers acting under color of legal authority" simply as
"suits against federal officers."
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court argues that, since § 1391(e) is written in the present
tense ("[a] civil action in which a defendant
is an
officer or employee of the United States . . .
acting in
his official capacity or under color of legal authority" (emphasis
added)), the phrase "acting . . . under color of legal authority"
is properly construed as applying only to a nominal suit against a
federal officer for equitable relief. Such a suit, the Court notes,
is necessarily brought against a defendant who is presently serving
as a federal officer.
Ante at
444 U. S.
535-536. This argument falls short of the mark, however,
for many suits against federal officers for money damages, such as
those at issue here, are brought against the officers while they
are still in Government service.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The Court also finds support for its construction of § 1391(e)
in our holding in
Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.
S. 487,
401 U. S. 490,
n. 4, that § 1391(e) does not apply to habeas corpus actions. This
reliance is misplaced, because the
Schlanger decision
turned on the
sui generis nature of habeas corpus actions
which, though "technically
civil,' . . . [are] not
automatically subject to all the rules governing ordinary civil
actions." Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/4]
This section of the bill, with minor modifications, was later
enacted as § 1 of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed
to the plaintiff."
[
Footnote 2/5]
The petitioners also argue, on statutory grounds, that § 1391(e)
does not confer personal jurisdiction. It is the petitioners'
position that § 1391(e) was designed only to govern venue and
service of process, not to confer personal jurisdiction. The flaw
in this argument is that, as a general rule, service of process is
the means by which a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, and, in the cases before us, the petitioners have failed
to demonstrate that there was any defect in the means by which
service of process was effected.
It cannot seriously be argued that § 1391(e) does not authorize
extraterritorial service of process, for it provides that, in civil
actions governed by § 1391(e),
"the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or
agency as required by the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] may be
made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the
district in which the action is brought."
The legislative history, moreover, confirms that Congress
intended extraterritorial service of process for all cases governed
by § 1391(e).
See H.R.Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
4 (1961).