Appellants' decedent, a 15-year-old girl, was murdered by a
parolee five months after he was released from prison despite his
history as a sex offender. Appellants brought an action in a
California court under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
that appellee state officials, by their action in releasing the
parolee, subjected the decedent to a deprivation of her life
without due process of law, and were therefore liable in damages
for the harm caused by the parolee. The trial court sustained a
demurrer to the complaint. The California Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that a California statute granting public employees
absolute immunity from liability for any injury resulting from
parole release determinations provided appellees with a complete
defense to appellants' state law claims, and that appellees enjoyed
quasi-judicial immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Held:
1. The California immunity statute is not unconstitutional when
applied to defeat a tort claim arising under state law. Pp.
444 U. S.
280-283.
(a) The statute, which merely provides a defense to potential
state tort law liability, did not deprive appellants' decedent of
her life without due process of law because it condoned a parole
decision that led indirectly to her death. A legislative decision
that has an incremental impact on the probability that death will
result in any given situation cannot be characterized as state
action depriving a person of life just because it may set in motion
a chain of events that ultimately leads to the random death of an
innocent bystander. P.
444 U. S.
281.
(b) Even if the statute can be characterized as a deprivation of
property, the State's interest in fashioning its own rules of tort
law is paramount to any discernible federal interest, except
perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from
wholly arbitrary or irrational state action. The statute is not
irrational, because the California Legislature could reasonably
conclude that judicial review of parole decisions "would inevitably
inhibit the exercise of discretion," and that this inhibiting
effect could impair the State's ability to implement a parole
program designed to promote rehabilitation of inmates,
Page 444 U. S. 278
as well as. security within prisons by holding out a promise of
potential rewards. Pp.
444 U. S.
281-283.
2. Appellants did not allege a claim for relief under federal
law. Pp.
444 U. S.
283-285.
(a) The Fourteenth Amendment protected appellants' decedent only
from deprivation by the State of life without due process of law,
and although the decision to release the parolee from prison was
action by the State, the parolee's action five months later cannot
be fairly characterized as state action. Pp.
444 U. S.
284-285.
(b) Regardless of whether, as a matter of state tort law, the
parole board either had a "duty" to avoid harm to the parolee's
victim or proximately caused her death, appellees did not "deprive"
appellants' decedent of life within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. P.
444 U. S.
285.
(c) Under the particular circumstances where the parolee was in
no sense an agent of the parole board, and the board was not aware
that appellants' decedent, as distinguished from the public at
large, faced any special danger, appellants' decedent's death was
too remote consequence of appellees' action to hold them
responsible under § 1983. P.
444 U. S.
285.
85 Cal. App. 3d
430, 149 Cal. Rptr. 519, affirmed. STEVENS, J., delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 444 U. S. 279
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The two federal questions that appellants ask us to decide are
(1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates a California
statute granting absolute immunity to public employees who make
parole release determinations, and (2) whether such officials are
absolutely immune from liability in an action brought under the
federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [
Footnote 1] We agree with the California
Court of Appeal that the state statute is valid when applied to
claims arising under state law, and we conclude that appellants
have not alleged a claim for relief under federal law.
The case arises out of the murder of a 15-year-old girl by a
parolee. Her survivors brought this action in a California court
claiming that the state officials responsible for the parole
release decision are liable in damages for the harm caused by the
parolee.
The complaint alleged that the parolee, one Thomas, was
convicted of attempted rape in December, 1969. He was first
committed to a state mental hospital as a "Mentally Disordered Sex
Offender not amenable to treatment," and thereafter sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of 1 to 20 years, with a recommendation that
he not be paroled. Nevertheless, five years later, appellees
decided to parole Thomas to the care of his mother. They were fully
informed about his history, his propensities, and the likelihood
that he would commit another violent crime. Moreover, in making
their release determination, they failed to observe certain
"requisite formalities." Five months after his release, Thomas
tortured
Page 444 U. S. 280
and killed appellants' decedent. We assume, as the complaint
alleges, that appellees knew, or should have known, that the
release of Thomas created a clear and present danger that such an
incident would occur. Their action is characterized not only as
negligent, but also as reckless, willful, wanton and malicious.
[
Footnote 2] Appellants prayed
for actual and punitive damages of $2 million.
The trial judge sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and his
order was upheld on appeal.
85 Cal. App. 3d
430, 149 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1978). After the California Supreme
Court denied appellants' petition for a hearing, we noted probable
jurisdiction. 441 U.S. 960.
I
Section 845.8(a) of the Cal.Gov't Code Ann. (West Supp. 1979)
provides:
"Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable
for:"
"(a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or
release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of
his parole or release or from determining whether to revoke his
parole or release."
The California courts held that this statute provided appellees
with a complete defense to appellants' state law claims. [
Footnote 3] They considered and
rejected the contention that the immunity
Page 444 U. S. 281
statute as so construed violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. [
Footnote 4]
Like the California courts, we cannot accept the contention that
this statute deprived Thomas' victim of her life without due
process of law because it condoned a parole decision that led
indirectly to her death. The statute neither authorized nor
immunized the deliberate killing of any human being. It is not the
equivalent of a death penalty statute which expressly authorizes
state agents to take a person's life after prescribed procedures
have been observed. This statute merely provides a defense to
potential state tort law liability. At most, the availability of
such a defense may have encouraged members of the parole board to
take somewhat greater risks of recidivism in exercising their
authority to release prisoners than they otherwise might. But the
basic risk that repeat offenses may occur is always present in any
parole system. A legislative decision that has an incremental
impact on the probability that death will result in any given
situation -- such as setting the speed limit at 55-miles-per-hour
instead of 45 -- cannot be characterized as state action depriving
a person of life just because it may set in motion a chain of
events that ultimately leads to the random death of an innocent
bystander.
Nor can the statute be characterized as an invalid deprivation
of property. Arguably, the cause of action for wrongful death that
the State has created is a species of "property"
Page 444 U. S. 282
protected by the Due Process Clause. On that hypothesis, the
immunity statute could be viewed as depriving the plaintiffs of
that property interest insofar as they seek to assert a claim
against parole officials. [
Footnote
5] But even if one characterizes the immunity defense as a
statutory deprivation, it would remain true that the States
interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to
any discernible federal interest, except perhaps an interest in
protecting the individual citizen from state action that is wholly
arbitrary or irrational.
We have no difficulty in accepting California's conclusion that
there "is a rational relationship between the state's purposes and
the statute." [
Footnote 6] In
fashioning state policy in a "practical
Page 444 U. S. 283
and troublesome area" like this,
see McGinnis v.
Royster, 410 U. S. 263,
410 U. S. 270,
the California Legislature could reasonably conclude that judicial
review of a parole officer's decisions "would inevitably inhibit
the exercise of discretion,"
United States ex rel. Miller v.
Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 721 (CA7 1973),
cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1146. That inhibiting effect could impair the State's
ability to implement a parole program designed to promote
rehabilitation of inmates as well as security within prison walls
by holding out a promise of potential rewards. Whether one agrees
or disagrees with California's decision to provide absolute
immunity for parole officials in a case of this kind, one cannot
deny that it rationally furthers a policy that reasonable lawmakers
may favor. As federal judges, we have no authority to pass judgment
on the wisdom of the underlying policy determination. We therefore
find no merit in the contention that the State's immunity statute
is unconstitutional when applied to defeat a tort claim arising
under state law.
II
We turn then to appellants' § 1983 claim that appellees, by
their action in releasing Thomas, subjected appellants' decedent to
a deprivation of her life without due process of law. [
Footnote 7]
Page 444 U. S. 284
It is clear that the California immunity statute does not
control this claim, even though the federal cause of action is
being asserted in the state courts. [
Footnote 8] We also conclude that it is not necessary for
us to decide any question concerning the immunity of state parole
officials as a matter of federal law, because, as we recently held
in
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137,
"[t]he first inquiry in any § 1983 suit . . . is whether the
plaintiff has been deprived of a right
secured by the
Constitution and laws'" of the United States. [Footnote 9] The answer to that inquiry disposes of
this case.
Appellants contend that the decedent's right to life is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. But the
Fourteenth Amendment protected her only from deprivation by the
"
State . . . of life . . . without due process of law."
Although the decision to release Thomas from prison
Page 444 U. S. 285
was action by the State, the action of Thomas five months later
cannot be fairly characterized as state action. Regardless of
whether, as a matter of state tort law, the parole board could be
said either to have had a "duty" to avoid harm to his victim or to
have proximately caused her death,
see Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of
Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260,
564 P.2d
1227 (1977);
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y.
339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), we hold that, taking these particular
allegations as true, appellees did not "deprive" appellants'
decedent of life within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Her life was taken by the parolee five months after his release.
[
Footnote 10] He was in no
sense an agent of the parole board.
Cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232.
Further, the parole board was not aware that appellants' decedent,
as distinguished from the public at large, faced any special
danger. We need not and do not decide that a parole officer could
never be deemed to "deprive" someone of life by action taken in
connection with the release of a prisoner on parole. [
Footnote 11] But we do hold that, at
least under the particular circumstances of this parole decision,
appellants' decedent's death is too remote a consequence of the
parole officers' action to hold them responsible under the federal
civil rights law. Although a § 1983 claim has been described as "a
species of tort liability,"
Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U. S. 409,
424 U. S. 417,
it is perfectly clear that not every injury in which a state
official has played some part is actionable under that statute.
The judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
[
Footnote 2]
Although the complaint refers to the failure to supervise Thomas
after his release, a failure to warn females in the area of
potential danger, and a failure to revoke the original parole
decision, the litigation has focused entirely on the original
decision. The individual appellees are not alleged to have
responsibility for post-release supervision of Thomas.
[
Footnote 3]
The dismissal of appellants cause of action charging negligent
failure to warn females in the area of danger was predicated on
appellants' concession that there was no continuing relationship
between the state and the victim, 85 Cal. App. 3d 43, 435, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 519, 523 (1978), a requirement of state law.
[
Footnote 4]
". . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S.Const., Amdt. 14, § 1.
Although the question presented in the jurisdictional statement
posits an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the statute, that
point was not actually briefed in this Court. It was also neither
raised in nor treated by the courts below. We therefore make no
further reference to that challenge.
[
Footnote 5]
It is arguable, however, that the immunity defense, like an
element of the tort claim itself, is merely one aspect of the
State's definition of that property interest. Recently, in
considering a lawyer's claim of immunity in a state malpractice
action, we noted that
"when state law creates a cause of action, the State is free to
define the defenses to that claim, including the defense of
immunity, unless, of course, the state rule is in conflict with
federal law."
Ferri v. Ackerman, ante at
444 U. S.
198.
[
Footnote 6]
"Martinez says the statute, Government Code section 845.8,
subdivision(a), is unconstitutional because it permits the
deprivation of life, a fundamental right, without due process. He
suggests the statute, if it confers absolute immunity, encouraged
the actions resulting in Mary Ellen's death and, thus, requires a
compelling state interest. However, the Legislature has broad
powers to control governmental tort liability limited only by the
rule it not act arbitrarily (
Reed v. City & County of San
Francisco, 237 Cal. App. 2d
23, 24 . . .). The California Tort Claims Act as a whole
(Gov.Code § 810
et seq.) has been found constitutional
(
Datil v. City of Los Angeles, 263 Cal. App.
2d 655, 660-661 . . . ). The stated purpose of section 845.8,
subdivision(a), is to allow correctional personnel to make
determinations of release or parole unfettered by any fear of tort
liability (Law Revision Com. com.). To impose tort liability would
have a chilling effect on the decisionmaking process, impede
implementation of trial release programs and prolong incarceration
unjustifiably for many prisoners. There is a rational relationship
between the state's purposes and the statute."
85 Cal. App. 3d at 437, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
The opinion of the California Court of Appeal does not expressly
mention the Federal Constitution. But it is clear from appellants'
response to the demurrer that they were relying on "a federally
protected right to life under the Constitution of the United
States." Record 59.
[
Footnote 7]
We note that the California courts accepted jurisdiction of this
federal claim. That exercise of jurisdiction appears to be
consistent with the general rule that, where
"'an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved
without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason
why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some
act of Congress, by a proper action in a State court.'"
Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386,
330 U. S. 391,
quoting
Clafin v. Houseman, 93 U. S.
130,
93 U. S. 137.
See also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S.
1,
427 U. S. 36, n.
17 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting);
Grubb v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 281 U. S. 470,
281 U. S. 476.
We have never considered, however, the question whether a State
must entertain a claim under § 1983. We note that, where the same
type of claim, if arising under state law, would be enforced in the
state courts, the state courts are generally not free to refuse
enforcement of the federal claim.
Testa v. Katt, supra at
330 U. S. 394.
But see Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25,
442
S.W.2d 248 (1969).
[
Footnote 8]
Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is
wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3) cannot be immunized by
state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a
state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a
basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause
of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be
enforced.
See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290
(7th Cir.1968). "The immunity claim raises a question of federal
law."
Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (CA7 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917.
[
Footnote 9]
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at
443 U. S. 140.
Although there was a dissent in that case, the issue that divided
the Court was, assuming the plaintiff had been deprived of
constitutionally protected liberty, what process was due. There was
no disagreement with the majority's methodology of isolating the
particular constitutional infringement complained of. Since we
decide here that the State did not "deprive" appellants' decedent
of a constitutionally protected right, we need not reach the
question whether a lack of "due process" was adequately alleged by
the reference to a failure to observe "requisite formalities." It
must be remembered that, even if a state decision does deprive an
individual of life or property, and even if that decision is
erroneous, it does not necessarily follow that the decision
violated that individual's right to due process.
[
Footnote 10]
Compare the facts in
Screws v. United States,
325 U. S. 91, where
local law enforcement officials themselves beat a citizen to
death.
[
Footnote 11]
We reserve the question of what immunity, if any, a state parole
officer has in a § 1983 action where a constitutional violation is
made out by the allegations.