This case involves a dispute over the ownership of church
property following a schism in a local church affiliated with a
hierarchical church organization. The property of the Vineville
Presbyterian Church of Macon, Ga. (local church), is held in the
names of the local church or of trustees for the local church. That
church, however, was established as a member of the Augusta-Macon
Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS),
which has a generally hierarchical form of government. Under the
polity of the PCUS, the government of the local church is committed
to its Session in the first instance, but the actions of this
"court" are subject to the review and control of the higher church
courts (the Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly). At a
congregational meeting attended by a quorum of the local church's
members, 164 of them voted to separate from the PCUS, while 94
opposed the resolution. The majority then united with another
denomination, and has retained possession of the local church
property. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to
investigate the dispute, and the commission eventually issued a
ruling declaring that the minority faction constituted the "true
congregation" of the local church, and withdrawing from the
majority faction "all authority to exercise office derived from the
[PCUS]." Representatives of the minority faction brought this class
action in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive orders
establishing their right to exclusive possession and use of the
local church's property as a member of the PCUS. The trial court,
purporting to apply Georgia's "neutral principles of law" approach
to church property disputes, granted judgment for the majority. The
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court had
correctly stated and applied Georgia law and rejecting the
minority's challenge based on the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Held:
1. As a means of adjudicating a church property dispute, a State
is constitutionally entitled to adopt a "neutral principles of law"
analysis involving consideration of the deeds, state statutes
governing the holding of church property, the local church's
charter, and the general church's constitution. The First Amendment
does not require the States to adopt a rule of compulsory deference
to religious authority in
Page 443 U. S. 596
resolving church property disputes, even where no issue of
doctrinal controversy is involved. Pp.
443 U. S.
602-606.
2. Here, the case must be remanded, since the grounds for the
Georgia courts' decision that the majority faction represents the
local church were not articulated, both the trial court and the
Georgia Supreme Court having applied Georgia's neutral principles
analysis as developed in cases involving church property disputes
between general churches and entire local congregations, without
alluding to the significant complicating factor in the present case
that the local congregation was itself divided. If, in fact,
Georgia has adopted a presumptive rule of majority representation,
defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the local church is
to be determined by some other means, this would be consistent with
both the neutral principles analysis and the First Amendment.
However, there are at least some indications that, under Georgia
law, the process of identifying the faction that represents a local
church involves considerations of religious doctrine and polity,
and thus, if Georgia law provides that the identity of the local
church here is to be determined according to the laws and
regulations of the PCUS, then the First Amendment requires that the
Georgia courts give deference to the presbyterial commission's
determination that the minority faction represents the "true
congregation." Pp.
443 U. S.
606-610.
241 Ga. 208,
243 S.E.2d
860, vacated and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered t,he opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART and
WHITE, JJ. joined,
post, p.
443 U. S.
610.
Page 443 U. S. 597
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of church
property following a schism in a local church affiliated with a
hierarchical church organization. The question for decision is
whether civil courts, consistent with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, may resolve the dispute on the
basis of "neutral principles of law," or whether they must defer to
the resolution of an authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical
church.
I
The Vineville Presbyterian Church of Macon, Ga., was organized
in 1904, and first incorporated in 1915. Its corporate charter
lapsed in 1935, but was revived and renewed in 1939, and continues
in effect at the present time.
The property at issue and on which the church is located was
acquired in three transactions, and is evidenced by conveyances to
the "Trustees of [or
for'] Vineville Presbyterian Church and
their successors in office," App. 251, 253, or simply to the
"Vineville Presbyterian Church." Id. at 249. The funds
used to acquire the property were contributed entirely by local
church members. Pursuant to resolutions adopted by the
congregation, the church repeatedly has borrowed money on the
property. This indebtedness is evidenced by security deeds
variously issued in the name of the "Trustees of the Vineville
Presbyterian Church," e.g., id. at 278, or, again, simply
the "Vineville Presbyterian Church." Id. at 299.
In the same year it was organized, the Vineville church was
established as a member church of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of
the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS). The PCUS has a
generally hierarchical or connectional
Page 443 U. S. 598
form of government, as contrasted with a congregational form.
Under the polity of the PCUS, the government of the local church is
committed to its Session in the first instance, but the actions of
this assembly or "court" are subject to the review and control of
the higher church courts, the Presbytery, Synod, and General
Assembly, respectively. The powers and duties of each level of the
hierarchy are set forth in the constitution of the PCUS, the Book
of Church Order, which is part of the record in the present
case.
On May 27, 1973, at a congregational meeting of the Vineville
church attended by a quorum of its duly enrolled members, 164 of
them, including the pastor, voted to separate from the PCUS.
Ninety-four members opposed the resolution. The majority
immediately informed the PCUS of the action, and then united with
another denomination, the Presbyterian Church in America. Although
the minority remained on the church rolls for three years, they
ceased to participate in the affairs of the Vineville church and
conducted their religious activities elsewhere.
In response to the schism within the Vineville congregation, the
Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate the
dispute and, if possible, to resolve it. The commission eventually
issued a written ruling declaring that the minority faction
constituted "the true congregation of Vineville Presbyterian
Church," and withdrawing from the majority faction "all authority
to exercise office derived from the [PCUS]." App. 235. The majority
took no part in the commission's inquiry, and did not appeal its
ruling to a higher PCUS tribunal.
Representatives of the minority faction sought relief in federal
court, but their complaint was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Lucas v. Hope, 515 F.2d 234 (CA5 1975),
cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976). They then brought this class
action in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive orders
establishing their right to exclusive possession and use of the
Page 443 U. S. 599
Vineville church property as a member congregation of the PCUS.
The trial court, purporting to apply Georgia's "neutral principles
of law" approach to church property disputes, granted judgment for
the majority. The Supreme Court of Georgia, holding that the trial
court had correctly stated and applied Georgia law, and rejecting
the minority's challenge based on the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, affirmed. 241 Ga. 208,
243 S.E.2d
860 (1978). We granted certiorari. 439 U.S. 891 (1978).
II
Georgia's approach to church property litigation has evolved in
response to
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church,
393 U. S. 440
(1969) (
Presbyterian Church I),
rev'g Presbyterian
Church v. Eastern Heights Church, 224 Ga. 61,
159 S.E.2d
690 (1968). That case was a property dispute between the PCUS
and two local Georgia churches that had withdrawn from the PCUS.
The Georgia Supreme Court resolved the controversy by applying a
theory of implied trust, whereby the property of a local church
affiliated with a hierarchical church organization was deemed to be
held in trust for the general church, provided the general church
had not "substantially abandoned" the tenets of faith and practice
as they existed at the time of affiliation. [
Footnote 1] This Court reversed, holding that
Georgia would have to find some other way of resolving church
property disputes that did not draw the state courts into religious
controversies. The Court did not specify what that method should
be, although it noted in passing that
"there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all
property disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing'
churches to which property is awarded."
393 U.S. at
393 U. S.
449.
Page 443 U. S. 600
On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that, without the
"departure from doctrine" element, the implied trust theory would
have to be abandoned in its entirety.
Presbyterian Church v.
Eastern Heights Church, 225 Ga. 259,
167 S.E.2d
658 (1969) (
Presbyterian Church II). In its place, the
court adopted what is now known as the "neutral principles of law"
method for resolving church property disputes. The court examined
the deeds to the properties, the state statutes dealing with
implied trusts, Ga.Code §§ 108-106, 108-107 (1978), and the Book of
Church Order to determine whether there was any basis for a trust
in favor of the general church. Finding nothing that would give
rise to a trust in any of these documents, the court awarded the
property on the basis of legal title, which was in the local
church, or in the names of trustees for the local church. 225 Ga.
at 261, 167 S.E.2d at 660. Review was again sought in this Court,
but was denied. 396 U.S. 1041 (1970).
The neutral principles analysis was further refined by the
Georgia Supreme Court in
Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30,
222 S.E.2d
322,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976). That case
concerned a property dispute between The United Methodist Church
and a local congregation that had withdrawn from that church. As in
Presbyterian Church II, the court found no basis for a
trust in favor of the general church in the deeds, the corporate
charter, or the state statutes dealing with implied trusts. The
court observed, however, that the constitution of The United
Methodist Church, its Book of Discipline, contained an express
trust provision in favor of the general church. [
Footnote 2] On this basis, the church
property was
Page 443 U. S. 601
awarded to. the denominational church. 236 Ga. at 39, 222 S.E.2d
at 328.
In the present case, the Georgia courts sought to apply the
neutral principles analysis of
Presbyterian Church II and
Carnes to the facts presented by the Vineville church
controversy. Here, as in those two earlier cases, the deeds
conveyed the property to the local church. Here, as in the earlier
cases, neither the state statutes dealing with implied trusts nor
the corporate charter of the Vineville church indicated that the
general church had any interest in the property. And here, as in
Presbyterian Church II, but in contrast to
Carnes, the provisions of the constitution of the general
church, the Book of Church Order, concerning the ownership and
control of property failed to reveal any language of trust in favor
of the general church. The courts accordingly held that legal title
to the property of the Vineville church was vested in the local
congregation. Without further analysis or elaboration, they further
decreed that the local congregation was represented by the majority
faction, respondents herein. App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a; 241 Ga. at
212, 243 S.E.2d at 864.
Page 443 U. S. 602
III
The only question presented by this case is which faction of the
formerly united Vineville congregation is entitled to possess and
enjoy the property located at 2193 Vineville Avenue in Macon, Ga.
There can be little doubt about the general authority of civil
courts to resolve this question. The State has an obvious and
legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property
disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of
church property can be determined conclusively.
Presbyterian
Church I, 393 U.S. at
393 U. S. 445.
It is also clear, however, that "the First Amendment severely
circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving
church property disputes."
Id. at
393 U. S. 449.
Most importantly, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from
resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious
doctrine and practice.
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696,
426 U. S. 710
(1976);
Maryland & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church,
396 U. S. 367,
396 U. S. 368
(1970);
Presbyterian Church I, 393 U.S. at 449. As a
corollary to this commandment, the Amendment requires that civil
courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or
polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization.
Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at
426 U. S.
724-725;
cf. 80 U. S.
Jones, 13 Wall. 679,
80 U. S.
733-734 (1872). Subject to these limitations, however,
the First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a
particular method of resolving church property disputes.
Indeed,
"a State may adopt
any one of various approaches for
settling church property disputes, so long as it involves no
consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy
of worship or the tenets of faith."
Maryland & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at
396 U. S. 368
(BRENNAN, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) .
At least in general outline, we think the "neutral principles of
law" approach is consistent with the foregoing constitutional
principles. The neutral principles approach was approved
Page 443 U. S. 603
in
Maryland & Va. Churches, supra, an appeal from a
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland settling a local
church property dispute on the basis of the language of the deeds,
the terms of the local church charters, the state statutes
governing the holding of church property, and the provisions in the
constitution of the general church concerning the ownership and
control of church property. Finding that this analysis entailed "no
inquiry into religious doctrine," the Court dismissed the appeal
for want of a substantial federal question. 396 U.S. at
396 U. S. 368.
"Neutral principles of law" also received approving reference in
Presbyterian Church I, 393 U.S. at
393 U. S. 449;
in MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's concurrence in
Maryland & Va.
Churches, 396 U.S. at
396 U. S. 370; and in
Serbian Orthodox Diocese,
426 U.S. at
426 U. S. 723
n. 15. [
Footnote 3]
The primary advantages of the neutral principles approach are
that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough
to accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity. The
method relies exclusively on objective, well established concepts
of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It
thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement
in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.
Furthermore, the neutral principles analysis shares the peculiar
genius of private law systems in general -- flexibility in ordering
private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the
parties. Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust
provisions, religious societies can specify what is to happen to
church property in the event of a particular contingency, or what
religious body will determine the ownership in the event of a
schism or doctrinal controversy. In this manner, a religious
organization
Page 443 U. S. 604
can ensure that a dispute over the ownership of church property
will be resolved in accord with the desires of the members.
This is not to say that the application of the neutral
principles approach is wholly free of difficulty. The neutral
principles method, at least as it has evolved in Georgia, requires
a civil court to examine certain religious documents, such as a
church constitution, for language of trust in favor of the general
church. In undertaking such an examination, a civil court must take
special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms,
and not to rely on religious precepts in determining whether the
document indicates that the parties have intended to create a
trust. In addition, there may be cases where the deed, the
corporate charter, or the constitution of the general church
incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the
ownership of property. If in such a case the interpretation of the
instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a
religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution
of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.
Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at
426 U. S.
709.
On balance, however, the promise of nonentanglement and
neutrality inherent in the neutral principles approach more than
compensates for what will be occasional problems in application.
These problems, in addition, should be gradually eliminated as
recognition is given to the obligation of
"States, religious organizations, and individuals [to] structure
relationships involving church property so as not to require the
civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions."
Presbyterian Church I, 393 U.S. at
393 U. S. 449.
We therefore hold that a State is constitutionally entitled to
adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church
property dispute.
The dissent would require the States to abandon the neutral
principles method, and instead would insist, as a matter of
constitutional law that, whenever a dispute arises over the
Page 443 U. S. 605
ownership of church property, civil courts must defer to the
"authoritative resolution of the dispute within the church itself."
Post at
443 U. S. 614.
It would require, first, that civil courts review ecclesiastical
doctrine and polity to determine where the church has "placed
ultimate authority over the use of the church property."
Post at
443 U. S. 619.
After answering this question, the courts would be required to
"determine whether the dispute has been resolved within that
structure of government and, if so, what decision has been made."
Post at
443 U. S. 619,
n. 6. They would then be required to enforce that decision. We
cannot agree, however, that the First Amendment requires the States
to adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in
resolving church property disputes, even where no issue of
doctrinal controversy is involved.
The dissent suggests that a rule of compulsory deference would
somehow involve less entanglement of civil courts in matters of
religious doctrine, practice, and administration. Under its
approach, however, civil courts would always be required to examine
the polity and administration of a church to determine which unit
of government has ultimate control over church property. In some
cases, this task would not prove to be difficult. But in others,
the locus of control would be ambiguous, and
"[a] careful examination of the constitutions of the general and
local church, as well as other relevant documents, [would] be
necessary to ascertain the form of governance adopted by the
members of the religious association."
Post at
443 U. S.
619-620. In such cases, the suggested rule would appear
to require "a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into
church polity."
Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at
426 U. S. 723.
The neutral principles approach, in contrast, obviates entirely the
need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or
doctrine in settling church property disputes.
The dissent also argues that a rule of compulsory deference is
necessary in order to protect the free exercise rights "of
Page 443 U. S. 606
those who have formed the association and submitted themselves
to its authority."
Post at
443 U. S. 618.
This argument assumes that the neutral principles method would
somehow frustrate the free exercise rights of the members of a
religious association. Nothing could be further from the truth. The
neutral principles approach cannot be said to "inhibit" the free
exercise of religion any more than do other neutral provisions of
state law governing the manner in which churches own property, hire
employees, or purchase goods. Under the neutral principles
approach, the outcome of a church property dispute is not
foreordained. At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties
can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the
hierarchical church will retain the church property. They can
modify the deeds or the corporate charter to include a right of
reversion or trust in favor of the general church. Alternatively,
the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an
express trust in favor of the denominational church. The burden
involved in taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil courts
will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the
parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.
[
Footnote 4]
IV
It remains to be determined whether the Georgia neutral
principles analysis was constitutionally applied on the facts of
this case. Although both the trial court and the Supreme Court of
Georgia viewed the case as involving nothing more than an
application of the principles developed in
Presbyterian Church
II and in
Carnes, the present case contains a
significant complicating factor absent in each of those earlier
cases.
Presbyterian Church II and
Carnes each
involved a
Page 443 U. S. 607
church property dispute between the general church and the
entire local congregation. Here, the local congregation was itself
divided between a majority of 164 members who sought to withdraw
from the PCUS and a minority of 94 members who wished to maintain
the affiliation. Neither of the state courts alluded to this
problem, however; each concluded without discussion or analysis
that the title to the property was in the local church, and that
the local church was represented by the majority rather than the
minority.
Petitioners earnestly submit that the question of which faction
is the true representative of the Vineville church is an
ecclesiastical question that cannot be answered by a civil court.
At least, it is said, it cannot be answered by a civil court in a
case involving a hierarchical church, like the PCUS, where a duly
appointed church commission has determined which of the two
factions represents the "true congregation." Respondents, in
opposition, argue, in effect, that the Georgia courts did no more
than apply the ordinary presumption that, absent some indication to
the contrary, a voluntary religious association is represented by a
majority of its members.
If, in fact, Georgia has adopted a presumptive rule of majority
representation, defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the
local church is to be determined by some other means, we think this
would be consistent with both the neutral principles analysis and
the First Amendment. Majority rule is generally employed in the
governance of religious societies.
See
Bouldin v.
Alexander, 15 Wall. 131 (1872). Furthermore, the
majority faction generally can be identified without resolving any
question of religious doctrine or polity. Certainly there was no
dispute in the present case about the identity of the duly enrolled
members of he Vineville church when the dispute arose, or about the
fact that a quorum was present, or about the final vote. Most
importantly, any rule of majority representation can always be
overcome, under the neutral principles approach, either by
providing, in the corporate
Page 443 U. S. 608
charter or the constitution of the general church, that the
identity of the local church is to be established in some other
way, or by providing that the church property is held in trust for
the general church and those who remain loyal to it. Indeed, the
State may adopt any method of overcoming the majoritarian
presumption so long as the use of that method does not impair free
exercise rights or entangle the civil courts in matters of
religious controversy. [
Footnote
5]
Neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court of Georgia,
however, explicitly stated that it was adopting a presumptive rule
of majority representation. [
Footnote 6] Moreover, there are at least some indications
that, under Georgia law, the process of identifying the faction
that represents the Vineville church involves considerations of
religious doctrine and polity. Georgia law requires that "church
property be held according to the terms of the church government,"
and provides that a local church affiliated with a hierarchical
religious association "is part of the whole body of the general
church, and is subject to the higher authority of the organization
and its laws and regulations."
Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. at
33, 38, 222 S.E.2d at
Page 443 U. S. 609
325, 328;
see Ga.Code §§ 22-5507, 22-5508
(1978). All this may suggest that the identity of the "Vineville
Presbyterian Church" named in the deeds must be determined
according to terms of the Book of Church Order, which sets out the
laws and regulations of churches affiliated with the PCUS. Such a
determination, however, would appear to require a civil court to
pass on questions of religious doctrine, [
Footnote 7] and to usurp the function of the commission
appointed by the Presbytery, which already has determined that
petitioners represent the "true congregation" of the Vineville
church. Therefore, if Georgia law provides that the identity of the
Vineville church is to be determined according to the "laws and
regulations" of the PCUS, then the First Amendment requires that
the Georgia courts give deference to the presbyterial commission's
determination of that church's identity. [
Footnote 8]
This Court, of course, does not declare what the law of Georgia
is. Since the grounds for the decision that respondents
Page 443 U. S. 610
represent the Vineville church remain unarticulated, the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is vacated, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
This is sometimes referred to as the "English approach" to
resolving property disputes in hierarchical churches.
See
Presbyterian Church I, 393 U.S. at
393 U. S. 433,
and n. 2;
Watson v.
Jones, 13 Wall. 679,
80 U. S.
727-728 (1872).
[
Footnote 2]
The Book of Discipline of The United Methodist Church � 1537
(1968) requires that
"title to all real property now owned or hereafter acquired by
an unincorporated local church . . . shall be held by and/or
conveyed and transferred to its duly elected trustees . . . and
their successors in office . . . in trust, nevertheless, for the
use and benefit of such local church
and of The United
Methodist Church. Every instrument of conveyance of real
estate shall contain the appropriate trust clause as set forth in
the Discipline (� 1503)."
(Emphasis added.) Although, in
Carnes, the deeds to the
local church did not contain the required trust clause, The Book of
Discipline provided that, in the absence of a trust clause, a trust
in favor of The United Methodist Church was to be implied if (a)
the conveyance was to the trustees of a local church or agency of
any predecessor to The United Methodist Church, or (b) the local
church used the name of any predecessor to The United Methodist
Church and was known to the community as a part of the
denomination, or (c) the local church accepted the pastorate of
ministers appointed by any predecessor to The United Methodist
Church. The Book of Discipline � 1503.5. The local church in
Carnes satisfied all three of these conditions. 236 Ga. at
39, 222 S.E.2d at 328.
[
Footnote 3]
Indeed, even in
Watson v. Jones, a common law decision
heavily relied upon by the dissent, Mr. Justice Miller, in speaking
for the Court, stated that, regardless of the form of church
government, it would be the "obvious duty" of a civil tribunal to
enforce the "express terms" of a deed, will, or other instrument of
church property ownership. 13 Wall. at
80 U. S.
722-723.
[
Footnote 4]
Given that the Georgia Supreme Court clearly enunciated its
intent to follow the neutral principles analysis in
Presbyterian Church II and
Carnes, this case does
not involve a claim that retroactive application of a neutral
principles approach infringes free exercise rights.
[
Footnote 5]
If the Georgia Supreme Court adopts a rule of presumptive
majority representation on remand, then it should also specify how,
under Georgia law, that presumption may be overcome. Because these
critical issues of state law remain undetermined, we, unlike the
dissent, express no view as to the ultimate outcome of the
controversy if the Georgia Supreme Court adopts a presumptive rule
of majority representation.
[
Footnote 6]
The Georgia Code contains the following provision dealing with
the identity of a religious corporation:
"The majority of those who adhere to its organization and
doctrines represent the church. The withdrawal by one part of a
congregation from the original body, or uniting with another church
or denomination, is a relinquishment of all rights in the church
abandoned."
Ga.Code § 22-5504 (1978).
The trial court noted that the defendants (respondents here) did
not claim any right of possession of the Vineville church property
under this section. App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a. The Georgia Supreme
Court did not mention the provision.
[
Footnote 7]
Issues of church doctrine and polity pervade the provisions of
the Book of Church Order of the Presbyterian Church (1972) dealing
with the identity of the local congregation. The local church
corporation consists of "all the communing members on the active
roll" of the church.
Id. § 6-2; App. 35. The "active
roll," in turn, is composed "of those admitted to the Lord's Table
who are active in the church's life and work." § 8-7; App. 38. The
Session is given the power "to suspend or exclude from the Lord's
Supper those found delinquent, according to the Rules of
Discipline." § 15-6(2); App. 51.
See § 111-2; App. 124.
The Session is subject to "the review and control" of the
Presbytery, § 14-5; App. 49, as a part of the Presbytery's general
authority to "order whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare of
the churches under its care." § 16-7 (19); App. 56.
[
Footnote 8]
There is no suggestion in this case that the decision of the
commission was the product of "fraud" or "collusion."
See
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.
S. 696,
426 U. S. 713
(1976). In the absence of such circumstances,
"the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts
shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept
such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the
religious issues of doctrine or polity before them."
Id. at
426 U. S.
709.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE
STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting.
This case presents again a dispute among church members over the
control of a local church's property. Although the Court appears to
accept established principles that I have thought would resolve
this case, it superimposes on these principles a new structure of
rules that will make the decision of these cases by civil courts
more difficult. The new analysis also is more likely to invite
intrusion into church polity forbidden by the First Amendment.
I
The Court begins by stating that "[t]his case involves a dispute
over the ownership of church property,"
ante at
443 U. S. 597,
suggesting that the concern is with legal or equitable ownership in
the real property sense. But the ownership of the property of the
Vineville church is not at issue. The deeds place title in the
Vineville Presbyterian Church, or in trustees of that church, and
none of the parties has questioned the validity of those deeds. The
question actually presented is which of the factions within the
local congregation has the right to control the actions of the
titleholder, and thereby to control the use of the property, as the
Court later acknowledges.
Ante at
443 U. S.
602.
Since 1872, disputes over control of church property usually
have been resolved under principles established by
Watson v.
Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (1872). Under the new and
complex, two-stage analysis approved today, a court instead first
must apply newly defined "neutral principles of law" to
determine
Page 443 U. S. 611
whether property titled to the local church is held in trust for
the general church organization with which the local church is
affiliated. If it is, then the court will grant control of the
property to the councils of the general church. If not, then
control by the local congregation will be recognized. In the latter
situation, if there is a schism in the local congregation, as in
this case, the second stage of the new analysis becomes applicable.
Again, the Court fragments the analysis into two substeps for the
purpose of determining which of the factions should control the
property.
As this new approach inevitably will increase the involvement of
civil courts in church controversies, and as it departs from
long-established precedents, I dissent.
A
The first stage in the "neutral principles of law" approach
operates as a restrictive rule of evidence. A court is required to
examine the deeds to the church property, the charter of the local
church (if there is one), the book of order or discipline of the
general church organization, and the state statutes governing the
holding of church property. The object of the inquiry, where the
title to the property is in the local church, is "to determine
whether there [is] any basis for a trust in favor of the general
church."
Ante at
443 U. S. 600.
The court's investigation is to be "completely secular," "rel[ying]
exclusively on objective, well established concepts of trust and
property law familiar to lawyers and judges."
Ante at
443 U. S. 603.
Thus, where religious documents such as church constitutions or
books of order must be examined "for language of trust in favor of
the general church,"
"a civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document
in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in
determining whether the document indicates that the parties have
intended to create a trust."
Ante at
443 U. S. 604.
It follows that the civil courts using this analysis may consider
the form of religious government
Page 443 U. S. 612
adopted by the church members for the resolution of intrachurch
disputes only if that polity has been stated, in express relation
to church property, in the language of trust and property law.
[
Footnote 2/1]
One effect of the Court's evidentiary rule is to deny to the
courts relevant evidence as to the religious polity -- that is, the
form of governance -- adopted by the church members. The
constitutional documents of churches tend to be drawn in terms of
religious precepts. Attempting to read them "in purely secular
terms" is more likely to promote confusion than understanding.
Moreover, whenever religious polity has not been expressed in
specific statements referring to the property
Page 443 U. S. 613
of a church, there will be no evidence of that polity cognizable
under the neutral principles rule. Lacking such evidence,
presumably a court will impose some rule of church government
derived from state law. In the present case, for example, the
general and unqualified authority of the Presbytery over the
actions of the Vineville church had not been expressed in secular
terms of control of its property. As a consequence, the Georgia
courts could find no acceptable evidence of this authoritative
relationship, and they imposed instead a congregational form of
government determined from state law.
This limiting of the evidence relative to religious government
cannot be justified on the ground that it "free[s] civil courts
completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine,
polity, and practice."
Ante at
443 U. S. 603.
For unless the body identified as authoritative under state law
resolves the underlying dispute in accord with the decision of the
church's own authority, the state court effectively will have
reversed the decisions of doctrine and practice made in accordance
with church law. The schism in the Vineville church, for example,
resulted from disagreements among the church members over questions
of doctrine and practice. App. 233. Under the Book of Church Order,
these questions were resolved authoritatively by the higher church
courts, which then gave control of the local church to the faction
loyal to that resolution. The Georgia courts, as a matter of state
law, granted control to the schismatic faction, and thereby
effectively reversed the doctrinal decision of the church courts.
This indirect interference by the civil courts with the resolution
of religious disputes within the church is no less proscribed by
the First Amendment than is the direct decision of questions of
doctrine and practice. [
Footnote
2/2]
Page 443 U. S. 614
When civil courts step in to resolve intrachurch disputes over
control of church property, they will either support or overturn
the authoritative resolution of the dispute within the church
itself. The new analysis, under the attractive banner of "neutral
principles," actually invites the civil courts to do the latter.
The proper rule of decision, that I thought had been settled until
today, requires a court to give effect in all cases to the
decisions of the church government agreed upon by the members
before the dispute arose.
B
The Court's basic neutral principles approach, as a means of
isolating decisions concerning church property from other decisions
made within the church, relies on the concept of a trust of local
church property in favor of the general church. Because of this
central premise, the neutral principles rule suffices to settle
only disputes between the central councils of a church organization
and a unanimous local congregation. Where, as here, the neutral
principles inquiry reveals no trust in favor of the general church,
and the local congregation is split into factions, the basic
question remains unresolved: which faction should have control of
the local church?
Page 443 U. S. 615
The Court acknowledges that the church law of the Presbyterian
Church in the United States (PCUS), of which the Vineville church
is a part, provides for the authoritative resolution of this
question by the Presbytery.
Ante at
443 U. S.
608-609, and n. 7. Indeed, the Court indicates that
Georgia, consistently with the First Amendment, may adopt the
Watson v. Jones rule of adherence to the resolution of the
dispute according to church law -- a rule that would necessitate
reversal of the judgment for the respondents.
Ante at
443 U. S. 609.
But instead of requiring the state courts to take this approach,
the Court approves as well an alternative rule of state law: the
Georgia courts are said to be free to
"adop[t] a presumptive rule of majority representation,
defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the local church is
to be determined by some other means."
Ante at
443 U. S. 607.
This showing may be made by proving that the church has
"provid[ed], in the corporate charter or the constitution of the
general church, that the identity of the local church is to be
established in some other way."
Ante at
443 U. S.
607-608.
On its face, this rebuttable presumption also requires reversal
of the state court's judgment in favor of the schismatic faction.
The polity of the PCUS commits to the Presbytery the resolution of
the dispute within the local church. Having shown this structure of
church government for the determination of the identity of the
local congregation, the petitioners have rebutted any presumption
that this question has been left to a majority vote of the local
congregation.
The Court nevertheless declines to order reversal. Rather than
decide the case here in accordance with established First Amendment
principles, the Court leaves open the possibility that the state
courts might adopt some restrictive evidentiary rule that would
render the petitioners' evidence inadequate to overcome the
presumption of majority control.
Ante at
443 U. S. 608
n. 5. But, aside from a passing reference to the use of the neutral
principles approach developed earlier in its
Page 443 U. S. 616
opinion, [
Footnote 2/3] the
Court affords no guidance as to the constitutional limitations on
such an evidentiary rule; the state courts, it says, are free to
adopt any rule that is constitutional.
"Indeed, the state may adopt any method of overcoming the
majoritarian presumption so long as the use of that method does not
impair free exercise rights or entangle the civil courts in matters
of religious controversy."
Ante at
443 U. S. 608.
In essence, the Court's instructions on remand therefore allow the
state courts the choice of following the long-settled rule of
Watson v. Jones or of adopting some other rule --
unspecified by the Court that the state courts view as consistent
with the First Amendment. Not only questions of state law but also
important issues of federal constitutional law thus are left to the
state courts for their decision, and, if they depart from
Watson v. Jones, they will travel a course left totally
uncharted by this Court.
II
Disputes among church members over the control of church
property arise almost invariably out of disagreements regarding
doctrine and practice. Because of the religious nature of these
disputes, civil courts should decide them according to principles
that do not interfere with the free exercise of religion in
accordance with church polity and doctrine.
Serbian
Page 443 U. S. 617
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.
S. 696,
426 U. S. 709,
720 (1976);
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church,
393 U. S. 440,
393 U. S.
445-946, 449 (1969);
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94,
344 U.S. 107 (1952);
id. at
344 U. S.
121-122 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See also
Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.
S. 190 (1960);
Maryland & Va. Eldership v.
Sharpsburg Church, 254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969),
appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question,
396 U. S. 367
(1970). The only course that achieves this constitutional
requirement is acceptance by civil courts of the decisions reached
within the polity chosen by the church members themselves. The
classic statement of this view is found in
Watson v.
Jones, 13 Wall. at
80 U. S.
728-729: [
Footnote
2/4]
"The right to organize voluntary religious associations to
assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious
doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted
questions of faith within the association, and for the
ecclesiastical government of all the individual members,
congregations, and officers within the general association, is
unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an
implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.
But it would be a vain consent, and would lead to the total
subversion of such religious bodies, if anyone aggrieved by one of
their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them
reversed. It is of the essence of these religious
Page 443 U. S. 618
unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the
decision of questions arising among themselves, that those
decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical
cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself
provides for."
Accordingly, in each case involving an intrachurch dispute --
including disputes over church property -- the civil court must
focus directly on ascertaining, and then following, the decision
made within the structure of church governance. By doing so, the
court avoids two equally unacceptable departures from the genuine
neutrality mandated by the First Amendment. First, it refrains from
direct review and revision of decisions of the church on matters of
religious doctrine and practice that underlie the church's
determination of intrachurch controversies, including those that
relate to control of church property. [
Footnote 2/5] Equally important, by recognizing the
authoritative resolution reached within the religious association,
the civil court avoids interfering indirectly with the religious
governance of those who have formed the association and submitted
themselves to its authority.
See supra at
443 U. S.
612-614;
Watson v. Jones, supra at
80 U. S.
728-729;
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
supra at
344 U.S.
107-110.
III
Until today, and under the foregoing authorities, the first
question presented in a case involving an intrachurch dispute over
church property was where within the religious association
Page 443 U. S. 619
the rules of polity, accepted by its members before the schism,
had placed ultimate authority over the use of the church property.
[
Footnote 2/6] The courts, in
answering this question, have recognized two broad categories of
church government. One is congregational, in which authority over
questions of church doctrine, practice, and administration rests
entirely in the local congregation or some body within it. In
disputes over the control and use of the property of such a church,
the civil courts enforce the authoritative resolution of the
controversy within the local church itself.
Watson v. Jones,
supra at
80 U. S.
724-726. The second is hierarchical, in which the local
church is but an integral and subordinate part of a larger church
and is under the authority of the general church. Since the
decisions of the local congregation are subject to review by the
tribunals of the church hierarchy, this Court has held that the
civil courts must give effect to the duly made decisions of the
highest body within the hierarchy that has considered the dispute.
As we stated in
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich:
"[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical
religious organizations to establish their own rules and
regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create
tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this
choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are created to
decide disputes over the government and direction of subordinate
bodies, the Constitution
requires that civil courts accept
their decisions as binding upon them."
426 U.S. at
426 U. S.
724-725 (emphasis added). [
Footnote 2/7]
A careful examination of the constitutions of the general
Page 443 U. S. 620
and local church, as well as other relevant documents, may be
necessary to ascertain the form of governance adopted by the
members of the religious association. But there is no reason to
restrict the courts to statements of polity related directly to
church property. For the constitutionally necessary limitations are
imposed not on the evidence to be considered, but instead on the
object of the inquiry, which is both limited and clear: the civil
court must determine whether the local church remains autonomous,
so that its members have unreviewable authority to withdraw it (and
its property) from the general church, or whether the local church
is inseparably integrated into and subordinate to the general
church. [
Footnote 2/8]
IV
The principles developed in prior decisions thus afford clear
guidance in the case before us. The Vineville church is
presbyterian, a part of the PCUS. The presbyterian form of church
government, adopted by the PCUS, is
"a hierarchical structure of tribunals which consists of, in
ascending order, (1) the Church Session, composed of the elders of
the local church; (2) the Presbytery, composed of several churches
in a geographical area; (3) the Synod, generally composed of all
Presbyteries within a State; and (4) the General Assembly, the
highest governing body."
Presbyterian Church v. Hull
Page 443 U. S. 621
Church, 393 U.S. at
393 U. S. 442.
The Book of Church Order subjects the Session to "review and
control" by the Presbytery in all matters, even authorizing the
Presbytery to replace the leadership of the local congregation, to
winnow its membership, and to take control of it. No provision of
the Book of Church Order gives the Session the authority to
withdraw the local church from the PCUS; similarly, no section
exempts such a decision by the local church from review by the
Presbytery.
Thus, while many matters, including the management of the church
property, are committed in the first instance to the Session and
congregation of the local church, their actions are subject to
review by the Presbytery. Here, the Presbytery exercised its
authority over the local church, removing the dissidents from
church office, asserting direct control over the government of the
church, and recognizing the petitioners as the legitimate
congregation and Session of the church. It is undisputed that,
under the established government of the Presbyterian Church --
accepted by the members of the church before the schism -- the use
and control of the church property have been determined
authoritatively to be in the petitioners. Accordingly, under the
principles I have thought were settled, there is no occasion for
the further examination of the law of Georgia that the Court
directs. On remand, the Georgia courts should be directed to enter
judgment for the petitioners.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Despite the Court's assert.ion to the contrary,
ante at
443 U. S. 602
603, this "neutral principles" approach was not approved by the
Court in dismissing the appeal in
Maryland & Va. Eldership
v. Sharpsburg Church, 254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969).
396 U. S. 367
(1970). The state court there examined the constitution of the
general church, the charters of the local churches, the deeds to
the property at issue, and the relevant state statutes. But it did
not restrict its inquiry to a search for statements expressed in
the language of trust and property law;
see 254 Md. at
169-176, 254 A.2d at 168-170. Rather, the state court canvassed all
of these sources, and others,
see Maryland & Va. Eldership
v. Sharpsburg Church, 249 Md. 650, 665-668, 241 A.2d 691,
700-701 (1968), for information about the basic polity of the
Church of God. Having concluded that the local congregations
retained final authority over their property, it awarded judgment
accordingly. Contrary to the statement of the Court in the present
case that such an inquiry into church polity requires analysis of
"ecclesiastical . . . doctrine,"
ante at
443 U. S. 605,
"the Maryland court's resolution of the dispute involved no inquiry
into religious doctrine." 396 U.S. at
396 U. S.
368.
In
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.
S. 440 (1969), "neutral principles" were referred to in
passing, but were never described.
Id. at
393 U. S. 449.
What the Court refers to as an "approving reference" to "neutral
principles" in
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U. S. 696
(1976), was only an acknowledgment in a footnote that "[n]o claim
is made that the
formal title' doctrine by which church
property disputes may be decided in civil courts is to be applied
in this case." Id. at 426 U. S. 723
n. 15. Nor can the Court find support for its position in
Watson v.
Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 80 U. S.
724-729 (1872).
[
Footnote 2/2]
The neutral principles approach appears to assume that the
requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if civil courts
are forbidden to consider certain types of evidence. The First
Amendment's Religion Clauses, however, are meant to protect
churches and their members from civil law interference, not to
protect the courts from having to decide difficult evidentiary
questions. Thus, the evidentiary rules to be applied in cases
involving intrachurch disputes over church property should be
fashioned to avoid interference with the resolution of the dispute
within the accepted church government. The neutral principles
approach consists instead of a rule of evidence that ensures that,
in some cases, the courts will impose a form of church government
and a doctrinal resolution at odds with that reached by the
church's own authority.
The neutral principles approach creates other difficulties. It
imposes on the organization of churches additional legal
requirements which, in some cases, might inhibit their formation by
forcing the organizers to confront issues that otherwise might
never arise. It also could precipitate church property disputes,
for existing churches may deem it necessary, in light of today's
decision, to revise their constitutional documents, charters, and
deeds to include a specific statement of church polity in the
language of property and trust law.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Ante at
443 U. S.
607-608. Such a use would be an extension of this
restrictive rule of evidence, and one likely to exacerbate further
the interference with free religious exercise.
See supra
at 612-614. Not only will a local congregation of a general
hierarchical church be treated as an independent congregational
church unless the rules of church government have been expressed in
specified documents with explicit reference to church property, in
addition, all local congregations will be regarded as having a rule
of majority control unless they have related their general voting
rules explicitly to disputes about church property. As a
consequence, the resolution of doctrinal disputes within the polity
chosen by the church members often will be overturned by the civil
courts, an interference with religious exercise that cannot be
squared with the First Amendment.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Watson v. Jones was decided at a time when the First
Amendment was not considered to be applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, and before
Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64
(1938), made state law applicable in diversity cases. But beginning
with
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. at
344 U. S. 116,
this Court has indicated repeatedly that the principles of general
federal law announced in
Watson v. Jones are now regarded
as rooted in the First Amendment, and are applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Presbyterian Church v. Hull
Church, 393 U.S. at
393 U. S.
447-448;
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at
426 U. S.
710-711.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Thus, in
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, the
Court forbade the use of the "English approach" in the resolution
of church property disputes because it requires the civil courts to
determine whether authoritative decisions of doctrine and practice
are consistent with the longstanding tenets of faith of a
particular church. 393 U.S. at
339 U. S.
449-450;
accord, Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. at
80 U. S.
727-729. Similarly, in
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, supra, the control of church property turned on
the resolution of questions of doctrine and practice, "which, under
our cases, is [only] for ecclesiastical, and not civil, tribunals."
426 U.S. at
426 U. S. 709;
see id. at
426 U. S.
720.
[
Footnote 2/6]
After answering this question, of course, the civil court must
determine whether the dispute has been resolved within that
structure of government and, if so, what decision has been
made.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Accord, Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, supra at
113-
344 U. S. 114;
Watson v. Jones, supra at
80 U. S.
727.
[
Footnote 2/8]
See Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment:
the
Presbyterian Church Case, in Church and State: The
Supreme Court and the First Amendment 90-92, 97-98 (P. Kurland
ed.1975). The Court suggests that the careful consideration of
church constitutions and other relevant documents as a prerequisite
to deciding basic questions of church polity may be impermissible
if it requires a "searching . . . inquiry into church polity."
Ante at
443 U. S. 605,
quoting
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
at
426 U. S. 723.
The issue in
Serbian Orthodox Diocese, however, was quite
different. There, the hierarchical polity of the church was clear.
Id. at
426 U. S.
715-717. What the Court held impermissible was the state
court's further inquiry into the faithfulness of the church
hierarchy's decisions to the detailed provisions of church law.
Id. at
426 U. S.
712-713,
426 U. S. 718,
426 U. S.
721-723;
id. at
426 U. S. 725
(WHITE, J., concurring).