Respondent was discharged by his employer, the Union Pacific
Railroad Co., for failing properly to request an extension of his
medical leave of absence. Petitioner union filed a grievance on
respondent's behalf two days after the time for submission had
expired. The National Railroad Adjustment Board denied respondent's
claim on the ground that the union had not complied with the filing
deadline. Respondent then brought an unfair representation suit
against the union. A jury found for respondent, awarding him actual
and punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed in most
respects, but remanded the case for consideration of whether the
punitive damages award was excessive.
Held: The Railway Labor Act does not permit an employee
to recover punitive damages for a union's breach of its duty of
fair representation in processing an employee's grievance against
his employer for wrongful discharge. Pp.
442 U. S.
46-52.
(a) Since Congress has not specified what remedies are available
in unfair representation actions, this Court's function is to
implement a remedial scheme that will best effectuate the purposes
of the Railway Labor Act, recognizing that the overarching
legislative goal is to facilitate collective bargaining and to
achieve industrial peace. Pp.
442 U. S.
47-48.
(b) The fundamental purpose of unfair representation suits is to
compensate for injuries caused by violations of employees' rights.
To permit punitive damages, which, by definition, provide monetary
relief in excess of actual loss, could impair the financial
stability of unions and unsettle the careful balance of individual
and collective interests which this Court has struck in the unfair
representation area. Additionally, the prospect of punitive damages
could curtail the broad discretion afforded unions in handling
grievances and thereby inhibit the proper functioning of the
collective bargaining system. Inflicting such risks on employees,
whose welfare depends on the strength of their unions, is too great
a price for whatever deterrent effect punitive damages may have.
Pp.
442 U.S. 48-52.
572 F.2d 710, reversed in part.
Page 442 U. S. 43
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which BURGER, C.J.,
and REHNQUIST and STEVENS, JJ., joined,
post, p.
442 U. S.
52.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action arises from the failure of petitioner union properly
to process respondent's grievance alleging wrongful discharge by
his employer. The question presented is whether the Railway Labor
Act [
Footnote 1] permits an
employee to recover punitive damages for such a breach of a union's
duty of fair representation.
I
Respondent, a member of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (IBEW), was injured in March, 1970, while
working for the Union Pacific Railroad Co. (Union Pacific). He
received a medical leave of absence through December 22, 1970. The
collective bargaining agreement between the union and the company
required that employees either request an extension before their
leave expired or return to work as scheduled. Accordingly,
respondent sought to renew his leave in late December.
Correspondence between Union Pacific and respondent's attorney,
however, revealed that the company had not received a doctor's
statement supporting respondent's request. Notwithstanding Union
Pacific's written assurance on January 25, 1971, that it would
await arrival of this document before reviewing respondent's
Page 442 U. S. 44
case, respondent was discharged on February 3 because, in the
company's view, he had not properly requested an extension.
After respondent's attorney failed to persuade Union Pacific to
reconsider its decision, he wrote the IBEW District Chairman, D. F.
Jones, requesting that the union initiate grievance proceedings on
respondent's behalf pursuant to Rule 21 of the collective
bargaining agreement. [
Footnote
2] The letter was dated March 26, and was received by Jones on
March 27, 52 days after the dismissal. Although Jones was aware
that Rule 21 required presentation of grievances "within 60 days
from the date of the occurrence on which the claim . . . is based,"
see n 2,
supra, and that this deadline was imminent, he did not
immediately prepare a grievance letter. Rather, he contacted the
IBEW General Chairman, Leo Wisniski, who insisted that respondent
personally request in writing the union's assistance. Wisniski
drafted a letter stating that the union could not "handle" the
claim until such an authorization was received. App. to Brief for
Respondent 8a. Instead of telephoning respondent or sending the
letter directly to him, Wisniski mailed the letter to Jones, who
then signed and forwarded it to respondent on April 5, 61 days
after the discharge. Without awaiting the requested written
authorization, Jones filed respondent's claim with Union Pacific on
April 6, two days after the time for submission had expired. The
claim form had been prepared by Wisniski in Omaha, Neb., sent to
Jones in Rawlins, Wyo., and then mailed by Jones to the railroad in
Omaha.
Both Union Pacific and the National Railroad Adjustment Board
denied respondent's claim on the ground that IBEW had not complied
with the 60-day filing deadline. Respondent then brought this suit
against the union and several of
Page 442 U. S. 45
its officers. [
Footnote 3]
He alleged that, by filing the grievance out of time, the union had
breached its duty of fair representation, which resulted in
dismissal of his wrongful discharge claim. A jury found for
respondent, awarding him $40,000 actual damages and $75,000
punitive damages, and the District Court accepted the jury's award.
No. C 74-50B (Wyo., May 17, 1976).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment in
most respects, but remanded the case for consideration of whether
the punitive damages award was excessive. 572 F.2d 710 (CA10 1978).
[
Footnote 4] It rejected the
suggestion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that
punitive damages are impermissible in unfair representation suits,
[
Footnote 5] and declined to
adopt the Eighth Circuit's standard, which allows punitive damages
only when union officers display malice toward the employee.
[
Footnote 6] Rather, following
the Fourth Circuit, the Court of Appeals ruled that a punitive
award is appropriate if a
Page 442 U. S. 46
union has acted wantonly or in reckless disregard of an
employee's rights.
See Harrison v. United Transportation
Union, 530 F.2d 558, 563-564 (CA4 1975),
cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976). [
Footnote 7]
We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict among the Courts
of Appeals as to what if any circumstances justify assessing
punitive damages against a union that breaches its duty of fair
representation. 439 U.S. 892 (1978).
II
This Court first recognized the statutory duty of fair
representation in
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.
Co., 323 U. S. 192
(1944), a case arising under the Railway Labor Act.
Steele
held that, when Congress empowered unions to bargain exclusively
for all employees in a particular bargaining unit, and thereby
subordinated individual interests to the interests of the unit as a
whole, it imposed on unions a correlative duty "inseparable from
the power of representation" to exercise that authority fairly.
Id. at
323 U. S.
202-204;
see Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.
S. 335,
375 U. S. 342
(1964);
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171,
386 U. S. 182
(1967);
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.
S. 554,
424 U. S. 564
(1976). [
Footnote 8] The fair
representation doctrine thus serves
Page 442 U. S. 47
as a
"bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals
stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of
federal labor law."
Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at
386 U. S. 182.
Under the doctrine, a union must represent fairly the interests of
all bargaining unit members during the negotiation, administration,
and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
See, e.g.,
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41,
355 U. S. 46
(1957);
Humphrey v. Moore, supra, at
375 U. S. 342;
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., supra at
424 U. S.
563-567. In particular, a union breaches its duty when
its conduct is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith," as,
for example, when it "arbitrarily ignore [s] a meritorious
grievance or process[es] it in [a] perfunctory fashion."
Vaca
v. Sipes, supra, at
386 U. S. 190,
386 U. S.
191.
The right to bring unfair representation actions is judicially
"implied from the statute and the policy which it has adopted,"
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., supra, at
323 U. S. 204,
and Congress has not specified what remedies are available in these
suits. [
Footnote 9] Our
function, therefore, is to implement a remedial scheme that will
best effectuate the purposes of the Railway Labor Act, recognizing
that the overarching legislative goal is to facilitate collective
bargaining and to achieve industrial peace.
See 323 U.S.
at
323 U. S. 204;
Textile Workers
v.
Page 442 U. S. 48
Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448,
353 U. S.
456-457 (1957);
Machinists v. Street,
367 U. S. 740,
367 U. S. 759
(1961);
cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U. S. 363
(1943). Whether awarding punitive damages would comport with this
national labor policy is the issue on which the instant case
turns.
III
Punitive damages "are not compensation for injury. Instead, they
are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible
conduct and to deter its future occurrence."
Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323,
418 U. S. 350
(1974). [
Footnote 10] In
respondent's view, this extraordinary sanction is necessary to
vindicate an employee's right to fair representation. Because
actual damages caused by a union's failure to pursue grievances may
be
de minimis, see Harrison v. United Transportation Union,
supra at 563;
St. Clair v. Local Union No. 515, 422
F.2d 128, 132 (CA6 1969);
see also infra at
442 U. S. 50,
respondent contends that a strong legal remedy is essential to
encourage unfair representation suits, and thereby inhibit union
misconduct.
We do not doubt that the prospect of lucrative monetary
recoveries unrelated to actual injury would be a powerful incentive
to bring unfair representation actions. Similarly, the threat of
large punitive sanctions would likely affect unions' willingness to
pursue individual complaints. However, offsetting these potential
benefits is the possibility that punitive awards could impair the
financial stability of unions and unsettle the careful balance of
individual and collective interests which this Court has previously
articulated in the unfair representation area.
The fundamental purpose of unfair representation suits is to
compensate for injuries caused by violations of employees'
Page 442 U. S. 49
rights. In approving "resort to the
usual judicial
remedies of injunction and award of damages when appropriate,"
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. at
323 U. S. 207
(emphasis added), the Court emphasized that relief in each case
should be fashioned to make the injured employee whole.
Id. at
323 U. S.
206-207. This compensation principle was again invoked
in
Vaca v. Sipes, supra, to govern an unfair
representation suit for compensatory and punitive damages based on
a union's refusal to process a grievance alleging wrongful
discharge. [
Footnote 11] The
Court there rejected the contention that an order compelling
arbitration was the employee's only remedy, and concluded that
damages and equitable relief could be awarded when necessary to
ensure full compensation. 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 196.
[
Footnote 12]
The Court in
Vaca applied the compensation principle
not only to gauge the sufficiency of relief, but also to limit
union liability. Because an employee can recover in full from his
employer for its breach of contract, we reasoned that a union which
fails to process a grievance predicated on that breach cannot be
held liable for damages attributable to the employer's
Page 442 U. S. 50
conduct.
Id. at
386 U. S. 197.
Recognizing the "real hardship" that large damages awards could
impose on unions, the Court found "no merit in requiring [them] to
pay the employer's share of the damages."
Ibid. To avoid
burdening unions beyond the extent necessary to compensate
employees for their injuries, we refused to create an exception
even for those unions with indemnification rights against
employers.
Ibid. Although acknowledging that this
apportionment rule might in some instances effectively immunize
unions from liability for a clear breach of duty, the Court found
considerations of deterrence insufficient to risk endangering the
financial stability of such institutions.
Id. at
386 U. S. 198.
Accordingly, we vacated the jury's award of compensatory and
punitive damages against the union, since "all or almost all" of
the employee's damages were attributable to the discharge.
Ibid. [
Footnote 13]
This limitation on union liability thus reflects an attempt to
afford individual employees redress for injuries caused by union
misconduct without compromising the collective interests of union
members in protecting limited funds. To permit punitive damages,
which, by definition, provide monetary relief "in excess of . . .
actual loss,"
Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S.
58,
165 U. S. 86
(1897), could undermine this careful accommodation. Because juries
are accorded broad discretion both as to the imposition and amount
of punitive damages,
see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
supra, at
418 U. S.
349-350; Prosser § 2, pp. 13-14, the impact of these
windfall recoveries is unpredictable, and potentially substantial.
Cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U. S. 1,
412 U. S. 9 n. 13
(1973). [
Footnote 14] Such
awards could deplete union treasuries,
Page 442 U. S. 51
thereby impairing the effectiveness of unions as collective
bargaining agents. Inflicting this risk on employees, whose welfare
depends upon the strength of their union, is simply too great a
price for whatever deterrent effect punitive damages may have.
Cf. Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.
S. 634,
356 U. S. 658
(1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
Additionally, the prospect of punitive damages in cases such as
this could curtail the broad discretion that
Vaca afforded
unions in handling grievances. We there rejected the notion that
employees could force unions to process their claims irrespective
of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and ruled that
a union satisfies its obligation to represent employees fairly if
it does not "arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process
it in a perfunctory fashion."
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S.
191-194. In so holding, the Court stressed that union
discretion is essential to the proper functioning of the collective
bargaining system. Union supervision of employee complaints
promotes settlements, avoids processing of frivolous claims, and
strengthens the employer's confidence in the union.
Id. at
386 U. S.
191-193. Without these screening and settlement
procedures, the Court found that the costs of private dispute
resolution could ultimately render the system impracticable.
Ibid.
Just as unlimited access to the grievance process could
undermine collective bargaining, so too the threat of punitive
Page 442 U. S. 52
damages could disrupt the responsible decisionmaking essential
to peaceful labor relations. In order to protect against a future
punitive award of unforeseeable magnitude, unions might feel
compelled to process frivolous claims or resist fair settlements.
Indeed, even those unions confident that most juries would hold in
their favor could be deterred by the possibility of punitive
damages from taking actions clearly in the interest of union
members. Absent clear congressional guidance, we decline to inject
such an element of uncertainty into union decisions regarding their
representative functions.
Acknowledging the "essentially remedial" objectives of the
National Labor Relations Act, this Court has refused to permit
punitive sanctions in certain unfair labor practice cases,
see,
e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U. S.
7,
311 U. S. 10-12
(1940);
Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.
S. 651,
365 U. S. 655
(1961), and in actions under § 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187,
Teamsters v. Morton,
377 U. S. 252,
377 U. S.
260-261 (1964). Like the NLRA, the Railway Labor Act is
essentially remedial in purpose.
See supra at
442 U. S. 47-48;
45 U.S.C. § 151a;
Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees,
300 U. S. 515,
300 U. S.
542-548 (1937);
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
at
367 U. S.
759-760;
see also Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB,
supra at
311 U. S. 10-11.
Because general labor policy disfavors punishment, and the adverse
consequences of punitive damages awards could be substantial, we
hold that such damages may not be assessed against a union that
breaches its duty of fair representation by failing properly to
pursue a grievance. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below
insofar as it upheld the award of punitive damages.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151
et seq.
[
Footnote 2]
Rule 21(a)(1) provides:
"All claims or grievances must be presented in writing by . . .
or on behalf of the employee involved, to the officer of the
Carrier authorized to receive same, within 60 days from the date of
the occurrence on which the claim or grievance is based."
[
Footnote 3]
Prior to initiating this action, respondent filed a separate
suit against the railroad seeking recovery for work-related
personal injuries and for the allegedly wrongful discharge. As part
of a settlement of the personal injury action, respondent waived
his wrongful discharge claim. App. 73.
[
Footnote 4]
The court held,
inter alia, that the jury was correctly
instructed on the element.s of the cause of action and on the
principles for assessing actual damages. It also found the evidence
sufficient to support the jury verdict. 572 F.2d at 714-718.
Our grant of certiorari was limited to the punitive damages
question.
See 439 U.S. 892 (1978). Consequently, for
purposes of our analysis, we must take as correct the findings
below that IBEW breached its duty of fair representation and that
the $40,000 compensatory damages award was proper.
[
Footnote 5]
Deboles v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 552 F.2d 1005,
1019 (CA3),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
See
also Williams v. Pacific Maritime Assn., 421 F.2d 1287 (CA9
1970).
[
Footnote 6]
See Butler v. Teamsters Local 82, 514 F.2d 442, 454
(CA8),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975). Under the Eighth
Circuit's analysis, plaintiffs may be required to demonstrate that
punitive damages are needed to deter future union misconduct.
See 514 F.2d at 454;
Emmanuel v. Omaha Carpenters
District Council, 560 F.2d 382, 386 (CA8 1977).
[
Footnote 7]
The court below further determined that the jury instructions
comported with this legal standard. The District Court had charged
the jury that it could award punitive damages if petitioners acted
"maliciously, or wantonly, or oppressively." App. 65.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN surmises that, "as a matter of law," the
union's conduct "betrayed nothing more than negligence."
Post at
442 U. S. 53.
This conclusion necessarily assumes that there was insufficient
evidence of malicious, wanton, or oppressive conduct to justify the
jury's punitive damages award. We, however, are unwilling to
substitute our judgment for that of the jury, District Court, and
Court of Appeals on this essentially evidentiary question.
See Tr. 270-271; App. 91-94; 572 F.2d at 719;
Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.
S. 271,
336 U. S. 275
(1949);
Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.
S. 630,
385 U. S.
635-636 (1967).
[
Footnote 8]
The duty of fair representation is also implicit in the National
Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151
et seq., because that statute, like the Railway Labor Act,
affords unions exclusive power to represent all employees of a
bargaining unit.
See, e.g., Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S.
892 (1955);
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.
S. 330 (1953);
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 177.
For a discussion of the similarities between unfair representation
suits under the two Acts,
see Feller, A General Theory of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 Calif.L.Rev. 663, 676-718
(1973).
[
Footnote 9]
Contrary to the fears expressed in the opinion concurring in the
result,
post at
442 U. S. 59, we
express no view on the propriety of punitive awards in suits under
the Landrum-Griffin Act. We are concerned here with judicially
created remedies for a judicially implied cause of action. Whether
the explicit statutory language of 29 U.S.C. §§ 411 and 412 and the
accompanying legislative history authorize punitive damages awards
obviously involves different considerations.
[
Footnote 10]
See W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 2, pp. 9-11 (4th
ed.1971) (hereinafter Prosser); D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.9, p.
204 (1973);
Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S.
58,
165 U. S. 86
(1897).
[
Footnote 11]
Vaca involved a union certified under the National
Labor Relations Act and a collective bargaining agreement that
permitted employees to initiate the grievance process, but
precluded them from personally pursuing arbitration once grievance
procedures were exhausted. 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 175
n. 3. The Railway Labor Act is somewhat more solicitous of
individual rights. It authorizes employees who are unsuccessful at
the grievance level to seek relief in their own right from the
National Railroad Adjustment Board. §§ 3 First (i), (j), 45 U.S. .
§§ 153 First (i), (j).
[
Footnote 12]
The compensation principle is also reflected in
Vaca's
refusal to hold unfair representation claims within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Because the
"public interest in effectuating the policies of the federal
labor laws,
not the wrong done the individual employee, is
always the Board's principal concern in fashioning unfair labor
practice remedies,"
we feared that denial of a judicial forum might "frustrate the
basic purposes underlying the duty of fair representation."
Vaca v. Sipes, supra at
386 U. S. 182
n. 8, 183 (emphasis added).
See also Glover v. St. Louis-San
Francisco R. Co., 393 U. S. 324,
393 U. S.
328-329 (1969).
[
Footnote 13]
On similar reasoning, the Court has applied
Vaca's
apportionment principle to cases arising under the Railway Labor
Act. In
Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U. S.
25,
397 U. S. 29
(1970), we held that
"damages against the union for loss of employment are
unrecoverable except to the extent that its refusal to handle the
grievances added to the difficulty and expense of collecting from
the employer."
[
Footnote 14]
Moreover, it cannot be ignored that punitive damages may be
employed to punish unpopular defendants. As we observed in the
defamation context:
"[Since] juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable
amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused . .
. , they remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish
expressions of unpopular views. Like the doctrine of presumed
damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily
exacerbates the danger. . . ."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.
S. 323,
418 U. S. 350
(1974).
Community hostility toward unions, management, or minority views
can thus find expression in punitive awards.
See Automobile
Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634,
356 U. S. 651
(1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST, and MR JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in the
result.
The Court now adopts a
per se rule that a union's
breach of its duty of fair representation can never render it
liable for
Page 442 U. S. 53
punitive damages, no matter how egregious its breach may be. I
seriously doubt both the correctness and the wisdom of this
holding. Whatever the merits of the Court's
per se rule,
however, there is no need to propound such a blanket proscription
in this particular case. The union's conduct here betrayed nothing
more than negligence, and thus presented an inappropriate occasion
for awarding punitive damages under any formula. In order to
dispose of this case, therefore, the Court need hold only that the
trial judge erred as a matter of law in submitting the punitive
damages issue to the jury; this is the holding I would adopt.
Inasmuch as the Court reaches to outlaw punitive damages in all
unfair representation cases, I shall attempt to show why I think
the Court errs and why I concur only in the result.
A
Because the duty of fair representation is judicially created,
the consequences of its breach necessarily are left to judicial
determination. "The appropriate remedy for a breach of a union's
duty of fair representation," the Court wrote in
Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U. S. 171,
386 U. S. 195
(1967), "must vary with the circumstances of the particular
breach." Depending on the circumstances of the particular breach,
the Court wrote in
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
323 U. S. 192,
323 U. S. 207
(1944), "the statute contemplates resort to the usual judicial
remedies of injunction and award of damages." These cases make
clear that a court, seeking a remedy to match the union's wrong,
has at its disposal the full panoply of tools traditionally used by
courts to do justice between parties. Punitive damages, being one
of these tools, thus are presumptively available for use in
appropriate cases unless Congress has directed otherwise. Since
Congress has never expressly interdicted their use, the Court's
decision to ban punitive damages from the arsenal necessarily rests
upon inference -- upon a perception that punitive damages in unfair
representation
Page 442 U. S. 54
suits are
per se inconsistent with "federal labor
policy." The Court proffers four main theories to support this
inference. I find none of them persuasive.
First, the Court discerns in
Vaca and
Steele a
"compensation principle," a principle supposedly dictating that a
damages award may "make the injured employee whole," but may do no
more.
Ante at
442 U. S. 49,
and n. 12. If these cases do embody a "compensation principle" --
really, a neologism in this area of the law -- it is a principle of
a vastly different sort from that on which the Court relies.
Steele and
Vaca assuredly do stand for the
proposition that a worker injured by his union's breach of duty
must
at least be made whole. In
Steele, the Court
held the plaintiffs entitled to a judicial damages remedy inasmuch
as no "adequate administrative remedy" was available. 323 U.S. at
323 U. S.
206-207. In
Vaca, it refused to find exclusive
jurisdiction of unfair representation suits in the National Labor
Relations Board, lest victims of union discrimination, owing to the
Board's limited remedial powers, on occasion be left remediless.
386 U.S. at
386 U. S.
182-183. And, in
Vaca, it also refused to limit
judicial relief to a decree compelling arbitration of the
underlying grievance, reasoning that an arbitrator might lack power
to award damages against the union, and holding instead that "the
court should be free to decide the contractual claim and to award
the employee appropriate damages or equitable relief."
Id.
at
386 U. S. 196.
In
Vaca and
Steele, in other words, the Court
held that a worker's remedies must include damages so that, in all
cases, he would be fully compensated. But in neither case did it
hold that the worker's remedies must
exclude damages to
the extent they rise above the full compensation norm. The Court
has read into Vaca's affirmative compensation policy a negative
pregnant; it has transformed its liberal "compensation principle"
into a parsimonious limiting rule; it has converted the floor
beneath the injured employee's remedies into a ceiling on top of
them.
Page 442 U. S. 55
Vaca and
Steele, to my mind, contain no such
negative pregnant. In
Vaca, the jury had awarded the
worker both compensatory and punitive damages, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 173;
the Court held that "such damages are not recoverable from the
Union in the circumstances of this case,"
id. at
386 U. S. 195,
pointing out that "all or almost all" of the worker's damages were
attributable to the employer, not to the union.
Id. at
386 U. S. 198.
Vaca stands only for the proposition that a union not
chargeable with compensatory damages may not be taxed with punitive
damages, either. If
Vaca contains any negative pregnant,
it is that, when a union is chargeable with compensatory damages,
it
may be taxed with punitive damages too. In
Steele, the Court held that "the statute contemplates
resort to the usual judicial remedies of injunction and award of
damages." 323 U.S. at
323 U. S. 207.
This language, read in context, seems expansive to me. The Court
now, by italicizing "usual," implies that punitive damages, being
an extraordinary sanction, are an "unusual remedy," and hence
outside
Steele's remedial compass.
Ante at
442 U. S. 49.
This reading is most strained. The Court's italics may make its
point clear, but they do not make its argument correct, and they
provide no substitute for a fair-minded appraisal of what
Steele says. Neither
Vaca nor
Steele, in
my view, supports the negative "compensation principle" upon which
the Court relies.
The Court's second reason for banishing punitive damages from
the pantheon, closely related to the first, is that federal labor
policy is "essentially remedial," and hence inhospitable to
punitive awards.
Ante at
442 U. S. 52.
The Court cites two major cases to support this theory. Neither is
apposite. In
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U. S.
7 (1940), the Court held that the Board cannot order
punitive sanctions. But the question in that case was whether
"Congress [had] conferred the power upon the Board to impose such
requirements."
Id. at
311 U. S. 10. The
question, in other words, was simply one of the Board's statutory
competence; the Court
Page 442 U. S. 56
decided that punitive sanctions were "beyond the Board's
authority," and that it lacked "jurisdiction" to impose them.
Id. at
311 U. S. 11,
311 U. S. 13.
Republic Steel has no pertinence here, since the federal
courts have both the jurisdiction and the authority to impose
punitive sanctions in their efforts to devise a federal law of
remedies. In
Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.
S. 252 (1964), the Court held that punitive damages may
not be recovered in § 303 suits for damages from secondary
boycotts. But
Morton was a case of statutory construction.
Section 303 expressly authorizes an employer's recovery only of
"the damages by him sustained." 29 U.S.C. § 187(b). "Punitive
damages for violation of § 303," the Court reasoned in
Morton,
"conflict with the congressional judgment, reflected both in the
language of the federal statute and in its legislative history,
that recovery for an employer's business losses caused by a union's
peaceful secondary activities . . . should be limited to actual,
compensatory damages."
377 U.S. at
377 U. S. 260
(footnotes omitted). Since Congress has expressed no such
prohibition on punitive damages in unfair representation suits,
Morton is simply inapposite here. Neither
Republic
Steel nor
Morton, therefore, supports the Court's
invocation of an "essentially remedial" theory in the fair
representation area.
The third reason the Court gives in support of its
per
se rule is that punitive damages awards "could deplete union
treasuries, thereby impairing the effectiveness of unions as
collective bargaining agents."
Ante at
442 U. S. 50-51.
It is true that
Vaca, in enunciating its formula for
apportioning damages in wrongful discharge cases, said that "[i]t
could be a real hardship on the union" to pay damages in certain
circumstances. 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 197. But the Court was not talking about
unions' fiscal soundness; one searches the opinion in vain for
references to "depletion of union treasuries" or "impairment of
union effectiveness in collective bargaining." What
Vaca
said was that it could be a real hardship to make
Page 442 U. S. 57
a union pay "damages attributable solely to the employer's
breach of contract."
Ibid. It is, obviously, a "real
hardship" for anyone, regardless of his wealth, to be forced to pay
money for something that was not his fault. And even if
Vaca were read to evince concern for union treasuries,
even in cases where the union is at fault, this concern would not
support the Court's proscription of punitive damages where the
union's fault is
egregious. As the Court notes, ante at
442 U.S. 48, the damages a
union will be forced to pay in a typical unfair representation suit
are minimal; under
Vaca's apportionment formula, the bulk
of the award will be paid by the employer, the perpetrator of the
wrongful discharge, in a parallel § 301 action.
See 386
U.S. at
386 U. S.
197-198. Union treasuries, in other words, will emerge
unscathed in the general run of unfair representation cases. Given
this, it can work no undue hardship on union fiscal soundness to
permit punitive awards in those rare cases where the union has
notoriously misbehaved.
The fourth theory underpinning the Court's
per se rule
is that "the prospect of punitive damages in cases such as this
could curtail the broad discretion that Vaca afforded unions in
handling grievances," and thus "could disrupt the responsible
decisionmaking essential to peaceful labor relations."
Ante at
442 U. S. 51,
442 U. S. 52.
The Court's theory seems to be that a union, fearing punitive
damages, might become more vigilant in processing workers'
grievances; that this vigilance might lead unions to process
frivolous grievances; that this frivolity might antagonize the
employer; and that this antagonism might beget disharmony at the
bargaining table. This reasoning seems tenuous to me. Surely the
Court cannot believe that such airy speculations will induce union
shop stewards to abandon all vestiges of common sense as they go
about their diurnal chores. And even if the prospect of punitive
damages did operate to chill a union's reason "in cases such as
this," no Member of the Court is proposing to
Page 442 U. S. 58
award punitive damages "in cases such as this." Everyone agrees
that punitive damages here were improper. The question is whether
punitive damages are also to be outlawed in cases, unlike this one,
where the union's conduct has been truly egregious. A little
chilling of union "discretion" in those cases would not bother
me.
B
The Court's four proffered reasons in support of a
per
se ban on punitive damages thus leave me unpersuaded. I am not
alone in feeling this way, for no Court of Appeals to consider the
question has embraced the
per se rule the Court today goes
out of its way to adopt. As the Court observes,
ante at
442 U. S. 45-46,
the Fourth Circuit, followed by the Tenth in this case, has
approved of punitive damages in unfair representation cases.
Harrison v. United Transportation Union, 530 F.2d 558,
563-564 (1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976). The
Eighth Circuit has expressed the view that punitive damages may be
awarded where the union is guilty of "outrageous or extraordinary
conduct."
Butler v. Teamsters Local 82, 514 F.2d 442, 454,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975). The Ninth Circuit,
while barring punitive damages on the facts, restricted its holding
to "grievances of the kind alleged" in the case.
Williams v.
Pacific Maritime Assn., 421 F.2d 1287, 1289 (1970). Even the
Third Circuit, upon whose decision the Court relies to make out a
Circuit conflict here,
ante at
442 U. S. 45-46,
declined to embrace the Court's
per se approach, refusing
to
"decide whether any circumstances exist in which a punitive-type
remedy . . . for union misconduct might be implied under the
Railway Labor Act,"
and holding only that punitive damages were unavailable where
(as in that case) no actual damages had been shown.
Deboles v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 552 F.2d 1005, 1019,
cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
Page 442 U. S. 59
Equally instructive, in my view, are Court of Appeals cases
upholding punitive damages awards in suits brought by workers
against unions under the Landrum-Griffin Act. That Act outlines a
"bill of rights" for union members, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a), and
provides that actions for violation of those rights may be had to
recover "such relief (including injunctions) as may be
appropriate." § 412. Every Circuit to consider the question has
held that punitive damages are "appropriate relief" when a union's
conduct manifests "actual malice or reckless or wanton
indifference" to members' speech and associational rights.
Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 199-201 (CA5) ,
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968);
Cooke v. Orange
Belt Dist. Council, 529 F.2d 815, 820 (CA9 1976);
Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19, 24-25
(CA2 1976);
Keene v. IUOE Local 62, 569 F.2d 1375,
1381-1382, and n. 8 (CA5 1978). These courts noted that punitive
damages would serve a legitimate deterrent purpose in appropriate
cases,
Braswell, 388 F.2d at 200;
Cooke, 529 F.2d
at 820, and held that, "[i]f punitive damages can be awarded
against other defendants, they can be awarded against unions as
well."
Morrissey, 544 F.2d at 25. This reasoning, I think,
is equally in point here. The Court properly reserves decision on
Landrum-Griffin cases,
ante at
442 U. S. 47 n.
9, but its pronouncements about "[t]he compensation principle,"
about the "windfall" nature of punitive damages, about the need to
safeguard union treasuries, and about the "essentially remedial"
quality of federal labor policy all would seem to apply with equal
force to § 412 suits, and they leave me uneasy. Although the Court
professes willingness to draw hairline distinctions between
different types of tort suits brought by workers against unions
under federal labor laws, this willingness, in my view, only
suggests how tenuous is the evidence of "congressional intent" on
which the Court relies to back up its
per se rule
here.
Page 442 U. S. 60
C
The Court of Appeals' unanimous refusal to erect a
per
se bar to punitive damages against unions, both in unfair
representation cases and in Landrum-Griffin cases, seems judicious
to me. If a union's conduct should reveal intentional racial
discrimination, deliberate personal animus, or conscious
infringement of speech and associational freedoms, I can discern no
principle of federal labor policy that stands in the way of a
punitive award. Punitive damages in such an exceptional case will
serve at least to deter egregious union conduct, and
Vaca
makes clear that deterrence is a proper objective in unfair
representation actions.
See 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 187.
If the Court feels obliged to devise some "careful balance of
individual and collective interests" here,
ante at
442 U.S. 48, the solution,
in my view, is not to ban punitive damages across the board, but to
restrict them to their proper sphere, namely, to those rare cases
where the union's conduct can truly be described as outrageous.
For these reasons, I would hesitate to embrace the Court's
per se rule even in a case that squarely presented that
question for decision. What I find particularly hard to fathom is
the Court's willingness to promulgate a
per se rule here,
where the pronouncement is manifestly unnecessary to decision. This
case involves no racial discrimination, no trampling on workers'
"bill of rights"; the record does not suggest -- indeed, respondent
does not even contend -- that the union's conduct was motivated by
personal hostility. For all this record shows, the union, in
neglecting to act promptly on respondent's grievance, was simply
following its standard operating procedure, a procedure admittedly
inappropriate here, given the time constraints under which the
union was operating, but a procedure for whose inappropriateness in
this case respondent himself was at least partly responsible, since
it was he who failed to notify the union until 52 days of the
contract's 60-day limit had expired. The union's conduct, in
Page 442 U. S. 61
other words, was negligent or, at worst, grossly negligent. No
court, to my knowledge, has ever held that negligence can form the
basis for a proper punitive damages award. Especially should this
be so in cases arising under the federal labor statutes.
To decide this case, in sum, the Court need hold only that the
trial judge erred as a matter of law in submitting the punitive
damages issue to the jury. Because the Court goes further and
proscribes punitive awards in much more difficult and questionable
situations not presented here, I cannot join the opinion and I
concur in the result only.