Held: A federal prisoner's allegation that a postsentencing
change in the policies of the United States Parole Commission has
prolonged his actual imprisonment beyond the period intended by the
sentencing judge will not support a collateral attack on the
original sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Pp.
442 U. S.
184-190.
(a) The claimed error that the judge was incorrect in his
assumptions about the future course of parole proceedings does not
meet any of the established standards of collateral attack, where
there is no claim of a constitutional violation, the sentence
imposed was within the statutory limits, and the proceeding was not
infected with any error of fact or law of a "fundamental" character
that renders the entire proceeding irregular and invalid. The
change in Parole Commission policies involved here -- considering
the seriousness of the offense as a significant factor in
determining whether a prisoner should be granted parole -- affected
the way in which the court's judgment and sentence would be
performed, but did not affect the lawfulness of the judgment
itself, then or now; and there is no claim that the action taken by
the sentencing judge was unconstitutional or was based on
misinformation of constitutional magnitude.
Davis v. United
States, 417 U. S. 333, and
United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443,
distinguished. Pp.
442 U. S.
184-187.
(b) There is no basis for enlarging the grounds for collateral
attack to include claims based not on any objectively ascertainable
error but on the frustration of the subjective intent of the
sentencing judge. Under the present statutory scheme, the judge has
no enforceable expectations with respect to the actual release of a
sentenced defendant short of his statutory term; and while the
judge may have expectations as to when release is likely, the
actual decision is not his to make, either at the time of
sentencing or later if his expectations are not met. To require the
Parole Commission to act in accordance with judicial expectations,
and to use collateral attack as a mechanism for ensuring that these
expectations are carried out, would substantially undermine the
congressional decision to entrust release determinations to the
Commission, not the courts, and nothing in § 2255 supports -- let
alone mandates -- such a frustration of congressional intent. Thus,
subsequent
Page 442 U. S. 179
actions taken.by the Parole Commission -- whether or not such
actions accord with a trial judge's expectations at the time of
sentencing -- do not retroactively affect the validity of the final
judgment itself, and do not provide a basis for collateral attack
on the sentence pursuant to § 2255. Pp.
442 U. S.
187-190.
573 F.2d 147, reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined except BRENNAN, J., who took no part in the
decision of the case, and POWELL, J., who took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Three prisoners have alleged that a postsentencing change in the
policies of the United States Parole Commission has prolonged their
actual imprisonment beyond the period intended by the sentencing
Judge. The question presented is whether this type of allegation
will support a collateral attack on the original sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. [
Footnote 1] We
hold that it will not.
Page 442 U. S. 180
I
With respect to the legal issue presented, the claims before us
are identical. To bring this issue into sharp focus, we accept for
purposes of decision Addonizio's view of the facts and the relevant
aspects of the Parole Commission's practices. After his conviction
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
on September 22, 1970, Addonizio was sentenced to 10 years'
imprisonment and a fine of $25,000. Factors which led the District
Judge to impose that sentence included the serious character of
Addonizio's offenses, [
Footnote
2] and the judge's expectation that exemplary institutional
Page 442 U. S. 181
behavior would lead to Addonizio's release when he became
eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence.
[
Footnote 3] The judge did not
contemplate that the Parole Commission
Page 442 U. S. 182
might rely on the seriousness of the offense as a reason for
refusing a parole which Addonizio would otherwise receive.
In 1973, the Parole Commission markedly changed its policies.
[
Footnote 4] Under its new
practices, the gravity of the offense became a significant factor
in determining whether a prisoner should be granted parole.
Addonizio became eligible for parole on July 3, 1975. After
hearings, the Parole Commission twice refused to release him,
expressly basing its refusal on the serious character of his
crimes. [
Footnote 5]
Page 442 U. S. 183
Thereafter, Addonizio invoked the District Court's jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and moved for resentencing. Following the
Third Circuit's decision in
United States v. Salerno, 538
F.2d 1005, 1007 (1976), the District Court accepted jurisdiction,
found that the Parole Commission had not given Addonizio the kind
of "meaningful parole hearing" that the judge had anticipated when
sentence was imposed, and reduced his sentence to the time already
served. The judge stated that he had
"anticipated -- assuming an appropriate institutional adjustment
and good behavior while confined -- that [Addonizio] would be
actually confined for a period of approximately three and one-half
to four years of the ten-year sentence."
This "sentencing expectation" was frustrated by the Parole
Commission's subsequent adoption of new standards and
procedures.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 573 F.2d 147. Because of a
conflict with the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that § 2255
does not give district courts this type of resentencing authority,
[
Footnote 6] we granted the
Government's petition for certiorari in Addonizio's case and in the
consolidated case of two other prisoners in which similar relief
was granted. [
Footnote 7] 439
U.S. 1045.
Page 442 U. S. 184
II
We decide only the jurisdictional issue. We do not consider the
Government's alternative argument that the significance of the
changes in the Parole Commission's procedures has been exaggerated
because it always attached some weight to the character of the
offense in processing parole applications. Nor do we have any
occasion to consider whether the new guidelines are consistent with
the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 219;
[
Footnote 8] or whether their
enforcement may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution. [
Footnote 9]
III
When Congress enacted § 2255 in 1948, it simplified the
procedure for making a collateral attack on a final judgment
entered in a federal criminal case, but it did not purport to
modify the basic distinction between direct review and collateral
review. It has, of course, long been settled law that an error that
may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support
a collateral attack on a final judgment. [
Footnote 10] The reasons for narrowly limiting the
grounds for collateral attack on final judgments are well known,
and basic to our adversary system of justice. [
Footnote 11] The question in this case is
Page 442 U. S. 185
whether an error has occurred that is sufficiently fundamental
to come within those narrow limits.
Under § 2255, the sentencing court is authorized to discharge or
resentence a defendant if it concludes that it
"was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack."
This statute was intended to alleviate the burden of habeas
corpus petitions filed by federal prisoners in the district of
confinement, by providing an equally broad remedy in the more
convenient jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
United States
v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205,
342 U. S.
216-217.
While the remedy is in this sense comprehensive, it does not
encompass all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing. Habeas
corpus has long been available to attack convictions and sentences
entered by a court without jurisdiction.
See, e.g.,
28 U. S. 3
Pet.193,
28 U. S.
202-203 (Marshall, C.J.). In later years, the
availability of the writ was expanded to encompass claims of
constitutional error as well.
See Waley v. Johnston,
316 U. S. 101,
316 U. S.
104-105;
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.
S. 443. But unless the claim alleges a lack of
jurisdiction or constitutional error, the scope of collateral
attack has remained far more limited.
Stone v. Powell,
428 U. S. 465,
428 U. S. 477
n. 10. The Court has held that an error of law does not provide a
basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted "a
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice."
Hill v. United States,
368 U. S. 424,
368 U. S.
428.
Similar limitations apply with respect to claimed errors of
fact. The justification for raising such errors in a § 2255
Page 442 U. S. 186
proceeding; as
amicus here points out, [
Footnote 12] is that traditionally they
could have been raised by a petition for a writ of
coram
nobis, and thus fall within § 2255's provision for vacating
sentences that are "otherwise subject to collateral attack." But
coram nobis jurisdiction has never encompassed all errors
of fact; instead, it was of a limited scope, existing "in those
cases where the errors were of the most fundamental character, that
is, such as rendered the proceeding itself irregular and invalid."
United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55,
235 U. S. 69.
Thus, the writ of
coram nobis was
"available to bring before the court that pronounced the
judgment errors in matters of fact which had not been put in issue
or passed upon and were material to the validity and regularity of
the legal proceeding itself; as where the defendant, being under
age, appeared by attorney, or the plaintiff or defendant was a
married woman at the time of commencing the suit, or died before
verdict or interlocutory judgment."
Id. at
235 U. S.
68.
The claimed error here -- that the judge was incorrect in his
assumptions about the future course of parole proceedings -- does
not meet any of the established standards of collateral attack.
There is no claim of a constitutional violation; the sentence
imposed was within the statutory limits; and the proceeding was not
infected with any error of fact or law of the "fundamental"
character that renders the entire proceeding irregular and
invalid.
The absence of any error of this nature or magnitude
distinguishes Addonizio's claim from those in prior cases, upon
which he relies, in which collateral attacks were permitted.
Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, for
example, like this case, involved a claim that a judgment that was
lawful when it was entered should be set aside because of a later
development. The subsequent development in that case, however, was
a change in the substantive law that established that the
Page 442 U. S. 187
conduct for which petitioner had been convicted and sentenced
was lawful. To have refused to vacate his sentence would surely
have been a "complete miscarriage of justice," since the conviction
and sentence were no longer lawful. The change in Parole Commission
policies involved in this case is not of the same character: this
change affected the way in which the court's judgment and sentence
would be performed, but it did not affect the lawfulness of the
judgment itself -- then or now. Nor is
United States v.
Tucker, 404 U. S. 443,
analogous to the present case. In that case, the Court ordered
resentencing of a defendant whose original sentence had been
imposed at least in part upon the basis of convictions secured
without the assistance of counsel. But the error underlying the
sentence in
Tucker, as the Court emphasized, was
"misinformation of constitutional magnitude."
Id. at
404 U. S. 447.
We have held that the constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel is itself violated when uncounseled convictions serve as
the basis for enhanced punishment.
Burgett v. Texas,
389 U. S. 109,
389 U. S. 115.
Whether or not the Parole Commission action in this case was
constitutional, a question not presented here, there is no claim
that the action taken by the sentencing judge was unconstitutional,
or was based on "misinformation of constitutional magnitude."
Our prior decisions, then, provide no support for Addonizio's
claim that he is entitled to relief under § 2255. According to all
of the objective criteria -- federal jurisdiction, the
Constitution, and federal law -- the sentence was and is a lawful
one. And in our judgment, there is no basis for enlarging the
grounds for collateral attack to include claims based not on any
objectively ascertainable error but on the frustration of the
subjective intent of the sentencing judge.
As a practical matter, the subjective intent of the sentencing
judge would provide a questionable basis for testing the validity
of his judgment. The record made when Judge Barlow pronounced
sentence against Addonizio, for example, is entirely
Page 442 U. S. 188
consistent with the view that the judge then thought that this
was an exceptional case in which the severity of Addonizio's
offense should and would be considered carefully by the Parole
Commission when Addonizio became eligible for parole. If the record
is ambiguous, and if a § 2255 motion is not filed until years
later, it will often be difficult to reconstruct with any certainty
the subjective intent of the judge at the time of sentencing.
Regular attempts to do so may well increase the risk of
inconsistent treatment of defendants; on the other hand, the
implementation of the Parole Commission's policies may reduce that
risk.
Nothing in the statutory scheme directs sentencing courts to
engage in this task on collateral attack; quite to the contrary,
the proposed system of sentencing review would be inconsistent with
that established by Congress. The decision as to when a lawfully
sentenced defendant shall actually be released has been committed
by Congress, with certain limitations, to the discretion of the
Parole Commission. [
Footnote
13] Whether
Page 442 U. S. 189
wisely or not, Congress has decided that the Commission is in
the best position to determine when release is appropriate, and in
doing so, to moderate the disparities in the sentencing practices
of individual judges. [
Footnote
14] The authority of sentencing judges to select precise
release dates is, by contrast, narrowly limited: the judge may
select an early parole eligibility date, but that guarantees only
that the defendant will be considered at that time by the Parole
Commission. [
Footnote 15]
And once a sentence has been imposed, the trial judge's authority
to modify it is also circumscribed. Federal Rule Crim.Proc. 35 now
authorizes district courts to reduce a sentence within 120 days
after it is imposed or after it has been affirmed on appeal.
[
Footnote 16] The time
period, however, is jurisdictional, and may not be extended.
[
Footnote 17]
Page 442 U. S. 190
The import of this statutory scheme is clear: the judge has no
enforceable expectations with respect to the actual release of a
sentenced defendant short of his statutory term. The judge may well
have expectations as to when release is likely. But the actual
decision is not his to make, either at the time of sentencing or
later if his expectations are not met. To require the Parole
Commission to act in accordance with judicial expectations, and to
use collateral attack as a mechanism for ensuring that these
expectations are carried out, would substantially undermine the
congressional decision to entrust release determinations to the
Commission, and not the courts. Nothing in § 2255 supports -- let
alone mandates -- such a frustration of congressional intent.
Accordingly, without reaching any question as to the validity of
the Parole Commission's actions, either in promulgating its new
guidelines or in denying Addonizio's applications for parole, we
hold that subsequent actions taken by the Parole Commission --
whether or not such actions accord with a trial judge's
expectations at the time of sentencing -- do not retroactively
affect the validity of the final judgment itself. The facts alleged
by the prisoners in these cases do not provide a basis for a
collateral attack on their respective sentences pursuant to §
2255.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore
reversed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN took no part in the decision of this
case.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides:
"A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to
collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
"
* * * *"
"If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by
law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been
such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the
prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack,
the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or
correct the sentence as may appear appropriate."
[
Footnote 2]
At the time he imposed sentence, Judge Barlow stated:
"Weighed against these virtues, [Mr. Addonizio's record of
public service] . . . is his conviction by a jury in this court of
crimes of monumental proportion, the enormity of which can scarcely
be exaggerated and the commission of which create the gravest
implications for our form of government."
"Mr. Addonizio, and the other defendants here, have been
convicted of one count of conspiring to extort and 63 substantive
counts of extorting hundreds of thousands of dollars from persons
doing business with the City of Newark. An intricate conspiracy of
this magnitude, I suggest to you, Mr. Hellring [defense counsel],
could have never succeeded without the then-Mayor Addonizio's
approval and participation."
"These were no ordinary criminal acts. . . . These crimes for
which Mr. Addonizio and the other defendants have been convicted
represent a pattern of continuous, highly-organized, systematic
criminal extortion over a period of many years, claiming many
victims and touching many more lives."
"Instances of corruption on the part of elected and appointed
governmental officials are certainly not novel to the law, but the
corruption disclosed here, it seems to the Court, is compounded by
the frightening alliance of criminal elements and public officials,
and it is this very kind of totally destructive conspiracy that was
conceived, organized and executed by these defendants."
". . . It is impossible to estimate the impact upon -- and the
cost of -- these criminal acts to the decent citizens of Newark,
and, indeed, to the citizens of the State of New Jersey, in terms
of their frustration, despair and disillusionment."
"
* * * *"
"Their crimes, in the judgment of this Court, tear at the very
heart of our civilized form of government and of our society. The
people will not tolerate such conduct at any level of government,
and those who use their public office to betray the public trust in
this manner can expect from the courts only the gravest
consequences."
"
* * * *"
"It is, accordingly, the sentence of this Court that the
defendant Hugh J. Addonizio shall be committed to the custody of
the Attorney General of the United States for a term of ten years,
and that, additionally, the defendant Hugh J. Addonizio shall pay a
fine of $25,000. That is all."
573 F.2d 147, 154.
[
Footnote 3]
In his opinion granting Addonizio relief under § 2255 in 1977,
Judge Barlow stated:
"At the time sentence was imposed, this Court expected that
petitioner would receive a meaningful parole hearing -- that is, a
determination based on his institutional record and the likelihood
of recidivism -- upon the completion of one-third (1/3) of his
sentence. The Court anticipated -- assuming an appropriate
institutional adjustment and good behavior while confined -- that
petitioner would be actually confined for a period of approximately
three and one-half to four years of the ten-year sentence, in view
of the fact that he was a first-offender and that there appeared to
be little probability of recidivism, given the circumstances of the
case and his personal and social history. This sentencing
expectation was based on the Court's understanding -- which was
consistent with generally-held notions -- of the operation of the
parole system in 1970."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a-29a (footnotes omitted).
[
Footnote 4]
The Commission commenced using guidelines on a trial basis in
1972, and started to apply them throughout the Nation in November,
1973.
See 38 Fed.Reg. 31942 (1973). The Commission's
present guidelines are codified at 28 CFR § 2.20 (1978). The use of
guidelines is now required by statute.
See 18 U.S.C. §§
4203(a)(1) and 4206(a).
[
Footnote 5]
As Judge Aldisert noted in his opinion for the Third Circuit,
the comments made by the Parole Commission on January 13, 1977,
explaining its denial of parole are remarkably similar to the
reasons given by the trial judge at the time sentence was imposed.
The Commission stated:
"Your offense behavior has been rated as very high severity.
Your salient factor score is 11. You have been in custody a total
of 57 months at time of hearing. Guidelines established by the
Commission for adult cases which consider the above factors suggest
a range of 26-36 months to be served before release for cases with
good institutional adjustment. After careful consideration of all
relevant factors and information presented, a decision above the
guidelines appears warranted because your offense was part of an
ongoing criminal conspiracy lasting from 1965 to 1968, which
consisted of many separate offenses committed by you and
approximately 14 other coconspirators. As the highest elected
official in the City of Newark, you were convicted of an extortion
conspiracy in which, under color of your official authority, you
and your coconspirators conspired to delay, impede, obstruct, and
otherwise thwart construction in the City of Newark in order to
obtain a percentage of contracts for the privilege of working on
city construction projects."
"Because of the magnitude of this crime (money extorted
totalling approximately $241,000) its economic effect on innocent
citizens of Newark, and because the offense involved a serious
breach of public trust over a substantial period of time, a
decision above the guidelines is warranted. Parole at this time
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and promote
disrespect for the law."
573 F.2d at 153-154.
[
Footnote 6]
Bonanno v. United States, 571 F.2d 588 (CA9 1978),
cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 1136.
[
Footnote 7]
United States v. Whelan & Flaherty. In that case,
two federal prisoners filed motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and
2255 challenging their confinement. The § 2241 motion was denied by
the District Court; the Court of Appeals affirmed, 573 F.2d 147,
and the prisoners did not seek further review. In the § 2255
motion, which is at issue here, these respondents claimed that the
Parole Commission's action frustrated the intent of Judge Shaw, who
had originally sentenced them and who had since died. The case was
assigned to Judge Biunno, who took the position that "the real
issue is whether the Parole Commission's denial of parole was
arbitrary and capricious,"
427 F.
Supp. 379, 381, and concluded that it was not. The Court of
Appeals vacated that decision and directed Judge Biunno to
reconsider the case to determine whether Judge Shaw's sentencing
intent had been frustrated. Proceedings on remand have resulted in
the release of both respondents.
[
Footnote 8]
See Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d
238 (CA3 1978),
cert. granted, 440 U.S. 945 (1979).
[
Footnote 9]
See Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm'n, 594 F.2d
170 (CA7 1979).
[
Footnote 10]
See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.
S. 269,
317 U. S. 274
("Of course, the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an
appeal. . . . This rule must be strictly observed if orderly
appellate procedure is to be maintained");
Sunal v. Large,
332 U. S. 174,
332 U. S.
181-182 ;
Hill v. United States, 368 U.
S. 424.
[
Footnote 11]
Inroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence
in the integrity of our procedures.
See, e.g., F. James,
Civil Procedure 517-518 (1965). Moreover, increased volume of
judicial work associated with the processing of collateral attacks
inevitably impairs and delays the orderly administration of
justice. Because there is no limit on the time when a collateral
attack may be made, evidentiary hearings are often inconclusive,
and retrials may be impossible if the attack is successful.
See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
428 U. S. 491
n. 31;
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.
S. 145,
431 U. S. 154
n. 13.
[
Footnote 12]
See Brief for Lewisburg Prison Project as
Amicus
Curiae 112.
[
Footnote 13]
A federal prisoner is entitled to release at the expiration of
his maximum sentence less "good time" computed according to 18
U.S.C. § 4161. In addition, any prisoner sentenced to more than 5
years' imprisonment is entitled to be released on parole after
serving two-thirds of each consecutive term or 30 years, whichever
is first, unless the Commission determines that the prisoner "has
seriously or frequently violated institution rules" or that there
is a reasonable probability that he would commit further crimes. 18
U.S.C. § 4206(d). The Commission has substantial discretion to
determine whether a prisoner should be released on parole, once he
is eligible, prior to the point where release is mandated by
statute. Title 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970 ed.), in effect when
Addonizio was sentenced, provided:
"If it appears to the Board . . . that there is a reasonable
probability that such prisoner will live and remain at liberty
without violating the laws, and if in the opinion of the Board such
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the Board
may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on
parole."
Under the statute now in effect, 18 U.S.C. § 4206, the
Commission is to consider the risk of recidivism and whether
"release would . . . depreciate the seriousness of [the] offense or
promote disrespect for the law."
[
Footnote 14]
See generally S.Conf.Rep. No. 94-648, p. 19 (1976).
[
Footnote 15]
The trial court may set a defendant's eligibility for parole at
any point up to one-third of the maximum sentence imposed,
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205(a),(b); 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202, 4208
(1970 ed.). Whether the defendant will actually be paroled at that
time is the decision of the Parole Commission.
See United
States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41,
438 U. S. 47
("[T]he extent of a federal prisoner's confinement is initially
determined by the sentencing judge, who selects a term within an
often broad, congressionally prescribed range; release on parole is
then available on review by the United States Parole Commission,
which, as a general rule, may conditionally release a prisoner any
time after he serves one-third of the judicially-fixed term"). The
trial judge is precluded from effectively usurping that function by
splitting a lengthy sentence between a stated period of probation
and imprisonment: probation may not be combined with a sentence
entailing incarceration of more than six months. 18 U.S.C. §
3651.
[
Footnote 16]
Prior to the adoption of Rule 35, the trial courts had no such
authority . "The beginning of the service of the sentence in a
criminal case ends the power of the court even in the same term to
change it."
United States v. Murray, 275 U.
S. 347,
275 U. S. 358.
This rule was applied even though the change related only to the
second of a pair of consecutive sentences which itself was not
being served at the time.
Affronti v. United States,
350 U. S. 79.
[
Footnote 17]
See Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 45(b);
United States v.
Robinson, 361 U. S. 220.