The Act of Congress, of March 2, 1833, commonly called the
Compromise Act, did not, prospectively, repeal all duties upon
imports after 30 June, 1842.
Repealing only such parts of previous acts as were inconsistent
with itself, it left in force, after 30 June, 1842, the same duties
which were levied on 1 June, 1842.
Duties were directed by the act of 1833 to be levied according
to a home valuation, "under such regulations as may be prescribed
by law." This phrase embraces all regulations lawfully existing-\
at the time the home valuation went into operation, whether made
before or after the passage of the act of 1833.
And the regulations established in the 7th and 8th sections of
the act of 1832 are sufficient for the correct performance of the
duty.
The regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury,
under a power given to him by the 9th section of the act of 1832,
are also "regulations prescribed by law."
The court, in construing an act, will not consider the motives,
or reasons, or opinions, expressed by individual members of
Congress, in debate, but will look, if necessary, to the public
history of the times in which it was passed.
This case was brought up by writ of error, from the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, and
involved the construction of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1833,
commonly called the Compromise Act. Williams was the collector of
the port of Baltimore, and the plaintiffs in error were importing
merchants, who sued to recover duties paid under protest.
The title of the act was "An act to modify the Act of 14 July,
1832, and all other acts imposing duties on imports."
The 1st section provided that from and after 31 December, 1833,
in all cases where duties shall exceed twenty percentum on the
value thereof, one-tenth part of such excess shall be deducted;
from and after 31 December, 1835, another tenth part; from
Page 44 U. S. 10
and after 31 December, 1837, another tenth part; from and after
31 December, 1839, another tenth part; from and after 31 December,
1841, one-half of the residue of such excess shall be deducted; and
from and after 30 June, 1842, the other half thereof shall be
deducted.
The 2d section raised the duty upon certain woolens from five to
fifty percentum.
The 3d section was as follows:
"That until 30 June, 1842, the duties imposed by existing laws,
as modified by this act, shall remain and continue to be collected.
And from and after the day last aforesaid, all duties upon imports
shall be collected in ready money, and all credits, now allowed by
law, in the payment of duties, shall be, and hereby are, abolished,
and such duties shall be laid for the purpose of raising such
revenue as may be necessary to an economical administration of the
government, and from and after the day last aforesaid, the duties
required to be paid by law on goods, wares, and merchandise, shall
be assessed upon the value thereof at the port where the same shall
be entered, under such regulations as may be prescribed by
law."
The 4th section exempted certain articles from duty during the
interval between 31 December, 1833, and 30 June, 1842.
The 5th section exempted certain articles from duty after 30
June, 1842, and concluded as follows:
"And all imports on which the first section of this act may
operate, and all articles now admitted to entry free from duty, or
paying a less rate of duty than twenty percentum,
ad
valorem, before the said 30 June, 1842, from and after that
day may be admitted to entry, subject to such duty, not exceeding
twenty percentum,
ad valorem, as shall be provided for by
law."
The 6th and last section was as follows:
"That so much of the Act of 14 July, 1832, or of any other act
as is inconsistent with this act, shall be and the same is hereby
repealed, provided that nothing herein contained shall be so
construed as to prevent the passage, prior or subsequent to the
said 30 June, 1842, of any act or acts, from time to time, that may
be necessary to detect, prevent, or punish evasions of the duties
on imports imposed by law, nor to prevent the passage of any act
prior to 30 June, 1842, in the contingency either of excess or
deficiency of revenue, altering the rates of duties on articles
which, by the aforesaid Act of 14 July, 1832, are subject to a less
rate of duty than twenty percentum
ad valorem in such
manner as not to exceed that rate, and so as to adjust the revenue
to either of the said contingencies."
The statement of facts agreed upon in the court below was as
follows:
Page 44 U. S. 11
"In this case it is admitted that on 20 August, 1842, the
plaintiffs in this cause imported into the port of Baltimore, from
Liverpool, in England, a large quantity of goods, wares, and
merchandise, and on the same day entered the same at the custom
house in the port of Baltimore; that the following is a true entry
and list of said goods, their equality, character and value. [Here
followed a list of the goods, with their value, amounting to 8254
16
s.]"
Adjustment
Value at Baltimore per appraisement . . . . . . . . .
$44,346.00
20 percent -- am't duties paid collector under protest
8,869.20
==========
Value per invoice, � str. 8254.16.0, or . . . . . . .
$36,651.00
20 percent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7,330.20
==========
Duty per home valuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $
8,869.20
Per invoice value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7,330.20
----------
$ 1,539.00
==========
"That, on their entry, the defendant exacted and required of the
plaintiffs to pay, as and for duties on said goods, the sum of
eight thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine dollars and two cents,
which the plaintiffs first refused to pay, but not being able to
get their goods without paying the same, they did pay the same
under protest; that the value of the goods, by the true invoice
cost, adding freight and other charges, was thirty-six thousand six
hundred and fifty-one dollars ($36,651); that the home valuation in
Baltimore, as fixed by the appraisers, was forty-four thousand
three hundred and forty-six dollars, ($44,346); that the duties
upon the invoice cost and charges would have been seven thousand
three hundred and thirty dollars and twenty cents ($7,330.20)."
"It is further agreed that the duties, so collected as aforesaid
by the defendant, were exacted under and in pursuance of orders and
regulations from the Treasury Department of the government of the
United States and with the approbation, and sanction, and direction
of the President of the United States."
"And it is also admitted that the amount exacted as aforesaid by
defendant of plaintiffs and by them paid him as aforesaid was
deposited by the defendant in the Merchants' Bank of Baltimore to
the credit of the Treasurer of the United States on 29 August,
1842."
"It is also agreed that the court may infer from the facts
hereinbefore agreed upon whatever a jury might infer."
"If upon the foregoing statement of facts the court shall be of
opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the above sum
of eight thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine dollars and
twenty
Page 44 U. S. 12
cents ($8,869.20) or any part thereof, then judgment to be
entered for the plaintiffs for the amount so determined to be due,
with interest; if they should be of opinion that the plaintiffs are
not entitled to recover at all, then judgment to be entered for
defendant."
"It is further agreed that this Court enter up a judgment upon
the aforegoing case stated for the defendant and that the
plaintiffs be at liberty to appeal or prosecute a writ of error to
the like effect and purport as if the above facts were stated in a
bill of exceptions and judgment rendered upon them for the
defendant."
"And it is further agreed that either party shall be at liberty,
in the Supreme Court, to raise and argue in that Court any points
or questions which it may appear to that court could be raised upon
the aforegoing facts."
"REVERDY JOHNSON,
for plaintiffs"
"Z. COLLINS LEE,
U.S. Attorney"
"29th November, 1842"
The court below gave judgment for the defendant, and a writ of
error brought the proceedings up to this Court.
Page 44 U. S. 23
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit comes before the Court upon a case stated, and is
brought here by writ of error from the Circuit Court for the
District of Maryland.
The case in its material circumstances is this:
On 20 August, 1842, the plaintiffs in error imported into the
port of Baltimore, from Liverpool, certain merchandise particularly
set forth in the record, which, at the port of Baltimore, was of
the value of $14,346, as ascertained by appraisement at the custom
house. Upon these goods the defendant in error, who was at that
time the collector, acting in pursuance of orders and regulations
made by the Treasury Department under the direction of the
President, demanded for duties twenty percent upon the value so
ascertained, which amount was paid by the plaintiffs in error under
protest, and this action instituted against the collector for the
purpose of recovering back the money. There are some other
circumstances mentioned in the case stated, but in the view which
the Court takes of the subject it is unnecessary to recapitulate
them. The judgment of the circuit court was in favor of the
defendant.
The great question intended to be tried is whether, under the
Act of Congress of March 2, 1833, the government was authorized
to
Page 44 U. S. 24
collect any duties upon goods imported after 30 June, 1842,
without the aid of further legislation by Congress.
In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any
degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by
individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on
its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for
supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it
passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only
mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must
gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it,
when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and
looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which
it was passed.
The act in question is certainly not free from difficulty, and
this difficulty arises from its peculiar character. It is commonly
called the Compromise Act, and upon the face of it, it is evidence
that something was intended beyond the ordinary scope of
legislation. Provisions are introduced in relation to the future
action of Congress upon the tariff, which can only be accounted for
by regarding the act as a compromise of conflicting opinions on
that subject, whereby a certain scale of duties was fixed upon and
established until June 30, 1842, and certain leading principles
agreed upon by which, after that time, it was proposed to regulate
the action of Congress, and the latter as well as the former
inserted in the law in the forms of legislation. That this was the
case is abundantly manifested by several clauses in the act, and
particularly in the 6th and last section, which provides that
nothing contained in the act shall be construed to prevent the
passage, prior or subsequent to 30 June, 1842, of laws to prevent
and punish evasions of the duties imposed by law, nor to prevent
the passage of any act prior to the day last mentioned, in the
contingency of either excess or deficiency of the revenue, altering
the rates of duties on articles which, under the Act of July 14,
1832, were subject to a less rate of duty than twenty percent, in
such manner as not to exceed that rate, and so as to adjust the
revenue to either of the aforesaid contingencies.
Now it is impossible to suppose that Congress could have doubted
its power to repeal or modify afterwards the duties imposed by this
act in such manner as the public exigencies might require or its
power to pass laws to secure the collection of the revenue and to
punish anyone who might attempt to evade the duties imposed by an
act of Congress. If there had been nothing in this law out of the
ordinary course of legislative action, it would hardly have been
deemed necessary to encumber it with these reservations of power,
which nobody doubted and which Congress was continually exercising
upon every other subject. These provisions strongly mark its
peculiar character. And this association of positive and imperative
enactments with agreements for future action has perhaps
unavoidably occasioned some obscurity, and, as to some of the
clauses, made it difficult at
Page 44 U. S. 25
first sight to say whether the language was mandatory or merely
declared the principles by which it was proposed that the
legislation of Congress should afterwards be governed.
Taking this view of its general character and objects, the very
large sum ultimately involved in the controversy makes it the duty
of the Court to proceed to a closer and more careful examination of
its different provisions. It is evidently supplementary to the Act
of July 14, 1832, and repeals only so much of that act and of other
previous acts as are inconsistent with it. All of the duties,
therefore, imposed by the act of 1832, or any other law, and all
the rules and regulations provided for their collection remain in
full force unless they are inconsistent with the act in
question.
The point to be determined then is whether, after 30 June, 1842,
the collection of duties imposed by the act of 1832 or by any other
law as modified by the act of 1833 is inconsistent with the last
mentioned act. In other words, whether it repeals all previous laws
imposing duties after the time above mentioned, and if it does not,
whether it has failed to provide the necessary rules and
regulations to enable the proper officers to collect them.
The 1st section declares that all duties above twenty percent
ad valorem imposed by the act of 1832 or any previous laws
shall be reduced annually at the rate therein mentioned until 31
December, 1841, and that after that time, the one-half of the
excess above twenty percent shall be deducted, and from and after
39 June, 1842, the other half shall be deducted. Here the section
stops, and so far, therefore, from repealing the whole duties, it
by necessary implication continues a duty of twenty percent after
30 June, 1842, for the direction to deduct the excess above that
sum presupposes that a duty to that amount is imposed and to be
collected. The language used is equivalent to a positive enactment
that from and after 30 June, 1842, the goods therein mentioned
shall be charged with that duty.
The 2d section is to the same effect. For after modifying the
duties imposed by the act of 1832 in regard to the articles
mentioned in that section, it declares that these duties shall be
liable to the same deductions as are prescribed in the 1st section
-- that is to say, the excess over twenty percent remaining on 30
June, 1842 -- is to be deducted, and consequently very clearly
implying that twenty percent is to be charged and collected after
that period.
The 3d section provides that the duties imposed by existing
laws, as modified by that act, shall remain and continue to be
collected until 30 June, 1842; that after that time, all duties
shall be collected in ready money, and that such duties shall be
laid as are necessary to an economical administration of the
government and shall be assessed upon the value of the goods at the
port where they are entered "under such regulations as may be
prescribed by law."
The latter words of this section relate merely to the
regulations
Page 44 U. S. 26
by which the duties were to be collected after the time
specified, and that part of the controversy will be hereafter
considered. The points to which our attention is now directed is
whether, under this and the preceding acts of Congress, any duties
continue to be imposed -- in other words, whether they were not all
repealed by this act after 30 June, 1842. Certainly the provision
that they shall be paid in cash and assessed upon the home
valuation is no repeal. Can the provision that such duties should
be laid after the time above mentioned as were necessary to an
economical administration of the government be construed to repeal
all the duties existing at that time? We think not. The Court is
not authorized to decide upon the amount of revenue necessary to an
economical administration of the government. It is a question for
the legislature. And the provision in this clause of the section
addresses itself to future legislative bodies, and not to the
tribunals and officers whose duty it is to carry into execution the
laws of Congress. And we should hardly be justified by any rule for
the judicial interpretation of statutes in pronouncing terms like
these to be an implied repeal of all duties after the time
specified, when that construction would make the law inconsistent
with itself, by repealing, in the 3d section, the duties it had
continued in force in the 1st and 2d. On the contrary, the true
judicial inference would rather seem to be that it was supposed at
the time of the passage of the act that the modified duties
remaining imposed on 30 June, 1842, might produce the proper amount
of revenue to be levied with a view to the economical
administration of the government, but leaving it to Congress, when
the time arrived, to alter and modify them in the manner and for
the purposes specified in this act.
The 4th section merely provides that certain enumerated articles
shall be admitted to entry free from duty from December 31, 1833,
until 30 June, 1842, and therefore contains nothing that can
influence the decision of the Court.
The 5th section declares certain articles free after 30 June,
1842, and then provides that all imports on which the 1st section
operates, and all articles, which were at the time of the passage
of the law admitted to entry free from duty, or paying a less rate
of duty than twenty percent
ad valorem, before 30 June,
1842, may be admitted to entry subject to such duty, not exceeding
twenty percent as shall be provided for by law, and this section,
as well as the third, has been much relied on in opposition to the
duty claimed by the government. But is it not like the clause in
the 3d, of which we have already spoken, the language of compromise
and agreement, and addressed to those who should be afterwards
called upon to legislate on the subject, rather than to the
administrative tribunals and officers of the country? It reserves
to Congress the right to reduce the duties continued by the 1st
section below twenty percent; to impose duties on free articles,
and to
Page 44 U. S. 27
raise duties which were below twenty percent up to that amount.
Yet nobody could have supposed that Congress would not have the
power to do all this, if it thought proper to exercise it, without
any reservation of this description. The clause obviously was not
introduced to reserve power, but with a view to the manner in which
it should afterwards be exercised. As a mere question of power,
Congress undoubtedly had authority, after 30 June, 1842, as well as
before, to impose any duties it saw fit upon the articles referred
to, or upon any other imports. And it cannot be supposed that the
Congress of 1833 intended to restrict, by force of law, the rights
of a future Congress. Yet if we lose sight of the compromise
character of the act, and treat it as an ordinary act of
legislation, we should be bound to say, from the language used,
that the Congress of 1833 supposed that the modifications of the
revenue made by them could not be altered by a subsequent
legislature, unless the right to do so was expressly reserved. No
one would think of placing such a construction upon the section in
question; and the difficulty is removed when we look at it in what
we doubt not is its true light, and regard it as a compromise of
conflicting opinions, which it was believed would be afterwards
respected, when it had thus been solemnly set forth in a law. In
this view of the subject it is not repugnant to the 1st and 2d
sections, and leaves the duties retained by them in full force
after 30 June, 1842, until they should be altered by subsequent
legislation.
The 6th and last section, the contents of which have been
already stated, still more clearly marks the character of the act,
and upon a view of the whole law, the Court is of opinion that the
duties which were in force 1 July, 1842, continued in force until
they were afterwards changed by act of Congress.
This brings us to the remaining inquiry whether, after 30 June,
1842, there were any regulations in force by which the officers of
the revenue were authorized to collect the duties which had not
been repealed by the act of 1833, and this question may be disposed
of in a few words, as it rests altogether upon the 3d section, the
material parts of which have been already stated.
Before the passage of the act of 1833 there was certainly
regulations prescribed by law abundantly sufficient for the
collection of the revenue. The clause at the close of the 3d
section, which directs that after the time so often referred to,
the duties shall be assessed upon the value at the port where the
goods are entered, "under such regulations as may be prescribed by
law," can scarcely be considered as an implied repeal of all
previous regulations, for it does not confine the regulations
spoken of to such as might afterwards be enacted, but uses the
ordinary legislative language appropriate to the subject, which
naturally and evidently embraces all regulations lawfully existing
at the time the home duties went into operation, whether made
before or afterwards. They can by
Page 44 U. S. 28
no just rule of construction be held to repeal preexisting ones
nor to require any new legislation upon the subject unless it
should turn out that those already in force were insufficient for
the purpose.
But it has been urged that this clause, taken in connection with
the new rule of home valuation, then for the first time
established, and to which they refer, shows that new regulations
were contemplated inasmuch as the existing legislation upon that
subject had been directed altogether to the value at the place of
export. This argument would undoubtedly be entitled to great weight
if the subsisting rules and regulations could not be applied to
this new mode of assessing the duties. But if the regulations
already in force were applicable to this new state of things, there
is no reason for concluding that there was any intention to repeal
them, even although it should appear that they had been framed with
a view to the foreign value, and should be found more difficult of
execution and less satisfactory in the result when applied to the
value at the port of entry.
The most important regulations in relation to this part of the
case are contained in the 7th, 8th and 9th sections of the Act of
July 14, 1832. It is true that these regulations point to the value
of the goods at the place of export, and many of the powers
particularly conferred on the appraisers would not assist them in
ascertaining the value at the place of import and could not be used
for that purpose. But the substantial and manifest object of these
regulations is to enable the proper officers to determine the
amount, upon which the rate of impost fixed by law is chargeable,
and if the place with reference to which the valuation is to be
made is changed, it does not by any means follow that the powers
before given to the officers and the duties imposed upon them are
not still to be exercised and performed so far as they are
applicable to the new state of things. The object and intention of
the valuation is still the same. It is to execute the law and to
assess and collect the duty prescribed. Thus, for example, the 7th
section of the act of 1832 declares, among other things, that it
shall be the duty of the appraisers, and of every person acting as
such, by all reasonable ways or means in his power to ascertain,
estimate, and appraise the true and actual value of the goods at
the time purchased and the place from which they were imported.
This place of valuation is afterwards changed by the act of 1833,
and the duty imposed according to the value at the home port. It
would be a most unreasonable interpretation of the law to say that
the appraisers must still go through the ceremony of estimating the
value at the foreign port, or that the mere change of place
repealed the authority to value at all. In both cases the only
object of the appraisement is to ascertain the sum upon which the
duty is to be calculated, and the value of the goods at the foreign
port, or at the home port, is of no importance to the public except
in
Page 44 U. S. 29
so far as it fixes the sum upon which the collector is to levy
the rate of duty directed by law.
The 9th section makes it the duty of the Secretary of the
Treasury, under the direction of the President, from time to time
to establish such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the
laws of the United States, as the President shall think proper, to
secure a just, faithful, and impartial appraisal of all goods,
wares, and merchandises, as aforesaid imported into the United
States, and just and proper entries of such actual value thereof,
and of the square yards, parcels, or other quantities, as the case
may require, and of such actual value of every of them, and it is
made the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to report all such
rules and regulations, with the reasons therefor, to the next
session of Congress. It is very clear that any regulations within
the authority thus given, are regulations prescribed by law. And
although this section, as well as the others before mentioned,
undoubtedly contemplated the value at the foreign port, yet when
the valuation is transferred to a home port, it was still the duty
of the Secretary of the Treasury to frame rules and regulations to
ascertain the value upon which the law directed that the duty
should be assessed. For this is the only object of the
appraisement, and the only purpose for which rules and regulations
are to be framed.
Indeed, when it is evident that under the act of 1833 certain
duties, as therein modified, were continued after 30 June, 1842, it
would scarcely consist with judicial duty, to give an
over-technical construction to doubtful words, which would make the
legislature inconsistent with itself, by imposing a duty on goods
imported, and at the same time repealing all laws by which that
duty could be collected. For it cannot be supposed that Congress,
in one and the same law, could so have intended; and such an
intention ought not to be implied, unless it was apparent from
unequivocal language. We think that there are no words in the act
of 1833, from which such a design can fairly be inferred.
It appears from the case stated, that the goods in question were
subject to a duty of twenty percent under the 1st section of the
last mentioned act, and that the duties in this case were assessed
accordingly upon the value of the goods at the port at which they
entered, as ascertained and appraised under the rules and
regulations established by the Secretary of the Treasury under the
direction of the President. In the opinion of the Court, they were
lawfully assessed and collected, and the judgment of the circuit
court is therefore affirmed.
We forbear to express an opinion upon the construction of the
act of 1839, which was argued in this case, because it is
understood that other cases are standing for argument, in which
that question alone is involved, and it is proper to give the
parties an opportunity of being heard before the point is
decided.
Page 44 U. S. 30
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN.
The decision of this case turns upon the construction of the act
of 1833, and as I differ from the opinion of a majority of the
judges, I will state, in a few words, my views upon the
subject.
The 1st section of the act provides, that ten percent on the
existing duties shall be deducted annually, until the duties shall
be reduced to twenty percent.
The 3d section declares
"That until 30 June, 1842, the duties imposed by existing laws,
as modified by this act, shall remain and continue to be collected.
And from and after the day last aforesaid, all duties upon imports
shall be collected in ready money, and all credits now allowed by
law, in the payment of duties, shall be, and are hereby abolished,
and such duties shall be laid, for the purpose of raising such
revenue as may be necessary to an economical administration of the
government; and from and after the day last aforesaid, the duties
required to be paid by law on goods, wares, and merchandise, shall
be assessed upon the value thereof, at the port where the same
shall be entered, under such regulations as may be provided by
law."
The above sections can scarcely be misapprehended by anyone. The
1st section reduces existing duties, in a time and manner stated,
to twenty percent. And the 3d section provides "That until 30 June,
1842, the duties imposed by existing laws, as modified by that act,
shall remain and continue to be collected." Now the inference is
irresistible that after the above date, the duties shall not be
collected under those laws. And this is shown conclusively by the
5th section, which provides
"That all imports on which the 1st section of the act may
operate, and all articles then admitted to entry free from duty, or
paying a less rate of duty than twenty percentum
ad
valorem, before the said 30 June, 1842, from and after that
day, may be admitted to entry subject to such duty, not exceeding
twenty percentum,
ad valorem, as shall be provided by
law."
Now these are not terms of compromise, but of enactment. After
the day specified, the law declares that the duties shall not
exceed twenty percent. This, like all other laws, was liable to be
repealed, expressly or by implication. But it is law until so
repealed. The duties are not to exceed twenty percent, but that
does not establish them at twenty percent.
The 6th section of the act repeals all laws inconsistent with
it. The twenty percent duties, by this act, were to be continued
only to 30 July, 1842. After that, by the same act, the duties were
not to exceed twenty percent. Here is no repugnancy in the law,
because the one provision is to cease at the same time that the
other begins to operate. It is impossible that both enactments can
be in force at the same time. They are inconsistent with each
other. The one provision fixes a definite amount of duties, the
other an indefinite amount. "Not to exceed twenty percent" is not
twenty
Page 44 U. S. 31
percent. To give effect to this provision, further legislation
was necessary. But is it the less binding on that account? Can it
be disregarded on the ground that it was a mere matter of
compromise? It has the form and solemnity of law, and it shows,
that the act imposing duties expired on 30 July, 1842.
That this was the view of Congress, is manifest from the fact,
that in due time they passed an act regulating the duties, to take
effect from the above date, which did not receive the signature of
the executive. But this is no reason why we, by construction,
should continue in force a law which Congress had repealed. After
the above date, such duties were to be imposed "as shall be
provided by law." Now this language cannot be mistaken, and it is
inconsistent with the idea that the law imposing duties prior to
that date, should, after it, continue in force. Such a construction
is unwarranted by the 3d section and the whole tenor of the
act.
It is not for this Court to determine, whether Congress, in this
respect, acted wisely or unwisely, whether their motive was to
compromise great and conflicting interests or not, but what have
they declared to be law? It would be a restriction on the
legislative power, hitherto unknown, to say that Congress cannot
repeal a law, unless they substitute another law in its place.
If the duty law in force prior to 30 July, 1842, be inconsistent
with the provisions of the act under consideration, then the prior
law is repealed. And it is no answer to this to say, that the prior
law, in its modified form, is in force by virtue of the act of
1833. The plain and unequivocal enactments of that act repudiate
such an inference. In its modified form, the prior law, by that
act, expired in 1842. And after that, a new enactment, in my
judgment, was essential, not only to continue duties upon foreign
merchandise, but also to give effect to all the important
provisions of the act of 1833.
The 3d section, after July, 1842, abolishes all credits for
duties, and requires them "to be paid in ready money," and it
further provides "that duties shall be laid for the raising of such
revenue as may be necessary to an economical administration of the
government," and that the duties
"required to be paid by law, . . . shall be assessed upon the
value of the goods at the port where the same shall be entered,
under such regulations as may be prescribed by law."
Now everyone of these provisions was adopted with reference to
its taking effect from, and after 30 July, 1842. They all belong to
the same class. The credit for duties was to be then abolished, and
prompt payment required. From and after that day, duties were to be
laid to meet the expenditure of an economical administration of the
government. And after that day, "that duties required to be paid by
law" were to be assessed on the value of the goods at the port of
entry, and this assessment is required to be made "under such
regulations as may be prescribed by law."
Page 44 U. S. 32
These provisions cannot, by any known rule of construction, be
made to refer to laws or regulations existing at the time of their
enactment. They all refer to the future: to future laws, and
regulations prescribed by those laws.
The existing laws made no provision to carry into effect the
changes in the system, introduced by the act of 1833. Appraisers
were appointed under former acts, but there was no law or
regulation as to the home valuation. This was a most important
matter, under the new system. And it is perceived, from the
explicit provision of the act of 1833, that Congress did not intend
to leave an arrangement of so much importance to the discretion of
the Secretary of the Treasury or of the President. They declare,
that the duties shall be assessed, "under such regulations as may
be prescribed by law." This is not to be met by argument. It is
matter of law.
No one can doubt that laws in relation to duties, not
inconsistent with the act of 1833, may be considered in giving a
construction to that act. But I am yet to learn, that such laws, by
any construction, can suspend or modify the positive enactments of
the act of 1833. Such a power belongs not to the executive nor the
judiciary, but to Congress.